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Abstract
Privatisation has been a key policy in the late 20th century in many countries.
In West Germany, the federal government sold most of its corporate industrial
shareholdings to private investors between 1949 and 1989. Unlike many other
countries, West Germany did not nationalise entire industries after the Sec-
ond World War. Instead, the portfolio of public enterprises and participations
was mainly an inheritance from the Third Reich. The aim of the thesis is to
explore the causes of privatisation and the driving and delaying forces in the
privatisation process between 1949 and 1989 based on qualitative historical
documents.
After the sale of participations stemming from the war economy in the early
1950s, the conservative federal government of CDU and CSU and later the
conservative-liberal government of CDU, CSU and FDP under the Federal
Chancellors Konrad Adenauer (CDU) and Ludwig Erhard (CDU) pursued a
larger scale privatisation programme by issuing people's shares between 1959
and 1965. The programme featured social elements and aimed at the prop-
erty formation of employees and a wide dispersion of shares in the society.
In the 1970s, public enterprises expanded under a social-liberal government
of SPD and FDP, until a conservative-liberal government of CDU, CSU and
FDP under Federal Chancellor Kohl (CDU) sold most of the remaining fed-
eral participations in industrial enterprises between 1984 and 1989. The total
volume of privatisation as measured by revenues remained modest compared
to other West European countries and strong political resistance within the
government parties CDU and CSU manifested in the process.
Findings indicate a high continuity of thought and policy patterns from the
1950s until the end of the 1980s while the main reasons for privatisation shifted
slightly. In the 1950s and 1960s, privatisation was primarily motivated by ﬁs-
cal reasons  access to equity capital proved to be limited for the growing
federal enterprises. Privatisation in the 1980s was caused by re-interpretations
of the economic situation due to globally changing conditions and increased
international competition. Hence, it can be interpreted as a lagged response to
market crisis in the 1970s. Ideological shifts of paradigm did not drive privati-
sation. Rather, advocates of ordoliberalism focused on other economic reforms
in the 1950s and liberal ideas in the 1980s co-developed with privatisation pol-
itics. For many decades, public enterprises were not viewed as ineﬃcient per se
as long as they were operating in competitive markets. This perception only
began to change slowly in the 1980s.
Acknowledgments
Many people have helped and encouraged me during the process of writing
this thesis. First and foremost, I would like to thank my parents for all their
support and always believing in me.
Special thanks go to my supervisors Albrecht Ritschl and Oliver Volckart who
have been incredibly encouraging and have given me lots of constructive advice
over the years. Also, I am particularly grateful to my examiners Ray Stokes
and Max Schulze for reading this thesis carefully and critically and for provid-
ing valuable feedback.
This thesis has evolved from an interdisciplinary research project on the history
of regulation in Germany which was funded by the German Federal Ministry of
Education and Research (Gestaltung der Freiheit  Regulierung von Wirtschaft
zwischen historischer Prägung und Normierung).
The Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach has kindly granted me the permission
to use their surveys.
Last but not least, I thank my friends in and out of the LSE for various kinds
of support and for sharing good times together.
Contents
List of Tables iv
List of Abbreviations v
List of Cited Laws vii
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Privatisation in West-Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Research Question . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.3 The International Context: Privatisation around the Globe . . . 18
1.3.1 Variations, Patterns and Contexts . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.3.2 Eﬀects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.3.3 Motivations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.3.4 Political Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.4 The German Context: A Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.4.1 Between Myth and Reality: TheWirtschaftswunder and
the Question of a Structural Break . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
1.5 Methodology and Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
1.6 Hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
1.7 Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2 Public Enterprises in the Federal Setting 52
2.1 The Origins of Public Enterprises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.2 Under Allied Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.2.1 Handover of Administrative Responsibilities . . . . . . . 58
2.2.2 Saving the Holding Companies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.3 Solving the Ownership Question: Portfolio-Redistribution in
the Federal Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.4 Public Sector Size and Relevance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
2.5 The Legal Framework for Public Enterprises . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3 Orientation Phase 84
3.1 Set-up of the Federal Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.2 Portfolio Streamlining and Reorganisation . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.2.1 Winding-up of the War Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.2.2 Portfolio Reorganisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.2.3 Parliamentary Veto: The Case of Howaldtswerke . . . . . 97
3.3 Privatisation Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
3.4 The Federal State as an Entrepreneur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
i
3.4.1 Limitations and Self-Perception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
3.4.2 Price Debates 1955 and 1957 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
3.5 Financing Public Enterprises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
3.6 From Idea to Concensus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
3.6.1 Government under Pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
3.6.2 Property Formation Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
3.6.3 Dispersed Ownership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
3.6.4 Summer 1956: Inﬂation Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
4 People's Shares Privatisations 134
4.1 Conceptualisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
4.1.1 People's Shares versus Investment Funds . . . . . . . . . 136
4.1.2 The Government Draft for a Volkswagen Law . . . . . . 138
4.1.3 Federal Elections and Ministerial Reorganisation . . . . . 142
4.1.4 The Long Negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
4.1.4.1 Lower Saxony, the SPD and the Foundation Idea147
4.1.4.2 Banks and the Question of Special Shares . . . 149
4.1.4.3 The Social Question . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
4.2 Preussag: Trial Run for Volkswagenwerk . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
4.3 Volkswagenwerk: Compromise with Lower Saxony . . . . . . . . 164
4.4 Hesitation and New Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
4.4.1 Privatisation versus Consolidation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
4.4.2 People's Shares for the Private Sector? . . . . . . . . . . 174
4.5 VEBA: The Problem Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
4.6 Lufthansa Stock Market Launch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
4.7 Epilogue & Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
5 Stagnation 19661982 206
5.1 Grand Coalition: From Privatisation to Consolidation . . . . . . 208
5.2 Social-Liberal Coalition: From Reorganisation to Structural Policy216
5.2.1 Capital Requirements and the Federal Holding Idea . . . 219
5.2.2 The Public Role in VEBA and Volkswagenwerk . . . . . 231
5.2.3 Structural Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
5.2.3.1 Creating Concentration in the Oil Market . . . 234
5.2.3.2 Expansion and Diversiﬁcation . . . . . . . . . . 240
6 Retreat of the State: De-Investments 19821989 248
6.1 Bonner Wende 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
6.2 Preparatory Works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
6.2.1 The First Case: VEBA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
6.2.2 Deﬁning the Public Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
6.2.3 The Privatisation List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
6.2.4 The Special Case: Lufthansa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273
6.3 Step-by-Step De-Investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279
6.3.1 The Ownership Side . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282
7 Epilogue & Conclusion 287
7.1 Driving Forces of Privatisation Re-examined . . . . . . . . . . . 288
7.1.1 Fiscal Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288
7.1.2 Crisis Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292
7.1.3 Liberal Ideas & Paradigms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
7.1.4 Property Formation Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294
7.2 Epilogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
7.2.1 Post-privatisation Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
7.2.2 Privatisation in the 1990s: Network Industries & German
Reuniﬁcation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
7.3 The Rise and Fall of Public Enterprises in (West) Germany . . . 300
Archival Sources 315
Bibliography 316
List of Tables
1.1 Privatisation transactions 19591989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2 Annual privatisation transaction numbers and volumes between
1987 and 2012 according to Privatization Barometer . . . . . . . 9
1.3 Selected transaction values 19591989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.4 Germany's rank in privatisation by revenues . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.5 Relative privatisation revenues for selected countries 19791991 15
2.1 Share of federal enterprises in national production . . . . . . . . 73
2.2 Share of public enterprises in gross value added . . . . . . . . . 74
2.3 Share of public enterprises in gross ﬁxed capital formation . . . 74
2.4 Share of public enterprises in labour force . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
2.5 Share of public enterprises in GDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
2.6 Share of public enterprises in GDP and capital formation in
selected countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
2.7 Net value added of federal enterprises in 1983 . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.1 People's shares privatisation of Preussag 1959 . . . . . . . . . . 161
4.2 People's shares privatisation of Volkswagenwerk 1961 . . . . . . 167
4.3 People's shares privatisation of VEBA 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
4.4 People's share privatisations 19591965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
4.5 Share ownership in West Germany 1953 and 1961 . . . . . . . . 195
4.6 Share ownership in VW 1962 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
4.7 Income distribution among shareholders 1961/1962 . . . . . . . 198
4.8 Share of population with security papers 1960 . . . . . . . . . . 199
6.1 Largest public companies 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284
6.2 Participation of private investors in selected privatisations . . . 285
iv
Abbreviations
AG. . . . . . . . . . . .Aktiengesellschaft (Joint stock company)
BArch . . . . . . . . . .Bundesarchiv (German National Archive)
BGBl . . . . . . . . . .Bundesgesetzblatt (Federal Law Gazette)
BKAmt . . . . . . . . .Bundeskanzleramt (Oﬃce of the Federal Chancellor)
BMBes . . . . . . . . . .Bundesministerium für wirtschaftlichen Besitz des Bundes (Fed-
eral Ministry of the Treasury)
BMF. . . . . . . . . . .Bundesministerium für Finanzen (Federal Ministry of Finance)
BMJ . . . . . . . . . . .Bundesministerium für Justiz (Federal Ministry of Justice)
BMSchatz . . . . . . . .Bundesschatzministerium (Federal Ministry of the Treasury)
BMWi . . . . . . . . . .Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft (Federal Ministry of Eco-
nomics)
CCG. . . . . . . . . . .Control Commission for Germany
CDA. . . . . . . . . . .Christlich-Demokratische Arbeitnehmerschaft (Christian Demo-
cratic Employees), also CDU-Sozialausschüsse (CDU Social Com-
mittees)
CDU. . . . . . . . . . .Christlich Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union)
CEEP . . . . . . . . . .European Centre of Enterprises with Public Participation and of
Enterprises of General Economic Interest
CWH . . . . . . . . . .Chemische Werke Hüls
CSA . . . . . . . . . . .Christlich Soziale Arbeitnehmerschaft (Christian Social Employ-
ees)
CSU . . . . . . . . . . .Christlich Soziale Union (Christian Social Union)
DAF . . . . . . . . . . .Deutsche Arbeitsfront (German Labour Front)
Depfa . . . . . . . . . .Deutsche Pfandbriefanstalt
DIAG . . . . . . . . . .Deutsche Industrieanlagen Gesellschaft
Div. . . . . . . . . . . .Division
DKBL . . . . . . . . . .Deutsche Kohlenbergbau-Leitung
DLH . . . . . . . . . . .Deutsche Lufthansa AG
DM . . . . . . . . . . .Deutsche Mark
DP. . . . . . . . . . . .Deutsche Partei (German Party)
DSL Bank . . . . . . . .Deutsche Siedlungs- und Landesrentenbank
DVKB . . . . . . . . . .Deutsche Verkehrs-Kredit-Bank AG
EU. . . . . . . . . . . .European Union
FDP . . . . . . . . . . .Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party)
FVP . . . . . . . . . . .Freie Volkspartei (Free People's Party)
GBAG . . . . . . . . . .Gelsenberg AG
GG . . . . . . . . . . .Grundgesetz (German Constitution)
GmbH . . . . . . . . . .Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (Company with limited li-
ability)
IVG . . . . . . . . . . . Industrieverwaltungsgesellschaft GmbH
KfW . . . . . . . . . . .Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau
KGaA . . . . . . . . . .Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien (limited liability company or
partnership limited by shares
Montan . . . . . . . . .Verwertungsgesellschaft für Montanindustrie GmbH
NGCC . . . . . . . . . .North German Coal Control
NSDAP . . . . . . . . .Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei
v
OFP . . . . . . . . . . .Oberﬁnanzpräsident (Chief Finance President)
Preussag . . . . . . . . .Preußische Bergwerks- und Hütten-Aktiengesellschaft (Prussian
Mine and Foundry Company)
Preussenelektra. . . . . .Preußische Elektrizitäts AG
Reichswerke . . . . . . .Reichswerke AG für Berg- und Hüttenbetriebe
RWE . . . . . . . . . .Rheinisch-Westfälisches Elektrizitätswerk AG, since 1990 RWE
AG
SOE . . . . . . . . . . . State-owned Enterprises
Subdiv. . . . . . . . . . Subdivision
Treuarbeit . . . . . . . .Deutsche Revisions- und Treuhand-AG
UFA . . . . . . . . . . .Universum Film AG
UFI . . . . . . . . . . .UfA Film GmbH
US/UK CCG. . . . . . .US/UK Coal Control Group
VAW. . . . . . . . . . .Vereinigte Aluminium-Werke AG
VEBA . . . . . . . . . .Vereinigte Elekrtizitäts- und Bergwerks-AG
VEW . . . . . . . . . .Vereinigte Elektrizitätswerke Westfalen AG
VIAG . . . . . . . . . .Vereinigte Industrieunternehmungen AG
VW . . . . . . . . . . .Volkswagen AG
WWI. . . . . . . . . . .Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Institut (Economic Institute of the
Federation of German Trade Unions)
List of Cited Laws
Name and short Form Translation Date and Reference
Allgemeine Kriegsfolgengesetz (AKG) Act regulating the Conse-
quences of War
5.11.1957, BGBl. I
p. 1747
Aktiengesetz (AktG) Stock Company Law 6.9.1965, BGBl. I
p. 1089
Gesetz über Aktiengesellschaften und Kom-
manditgesellschaften auf Aktien (Aktienge-
setz)
Stock Company Law 30.1.1937, RGBl. I
p. 107
Bundesgesetz zur Entschädigung für Opfer
der nationalsozialistischen Verfolgung (BEG,
Bundesentschädigungsgesetz)
Act regulating the Com-
pensation of the Victims
of National Socialist Per-
secution
18.9.1953 (retroac-
tively), BGBl. I
p. 1387, passed on
29.6.1956
Betriebsverfassungsgesetz (BetrVG) Works Council Constitu-
tion Act
11.10.1952, BGBl.
I p. 681
Bundeshaushaltsordnung (BHO) Federal Budget Act 19.8.1969, BGBl. I
S. 1284
Deutsches Beamtengesetz Public Service Code
(Third Reich)
26.1.1937, RGBl. I,
p. 39
Bundesbeamtengesetz (BBG) Public Service Code 14.7.1953, BGBl. I.
p. 551
Bundesfassung des Deutschen Beamtengeset-
zes
Public Service Code (Fed-
eral Republic)
30.6.1950, BGBl.
p. 279
Deutsches Beamtengesetz Public Service Code
(Third Reich)
26.1.1937, RGBl. I,
p. 39
Einkommenssteuergesetz (EStG) Income Tax Law 16.11.1934, RGBl.
I, p. 1005
Erstes Gesetz zur Förderung des Kapital-
markts (Kapitalmarktförderungsgesetz)
Capital Market Aid Act 15.12.1952, BGBl.
I No. 53, p. 793
Gesetz über die Abwicklung der Kriegsge-
sellschaften
Act regulating the Liqui-
dation of War Companies
9.5.1960, BGBl. I
p. 303
Gesetz über die Einbringung der Steinkohlen-
bergwerke im Saarland in eine Aktienge-
sellschaft
Act governing the Estab-
lishment of the Saarberg-
werke AG
27.7.1957, BGBl. I
p. 1103
vii
Gesetz über die Eröﬀnungsbilanz in Deutscher
Mark und die Kapitalneufestsetzung (D-
Markbilanzgesetz)
DM Opening Balance
Sheet Law
21.8.1949, Geset-
zblatt der Ver-
waltung der
Vereinigten
Wirtschaftsge-
bietes 1949, p.
279
Gesetz über die Gewährung von Prämien
für Wohnbausparer (WoPG, Wohnungsbau-
Prämiengesetz)
Housing Subsidies Act 17.3.1952, BGBl. I,
p. 139
Gesetz über die Investitionshilfe der
gewerblichen Wirtschaft (Investitionshil-
fegesetz)
Investment Aid Act 7.1.1952, BGBl. I,
p. 7
Gesetz über die Mitbestimmung der Arbeit-
nehmer (MitbestG)
Act on Co-Determination 4.5.1976, BGBl. I
p. 1153
Gesetz über die Mitbestimmung der Arbeit-
nehmer in den Aufsichtsräten und Vorstän-
den der Unternehmen des Bergbaus und der
Eisen und Stahl erzeugenden Industrie (Mon-
tanMitbestG)
Act on the Co-
Determination in the
Coal, Iron and Steel
Industry
21.5.1951, BGBl. I
p. 347
Gesetz über die Regelung der Rechtsverhält-
nisse bei der Volkswagenwerk-Gesellschaft mit
beschränkter Haftung
Volkswagen Ownership
Act
9.5.1960, BGBl. I,
p. 301
Gesetz über die Überführung der Anteil-
srechte an der Volkswagenwerk Gesellschaft
mit beschränkter Haftung in private Hand
(VWGmbHÜG, VW-Gesetz)
Volkswagen Privatisation
Act
21.6.1960, BGBl. I,
p. 585)
Gesetz über Kapitalanlagegesellschaften (In-
vestmentgesetz)
Investment Company Act 16.4.1957, BGBl. I
378
Gesetz zur Abwicklung und Entﬂechtung des
ehemaligen reichseigenen Filmvermögens
Act regulating the Un-
bundling of the Reich
Film Assets
6.6.1953, BGBl. I,
p. 276
Gesetz zur Förderung der Vermögensbildung
der Arbeitnehmer (1. VermBG, Erstes Ver-
mögensbildungsgesetz, 312-Mark-Gesetz)
First Capital Accumula-
tion Act
12.6.1961, BGBl I. ,
S. 909
Gesetz zur Regelung der Rechtsverhältnisse
des Reichsvermögens und der preußischen
Beteiligungen (Reichsvermögen-Gesetz)
Reich Property Act 16.5.1961, BGBl. I,
p. 597
Gesetz zur vorläuﬁgen Regelung der
Rechtsverhältnisse des Reichsvermögens und
der preußischen Beteiligungen (Vorschaltge-
setz)
Provisional Act for Prus-
sian and Reich Property
BGBl. I, 21.7.1951,
p. 467
Haushaltsgrundsätzegesetz (HGrG) Act on Budget Principles
Reichshaushaltsordnung (RHO) Reich Budget Act 31.12.1922, RGBl.
1923 II, p. 17
Reichswirtschaftsbestimmungen Reich Economic Regula-
tions
11.2.1929, Re-
ichsministerialblatt
p. 49
Sparprämiengesetz Savings Premium Act 5.5.1959, BGBl. I,
p. 241)
Umsatzsteuergesetz (Mehrwertsteuer) Value Added Tax Act 29.5.1967, BGBl. I,
p. 545
Vertrag über die Regelung der Rechtsverhält-
nisse bei der Volkswagenwerk-GmbH und über
die Errichtung einer `Stiftung Volkswagen-
werk' (VwGmbHVtr)
Volkswagen Ownership
Contract
12.11.1959
Viertes Gesetz zur Förderung der Vermö-
gensbildung der Arbeitnehmer (4. VermBG,
Viertes Vermögensbildunggesetz, 936-Mark-
Gesetz)
Fourth Capital Accumula-
tion Act
6.2.1984, BGBl. I,
p. 201
Zweites Gesetz zur Änderung des Gesetzes
zur Überführung der Anteilsrechte an der
Volkswagenwerk Gesellschaft mit beschränk-
ter Haftung (Zweites Volkswagenänderungsge-
setz)
Second Volkswagen Law
Amending Act
31.7.1970, BGBl. I,
p. 1149
Zweites Gesetz zur Förderung der Vermö-
gensbildung der Arbeitnehmer (2. VermBG,
Zweites Vermögensbildunggesetz, 624-Mark-
Gesetz)
Second Capital Accumula-
tion Act
1.7.1965, BGBl. I,
p. 585
Chapter 1
Introduction
Privatisation has been a key policy in the 20th century in many countries
around the globe. In West Germany, privatisation started in the 1950s 
signiﬁcantly earlier than in most other European countries. The West German
federal government sold most of its shareholdings1 in the industrial sector
completely to private investors between 1959 and 1989. Federal shareholdings
in infrastructure sectors followed from 1989 onwards. The portfolio of public
shareholdings was mainly an inheritance of the Third Reich and had been
built over decades by the Reich and Prussia. Unlike other Western European
countries, Germany had not nationalised entire industries after the Second
World War.
The aim of this thesis is to explore the reasons for privatisation in West
Germany and to examine the factors which have shaped the privatisation pro-
cess. To do so, the thesis will draw on an extensive range of sources, primarily
government sources. In order to understand privatisation, the relationship
1 In the context of this thesis, public shareholdings include public enterprises and public
participations in enterprises and exclude other forms of public undertakings. Hereafter,
the term participation denotes public equity participations of all sizes in enterprises
with several owners. Public enterprises include all enterprises with a public (federal,
state and/or municipal) participation of at least 50%. The terms federal shareholdings,
federal participations and federal enterprises are used accordingly. In a large part of the
literature, the term state-owned enterprises (SOE) is used. However, the term public
enterprise is preferred in the context of this thesis in order to avoid a possible mix-
up of the general term state and the German states. Yet, the term public enterprise
should not be confused with the term public company. According to common notion,
public companies are companies which are listed at the stock exchange. In Germany,
this includes only listed joint stock companies.
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between privatisation and the understanding of the role of the state in the
economy will be analysed.
West German privatisation as a historical phenomenon has not been ex-
tensively studied. Comparative studies reﬂect the poor level of knowledge,
data sets have remained incomplete and the case of West Germany is only
rarely or superﬁcially cited despite the distinct features arising from the facts
that privatisation started earlier than in most Western European countries
and that Germany had not nationalised industries after the Second World
War. The abundant qualitative sources allow me to shed light on the poli-
tics of privatisation and explore how selling public enterprises has altered the
German economy and society.
The following sections will show that the extent of privatisation lagged
that of other Western European countries. However, I regard German privati-
sation as important and will examine it for two reasons: First, the German
economy has become one of the largest economies in the world after the Sec-
ond World War. In particular the economically successful post-war years have
been extensively studied and the state has been ascribed several roles in this
process. While some scholars emphasise the role of setting the framework for
economic activity in line with the ordoliberal view, other scholars have de-
scribed a more active and economically engaged state. However, the role of
the state as a shareholder has not received much attention. Views on public
ownership can serve as a window into more general concepts of the state and
its role in the economy. Second, the story of industrial privatisations is the
pre-story of the larger privatisations in the 1990s which include the privatisa-
tion of infrastructures such as telecommunication and postal services and the
sale of public enterprises in East Germany after reuniﬁcation. Understanding
the concepts and possible problems of privatisation prior to the 1990s can help
us to gain a better understanding of subsequent privatisation policies.
Chapter 1. Introduction 3
1.1 Privatisation in West-Germany
At the end of the Second World War, West Germany inherited a mixed port-
folio of shareholdings which had been built over decades by the Reich and
Prussia. Those state-owned shareholdings were the result of a tradition of
state-ownership before 1945. The state-owned sector was transferred from the
German Reich over to the new West German state. It consisted of a broad
range of companies especially in infrastructure, mining, energy, chemical pro-
duction, banks and insurance.
The federal government started to unwind the war economy and to un-
bundle and liquidate small-scale enterprises in the early 1950s. A number of
small shareholdings were transferred into private ownership by the Ministry
of Finance; some of the sales had been provided by the British and American
military governments. At the same time, private sector associations and liberal
politicians extensively promoted the privatisation of the large industrial federal
enterprises and participations. Larger corporate shareholdings were sold in two
privatisation waves: the ﬁrst one under the conservative-liberal governments
of Konrad Adenauer (Christian Democratic Union, CDU) and Ludwig Erhard
(CDU) between 1959 and 1965, and the second one under the conservative-
liberal Kohl government between 1984 and 1989. In between, privatisation
was interrupted, ﬁrst by a grand coalition of CDU, the CDU's sister party in
Bavaria Christian Social Union (CSU) and Social Democratic Party (SPD),
and later by a social-liberal government coalition of SPD and Free Democratic
Party (FDP).
The Adenauer and Erhard governments pursued a larger scale privatisa-
tion programme from the mid-1950s onward. Privatisation was implemented
by the Ministry of the Treasury, a small ministry which was established for
this purpose in 1957.2 Over a period of six years, the federal government
sold major shares of three large companies by issuing so-called people's shares
on domestic stock markets: the car manufacturer Volkswagenwerk GmbH
2 Unlike suggested by the name, the Ministry of the Treasury did not replace the Ministry
of Finance or the Ministry of Economics; the three ministries co-existed between 1957
and 1969.
Chapter 1. Introduction 4
(since the ﬁrst partial privatisation in 1960: Volkswagenwerk AG; since 1985:
Volkswagen AG, short: VW), the large energy holding company Vereinigte
Elektrizitäts- und Bergwerks AG (short: VEBA, since a merger with VIAG
in 2000: E.ON AG) and its energy and mining company subsidiary company
Preußische Bergwerks- und Hütten-AG (short: Preussag , since 2002: TUI
AG). In 1965, a stock market decline shortly before the federal elections damp-
ened the high expectations of buyers, political approval plummeted and forces
of inertia became stronger. In light of these developments, the new grand
coalition of CDU/CSU and SPD, which had been formed in 1966 after the
conservative-liberal coalition of SPD and FDP had been ended after just one
year, abstained from privatisation. Under a social-liberal government which
abolished the Federal Ministry of the Treasury and transferred its responsi-
bilities to the Ministry of Finance, federal enterprises expanded and took on
public tasks.
Privatisation was resumed after a change of government in 1983. The
new conservative-liberal government under Kohl pursued a programme of a
`lean government'. Between 1983 and 1989, industrial shareholdings were sold
in the form of traditional share issues, still aiming at dispersed ownership but
without social elements. This second privatisation wave included industrial
enterprises such as Salzgitter AG,3 Vereinigte Industrieunternehmungen AG
(short: VIAG, since a merger with VEBA in 2000: E.ON AG) and Industriev-
erwaltungsgesellschaft mbH (short: IVG; until 1951: Verwertungsgesellschaft
für Montanindustrie GmbH, short: Montan). By the end of 1989, most federal
industrial shareholdings had been transferred into private hands. Exemptions
were the aerospace industry and Saarbergwerke AG. Deutsche Lufthansa AG
was only passively privatised by equity increases ﬁnanced with private capital
until 1989.
1989 marks the end of the ﬁrst privatisation period in Germany. In 1990,
a second period began. This had to do with two developments: First, the
German reuniﬁcation led to the necessity to unwind the poorly capitalised,
3 Salzgitter AG was etablished in 1937 as Reichswerke Hermann Göring; renamed Reich-
swerke AG für Berg- und Hüttenbetriebe (short: Reichswerke) in 1951 and Salzgitter AG
in 1962. I will use the full name Salzgitter AG throughout the thesis in order to avoid a
confusion with the town of Salzgitter where the company is located.
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ineﬃcient East German public enterprises. Second, by 1989, most sharehold-
ings in manufacturing had been sold to private investors. Privatisation from
the 1990s onwards focused on state monopolies and infrastructures and hence
reached a new dimension. Yet, public enterprises, in particular in the area
of responsibility of the Federal Ministry of Transportation, have increased in
recent decades. In many cases, mixed ownership structures with participations
of local authorities, such as the Frankfurt airport corporation FRAPORT, have
been created. Also, at the local level there has been a recent counter-trend
with attempts to re-municipalise privatised municipal enterprises.4
Table 1.1 provides an overview of privatisation transactions on the fed-
eral level between 1959 and 1989. As can be seen, the government reduced its
shares step-by-step. The table contains mainly active privatisation transac-
tions. Not captured is the passive privatisation of Lufthansa, where the gov-
ernment reduced its stake from 100% to 56% between 1953 and 1989 by not
participating in equity increases. Between 1987 and 1989, the federal govern-
ment raised more than 180 million DM from the sale of Lufthansa subscription
rights. The passive privatisations of VW, VEBA and VIAG are incorporated
to avoid unexplained downward jumps in the government share. The initial
federal share in Volkswagen is indicated as non-existent because of the un-
clear ownership situation of Volkswagenwerk prior to privatisation. Revenues
are not recorded in those cases, where the federal government has not been
the recipient. This includes the privatisation of indirect shareholdings such as
Preussag and Deutsche Verkehrs-Kredit-Bank AG (DVKB), and VW, where
revenues have been transferred to the Volkswagenwerk Foundation.
4 Libbe, Hanke, and Verbücheln (2011).
Table 1.1: Privatisation transactions 19591989
Year Company Method Federal share before Federal share afterwards Sold shares Transaction Federal revenues
nom. value in % of nom. value in % of nom. value in % of value in % of
(mill. DM) share capital (mill. DM) of share capital (mill. DM) share capital (mill. DM) (mill. DM) fed. budget
1959 Preussag IPO, SR 75.0 100.0 23.5 22.4 81.5 77.6 118.2 n.a. n.a.
1961 VW IPO n.a. n.a. 120.0 20.0 360.0 60.0 1,029.6 n.a. n.a.
1965 VEBA IPO, SR 450.0 100.0 297.0 36.0 528.0 64.0 1,108.8 312.0 0.07
1984 VEBA PO 737.1 43.8 505.1 30.0 232.0 13.8 802.7 769.2 0.14
1985 VEBA ES, EOS 505.1 30.0 505.1 25.5 - - n.a. n.a. n.a.
1986 VIAG IPO 506,9 87.4 274,9 47.4 232.0 40.0 765.6 730.2 0.12
VW SR 240.0 20.0 240.0 16.0 - - n.a. 111.4 0.02
IVG IPO 110.0 100.0 60.5 55.0 49.5 45.0 163.4 154.9 0.03
1987 VEBA PO 505.1 25.5 - - 505.1 25.5 2,525.6 2,418.6 0.40
Treuarbeit ESO 9.3 45.0 6.3 30.5 14.5 3.0 n.a. 10.5 0.00
1988 VW PO 240.0 16.0 - - 240.0 16.0 1,142.4 1,094.0 0.17
VIAG PO 274.9 47.4 - - 274.9 47.4 1,041.3 1,223.6 0.19
DVKB IPO 75.0 100.0 56.3 75.1 18.7 24.9 36.2 n.a. n.a.
1989 Treuarbeit ESO 6.3 30.5 5.3 25.5 1.0 5.0 n.a. 4.0 0.00
DSL Bank IPO 253.4 99.0 112.7 51.0 105.0 48.0 222.9 225.7 0.03
Salzgitter AG PS 425.0 100.0 - - 425.0 100.0 2,452.0 2,452.0 0.38
Sources: Knauss (1993), p. 155, 164, 169; Erdmeier (2000), p. 114, Annual Federal Budget Reports. For the calculation of transaction values see Table 1.3.
(I)PO=(Initial) Public Oﬀering; ES=Exchange of Shares; ESO=Employee Share Oﬀer; SR=Sale of Subscription Rights; PS=Private Sale
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The step-by-step privatisation of industries led to a gradual transforma-
tion of ownership structures. In particular, the three partial people's shares
privatisations created mixed ownership structures and secured a certain role for
the state, following the German tradition of a mixed economy. In some cases,
the sale of assets were combined with an increase in equity for the companies.
The framework which was chosen for privatisation until 1965 had a strong
social dimension. The means by which the main share of federal shareholdings
was sold in the 1950s and 1960s hence became known as a social privati-
sation. Shareholdings were sold through share issues to small and medium
income households featuring ﬁnancial concessions. This was meant to attract
new classes of shareholders and stimulate wealth formation of the lower in-
come classes. People's shares privatisation can be described as a mixed form
between share issue and voucher privatisation and was aimed at dispersed
ownership. The share issue featured additional social elements to attract low-
and medium-income households. This design was embedded in a broader po-
litical programme of the conservative party which aimed at private capital
formation of small- and medium-income households  a core concept of the
conservative employees' association. People's shares became the prominent
counter-programme to socialist ideas.
The main features of people's shares were a small denomination and is-
sue conditions with social elements, such as ﬁnancial discounts for low-income
households. Purchase restrictions were imposed to limit the number of shares
per buyer and create dispersed ownership. That way, VEBA became the
world's second largest public corporation in terms of the number of share-
holders after American Telecom. In all three privatisation cases, demand for
the issued people's shares was much higher than expected.
Until 1989, privatisation attempts focused on federal enterprises which
belonged to the Erwerbswirtschaft  a term that described the market-based
proﬁt-oriented sector of an economy in contrast to the non-proﬁt sector. This
terminology was associated with a dualistic view of the economy which dif-
ferentiated between the proﬁt-oriented part of the economy which was based
on market mechanisms, driven by the proﬁt-maximizing behaviour of the indi-
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viduals, and Gemeinwirtschaft (non-proﬁt sector) as the part of the economy
which was concerned with the welfare of the society and required a continuous
form of state intervention and public entrepreneurship. The non-proﬁt sector
included all public services such as railways, energy, communication and water
supply and was inseparably connected with the idea of Daseinsvorsorge (pub-
lic provision of basic services). This term describes the idea that the state has
a duty to supply the services of general interest.5 In line with this dualistic
view, the German Federal Railway Bundesbahn and the German Federal Post
Oﬃce Bundespost were part of the federal administration as special federal
assets and not regarded as enterprises with the intention or even suitability
to make proﬁts. They were not considered for privatisation until the 1990s.
After the European liberalisation of network industries, the German Federal
Post Oﬃce and the German Federal Railway were transformed into corpora-
tions with their own legal entity in the form of joint stock companies. While
the newly created Deutsche Bahn AG remained in public hands, Telekom AG
and Post AG were partially privatised. In the case of Telekom, the federal
government abstained from participating in the equity increase when the so-
called T-Aktien (T-shares) were issued in 1996. This label was referring to the
people's shares privatisations of earlier decades.
5 See for example Ritschl (1931).
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Table 1.2: Annual privatisation transaction numbers and volumes between
1987 and 2012 according to Privatization Barometer
Year Transaction value Public oﬀers Private sales Public
oﬀers
Private
sales
Transactions
(mill. US$) (mill. US$) (mill. US$) (no.) (no.) (no.)
1987 275.60 275.60 0.00 1 0 1
1988 816.60 816.60 0.00 3 0 3
1989 1,751.00 682.60 1,068.40 2 1 3
1990 306.87 0.00 306.87 0 2 2
1991 2,877.48 240.70 2,636.78 1 45 46
1992 565.09 0.00 565.09 0 19 19
1993 563.62 0.00 563.62 0 9 9
1994 4,906.99 2,140.00 2,766.99 2 11 13
1995 1,302.98 0.00 1,302.98 0 5 5
1996 13,993.48 12,487.00 1,506.48 1 3 4
1997 6,567.40 2,480.50 4,086.90 1 8 9
1998 3,282.69 814.30 2,468.39 2 8 10
1999 13,356.78 10,365.50 2,991.28 2 7 9
2000 19,373.29 17,391.80 1,981.49 2 6 8
2001 4,571.34 656.90 3,914.44 1 4 5
2002 420.98 0.00 420.98 0 2 2
2003 1,322.52 1,221.40 101.12 1 2 3
2004 15,440.70 6,321.48 9,119.22 2 11 13
2005 3,632.29 3,240.73 391.56 2 3 5
2006 10,546.74 1,652.20 8,894.54 1 6 7
2007 9,163.06 3,258.50 5,904.56 2 7 9
2008 10,177.67 0.00 10,177.67 0 7 7
2009 6,814.53 0.00 6,814.53 0 2 2
2010 5,543.79 0.00 5,543.79 0 8 8
2011 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 0
2012 2,465.92 1,224.27 1,241.65 1 10 11
Total 140,039.39 65,270.08 74,769.31 27 186 213
Source: Privatization Barometer, http://privatizationbarometer.com/ (last access:
March 2016).
Table 1.2 provides an overview of privatisation transactions and volumes
in Germany between 1987 and 2012 according to the database Privatization
Barometer. The data from Privatization Barometer suggest that privatisation
only really picked up in the mid-1990s. The number of private sales in contrast
to public oﬀers was exceptionally high between 1991 and 1949. This reﬂects the
sale of East German enterprises by the Treuhandanstalt, a government agency
which had been assigned the task to unwind and privatise the East German
economy. The relatively high volume in 1989 reﬂects the sale of Salzgitter AG.
However, there are some problems associated with the Privatization Barom-
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eter database. First, the database does not list accessible and suﬃcient sources
for the data input. Second, the methodology of the calculation of transaction
values is not clear. It is not indicated whether the ﬁgures are nominal or
adjusted. Third, the database contains no data for Germany prior to 1987, al-
though privatisation transactions took place. And fourth, my own calculations
(see Table 1.3) ﬁnd considerably higher transaction values for the privatisa-
tions of VEBA and VIAG in 1987 and 1989 than those which are listed in the
database.
These problems matter because according to information provided by Pri-
vatizationbarometer6 and World Bank7, Privatization Barometer is the oﬃcial
provider for the World Bank and the OECD of data on European countries.
It also provides information on privatisation revenues for the DICE database
of the CESifo.8
In addition to these issues, there is the question of how to deal with pas-
sive privatisations through equity increases. The capital raised in the Telekom
AG stock market launch did not involve a sale of government shares. The
federal government did not participate in the equity increase and sold its sub-
scription rights, but did not receive revenues other than that. Instead, funds
generated through the equity increase in Telekom's IPO remained within the
enterprise. Despite this, the Telekom AG public oﬀering is listed with a trans-
action value of US$ 12,487 million in the database. Listing passive privati-
sations can lead to misinterpretations when the transaction volumes are used
as proxies for government revenues or revenues from privatisation, since the
transaction does not necessarily mean funds for the government but for the
enterprise itself. If equity raised by passive privatisations is meant to be in-
cluded in the transaction volumes, the privatisation volume before 1990 is
relatively underestimated because the passive privatisation and reduction of
the government stake in Lufthansa from 100% to almost 50% between 1953
and 1989 is missing in the Privatization Barometer database. Another issue is
6 http://www.privatizationbarometer.com/about.php (last access: March 2016).
7 https://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/privatization-database (last access:
March 2016).
8 http://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/facts/DICE/Public-Sector/
Public-Enterprises-Privatisation.html (last access: March 2016), see also
CESifo (2010).
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that a signiﬁcant number of Telekom and Post shares were sold to the German
state-owned development bank Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) (Recon-
struction Credit Institute) in 1997, 1998 and 1999. This created revenues for
the federal government, but the stakes remained indirectly state-owned owned.
Before Privatization Barometer was launched, data were mainly provided
by the OECD. The reports published in 1999 and 2001 diﬀer signiﬁcantly with
respect to sales volumes. The Telekom AG share issue from 1996 seems to
be included in the 2000 report but not in the 2002 report, since the 2000
ﬁgure of 1996 is exceptionally high, whereas the 2002 ﬁgure is not.9 Most
quantitative studies which use privatisation revenues or volume as a variable
use either of the named sources.10 Hence, it can be assumed that these papers
do contain some considerable inaccuracies in the case of Germany. They seem
to structurally underestimate the privatisation volume prior to 1990 while
government revenues in the 1990s and 2000s can be structurally overestimated,
depending on the source.
My own calculation of privatisation transactions in the years 1959 to
1989 is shown in Table 1.3. Transaction values have been calculated as the
market value of privatised shares. In the case of Salzgitter AG, the transaction
value is the sales price. The data show that early privatisation volumes were
larger than the Privatizationbarometer suggests and deserve more attention
than they have received to date.
9 For a comparison, see tables in OECD (2000), p. 46, and OECD (2002), p. 46.
10 These include Schneider (2003), Clifton, Comin, and Fuentes (2003), Clifton, Comin, and
Fuentes (2006) and many more.
Table 1.3: Selected transaction values 19591989
Year Company Nom. value of sold Issue price Transaction value Privatization Barometer
shares (mill. DM) per 50 DM share (mill. DM) (mill. US $) (mill. US $)
1959 Preussag 81.5 72.5 118.2 28.3 -
1961 VW 360.0 143.0 1,029.6 259.4 -
1965 VEBA 528.0 105.0 1,108.8 276.9 -
1984 VEBA 232.0 173.0 802.7 294.7 -
1986 VIAG 232.0 165.0 765.6 329.5 -
1986 IVG 49.5 165.0 163.4 81.3 -
1987 VEBA 505.1 250.0 2,525.6 1,381.5 275.6
1988 VW 240.0 238.0 1,142.4 676.2 675.8
1988 VIAG 274,9 210.0 1,041.3 616.3 129.7
1989 Salzgitter AG 425.0 n.a. 2,452.0 1,307.2 1068.4
Sources: Knauss (1993), p. 155169; Erdmeier (2000), p. 114, Annual Federal Budget Reports.
All values are in current prices. Exchange rate: ﬁrst day of the month of transaction.
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Such database errors can have an impact when privatisation volumes of
several countries are compared. Also, diﬀerent types of variables for revenues
and diﬀerent time frames can have a strong impact on rankings. The leading
role of the UK for example becomes weaker over time when other countries
followed.
Table 1.4 provides accumulated revenues and Germany's ranking in dif-
ferent country samples for diﬀerent periods from ﬁve papers. While all papers
see Germany on a high rank in terms of absolute privatisation volumes, Ger-
many is ranked low in terms of privatisation volume per head or relative to
GDP:
Table 1.4: Germany's rank in privatisation by revenues
Paper Roberts and Saeed (2012) Zohlnhöfer and Obinger (2006) Bortolotti (2004) Megginson (2005) Clifton, Comin, and Fuentes (2006)
Source PB OECD 2002 PB Privatisation Int. PB PB
Time period 19882006 19902001 19772003 19771999 19771992 19932003
Country sample OECD OECD Europe 34 countries, mixed EU 14 EU 14
Unit mill UD $ (2000) mill US $ (current) mill US $ (current) mill US $ (current) mill US $ (current) mill US $ (current)
Volume 113,600 21,711 80,658 71,577 6,593.00 71,430
- Rank 4 of 50 7 of 21 3 of 23 6 of 34 3 of 14 2 of 14
Per head 265 949
- Rank 20 of 21 13 of 14
In % of GDP 1.22 4.00 3.54 3.70
- Rank 20 of 21 21 of 23 23 of 34 13 of 14
Sources: Roberts and Saeed (2012), p. 55; Zohlnhöfer and Obinger (2006), p. 32; Bortolotti (2004), pp. 1011; Megginson (2005), p. 92 .
Clifton, Comin, and Fuentes (2006), p. 743.
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Only a few country comparisons go back further than the 1980s or even
the 1990s. Table 1.5 ranks countries for the period before 1990:
Table 1.5: Relative privatisation revenues for selected countries 19791991
Country Privatisation period Accumulated privatisation revenues as
a percentage of average annual GDP
over the privatisation period
UK 197991 11.9
Portugal 198991 4.3
France 198391 1.5
Italy 198391 1.4
Sweden 198790 1.2
Netherlands 198791 1.0
Austria 198790 0.9
West Germany 198490 0.5
Spain 198690 0.5
Source: Bös (1993), p. 100, based on Stevens (1992), p. 6.
Table 1.5 clearly shows the pioneering role of the UK. In terms of revenues
relative to GDP, West Germany and Spain rank last. However, the paper does
not list its sources so the data could not be veriﬁed.
Although comparative studies can vary due to the named diﬃculties, one
characteristic of German privatisation becomes evident: Compared to other
countries, in particular the UK, German privatisation looks more like a con-
tinuous process which has started comparatively early, before the emergence
of a neo-liberal, pro-market Zeitgeist and global privatisation waves. Maybe it
has never received the attention which other countries have attracted because
it was so relatively undramatic.
1.2 Research Question
At the end of the Second World War, Germany's portfolio of public enterprises
was similar to that of other Western European countries. In the ﬁrst legislation
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period from 1949 to 1953, the German government had already decided to start
selling smaller shareholdings from its portfolio. Privatisation was then pursued
on a larger scale in the third and fourth legislation period from 1957 to 1965.
On the one hand, this is surprising and it raises the question of what inspired
politicians in the 1950s and 1960s to start selling industrial enterprises, while
most other European governments were nationalising entire industries. On
the other hand, privatisation is unsurprising because it seems to ﬁt well into
the idea of a social market economy where the role of the state is to set the
framework for economic activity instead of participating in the economy itself.
This thesis analyses privatisation politics in West Germany between 1949
and 1989 against this background and the tension which it creates. It aims
to identify driving and delaying forces of privatisation, looks into the political
decision-making and negotiation process and evaluates the nature of change
which privatisation brought about.
Several dimensions are of interest in order to fully capture the privatisa-
tion phenomenon. A ﬁrst dimension is the actual nature of change which the
term privatisation captures. Research distinguishes between two main forms of
privatisation: formal and substantial privatisation. Formal privatisation means
the shift of government agencies and public corporations into companies regu-
lated by corporate law, but still owned by the state. Substantial privatisation
means that the ownership of assets of a company which is already regulated by
corporate law is transferred from state to private investors. This is the form
of privatisation usually referred to when speaking about privatisation. Formal
privatisation is regarded as the ﬁrst step towards `real' privatisation. It has,
however, been controversial to speak of formal privatisation, since the term is
misleading.11 Both forms of privatisation include a broad range of varieties.
State-owned services can be run more or less directly and strictly by the state.
Substantial privatisation can occur in diﬀerent grades, from small partial sales
to keeping controlling shares to full privatisations.
Ownership itself is not a binary variable which takes either the value
`state' or `private'. State ownership can come in various forms on a contin-
11 Bös (1993), p. 96.
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uum with more or less state involvement, so there are diﬀerent qualities of
state ownership with and without private participation. Beyond ownership,
the state can control private companies through regulatory measures. Hence,
before looking at privatisation, it is necessary to understand how the state it-
self perceived its role as an enterprise owner, whether it behaved like an active
entrepreneur or remained relatively passive in the background and exercised
little control over the management. This thesis focuses on substantial privati-
sation. Hence, the changes in ownership and control structures following the
sale of assets will be examined. Central questions are: Was there a desired
outcome concerning the new structures? And if there was, how did the state
implement the desired outcome and how does it compare to the actual out-
come? What was the role of particular interests in this process? And since
privatisations in the 1950s and 1960s were aimed at dispersed ownership: how
was the reduction in state control meant to be replaced, given that dispersed
ownership can lead to monitoring problems?
A second dimension which is closely connected with forms of privatisa-
tion is the role of the state in the economy. A central question is whether
privatisation was primarily stimulated by a shift in paradigms. With the ex-
ample of the UK policy under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in mind,
it is often assumed that privatisation was the result of a change of economic
ideas towards a more market-based approach. Whether such ideas, for ex-
ample in the form of German economic concepts such as ordoliberalism and
the social market economy, played a signiﬁcant role remains to be examined.
Ordoliberalism was a speciﬁc form of German liberalism which developed in
the 1930s. Beyond purely idealogical factors, ﬁscal factors could have been of
major importance.
A third dimension is the analysis of political processes. What were the
conditions which created change? And in particular: was external pressure
necessary or was privatisation more internally motivated? Factors which need
to be taken into account are voters and the organisation of the political system,
both on the state and party level. The central question focus on how political
coalitions were formed and the role which federalism played.
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Federalism can be regarded as an important factor in two ways. First,
the states of Germany have a signiﬁcant impact on the federal decision-making
process through the second chamber, the Bundesrat. Second, the states had
considerable stakes in enterprises themselves. The Landesbanken, the banks
founded and owned by the states of Germany, which were established after the
Second World War acquired considerable portfolios of participations. Each
state followed its own policy of state ownership and privatisation, based on
the respective political majorities, so that a collective examination is rather
diﬃcult. The federal state will be the focus of this thesis because this is where
the most signiﬁcant political debates took place and where privatisation began.
However, some enterprises had mixed ownership structures with participation
of one or more German states and the federal state. Hence, privatisation on
the federal level had a possible impact on the state level. One reason why the
German states were possibly more reluctant to privatise could be that public
enterprises were more important for the states as instruments for regional and
structural policy. One example for such a long-term strategic participation is
the 20% stake of Lower Saxony in VW.
1.3 The International Context: Privatisation
around the Globe
Privatisation has been one of the key policies in diﬀerent parts of the world
since the 1970s and has been discussed intensely in both politics and academia.
It has received much attention following the liberalisation and privatisation
policies in Western Europe and the breakdown of the communist regimes in
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Although a global phenomenon, varia-
tions in the timing and intensity of privatisation across the world and Western
Europe have occurred. Scholars have tried to identify and explain those dif-
ferent outcomes.
In Western Europe, privatisation has often been seen in the contexts of a
new neo-liberal paradigm, the European market liberalisation and ﬁscal chal-
lenges from the European market integration. In post-communist countries,
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privatisation has a stronger political connotation. There, privatisation of pub-
lic enterprises has functioned as a core element of the transition of socialist
planned economies into market-based economies. Approaches and outcomes of
privatisation varied considerably between countries. The comparative political
reform literature has attempted to explain these diﬀerent results by drawing
on interest group theories and the extremely diﬀerent privatisation methods
which have been imposed. A typical approach has been to explain privati-
sation in terms of regulatory capture in post-communist countries with weak
governments and strong interest groups. For Western Europe, capture theories
have played a more marginal role.
The literature on privatisation is vast. General research covers four dif-
ferent areas which will be examined in more detail in the next sections: A
ﬁrst group of studies examines patterns of privatisation and correlations with
economic and political variables. These variables are often derived from or
related to theoretical considerations about factors which might play a role in
the privatisation process. A second group focuses on the eﬀects of privatisa-
tion. A third group examines motivations for privatisation based on empirical
ﬁndings, and a fourth group analyses the political process of privatisation.
1.3.1 Variations, Patterns and Contexts
Previous research has noted that there is a huge variability of privatisation
policies and experiences across and within countries, even within a relatively
small and homogeneous group of countries such as the `old' European Union
before its enlargement in 2004. For example, UK and France were the early
privatisers, in Scandinavian countries, an active policy of state-ownership has
been maintained, where companies are organised in private law form12 and have
to face market competition  similar to Germany  and Spain turned towards a
gradual de-investment policy in the 1990s.13 Similarly, privatisation in Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union varies signiﬁcantly between countries.
Experiences range from mass voucher privatisations in Czechoslovakia and
12 Companies which are governed by private law, such as stock company law, are referred
to as private law companies or companies in private law form.
13 Clifton, Comin, and Fuentes (2003) and Clifton, Comin, and Fuentes (2006).
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early post-communist Poland to share oﬀerings in later post-communist Poland
and to asset and block sales in Hungary, East Germany and Russia.14 Despite
the variability, research has identiﬁed typical patterns of privatisation and the
context in which it is more likely to occur. This can help to identify what
motivated privatisation in the ﬁrst place. A small group of studies focuses
on how privatisation is implemented, a larger group looks at factors which
determine the privatisation volume.
Jones, Megginson, Nash, and Netter (1999) ﬁnd that governments often
sell large fractions of public enterprises, but not entire enterprises through stock
market oﬀering. This procedure is called a share issue privatisation (SIP). Most
SIPs are ﬁxed-price oﬀerings. Often, shares are sold at discounted prices and
preferably oﬀered to domestic and retail investors. In most cases, oﬀerings
are oversubscribed. Typically, a fraction of shares is sold to employees, often
with favourable terms such as discounts and lenient payment schedules. In
most cases, the government keeps enough shares to be still able to control the
privatised company. Furthermore, it is shown that initial returns capturing
underpricing are positively correlated with the fraction of the ﬁrm's capital
sold and the degree of income inequality in a country. This suggests that
underpricing is used to attract the support of middle class voters. Those
ﬁndings have been conﬁrmed by other studies.15
Given that privatisation often occurs gradually, the question of the choice
of companies remains: What factors determine the selection of companies that
are privatised ﬁrst? One theory is that it is the companies with the worst eco-
nomic performance that the state tries to sell oﬀ ﬁrst for ﬁscal reasons. Yet,
previous research has shown that the opposite seems to be true: privatisation
appears to be more likely for companies with a good economic performance.
Dinc and Gupta (2011) ﬁnd that in India, the likelihood of a company being
privatised early increases with the proﬁtability. It decreases with the size of the
wage bill, when the company is located in regions with strong political compe-
tition between parties and when a company is located in the home state of the
14 As a more recent example, Bayliss (2005) ﬁnds signiﬁcant diﬀerences between privatisa-
tion policies and outcomes in Serbia and Bosnia Herzegovina.
15 For a survey of early empirical studies on privatisation see Megginson and Netter (2001),
Chapter 3: How do countries privatise, pp. 68101.
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minister in charge. They suggest that a high proﬁtability is correlated with
higher privatisation revenues and is therefore more favourable for governments
in the short-run.
The second group of studies looks at determinants of the privatisation
volume. Transaction volumes or revenues from privatisation have been widely
used to measure the level of privatisation. However, the diﬀerent forms of
privatisation, particularly formal and substantial privatisation, make it diﬃ-
cult to measure. Transaction volumes and revenues capture only substantial
privatisation and neglect formal privatisation. Yet, the advantage of this vari-
able is that, in contrast to simple measures such as the number of privatised
ﬁrms, it captures partial privatisation. While they do not identify causali-
ties, those studies have found a number of factors which are correlated with
the likelihood of privatisation. The identiﬁed factors give us an idea about
the potential motivations and intentions which may have played a role in the
privatisation decisions of a country. They describe typical contexts in which
privatisation occurs and can point to potential causes, accelerating and de-
laying forces within the process. It should be noted that those studies are
based on simpliﬁcations and often incomplete datasets. For example, they do
normally not account for the fact that there are huge variations in the nature
of state ownership prior to privatisation and also in the nature of the relation-
ship between state and ﬁrms after privatisation, but rather treat private and
state-owned as a binary variable.
Most of the factors which have been studied have been derived from po-
litical and economic theories of privatisation. Factors that have been identiﬁed
as being correlated with the timing and intensity of privatisation can be subdi-
vided into three groups: economic, political and institutional factors. The ﬁrst
group consists of economic and ﬁscal factors. Regarding the general economic
situation of a country, two theoretical hypotheses exist: The crisis hypothesis
goes back to Rodrik (1996) who suggests that economic crisis causes reforms.
On the other hand, favourable economic indicators might lead to more pri-
vatisation by increasing the ability of a country to attract capital. Obinger,
Schmitt, and Zohlnhöfer (2013) ﬁnd a strong negative eﬀect between GDP and
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privatisation which supports the crisis hypothesis. Also, Belke, Baumgärtner,
Schneider, and Setzer (2007) ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of unemployment on pri-
vatisation for a sample of 22 OECD countries between 1990 and 2001, and a
negative eﬀect of economic growth. The initial level of state ownership seems
to be positively associated with privatisation, as Zohlnhöfer, Obinger, and
Wolf (2008) and Obinger, Schmitt, and Zohlnhöfer (2013) show. Zohlnhöfer,
Obinger, and Wolf (2008) also ﬁnd that heavily regulated economies tend to
privatise more. Fiscal conditions as measured by the debt ratio of a country
have been identiﬁed as a main driver of privatisation in Western Europe in
previous studies. Bortolotti and Milella (2006), Bortolotti and Pinotti (2008),
Bortolotti, Fantini, and Siniscalco (2003) and Belke, Baumgärtner, Schneider,
and Setzer (2007) ﬁnd a negative eﬀect of budget surpluses on privatisation.
Yarrow (1999) argues that privatisation is rather driven by ﬁscal pressure and
the demand for public expenditures than by ineﬃciencies of public enterprises.
However, there can be an indirect eﬀect since loss-making public enterprises
can have a detrimental eﬀect on a country's balance sheet. Obinger, Schmitt,
and Zohlnhöfer (2013) test for the impact of the European Monetary Union
and ﬁnds it to be positively associated with privatisation. This ﬁnding is likely
related to a political pressure to reduce debt and raise short-term revenues be-
fore the European Monetary Union became eﬀective. Also, globalisation and
international economic integration in general seem to have been driving pri-
vatisation. Empirical research has suggested that within Europe, the ﬁscal
eﬀect of privatisation is stronger and more important in the South.16 The
hypothesis that European market integration mattered is supported by Belke,
Baumgärtner, Schneider, and Setzer (2007). Their results indicates that eco-
nomic integration in OECD countries is positively associated with privatisa-
tion.
The second group comprises factors of a political nature. Two subgroups
of factors have been studied: partisan eﬀects and political enforceability. Par-
tisan theory assumes that the political orientation of the government can de-
termine its privatisation strategy. The hypothesis that government prefer-
16 Jeronimo, Pagán, and Soydemir (2000).
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ences and aﬃliations have an inﬂuence on privatisation goes back to Shleifer
and Vishny (1994) who established the theoretical prediction that conserva-
tive governments are more likely to privatise. Empirically, this hypothesis that
privatisation is more likely under right-wing governments has been widely con-
ﬁrmed.17 Yet, some authors argue that this partisan inﬂuence has signiﬁcantly
decreased in the Western world. Bortolotti, Fantini, and Siniscalco (2003) ﬁnd
that the positive partisan eﬀect for 48 countries between 1977 and 1999 dis-
appears for OECD countries. Zohlnhöfer, Obinger, and Wolf (2008) ﬁnd no
partisan eﬀect for OECD countries between 1990 and 2000 and argue that par-
tisanship only matters when the economic circumstances allow for this. When
facing economic problems, left-wing governments tend to privatise more. Ob-
inger, Schmitt, and Zohlnhöfer (2013) however suggest that the partisan di-
mension has continued to matter in OECD countries and was even reinforced
by European integration. While secular-conservative parties have a positive 
and left-wing parties a negative  eﬀect on privatisation, they ﬁnd no signif-
icant impact of Christian Democratic parties which are ideologically located
between the two poles. Liberalisation and privatisation are often seen as twin
policies, with liberalisation eventually driving privatisation. Belloc, Nicita,
and Sepe (2014) disentangle the two policies. They study network industries
in OECD countries and ﬁnd that while all political camps have pursued both
policies, privatisation is more likely under right-wing governments and liber-
alisation more likely under left-wing governments, which hints at ideological
diﬀerences. Hence, the relationship between liberalisation and privatisation
might be more complex than the hypothesis that market liberalisation drives
privatisation suggests. Also, the negative eﬀect of regulation on privatisation
could mean that public enterprises are replaced by more regulation. Factors
representing political enforceability measure the government's ability to pursue
a given programme within the constraints of a political system. The hypothe-
sis that a government's ability to implement its desired policy has an impact
on privatisation goes back to Alesina and Drazen (1989) and Spolaore (2004)
17 See for example Opper (2004) for transition economies, Banerjee and Munger (2004) for
developing countries, Bortolotti and Pinotti (2008), Saeed (2012) and Belke, Baumgärt-
ner, Schneider, and Setzer (2007) for OECD countries.
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who show that lower political cohesion in a country delays reform with dis-
tributional consequences. They explain their ﬁndings by a war of attrition
between the political actors. Veto player theory focuses on the political re-
sistance which needs to be overcome in order to implement change. Tsebelis
(2002) argues that a higher number of agents with veto power complicates and
slows down the political decision process. Consistent with that, it has been
found that political fragmentation is signiﬁcant in explaining the variation in
privatisation. Bortolotti, Fantini, and Siniscalco (2003) ﬁnd that transaction
volumes are higher in democracies than in autocracies. Obinger, Schmitt, and
Zohlnhöfer (2013), Bortolotti and Pinotti (2008), Zohlnhöfer, Obinger, and
Wolf (2008) and Belke, Baumgärtner, Schneider, and Setzer (2007) ﬁnd that
political fragmentation in democracies signiﬁcantly delays privatisation. For
example, privatisation is stronger in single-party governments than in coali-
tions, and in majoritarian systems than in consensus systems under propor-
tional electoral rules where more veto players have to agree. Although increas-
ing the number of veto players, a federal setting has also been found to have a
positive eﬀect on privatisation, which can be explained by tighter control and
budget constraints. Obinger, Schmitt, and Zohlnhöfer (2013) ﬁnd a positive
eﬀect of government incumbency, which means that privatisation takes time
and governments who stay in power longer are in a better position to sell oﬀ
public enterprises. There is evidence from Belke, Baumgärtner, Schneider, and
Setzer (2007) and Zohlnhöfer, Obinger, and Wolf (2008) that union strength
and industrial conﬂict are negatively associated with privatisation, possibly
weakening a government's ability to implement unwanted policies. However,
privatisation has also been regarded as an instrument to weaken unions, as for
example Vickers and Wright (1989) argue in the case of the UK.
The third group comprises institutional factors. It has been suggested
that a higher quality of institutions should be positively associated with pri-
vatisation revenues. Consistent with this, Bortolotti, Fantini, and Siniscalco
(2003) and Adams and Mengistu (2008) ﬁnd a positive relationship between
privatisation and institutional quality as measured by government indicators.
Biglaiser and Brown (2003) ﬁnd a remarkable variation of privatisation in Latin
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American countries which they partially link to the idea that new governments
might ﬁnd it diﬃcult to privatise as new legislation could be needed ﬁrst. Bor-
tolotti, Fantini, and Siniscalco (2003) ﬁnd evidence that privatisation volumes
are smaller in civil-law countries. They explain these results with the poorer
protection of shareholders, stronger banks and less developed ﬁnancial markets
in such countries. Research has suggested a positive association between ﬁnan-
cial market development and privatisation while establishing that privatisation
revenues are higher in countries with well-developed markets.18 The question
is the direction of this relationship. Roberts and Saeed (2012) suggest that in
developed and developing countries, a well-functioning ﬁnancial system has a
positive eﬀect on privatisation, whereas in transition economies, privatisation
stimulates ﬁnancial markets. The idea is that well developed ﬁnancial mar-
kets should have an impact on the conditions for a successful implementation
of privatisation and should therefore be positively associated with revenues.
However, Bortolotti, De Jong, Nicodano, and Schindele (2007) show that in
developed markets, share issue privatisations have a positive impact on stock
market liquidity, and that spillover eﬀects also improve the liquidity of private
companies. If privatisation has a positive impact on stock market development,
privatisation can be used for this purpose. Yet, the relationship between pri-
vatisation and ﬁnancial development is more complex.
1.3.2 Eﬀects
A second strand of literature focuses on the eﬀects of privatisation. Theoretical
economic considerations suggest that privatisation should have a positive eﬀect
on ﬁrm performance. In economic theory, state-ownership is connected with
issues such as incentive problems, asymmetric information and soft budget
constraints. Based on this view, research has examined the eﬀects of privati-
sation on ﬁrm performance. The empirical results are mixed and indicate that
the success of privatisation depends widely on the circumstances, conditions
and implementation of privatisation. Some studies carefully support the view
18 See for example Megginson and Netter (2001), Boubakri and Hamza (2007), Megginson,
Nash, Netter, and Poulsen (2004) and Bortolotti and Pinotti (2008).
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that privatisation generally leads to an improvement of the operating and ﬁ-
nancial performance of the selected companies by increasing output, operating
eﬃciency, proﬁtability capital investment spending, dividend payments and
decreasing leverage. There has been evidence of an increase in performance
indicators and employment of privatised ﬁrms.19 But it has also been suggested
and empirically supported that competition is more important than ownership
for ﬁrm performance.20
However, studying the eﬀects of privatisation on ﬁrm performance has
massive methodological ﬂaws. First, it is likely that there is a selection bias.21
Since research indicates that the best ﬁrms are often privatised ﬁrst,22 there
can be an overestimation of positive eﬀects. Another problem is the lack of
counterfactuals. We simply do not know what would have happened without
privatisation, even more so when privatisation is part of a broader transfor-
mation process.23 Another problem is the question of what to measure. In
the 1990s, research measuring the restructuring of privatised ﬁrms was mainly
based on traditional ﬁnancial and performance indicators. Studies have led
to vary mixed results.24 More recently, scholars have developed alternative
measures, accounting for the fact that traditional data might not capture the
full eﬀects. Bayliss (2005) distinguishes between defensive (cost-cutting) re-
structuring such as plant closures and deep (strategic, or revenue-enhancing)
restructuring such as the discovery of new markets. Based on this categorisa-
tion, Carlin, Fries, Schaﬀer, and Seabright (2001) ﬁnd an increase in restruc-
turing directed at new markets after privatisation. In line with that, Bayliss
(2005) ﬁnds that ﬁrms in Serbia and Bosnia Herzegovina were more likely to
increase their product ranges and suppliers and to increase investments after
privatisation.
19 For a survey on the literature on privatisation eﬀects until 2005 see Megginson (2005),
pp. 4446; 4950; 107; 111112; 122123.
20 For a survey on the literature on this until 2005 see Megginson (2005), p. 5455 .
21 Bayliss (2005), p. 1011.
22 See for example Dinc and Gupta (2011), Goud Jr et al. (2002) and Gupta, Ham, and
Svejnar (2001).
23 Bayliss (2005), p. 1112.
24 Problems regarding such ﬁrm data are well summarised by Bayliss (2005), p. 14.
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1.3.3 Motivations
The research described above does not look at the initial intentions for privati-
sation. Identifying factors which are correlated with privatization does not yet
prove any causal relationship. However, strong correlations can hint at factors
which are worth examining. Unfortunately, the question of why governments
decide to privatise has attracted less attention. This might have to do with
the diﬃculty in ﬁltering out one single motivation in most cases. Research has
suggested that privatisation is usually inspired by a variety of reasons both
across and within countries which change over time.
Research has tried to categorise motivations and has used diﬀerent ty-
pologies to do so. In the introduction to their pivotal edited volume on pri-
vatisation, Vickers and Wright (1989)25 describe ﬁve categories of motives:
ideological, economic, managerial, political and ﬁnancial. They argue that
privatisation can be found on a continuum between neo-liberal ideological and
politically inspired privatisations on one side, and pragmatically driven privati-
sations of mostly smaller scope on the other side. Ideologically driven cases
include the UK, France under President Jaques Chirac and the ﬁrst cohabi-
tation government, Portugal and Norway. Ideological motives comprise those
which aim at limiting the state and shifting the boundaries between the pri-
vate and the public sphere. According to Vickers and Wright (1989), such
arguments have received a lot of attention in the UK and France, but much
less in Christian Democratic circles in West Germany, Italy, Spain, Belgium
and the Netherlands. Two other ideological motivations for privatisations are
the limited choice for consumers in state-dominated, subsidised and monop-
olistic settings, and the wish to create a shareholder democracy as a form
of real public ownership. One economic motivation according to Vickers and
Wright (1989) is the idea to use privatisation to change the rules of the game,
for example by loosening state monopolies and fostering market liberalisation.
Other economic motivations include the general ineﬃciency of state enterprises
and the view that it is easier to pursue unpopular business decisions if there
is some distance between government and enterprises, for example in shrink-
25 The same is argued by Wright (1994) in an edited second version of the book.
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ing sectors such as coal, and the usefulness of privatisation for reorganising
asset portfolios in state holdings. Managerial motives describe the beneﬁts
from disentangling state and enterprises. Political motives comprise attract-
ing conservative voters and rewarding political friends. And ﬁnally, the series
of ﬁnancial motives includes ﬁnancial revenues, fostering stock markets, im-
proving access for enterprises to equity and capital markets, and the removal
of ineﬃcient enterprises and potential cost factors of the state's balance sheets.
The list above is not complete and oﬀers a broad compendium of mo-
tivations to reduce state ownership. The categorisation resembles the factors
whose impact on privatisation has been examined, as shown in the previous
sections. Feigenbaum and Henig (1994) oﬀer a more systematic typology. They
distinguish between pragmatic, tactical and systemic privatisation. Pragmatic
privatisation seeks to solve a perceived problem, such as the ineﬃciency of
state bureaucracies or a shortage of funds. The authors argue that this type of
privatisation which is more technocratic than political can mainly be observed
in the US, but also in Italy for example. Tactical privatisation which is po-
litical and involves a power game, such as electoral competition or rewards, is
interest-driven and beneﬁts particular interests of parties, politicians or inter-
est groups. As examples, Feigenbaum and Henig (1994) cite the cases of the
UK under Thatcher and France under Chirac. Systemic privatisation aims at
profoundly reshaping and reorganising a society. Examples of this are the pri-
vatisations in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union after the collapse
of communism. Clifton, Comin, and Fuentes (2003) and Clifton, Comin, and
Fuentes (2006) group existing explanations for privatisation in the European
Union into three categories: the `multiple logics', the `European paradigm' and
the `British paradigm' approach. A generalisation of these three explanations
leads to the following three hypotheses: First, there is no commonality re-
garding the intention, but each country has its own, distinct motivational set.
Second, there are context-based common rationalities for sub-sets of countries.
And third, there is a universal explanation behind all privatisations. According
to the `multiple logics' paradigm, privatisation policies were profoundly diﬀer-
ent and inspired by diverse reasons. The multiple logics approach goes back
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to Feigenbaum, Henig, and Hamnett (1998). They point to the variability of
privatisation across countries and do not ﬁnd a common logic. In particular,
they argue that an economics-based view does not reveal any motivations. In
other words, what should happen does not explain what happens. Instead,
they propose that privatisation depends on unique historical circumstances, so
that even though we can create categories, we cannot conclude that privatisa-
tion was actually inspired by the same factors. Similarly, Yarrow (1999) does
not ﬁnd a common rationale which could explain the global spread of privati-
sation in the 1980s and 1990s. He complains that the lack of a positive theory
of privatisation is coupled with a lack of a positive theory of state ownership
in general, leaving us with textbook models of private enterprise. However,
principal-agent theories which theoretically account for eﬃciency beneﬁts of
private ownership do not serve as an explanation of privatisation. He argues
that while privatisation does enhance eﬃciency, it requires another trigger,
such as the costs of government debt, which overrides the political beneﬁts
which are associated with state ownership. The `European paradigm' sees the
European integration and liberalisation policy as the driving force behind pri-
vatisation. The withdrawal from state ownership is regarded as a response
to state-owned companies facing challenges of increased international compe-
tition. Such a trend has occurred worldwide since the 1970s, and has been
intensiﬁed by the European integration process. Since privatisation in the Eu-
ropean Union has picked up from 1993 onwards and there seem to be similar
trends in the diﬀerent sectors, across countries, Clifton, Comin, and Fuentes
(2003) and Clifton, Comin, and Fuentes (2006) conclude that the `European
paradigm' has the most explanatory power.
One thing should be noted, particularly in the European context. Liber-
alisation and privatisation are two distinct policies. Article 222 of the Treaty
establishing the European Economic Community (TEEC, also Treaty of Rome)
from 1957 states: This Treaty shall in no way prejudice the system existing
in Member federal states in respect of property. This provision has survived
all European renegotiations. Hence, the European Union has been neutral re-
garding private and state ownership from the start. It has, however, enforced
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market liberalisation, which might have fostered privatisation. The mechanism
by which liberalisation and privatisation are linked is not yet entirely clear.26
In some liberalised service sectors, reverse trends can currently be observed.
Dissatisfaction with privatisation outcomes has led to counter movements in
some countries. In Germany, this trend has occurred mainly on the level of
local service providers since around 2000+ and has been labelled Rekommu-
nalisierung (re-municipalisation).27
The `British paradigm' is the most controversial and one of the most
prevailing paradigms to explain the move to privatisation. It sees the privati-
sation activities in Thatcher's UK as the crucial turning point. According to
the `British paradigm', privatisation has been mainly ideology-driven: expe-
riences in the UK have shown that privatisation enhances the eﬃciency and
competitiveness of the privatised enterprise and was hence perceived positively.
The UK privatisations have therefore proven the universal superiority of pri-
vate against state actors in the economic sphere. Due to spill-over eﬀects,
these experiences have triggered pro-market beliefs and a subsequent shift in
the attitude of other Western European countries and have thus led to a with-
drawal of the state from the production sphere across the European Union
since the late 1970s.28 Commonly, the post-war history of public enterprises
in Western Europe is based on the British paradigm and tells the story of a
rise of state-ownership during large nationalisation programmes in the 1950s
and 1960s followed by a decline of state-ownership and a privatisation trend
emanating from the UK in the late 1970s.29 Yet, this non-linear story does
not apply to all Western countries to the same extent. In West Germany, no
nationalisation of industries took place after the Second World War. The case
of West Germany was not the only exception from the general trend of the rise
and fall of public enterprises in post-war Western Europe. Several authors have
tackled the `British myth'. Clifton, Comin, and Fuentes (2003) and Clifton,
Comin, and Fuentes (2006), who observe and analyse privatisation patterns
across Europe for diﬀerent sectors such as manufacturing, energy, transporta-
26 See also Belloc, Nicita, and Sepe (2014).
27 For an overview on Rekommunalisierung, see Libbe, Hanke, and Verbücheln (2011).
28 Examples are Clarke and Pitelis (1993) and Dininio (1999).
29 Toninelli (2000).
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tion and banking, point to the wide variety of privatisation policies in the
European Union. They criticise the evolutionist perspective of privatisation
as a homogeneous process which countries had to follow if they wished to stay
internationally competitive, such as the British paradigm suggests.
Some authors have pointed to the fact that the UK was by far not the
ﬁrst country to privatise. Bel (2011b) names the sale of public enterprises and
privatisation of monopolies in fascist Italy between 1922 and 1925 as the ﬁrst
case of privatisation. Bel (2010) writes about privatisation in Germany in the
1930s. Burk (1988) describes the British denationalisation in the iron and steel
industry under Churchill as the ﬁrst case of privatisation in Europe after the
Second World War and Bel (2011a) names the privatisations in Puerto Rico
between 1948 and 1950 as the ﬁrst privatisations in Latin America. Yotopou-
los (1989) describes the Chilean case where companies were privatised under
Salvador Allende in the 1970s. And a few authors point to the privatisations in
Adenauer's West Germany around 1960.30 None of these privatisations gained
the popularity which later privatisations did. This might have had to do with
the poorer implementation and the smaller scope of these privatisations, both
in terms of depth and quantity. However, these earlier cases pose the question
of why the privatisation trend has picked up in the late 1970s and not earlier.
Also, while it seems that state ownership in Europe has been largely abandoned
in manufacturing, this looks slightly diﬀerent in the transportation, banking
and energy sectors. Here, the state often, and in some cases increasingly, still
plays a big role in providing these services.
A relatively new strand of research examines diﬀusion eﬀects, based on
the idea that countries learn from each other,31 give in to pressure from ref-
erence groups,32 and adopt strategies from similar countries.33 Findings from
this literature could add some aspects to the story of a diﬀusion of ideas and
hence support the 'British paradigm'. Empirical evidence seems to conﬁrm the
existence of such diﬀusion eﬀects. Most of this research is based on network
30 See p. 34.
31 Meseguer (2004), Meseguer (2009).
32 Henisz, Zelner, and Guillén (2005).
33 Schmitt (2011), Fink (2011).
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industries.34 Results suggest that economic relationships between countries
are more important than ideological similarities between governments for the
existence of diﬀusion.35
What can be taken from research on motivations is that privatisation
experiences within and across countries are manifold. Therefore, research has
found it diﬃcult to agree on a common hypothesis. In particular, it seems
diﬃcult to disentangle initial intentions and triggers, fostering and hindering
factors. Schneider and Häge (2008) for example ﬁnd empirical evidence for an
impact of market integration and partisanship, but support the hypothesis that
privatisation was triggered by a shift in the economic discourse in the 1970s
and has only been fostered by European market integration and right-wing
governments, while Clifton, Comin, and Fuentes (2006) see integration itself as
a trigger. Given these diﬃculties, the current debate could beneﬁt immensely
from moving from cross-sectional studies to case studies on single countries in
order to ﬁnd further evidence and gain insights about policy discussions. Until
now, it remains rather unclear how exactly factors such as experiences in other
countries, the changing global economic discourse and pressure from market
competition have stimulated and shaped national discourses and debates about
state ownership and privatisation.
1.3.4 Political Economy
The process of privatisation is political and subject to the inﬂuence of inter-
ests groups, party politics and ideologies. Research focusing on the political
economy dimension has examined how the process and the resulting privati-
sation outcomes can be explained. A rather small strand of literature has
focused on the political economy side of reform. One main focus thereby was
on the dimension of political capture, rent-seeking and particular interests in
countries with a weak state, such as former communist Soviet and Eastern
34 For recent literature see Schmitt (2014), also Schmitt (2011), Fink (2011) and Henisz,
Zelner, and Guillén (2005); beyond network industries Jordana, Levi-Faur, and i Marín
(2011) and Levi-Faur (2005).
35 For network industries in 15 European countries, it has been shown that economically
connected countries tend to move towards the same direction. Schmitt (2014), pp. 625
630.
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European countries or Latin America. It has been examined to what extent
diﬀerent approaches and pre-conditions favour an insider-based privatisation
model which can be prone to rent-seeking behaviour. Gould (2011) applies a
simple political economy model to former communist Eastern European transi-
tion countries. He ﬁnds that a lack of developed competitive market structures
and an insider-oriented former communist elite leads to a higher degree of in-
sider trade. Corrales (1998) explains privatisation policy in Argentina at the
end of the 1990s as a result of a reorganisation of particular interest groups.
In the 1980s and 1990s, researchers with a focus on theoretical political
economy have struggled to ﬁnd a theoretical approach to explain privatisation
in the Western world with the classical models of political economy, interest
groups and political capture. Privatisation was regarded as a pro-market re-
form, and there was a general lack of theory on how pro-market reforms can be
rationally explained, since, according to the assumption, a turn towards mar-
kets tends to eliminate rent-seeking opportunities in the longer run.36 Later,
authors have turned to electoral competition and the organisation of the polit-
ical decision-making process. In particular, veto power theory has served as a
theoretical tool. The veto power approach points out that ideas and arguments
are not enough, but that the ability to implement change depends on the abil-
ity of the group which is interested in change to integrate all potential veto
groups in the decision-making process. The number of veto players tends to be
high in systems with government coalitions, several chambers and federalism.
In such systems, the balancing of interests and ability to ﬁnd compromise is
a complex task, which can make policy reform very slow. Hence, more recent
research has focused on compensations as a mechanism to overcome politi-
cal resistance. The compensation approach can be useful in political systems
where broad majorities are required in order to impose reforms. Governments
can use certain modes of privatisation to compensate speciﬁc interest groups
for disadvantages and increase the acceptance of pro-market policies. Schamis
(2002) argues for example that privatisation-based beneﬁts for working class
households have served in the case of British privatisation policy. Similarly,
36 Tommasi and Velasco (1996).
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Etchemendy (2011) shows that in Argentina, speciﬁc forms of privatisation
have been used to compensate groups for disadvantages from market liber-
alisation. He calls this the market-share-compensation in contrast to more
direct subsidies. For West Germany, Mayer (2006) argues that a large num-
ber of veto players and low cohesion retarded privatisation signiﬁcantly in the
1980s.
1.4 The German Context: A Literature Review
German privatisation has been addressed in the international comparative lit-
erature and in more detail in the German literature. In the context of inter-
national and comparative literature, the 1950s and 1960s privatisations have
frequently been mentioned as one of the earliest cases of privatisation, whereas
in total, Germany is seen as one of the smaller and later privatisers. Diﬀerent
authors have pointed to diﬀerent aspects of German privatisation politics. The
ﬁrst internationally acknowledged article on privatisation in Germany is Esser
(1988).37 He describes German privatisation as symbolic, given the fact that
the privatisation volumes in other countries had been much larger. Also, he
argues that federal privatisation eﬀorts have been counteracted by the Ger-
man states who resisted strongly against privatisation, in particular Bavaria,
and bought back a number of assets which had been sold by the federal gov-
ernment. Similarly, Clifton, Comin, and Fuentes (2003) and Clifton, Comin,
and Fuentes (2006) describe West Germany as a case of federal resistance in
which the states partially counteracted national privatisation attempts.38 Meg-
ginson and Netter (2001) describe German privatisation as the ﬁrst large scale
privatisation programme which did not survive the stock market downturn
in the mid-1960s.39 Clifton, Comin, and Fuentes (2006) regard privatisation
in Germany as tactical and opportunistic, where shares were sold when the
market conditions were good; the result of this approach were irregular rev-
enues. A few authors point to the popular capitalism dimension of German
37 A later version of this article is Esser (1994).
38 Clifton, Comin, and Fuentes (2003), pp. 5556.
39 Megginson and Netter (2001), p. 323.
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privatisation. Hawkins (1991) argues that the 1950s and 1960s West German
privatisation model was in some ways similar to the later English model, both
attempting to popularise shares in the working and middle class. Bortolotti,
De Jong, Nicodano, and Schindele (2007) name the Adenauer privatisations
as the ﬁrst experiment to foster the domestic stock market through privati-
sation.40 Bortolotti and Milella (2006) however calls them a failed attempt.41
Bös (1993) ﬁnds the Adenauer privatisations were also not very successful since
they did not result in a nation of small-scale shareholders and initial investors
re-sold their shares quickly instead. Bös (1993) compares privatisation in the
UK and West Germany in the 1980s. He argues that the privatisation vol-
ume was much smaller in West Germany for ﬁve reasons: First, there was less
public ownership therefore less to privatise. This assumes that the initial level
of state ownership has an impact on privatisation, which has been empirically
conﬁrmed. Second, public enterprises performed better. Third, there was no
political incentive to reduce trade union power such as it was the case in the
UK, since unions behaved more reasonably. Fourth, there was less interest
in privatisation on state and local levels, and ﬁfth, ideological conservatism
was less rigorous in Germany. However, he does not prove that these factors
actually had an impact.
In the literature which focuses on Germany, privatisation has hardly at-
tracted any academic attention until the end of the 1980s. The few descriptive
studies comprise Bukow (1965) and Knauss (1978). At the same time, a small
group of German economists rather unsuccessfully tried to establish a positive
theory of public ownership in the framework of the before-mentioned Gemein-
wirtschaftslehre and to normatively justify the existence of a mixed economy
with public ownership.42 Later descriptions of public enterprises in the post-
war economy, their legitimisation and the corresponding legal framework were
provided by Fasbender (2004) and Knauss (1986), Knauss (1988) and Knauss
(1990). Fritz Knauss was himself an oﬃcial in the Federal Ministry of Finance
40 Bortolotti, De Jong, Nicodano, and Schindele (2007), p. 298.
41 Bortolotti and Milella (2006), p. 3.
42 See the various publications of Thiemeyer and the publication series of the Gesellschaft
für öﬀentliche Wirtschaft, for example Thiemeyer (1970). For the early foundations of
Gemeinwirtschaftslehre in the 1930s see Ritschl (1931), and for a conclusive overview
Ortlieb and Rittig (1972).
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in the 1970s and had access to additional material to the federal reports. Only
Dietrich (1996) and Nicolaysen (2002) thoroughly analyse the early privatisa-
tion policy around 1960. Both emphasise the unique setting of privatisation
policy at that time and its embeddedness in a wider socio-economic context.
They suggest that early privatisation and the concept of people's shares were
strongly determined by Christian democratic ideas of property formation of
low- and medium income households which was a centrepiece of left conser-
vatives in the 1950s and 1960s. Hence, privatisation has to be seen through
the lens of social policy. Dietrich (1996) argues that people's shares were one
of several measures of property formation and the result of an internal com-
promise between the liberal business wing and the employees' faction.43 It
will have to be assessed to what extent the balancing of interests within the
CDU/CSU motivated privatisation or rather shaped its design after the gen-
eral decision to privatise had been made. Zohlnhöfer (2003) and Mayer (2006)
use the veto player theory to show that reforms by the Kohl government in the
1980s, including privatisation, were only incrementally imposed. They ascribe
this to the low degree of cohesion within the government coalition and to low
economic pressure on the ground of a stabilizing global economy. However,
they leave aside that the incremental nature of privatisation can also be the
result of a conscious decision, based on the idea that it can be beneﬁcial to im-
plement policies gradually. Tofaute (1994) and Wellenstein (1992) focus on the
partisan dimension and view the privatisations in the Kohl era primarily as the
result of a shift of the German Christian democratic ideology towards a more
market-oriented policy, embedded in the rhetoric of a lean state. Yet, none of
them was able to access internal government documents at that time. Tofaute
(1994) is a commissioned work by the Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, a foundation of
the German Confederation of Trade Unions. Not surprisingly, he has a rather
critical approach. This becomes clearly evident in the title The big sell-out.44
Still, the book contains a chronicle of the industrial privatisations in the 1980s
and explains the union argument against privatisation. Based on a survey, the
author admits that, despite initial concerns from the union side, the privatisa-
43 See Dietrich (1996), pp. 229269, 321335.
44 Der grosse Ausverkauf
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tions have not led to a decrease in employment of the privatised companies or
worsening of working conditions.45. Wellenstein (1992) summarises the pub-
lic and political discussions about the state as an entrepreneur. He sees the
1960s people's shares as an attempt to popularise the social market economy
among the population, and the 1980s privatisations as a conservative counter
movement to Keynesian policies in the 1970s. However, the implementation
was made diﬃcult by the heterogeneity within the conservative-liberal spec-
trum.46 Wellenstein (1992) examines privatisation not only on the federal level
but also in the states Baden-Württemberg, Rhineland-Palatinate, Hesse and
Lower Saxony. He depicts the diversity of their industrial property and the
interweaving of state and federal shareholdings. Also, he shows that privatisa-
tion in the German states started signiﬁcantly later, strongly depended on the
political orientation of the respective governments and in some cases counter-
acted federal policy.47 Since Wellenstein (1992) bases his book on published
sources and newspaper articles, his argumentation needs to be veriﬁed with
the government sources which have in the meantime become accessible.
Privatisation has also been addressed by company history literature. Re-
cent histories of VW, Preussag, Lufthansa, VIAG and IVG have used historical
documents and hence represent a valuable source. Laufer and Stier (2005) anal-
yse the history of the former Prussian mining company Preussag between 1923
and 2003 and focus on how the company's development was shaped by state
ownership. The study portrays the company's path of reconstruction, con-
solidation and orientation in the early post-war period48 including its partial
privatisation through people's shares in 1959.49 They ﬁnd that the company
management was reluctant towards privatisation plans.50 Nicolaysen (2002)
describes the partial privatisation of Volkswagenwerk in 1959 by focusing on
the establishment of the Volkswagenwerk Foundation. He draws on a broad
variety of sources from the VW archive and some government records. He
highlights that the ﬁrst impulse towards privatisation did not come from Er-
45 Tofaute (1994), pp. 300316.
46 Wellenstein (1992), p. 461.
47 Wellenstein (1992), pp. 351459.
48 Laufer and Stier (2005), pp. 393445.
49 Laufer and Stier (2005), pp. 446466.
50 Laufer and Stier (2005), pp. 451452.
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hard and the representatives of the paradigm of social market economy but
from business circles.51 Other valuable works on VW are Edelmann (1999) and
Tolliday (1995). Pohl (1998) describes the development of VIAG between 1923
and 1998. He mentions attempts of Bavaria, which was a co-owner of some of
VIAG's subsidiary companies, to take over parts of VIAG's shareholding52 and
not-implemented privatisation plans in the 1960s.53 It remains slightly open
why these plans failed, but Pohl mentions likely diﬃculties resulting from the
strong horizontal and vertical integration of VIAG and the economic crises in
the late 1960s as possible explanations.54 Hopmann (1996) tells the story of
IVG and focuses on the involvement of the company in the war economy of
the Third Reich and the ﬁrst years after the Second World War until 1951.
The later development is only brieﬂy outlined. She ﬁnds that IVG was used
for military purposes in the 1960s under Defence Minister Strauß.55 She also
brieﬂy depicts the circumstances of its gradual privatisation between 1986 and
1993.56 Additional information about Strauß and his interest in IVG for the
Bavarian aircraft industry can be found in Milosch (2006), who describes the
history of the modernisation of the Bavarian economy from 1949 to 1969.57
Bozdag-Yaksan (2008) outlines the history of Lufthansa and covers the pe-
riod between its formation in 1926 until the late 1990s. She includes valuable
information about the company's partial privatisation since 1953 and its full
privatisation in the 1990s and argues that the company's immense need for eq-
uity capital after its re-establishment in 1951 led to the government's pragmatic
decision to allow private investment as early as the 1950s.58 Less analytical
are Radzio (1979) and Birnbaum (1980). Radzio (1979), a commissioned work
by VEBA, episodically tells the history of Preussag's mother company VEBA.
He focuses on the personalities which had a strong inﬂuence on the company's
development and speciﬁc company milestones. Birnbaum (1980) is more an
51 Nicolaysen (2002), p. 71, see also Dietrich (1996), p. 214.
52 Pohl (1998), pp. 223258.
53 Pohl (1998), pp. 278291.
54 Pohl (1998), pp. 288289.
55 Hopmann (1996), pp. 199206.
56 Hopmann (1996), pp. 215218
57 Milosch (2006), pp. 105116.
58 Bozdag-Yaksan (2008), pp. 105129.
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autobiographic source than an analysis of the history of Salzitter AG between
1945 and 1979. Hans Birnbaum was involved in many ways with the company
and was one of the inﬂuential German industry managers whose career began
in the ministerial bureaucracy: Between 1947 and 1949, Birnbaum had been
working for the British military government; from 1949 to 1961 he had been
an oﬃcial in the Ministry of Finance in Lower Saxony, the Federal Ministry
of Finance and the Federal Ministry of the Treasury. In 1961, Birnbaum be-
came a board member and commercial manager of Salzgitter AG, from 1968
until 1979 he was the company's chief executive director. Also, Birnbaum was
chairman of the supervisory board of VW from 1974 to 1979.
Privatisation has brieﬂy been addressed in the literature on corporate
governance and ownership structures. Gonser (2014) describes the growth of
consumer banking in the 1950s and 1960s and the role which people's shares
played in this process.59 Aside from that, it still remains to connect privatisa-
tion and people's shares with the corporate governance literature. In general,
the corporate governance literature emphasises the traditionally strong role of
banks in the German system.60 So the question is how the transfer of own-
ership from the state to private investors ﬁts into the framework. Yarrow,
King, Mairesse, and Melitz (1986) argues that privatisation can lead to moni-
toring problems since government ownership provides better monitoring than
dispersed private ownership.61
The question of socialisation and nationalisation is naturally connected
with the question of public ownership and privatisation. Neither the federal
government nor state governments nationalised entire industries in post-war
West Germany, although some attempts had been made in the later 1940s and
early 1950s: In 1948, North Rhine-Westphalia adopted a law concerning the
socialisation of the coal industry but was rejected by the British military gov-
ernment with the justiﬁcation that the law aﬀected national property whose
future had to be decided by a new German federal government. In 1947,
Hesse decided to transfer key industries and public utilities into public owner-
59 See the chapters about investment funds and people's shares in Gonser (2014), pp. 6876
for the 1950s and pp. 142149 for the 1960s.
60 See for example Edwards and Nibler (2000) and Fohlin (2005).
61 Yarrow, King, Mairesse, and Melitz (1986), pp. 329333.
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ship as so-called social entities (Sozialgesellschaften, Sozialgewerkschaften or
Sozialgenossenschaften).62 The question as to whether socialism was an actual
alternative and whether history could have turned out diﬀerently has been an-
swered in diﬀerent ways. Some historians have drawn the conclusion that a
nationalisation of industries was an actual option but was not implemented.
The most common explanation ascribes this to the fact that the US military
government inhibited such plans and that subsequently British intentions to
socialise the coal and iron industry in the Ruhr region were given up.63 Other
authors ﬁnd contradictory opinions about public ownership within both the
US and the UK government.64 Some authors also point to the lacking domes-
tic support in politics and the society. Winter (1974) for example ﬁnds that
the SPD was too weak and uncoordinated to exert an inﬂuence on immediate
Allied post-war planning. Hook (2002) argues that there was no nationalisa-
tion of heavy industries after 1949 due to a lack of cohesion in the left political
spectrum. Faced with the US American rejection of socialisation, the SPD
shifted their priority from the ownership question to the co-determination of
employees. According to Prowe (1992), the German political desire for sociali-
sation has to be understood as a pragmatic response to the economic crisis and
low level of supply of essential goods in the early post-war years and that these
economic diﬃculties had led to a broad consensus in favour of a socialisation
of key industries. The Hessian socialisation law for example was backed by
a broad coalition and even the FDP favoured a limited socialisation. Polit-
ical support among the population was proven by a 72% majority in favour
of Article 41 of the Hessian constitution in a December 1946 plebiscite. By
1948, socialisation laws had been passed in several German states and nation-
alisation of industries was anchored in most state constitutions. When the
German economy started to blossom again in the early 1950s and the crisis
62 Rechtsform der Sozialisierung unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Sozialisierung in
Hessen, Speech of the Hesse Minister for Economics Koch at a meeting of the German
lawyers association in Bad Godesberg, 30.9./1.10.1947, Special Publication of the Central
Legal Gazette for the British Zone 1947, Gesetz und Recht Verlag GmbH, Hamburg.
63 See for example Abelshauser (1975), Rudzio (1978), Steininger (1988) and Winkler
(1965). On the reluctant attitude towards socialisation in the US military government
see Gimbel (1968).
64 See for example Abelshauser (1975) and Winkler (1965).
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was overcome, the wish for socialisation was weakened within the whole po-
litical spectrum except for the radical left. Prowe (1992) explains that this
pragmatic behaviour of the traumatised German population was driven by
fears of a concentration of power. This argument is supported by the speciﬁc
ideas on socialisation that were prevalent in all political parties. As the view
of history at that time was that private industrial cartels drove Germany into
the recession that brought Hitler to power, who was then supported by these
cartels. The idea was hence that socialisation would avoid direct state control
and a concentration of power.
1.4.1 Between Myth and Reality: The
Wirtschaftswunder and the Question of a
Structural Break
One of the major research topics on post-war Germany has been the question
of whether there was a structural break in West Germany after the Second
World War which led to a reorganisation of the economy. Olson (1982) was
the ﬁrst one who pointed at a structural break in the form of a disruption
of distributive coalitions during the Third Reich and the Allied occupation.
Moreover, he argued that the West German super-growth (Wirtschaftswunder)
in the 1950s was mainly caused by this structural break. Since then, a narrative
has become popular both in the political and the public world, which involves
the setup of a new 'economic order' dubbed a social market economy which
provided the basis for West Germany's post-war growth. It involves the idea
of a planned economy during the Third Reich and the transition into a market
economy after 1945, with the Antitrust Law from 1957 as a core element.
The social market economy has been connected with the ideas of ordolib-
eralism. Ordoliberalism can be described as a German version of liberalism
which originated in the 1930s and is associated with a group of economists
in Freiburg around Walter Eucken. Ordoliberalism started to develop in the
aftermath of the Great Depression in the 1930s and was built on the idea of a
general supremacy of market mechanisms and private economic activity within
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free markets. It was based on Eucken's theory that market forms determine
market results. Ordoliberalism emphasised the importance of a strong state
as a safeguard for economic competition which restricts economic power in
order to maximise competition and restrict the political inﬂuence of particular
interest groups. Hence, the theory suggested that economic policy should fo-
cus on establishing a framework and enforcing general rules of competition.65
After 1945, the school of thought became popular through the social market
economy paradigm and its political promoter Ludwig Erhard (CDU), who be-
came the ﬁrst Federal Minister of Economics. Scholars have argued that after
1945, ordoliberalism found a vacuum in which it could exercise both academic
and political inﬂuence.66 The German and in particular the Christian Demo-
cratic self-perception is to a large extent based on the legacy of the social
market economy, foremost its representative Erhard. The success of the Ger-
man economy is ascribed to its ordoliberal foundation. Hence, ordoliberalism
has received broad attention and appraisal in the year of the 50th anniversary
of the social market economy in 1997, celebrated by politicians of the Christian
Democratic Party.
The structural break view has been criticised because it neglects the
existence of legal and structural continuities. Therefore, in the past decade,
emphasis has turned to structural and legal continuities which go back to the
Third Reich, Weimar Republic and the German Empire. Abelshauser argues
that a reorganisation of economic interest groups had already taken place in
the early 1950s.67 Other authors emphasise personal continuities between the
Third Reich and the Federal Republic, both in the political and the economic
sphere.68 Ritschl (2004) and Ritschl (2005) describe legal continuities in the
form of sector-speciﬁc regulatory laws: During the early National Socialist
economic policy between 1933 and 1936, a number of such laws were created
under the leadership of Hjalmar Schacht, Minister of Economics between 1934
and 1937. Many of these laws remained in eﬀect for decades after 1945 until
65 For the theoretical foundation of ordoliberalism see Eucken (1939).
66 Of the vast academic literature see Goldschmidt (2005), Blumenberg-Lampe (1973), Ptak
(2004) and Müller (1988) on ordoliberalism and its implementation.
67 Abelshauser (1983), pp. 7688.
68 Berghahn (1986), pp. 182259, Grunenberg (2006) and Paqué (1996).
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new, federal laws replaced them. This is referred to as the long shadow of
Hjalmar Schacht. Similarly, Ambrosius (2008) identiﬁed the beginning of
a regulatory continuity in 1933 which is marked by a sovereign public law
regulation, whereas previously, economic regulation had been based primarily
on private law. However, the regulation acts of the Third Reich were not Nazi
innovations but trace back to earlier ideas, rules and practices. Authors show
this for several sectors in Bähr and Banken (2006). Beyond the question of a
structural break, the phenomenon of post-war growth is much more complex.69
The gap between myth and reality has recently been addressed again
during the Eurozone crisis. It has been noted that the German response to
this crisis was widely characterised and shaped by ideas going back to ordolib-
eralism. The German prescription has been criticised for focusing too much on
austerity and neglecting the dangers and side eﬀects of such a policy.70 Hesse
(2010) argues that ordoliberalism did not embody the modernisation of Ger-
man economics with which it is often related. According to Hesse (2010), a
real modernisation only took place with the implementation of Anglo-American
economics in the 1950s and 1960s. He pointed out that instead of moving to-
wards liberalism, the idea of state interventionism remained abundant in aca-
demic economics until a change of generations in the 1960s. This included the
above described idea of Gemeinwirtschaftslehre which combines both market
mechanism and state activity.
The continuities described above led to a gradual adoption of pro-market
reforms in small steps. Similarly, the public enterprises which were inherited
from the Third Reich remained in state ownership for decades and were pri-
vatised step by step. This ﬁnding does not ﬁt well into a story of structural
breaks. State ownership in the industrial sector does not seem to comply
with an ordoliberal framework. It remains to be examined whether and how
ordoliberal ideas shaped privatisation discussions.
69 For a discussion see Eichengreen and Ritschl (2009).
70 Young (2014).
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1.5 Methodology and Sources
This thesis provides a comprehensive analytical narrative of German privati-
sation politics between 1948 and 1969 based on qualitative primary sources.
The length of the ﬁrst German privatisation period makes it a valuable case for
studying the political process of privatisation. Abundant qualitative sources
allow us to look into the black box of privatisation, evaluate the decisions
and conceptions of policymakers and identify internal and external interests.
Hence, it goes beyond research which focuses on observable or measurable out-
comes. Historical sources are an opportunity to look into thoughts, ideas and
motivation. They do not only reveal what happened, but also what did not
happen and which ideas fell by the wayside. This can add important elements
to a narrative.
The aim of this thesis is not to test a theory, hence, it would only be
somewhat helpful to impose a limiting framework. Instead, the West German
privatisation path is described narratively. Factors which have been identiﬁed
as possibly having an impact on privatisation in previous research are taken
into consideration. Given the broad nature of the topic of the thesis, such a
narrative style will be necessarily episodic. Events and developments have been
examined to a very diﬀerent extent by previous research. Also, the way that
events are reﬂected in the qualitative sources can diﬀer considerably, based
on a variety of circumstances. This applies to the historical background and
broad economic and political developments as well as company histories.
The thesis mainly draws on government sources. Previous research on
individual enterprises such as VW, Preussag, VEBA and Lufthansa have made
more or less extensive use of company archives. Therefore, these have not been
reviewed again. Also, Dietrich (1996) has suﬃciently analysed the decision-
making processes within the CDU until the early 1960s, so that I can draw
on his research. Most of the government sources used in this thesis have not
been examined and evaluated before and hence provide new information. I
will assume that even when decisions are taken informally, possibly in small
circles or unoﬃcial meetings of politicians and lobby groups, this will in some
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way appear in the documentation of the ministerial administration. Hence,
it can be concluded that what does not show up there has not been decisive
for the process or can simply not be observed. Government sources consist
mainly of the documentation of the three involved ministries and the Oﬃce
of the Federal Chancellor. Taking into account several state departments has
the advantage that the sources correct and complement each other and that a
biased view from the angle of just one ministry is avoided. All governmental
sources can be found in the Bundesarchiv, the German national archives, in
Koblenz.
This approach focuses on the administrative side, although decisions are
political in the end. However, it can be assumed government debates and deci-
sions are mirrored in the governmental administration. Furthermore, inﬂuence
mechanisms can work in both directions: Political tendencies are picked up by
the administration, and the administration is an important source of knowl-
edge and ideas for the political side. Leading politicians have to cover a broad
spectrum and are often not able to take care of the details. Hence, ministers
and secretaries of state might be only as strong as their administrative support
allows.
The most important unpublished accessible sources are government records
from 1945 until 1984 concerning federal industrial property. This includes
records from the Federal Ministry of Economics (BArch B102), the Federal
Ministry of Finance (BArch B126), the Federal Ministry of the Treasury (BArch
B115) and the Oﬃce of the Federal Chancellor (BArch B136). Relevant records
comprise more than 100 folders containing letters, internal memorandums, rel-
evant newspaper articles, reports, excerpts from Bundestag discussions and
minutes of board meetings. One small drawback is that the sources might
be incomplete. An unknown number of documents is still stored within the
ministries and has not been handed over to the national archives yet. It is
very likely that this mainly concerns those documents that are still of actual
relevance and documents that were of relevance for Germany's reuniﬁcation.
These could include documents about the allocation of public enterprises be-
tween the federal state and the German states. An additional source in the
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national archives are documents left behind by the former Secretary of State
Ludwig Kattenstroth71 who was a long-standing government oﬃcial and in
charge of state ownership and privatisation for many years. Government ﬁles
remain closed for 30 years so that only records until the mid-1980s can be
taken into account. For later years, the thesis has to rely on previous research
and public documents.
Another important set of sources are the minutes of the federal cabinet
and the economics committee of the federal cabinet which have been published
as an online edition by the national archives (Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bun-
desregierung online).72 Parliamentary records are partially published by the
federal government as Bundestagsdrucksachen. Published documents include
Bundestag debates. The minutes of the Bundestag committees, where impor-
tant preliminary decisions are taken, are being held at the Parlamentsarchiv
des Deutschen Bundestages (Parliamentary Archive, short: PA). Of particular
importance are the economic policy committee and the budget committee and
their subcommittees, for example the subcommittee for federal industrial prop-
erty in the ﬁrst, second and third legislative period. In the fourth legislative
period, a committee for federal property was introduced. Government records
have revealed that banks, especially Deutsche Bank, might have actively tried
to shape privatisation policy. Thus, records in Deutsche Bank archive have
been used as an additional source. The minutes of the scientiﬁc advisory bod-
ies of the Ministries of Economics and Finance which are stored at the Institut
für Zeitgeschichte, IfZ (Institute of Contemporary History) in Munich have
been reviewed for the purpose of this thesis. However, these sources have not
71 From 1940 to 1941, Kattenstroth had been working for the Reich commissariat for the
occupied Dutch territories and for the military administration in France. After the war,
he was employed by the documentary division of the International Military Tribunal from
1947 to 1948 and transferred to the combined economic administration of the Bizone in
1949. From 1949 to 1962 he was working in the Ministry of Economics, from 1949 to
1954 as head of division II (general policy), from 1954 to 1956 as head of the central
division, from 1956 to 1962 as head of division III (mining, energy and water, iron and
steel, EGKS). From 1962 to 1963 he was employed in the Federal Chancellor Oﬃce as
head of division II (economics, ﬁnance, social questions), from 1963 to 1965 as secretary
of state in the Ministry of the Treasury. After a disagreement with the later Minister
of the Treasury Werner Dollinger (CSU), he transferred to the Ministry for Labour and
Social Aﬀairs as secretary of state until 1969.
72 http://www.bundesarchiv.de/cocoon/barch/00/k/index.html (last access: March
2016).
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proven to be relevant, contrary to what can be assumed given the notion of an
'expert culture' of economic policy in post-war Germany.73
Very valuable published sources are the annual reports on federal enter-
prises. They include statistical data such as the number, size and value of
shareholdings, balance sheet data, data on important capital investments and
the names of the members of the executive boards and supervisory boards.
The Ministry of Finance has published information on federal enterprises in
the annual budget reports since 1955. From 1959 until 1969, the Ministry of
the Treasury has published annual reports about the development of public
enterprises. These have been additionally been attached to the annual budget
reports of the Federal Ministry of Finance. Since 1973, the Federal Ministry
of Finance has published annual reports (Beteiligungsberichte) on the federal
participations of which it was in charge. These are available online for all
years since 2001.74 An incomplete overview of privatisation transactions can
also be found in an online publication of Subdivision VIIIB2 of the Ministry of
Finance, dated April 2014. Information about transaction values and net rev-
enues are however not listed in either of these sources. Additional information
from the Federal Ministry of Finance can be found in publications of Knauss,
civil servant for many years in the 1970s and 1980s.75
Additional sources include newspapers and magazines. These might not
only provide relevant background information on public opinion and reveal
cross-connections between managers, politicians and high oﬃcials. They also
provide insights into the way that the public evaluated government policies.
Copies of many relevant articles can be found in the relevant government doc-
umentation, sometimes with a comment in the case that the articles contain
incorrect information. This limits the danger that these articles are misleading.
73 Nützenadel (2005), pp. 123174.
74 http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Web/DE/Themen/Bundesvermoegen/
Privatisierungs_und_Beteiligungspolitik/Privatisierungspolitik/
privatisierungspolitik.html (last access: March 2016).
75 Knauss (1993).
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1.6 Hypothesis
In this thesis, I will argue that privatisation was motivated by a combination
of ﬁscal and ideological reasons. Weighing the advantages and disadvantages
of state ownership, it became more and more evident over time that there
were no good enough reasons to maintain full state ownership while better
alternatives existed. However, since economic and political pressures were
small, privatisation remained a slow process.
Previous research has established the idea that economic crisis can moti-
vate change, both under right-wing and left-wing governments. A crisis can be
the result of a lack of growth, deteriorating ﬁscal conditions, low proﬁtability
of public enterprises, market pressures due to increasing international compe-
tition or external factors such as the European market liberalisation and ﬁscal
rules.
At ﬁrst view, the crisis hypothesis seems to have little explanatory power
for German privatisation. Growth was abundant in the 1950s and seemed
to pick up again in the 1980s, state debt was comparably small and public
enterprises were doing comparably well. Also, the revenues from privatisation
were too small to have a big eﬀect on the federal budget. However, ﬁscal
factors deserve some more attention.
Privatisations both in the 1950s and 1960s and in the 1980s were often
combined with equity increases, which hints to the fact that ﬁscal elements
might have played a role. If a state wants to keep a stake in a company, it
is forced to capital injections though equity increases according to this stake,
otherwise it puts its enterprises at risk of being under-ﬁnanced. If the federal
state was forced to increase its investment consistently over a long period of
time, this might have led to debates about the necessity and costs of state own-
ership. This has possibly motivated the government to withdraw entirely from
public enterprises, even though they were not necessarily highly unproﬁtable.
Since no external ﬁscal limits were imposed until the 1990s, the willingness of
the government to fund equity increases was probably much more important
than the ability to do so. These two factors are not necessarily perfectly cor-
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related. It is possible that there was a preference for austerity even without
external rules.
Avoiding equity increases seems to have been more important than creat-
ing revenues. Comparative quantitative studies have shown that the German
privatisation revenues have only caught up in the 1990s, although the revenues
in the 1980s have been underestimated. But still they remained rather small
compared to the federal budget. Also, the main share of the revenues from the
sale of VW shares had to be passed on to the Volkswagenwerk Foundation and
the revenues from the sale of Salzgitter AG were used to establish the DBU
foundation. This suggests that creating revenues was no major motivation.
The role of ideas and ideologies is more diﬃcult to capture. It is likely
that a general preference for private economic activity over state economic ac-
tivity has been an important factor for the early move to privatisation. How-
ever, ordoliberalism only argued for a general superiority of markets. Theories
for a regulation of markets where competition does not arise naturally were
only developed later and remained vague. This left a wide scope for deﬁning
exceptions and legitimise existing public enterprises. This theoretical gap was
only ﬁlled when ideas from economic theories of regulation were applied in the
course of the liberalisation of state monopolies in the 1990s.
Until the end of the 1980s, privatisation was adopted only by conservative-
liberal governments. This observation is congruent with the partisan hypoth-
esis that right-wing governments privatise more. However, the SPD did not
re-nationalise public enterprises in the 1970s, as has happened in the UK, and
the SPD-led government of Lower Saxony approved the partial privatisation
of Volkswagenwerk in 1961. Also, the partisan eﬀect diminishes in the 1990s
when privatisation was adopted both by CDU-led and SPD-led governments.
Another fact which deserves some attention is that the FDP left the
conservative-liberal government coalition in 1966 which led to a grand coalition
ﬁrst and a social-liberal coalition later. It can be concluded that diﬀerences in
economic ideologies between the parties were either politically not that deci-
sive around that time or that they had converged. Economic ideologies became
more distinct in the 1980s. As a result, the FDP went back to a conservative-
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liberal coalition. This development might initially have been motivated by
domestic factors, however, over the course of the 1980s, neoliberal ideas and
expressions seem to manifest more and more. It is likely that a global diﬀusion
of neoliberal ideas has played a role in this context. International experiences
provided a background against which domestic privatisation supporters prob-
ably found it easier to convince others of their ideas and promote privatisation
publicly.
Beyond diﬀerences on the party level, the internal negotiation process
of the CDU/CSU is an important factor. The hypothesis that privatisation
was the result of CDU-internal negotiations about the social question can
only be part of the answer why conservative governments were more prone to
privatise. The adoption of privatisation policy requires an internal agreement
about the tasks of the state in the economy which goes beyond an agreement
on the design of selling state-owned companies. It is likely that the internal
diﬀerences became smaller due to a diﬀusion of neoliberal ideas in the 1980s
and that the party has subsequently become much more homogeneous with
respect to economic ideas.
1.7 Outline
The ﬁrst chapter examines how the portfolio of state enterprises which was left
behind by the Third Reich was integrated in the new German state. First, a
brief look is taken at the history and origins of state ownership to help explain
the composition of the portfolio. Next, the question will be addressed how this
portfolio was aﬀected by the Allied occupation and whether any important
preliminary decisions about the enterprises or the future institutional setting
were taken during that time. Third, the size and relevance of the portfolio of
state enterprises for the German economy will be examined. Last, the legal
foundations of how federal enterprises were managed and how these changed
over time will be described.
The second chapter covers the orientation phase of the new federal gov-
ernment of CDU, CSU and FDP in the ﬁrst and second legislation period.
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It will be addressed how inherited enterprises were distributed between the
federal level and the German states, how the enterprises which were assigned
to the federal level were organisationally integrated and which ﬁrst steps to-
wards a reorganisation were implemented. The government's scope to exercise
inﬂuence on its enterprises and how it was challenged by ﬁnancial demands of
growing enterprises will be examined.
The third chapter deals with the partial privatisation of Preussag, Volk-
swagenwerk and VEBA through the issue of people's shares in the third and
fourth legislation period between 1959 and 1965. It examines how the ne-
gotiation processes within the government parties led to the design of shares
and shaped the issue conditions which favoured low and middle income house-
holds. Also, it addresses the question of what happened to ownership and
control structures after the partial privatisations and how government control
was, or was not, replaced.
The fourth chapter covers the grand coalition between 1966 and 1969 and
the social-liberal coalition from 1969 to 1982. For privatisation, this was a time
of stagnation. The chapter examines how the perception of state ownership
changed throughout this time. It addresses the question as to whether this
was aﬀected by external factors such as the increasing importance of oil and
the internationalisation of markets.
The ﬁfth chapter explains the return to privatisation between 1983 and
1989. It looks at the opinion-forming and negotiation process within the new
government coalition of CDU, CSU and FDP and evaluates the outcome of an
almost complete withdrawal from industries.
Finally, the sixth chapter concludes and connects the ﬁndings with later
privatisation policies.
Chapter 2
Public Enterprises in the Federal
Setting
Federal enterprises which were later subject to privatisation were not federal
property from the start. The public enterprises and participations which the
Reich and Prussia left behind were at ﬁrst labelled heirless property and
became subject to conﬂicts between the federal government and the German
states. This chapter explores how these conﬂicts arose, how they were solved
and what they were actually about.
The ﬁrst section will explore the historical circumstances of and reasons
for the establishment and expansion of public enterprises. The second section
will address how public enterprises were administered under Allied control and
ask whether important preliminary decisions were made during those years.
The third section explores how the federal government and states negotiated
and came to an agreement about the heirless property. The fourth section
explores how important public enterprises were in the economy and in speciﬁc
sectors, and the last section looks at the institutional setting and analyses
how control was organised and imposed. This includes both the legal basis
and informal control structures. The chapter as a whole will focus on the
enterprises which were subject to federal privatisation until 1989.
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2.1 The Origins of Public Enterprises
Germany entered the post-war period with a set of state-owned shareholdings
operating in the energy sector, postal service and communications, railways,
manufacturing, banking and insurance. There had been no systematic estab-
lishment of state sectors in Germany. Due to the combination of a federal
structure and several regime changes, a continuous public enterprise policy
had hardly been possible. The result was that, with a few exceptions, there
was a mix of state and private ownership in competitive and oligopolistic mar-
kets and markets were to diﬀerent extents dominated or aﬀected by state
ownership. The heterogeneous conglomerate of industrial shareholdings which
West Germany inherited included a variety of companies with diﬀerent histor-
ical backgrounds. Most of the industrial participations were bundled in four
large corporations: the Prussian holding company VEBA, the holding com-
pany of the Reich VIAG, Verwertungsgesellschaft für Montanindustrie GmbH
(short: Montan, since 1951: Industrieverwaltungsgesellschaft GmbH, short:
IVG) and Reichswerke Hermann Göring in Salzgitter. Other industrial en-
terprises were Volkswagenwerk, the shipbuilding company Howaldtswerke and
Deutsche Lufthansa AG which was liquidated in 1951.76 Other shareholdings
existed in the infrastructure and service sector, including large national com-
panies such as Reichspost and Reichsbahn, municipality-owned public utilities,
state banks and public savings banks.
Public enterprises and enterprises with mixed public-private ownership
structures were established for a variety of reasons during the German Empire,
the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich. They served as an instrument of
economic policy to ensure the state's inﬂuence in certain markets, as an in-
strument of regulation and information, to meet the needs of the state and
of other public enterprises, for war and for ﬁscal reasons. Sectors in which
the state played a major role as an entrepreneur included infrastructure and
services such as transportation, communication, banking, insurance and the
76 Deutsche Lufthansa AG was founded in 1926 as Deutsche Luft Hansa AG. Today's
Deutsche Lufthansa AG (short: Lufthansa) is not a legal successor of the old Deutsche
Lufthansa AG, but has acquired the naming rights.
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supply of gas, water and electricity as well as mining and related industries.
All political levels  municipalities, the states of Germany and the federal level
 were involved. That way, a very heterogeneous state-owned sector with com-
plex ownership structures was built up over decades. Public entrepreneurship
was connected to the general view that the state should both complement
and regulate private economic activity. This idea was widely and for a long
time accepted among economists, politicians and the public and was theoret-
ically developed in the Gemeinwirtschaftslehre. The history of state-owned
enterprises in Germany is characterised by a wide-spread use of mixed public-
private ownership structures and the involvement of three political levels in the
federal framework. As a result, public ownership on the three political levels
was connected. In particular, the German states and the federal level were
interwoven due to complicated and joint shareholding structures. A number
of subsidiary companies of the holding company VIAG for example were situ-
ated in Bavaria and jointly owned by VIAG and Bavaria  a fact which would
later cause numerous disputes. The municipalities constituted a signiﬁcant
factor in the energy market due to their municipal shareholdings, including
the energy sector. An example of an intertwining of federal and municipal
state-ownership was Preussenelektra AG. The federal share in Preussenelektra
was 83,67%, the rest was partially owned by local authorities. Given that mu-
nicipal energy suppliers were in diﬀerent ways horizontally connected to federal
energy companies, which produced a major part of the German energy supply,
they might turn out to be a relevant factor in the privatisation discussion.77
Until the First World War, municipalities and the German states had
been major players in public enterprises. The federal level became more im-
portant during the First World War because of the perceived need for state
interventions in the war economy. In 1923, VIAG was founded as a holding
company for participations of the Reich in the energy and chemical sectors
which had been acquired to a large extent during the war. However, the
states remained the driving forces of economic activity during the Weimar Re-
public. The centralisation of economic control and regulation in the Third
77 For an overview of public enterprises in Germany see Wengenroth (2000).
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Reich led to a shift of responsibilities and ownership to the federal level. This
tendency was reversed with the revival of the federal political structure after
1945. Municipal entrepreneurship was concentrated in public utilities such as
the supply of water, electricity, gas and local transportation and was linked
to the expansion of municipal tasks due to urbanisation. Fiscal reasons only
played a minor role; often pragmatic reasons such as quality and security of
supply led to the formation of municipal enterprises or the takeover of pri-
vate companies. In many cases, limited ﬁnancial resources of municipalities
led to mixed public-private ownership in these sectors.78 Historically, pub-
lic services were largely organised on the municipal level. Local authorities
have been important political levels in the German federal system since the
Weimar Republic. The German constitution (Grundgesetz, GG) from 1949
has anchored the principle of municipal self-government in Art. 28 Abs. 2
Satz 1 GG. The framework for municipal economic activity are the municipal
codes of the German states which were adopted after 1945. They replaced
the national German municipal code from 1935 which had abolished the fed-
eral structure during the Third Reich. On the municipal level, privatisation
discussions did not play an important role until the late 1980s, when some au-
thorities started to privatise public services. The states of Germany played a
dominant role in the transportation and communication sectors. While in the
middle of the 19th century public and private ownership still coexisted, con-
centration towards the end of the 19th century led to nationalisation and the
formation of monopolistic state companies. Among the ﬁve largest employers
in the German Reich, four were public enterprises, two of them railway com-
panies owned by the states: the Prussian-Hessen Railway Company and the
Royal Bavarian Railway Company. The third large employer was the Prussian
Mine and Foundry Company Preussag, founded in 1923 as a holding company
for the Prussian mining industry. Only the fourth enterprise, Reichspost, was
owned by the Reich. Mining and energy formed a second focus of state en-
trepreneurship. Prussia in particular developed a very active entrepreneurial
policy. In need of coal for its extended railway network, Prussia started to
78 See Ambrosius (1995).
Chapter 2. Public Enterprises in the Federal Setting 56
engage in the coal business in the second half of the 19th century. Between
1904 and 1917, the Ruhr coal mining company Hibernia AG, established in
1855 as a private company in Herne, was taken over against the strong re-
sistance of private companies and banks.79 In the 1920s, the large number
of small shareholdings were bundled with the aim to allow for horizontal and
vertical integration and to raise proﬁtability. In 1923, two large umbrella com-
panies were formed besides Hibernia: Prussia's mining shareholdings became
part of the Prussian Mine and Foundry Company; shareholdings in electricity
production and supply were bundled as Preussenelektra. In 1929, VEBA was
founded as a holding company of the three large Prussian mining and energy
enterprises.80 Except for Reichspost, the Reich did not play a signiﬁcant role
as an entrepreneur or shareholder until 1914. This began to change during the
First World War, when a large number of regulations and war-related com-
panies, for example in chemical industries, were set up. Later, many of these
were bundled in the holding company VIAG. In 1924, Deutsche Reichsbahn-
Gesellschaft was formed as an independent, Reich-owned holding company of
the state railways. Since the 1920s, the Reich government also engaged ac-
tively in the aircraft industry: In 1926, Deutsche Luft Hansa AG was founded
as a merger of two partly state-owned aircraft companies Deutsche Aero Lloyd
and Junkers Luftverkehr AG, part of Junkers Flugzeug- und Motorenwerke
AG. During the Third Reich, public enterprises were to a large extent used for
military purposes as part of the war economy. Due to political and economic
centralisation, the federal structure was abandoned or became insigniﬁcant
and the German states and municipalities lost inﬂuence. In 1937, Reichswerke
Hermann Göring AG, a large iron and steel producer, was established: The soil
around Braunschweig was known for its low content of iron ore; nevertheless,
it was needed for war production. When the mining companies in the Ruhr
district refused to establish production sites in Salzgitter, Göring decided to
form Reichswerke as a public enterprise. Another important industrial enter-
prise was the de facto takeover of the Montan AG. Montan served as a lessor
for industrial estates owned by the army. This policy of veiled state interven-
79 On the history of Hibernia see Bleidick (1999).
80 See Winkler (1965).
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tionism in the war industry became later known as Montan-Schema. In 1937,
Volkswagenwerk was founded by the National Socialist trade union organisa-
tion German Labour Front (Deutsche Arbeitsfront, DAF ) with the purpose of
producing Volkswagen cars, yet the factory was used to manufacture military
vehicles. Both Reichswerke and Volkwswagenwerk were established as part of
the war industry.
2.2 Under Allied Control
After the end of the war, public enterprises were subject to Allied81 control.
Participations were among the property taken under control by the military
government. All companies had to be registered and provisional trusteeships
were established. As in the private sector, public enterprises were aﬀected by
war destructions and losses, liquidations and dismantling of industries.82
At the end of the Third Reich, the situation of public enterprises was
unclear. Prussia was oﬃcially liquidated by the Allied Supreme Command in
1947, so that the large amount of Prussian industrial property had became
ownerless. A large part of these shareholdings were located in the British zone
of occupation, in particular in the Ruhr district. In addition to this, it was an
open question whether a new German state would be a legal successor of the
German Reich and would automatically inherit public enterprises.
The question of public ownership did not play a major role during the
Allied occupation and the military government left key decisions to the new
German government. This might have been inﬂuenced by the fact that public
enterprises were engaged primarily in industries which were of fundamental
importance for German and European reconstruction. The power vacuum and
the lack of an Allied concept regarding the question of state ownership led
to a rather chaotic initial situation for public enterprises. Hence, individual
resolute actions dominated the immediate post-war situation. Eventual so-
cialisation plans, in particular in the Ruhr district, had no direct eﬀect on the
81 In most of the cases in this chapter, the term Allied or Allies refers predominantly to the
British and US military government.
82 Wengenroth (2000), pp. 118119.
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administration of existing public enterprises. To the contrary, ﬁrst initiatives
towards selling shareholdings were already made by the Court of Audit in the
British zone before 1949.
Administrative decisions of the military government had an impact on
the future ownership situation of shareholdings. Crucial for the further devel-
opment was that the states of Germany, except for Saarland, were established
before the federal state. That way, the states played an important role in the
administration of the public enterprises between 1945 and 1949. The adminis-
tration of this heirless property was quickly handed over to the German ﬁnance
administration, both in the American and British zone. This put the German
states in a very strong position. In some cases, sector speciﬁc controls and
strong position of chief ﬁnance presidents protected companies from the grasp
of the states.
On 10 November 1948, law no. 75 of the US and the British military
governments Reorganisation of German coal and iron and steel Industries
became eﬀective. The attached schedule named VEBA, RWE, Vereinigte Elek-
trizitätswerke Westfalen AG (VEW) and VIAG and declared that these assets,
if not already under such control, are hereby placed under control pursuant
to the provisions of military government law no 52 about the blocking and
control of property. In its preamble, law no. 75 declared that the question of
the eventual ownership of the coal and iron and steel industries should be left
to the determination of a representative, freely elected German Government.
This ﬁnally postponed a decision about the question of public ownership, na-
tionalisations and privatisations and left it to the future German state.
2.2.1 Handover of Administrative Responsibilities
The administration of shareholdings was organised within zonal borders. Ad-
ditionally, a unit for the administration of former Prussian and Reich property
was established in the Bipartite control oﬃce in 1947.
US military government law no. 52 about the blocking and control of
property in combination with general order no. 1 named the companies un-
der control. Control was handed over to the property control branch, which
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initially was part of the economics division of the military government, later
of the ﬁnance division. When the ﬁnance division was dissolved in March
1948, property control became a branch of the new property division. A grad-
ual transfer of responsibility to German authorities began in the latter half
of 1946. Authority was assigned to the Land property control chiefs and the
German Land civilian agency heads.83 One reason for this early transfer of
control might have been the sheer amount of controlled property. For the
shareholdings, trustees were appointed.
The British military government handed responsibility over to the chief
ﬁnance presidents (Oberﬁnanzpräsidenten, OFP). The chief ﬁnance presidents
were the intermediate authority of the Reich ﬁnance administration under the
supervision of the Reich Finance Ministry between 1919 and 1945. Later, they
became part of the ﬁnance administration of the German states. The ﬁnance
administration was controlled by the British property control branch which
itself was based in Minden. Regional administration was handed over to the
local ﬁnance administration. Just as in the US zone, provisional trusteeships
for the management of shareholdings were established.
The British zone which included the industrially important Ruhr district
became a centre for many shareholdings. A majority of headquarters, in par-
ticular of holding companies, was located or relocated here. This included
VIAG, VEBA and its three subsidiary companies Preussag, Preussenelek-
tra and Hibernia, Howaldtswerke in Hamburg and Kiel, Volkswagenwerk and
Reichswerke. VEBA had relocated its headquarters from the Soviet sector
in Berlin to Hamburg, VIAG established second headquarters in Hannover.
Also located in the British zone were VEBA's subsidiary companies Hibernia,
Preussenelektra and Preussag. Preussenelektra had relocated its headquarters
from the Soviet Sector of Berlin to Hannover, Preussag, which was also based
on the Soviet Sector of Berlin, established second headquarters in Goslar. Also,
the owner-less Volkswagenwerk and Howaldtswerke were based in the British
zone.
A report of the audit court in the British zone identiﬁed approximately
83 Oﬃce of Military Government for Germany (US): Property Control in the U.S.-occupied
area of German 19451949, Special Report of the Military Governor, July 1949.
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420 companies which were either located in the British zone or had property
in the British zone, most of them private law companies in the form of AG or
GmbH. Of these, 35% were direct shareholdings and 65% indirect sharehold-
ings; 71% were located in the British zone and 29% outside.84 The nominal
value of Reich and Prussian shareholdings in the British zone was estimated
to be 1,717,887,000 RM (Reich) and 676,170,000 RM (Prussia).85
In the British zone, shareholdings were better protected from the grasp
of the German states because the state ﬁnance administration did not have a
decisive role in the administration of state property. Chief ﬁnance presidents
reported directly to the military government. At ﬁrst, they were entrusted
with investigations about heirless property located in their regions. Later, the
property control section of the ﬁnance branch of the British military govern-
ment gradually transferred control of companies with signiﬁcant shareholdings
of the Reich to the chief ﬁnance presidents. The chief ﬁnance presidents then
replaced and appointed members of the management board and supervisory
bodies, executives and trustees according to economic principles.86
On 3 December 1947, the British property control branch established
a zonal coordination committee for Reich and NSDAP property, the Zone-
nausschuss für die Verwaltung von Reichs- und Staatsvermögen, based in Ham-
burg.87 This was based on a suggestion of the Court of Audit to establish a
superior institution that would, similar to the Reich Finance Ministry before-
hand, control compliance with regulations .88 Members of the committee were
the president of the Court of Audit, the president of the central oﬃce of the
ﬁnance administration, the director of the zonal budget oﬃce and the chief
84 BArch B102/75789, Die Überprüfung der Beteiligungen des Reiches und des ehemaligen
Landes Preußen in der britischen Besatzungszone durch den Rechnungshof des Deutschen
Reichs (Britische Zone) in Hamburg, Vortrag auf der Tagung des Unterausschusses für
Beteiligungen des Zonenausschusses für die Verwaltung von Reichs- und Staatsvermögen
am 7. September 1948 in Stadthagen.
85 BArch B102/75789, Verwaltung und Nutzung des Reichs- und Staatsvermögens in der
Britischen Besatzungszone.
86 BArch B326/309, Der Oberﬁnanzpräsident, Hamburg, August 1946: Erfassung und
Verwaltung des Reichs-, Partei- und Wehrmachtsvermögens.
87 BArch B326/263, Rechnungshof des Deutschen Reichs (Britische Zone), to: Verwaltung
für Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten des Vereinigten Wirtschaftsgebiets, Ham-
burg,14.5.1948.
88 BArch B102/75789,Verwaltung und Nutzung des Reichs- und Staatsvermögens in der
Britischen Besatzungszone.
Chapter 2. Public Enterprises in the Federal Setting 61
ﬁnance presidents.89 Later, state delegates were added.90
That the chief ﬁnance presidents were in charge led to disputes with the
German states which tried to decentralise the management of Reich and NS-
DAP property.91 Without success, the states requested parity between the
chief ﬁnance presidents and the state administrations concerning the adminis-
tration of property and positions in the supervisory boards of the companies
under control.92 A Handbook of Property Control conﬁrmed the status of
the chief ﬁnance presidents.93 The status of the chief ﬁnance presidents was
conﬁrmed again later by an order of the military government which determined
that the chief ﬁnance presidents were custodians and as such directly subordi-
nated to the military government, and not part of the ﬁnance administration
of the German states.94
Transfer of ownership to the federal level was prepared by three simul-
taneously enacted directives: US law no. 19 from 10 April 1949,95, British
directive No. 202 and French directive 217. All directives established trustee-
ship of the German states until further regulation would have been adopted
by the future German government, but in diﬀerent ways.96
British law no. 202 placed public enterprises under ﬁduciary administra-
tion of the German states while the question of ownership was left to the future
89 BArch B326/264, Property Control Section, HQ Hansestadt Hamburg, to Präsident des
Rechungshofes für die Britische Zone, 10.12.1947.
90 BArch B326/256,Geschäftsordnung des Zonenausschusses für die Verwaltung von
Reichs- und Staatsvermögen in Hamburg. (In der Fassung des Beschlusses vom 30.
November 1948).
91 BArch B326/309, OFP to Präsident der Leitstelle der Finanzverwaltung, 2.12.1946.
92 BArch B326/262, Niederschrift über die Besprechung zwischen den Abteilungsleitern
und Referenten der Oberﬁnanzpräsidenten, der Finanzleitstelle, des Zentral-Haushalts-
Amts und des Rechnungshofs am 20. und 21. Januar 1948 in Hamburg über Einrichtung
der den Oberﬁnanzpräsidenten übertragenen Verwaltung von Reichs- und Staatseigen-
tum.
93 BArch B326/264, Property Control Instruction No. 24 (S), see Handbuch der Vermö-
genskontrolle, published by the Control Commission for Germany (BE), sent to Chief
Finance President, Section V3, 22.1.1948.
94 BArch B326/262, Transcript:  Zonenausschuss für die Verwaltung von Reichs- und
Staatsvermögen  Zuständigkeit der Oberﬁnanzpräsidenten, Property Control Branch
Minden, to Property Control Branches Düsseldorf, Hanover and Kiel, 20.7.1948.
95 US Law No. 19 about the Disposing of Properties in the United States Zone of occupation
and the United States Sector of Berlin Having Belonged to the Former German Reich
and to the Former German States, Länder or Provinces (including the State of Prussia).
96 For an overview see BArch B102/75787, Verwaltung für Finanzen: Niederschrift über
die Sitzung am 23. September 1949 betr. das Reichsvermögen und das Vermögen des
früheren Landes Preußen, 23.9.1949, Bad Homburg.
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federal government. Article VI conferred powers upon the future German gov-
ernment but conﬁrmed that land authorities remained in charge. The mili-
tary government later clariﬁed that the emphasis was on `authorities', and not
on `land', so that the chief ﬁnance presidents would stay in charge.97 Article
II speciﬁed the property which would remain under British control, amongst
this Wehrmacht property, moving picture property and property which was
subject to disarmament.
US Law No. 19 and French Directive No. 217 attributed property the
ﬁduciary ownership of the respective German state. An exemption was made
in case of a majority participation in an entity which was located in another
state. In these cases, the state where the participation was located had to
be assigned a stake in the parent company.98 This applied particularly to
subsidiary companies of VIAG which were located in Bavaria.
A special case was Volkswagenwerk, which had been established by the
German Labour Front, the National Socialist trade union organisation, in 1937.
The question of its ownership was legally debated for more than a decade be-
cause it was not clear whether the German Labour Front was part of the Reich
or constituted its own legal entity.99 Therefore, it did not count as former Re-
ich Property. Here, the hesitant approach of the British military government
for a trend-setting decision became most evident. Since it did not consti-
tute Reich property, Volkswagenwerk did not fall under the general British
rules and required special regulations. In September 1949, responsibility for
Volkswagenwerk was delegated to the federal government and Lower Saxony
as trustee. According to previous research, the British military government
preferred public ownership over private ownership.100 In 1949, the British gov-
ernment handed responsibility directly over to Lower Saxony which should as
a trustee administer Volkswagenwerk until the new federal government would
take further decisions.101
97 BArch B326/256, Landesamt für Vermögenskontrolle: Niederschrift über die Tagung der
Oberﬁnanzpräsidenten  Reichs- und Staatsvermögensstellen  der Finanzministerien der
brit. Zone und des Rechnungshofes für Sonderaufgaben, Hamburg, in Bad Meinberg am
4. November 1949, 7.11.1949.
98 US Law No. 19, Art. 5 (6) and Art. 5 (7)
99 Nicolaysen (2002), pp. 1361.
100 Edelmann (2003), p. 89; Mommsen and Grieger (1996), p. 978.
101 Verordnung 202 of the British Military Government. This regulation was conﬁrmed by
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The Court of Audit in the British zone became an important institu-
tion and participated as an advising body in many decisions concerning the
administration of shareholdings. The idea to make use of the Reich ﬁnance ad-
ministration and chief ﬁnance presidents for administering heirless enterprises
goes back to a suggestion of the Court of Audit in the British zone in the
summer of 1945.102 In August 1945, the military government entrusted the
zonal Court of Audit in Hamburg with a review of the activity of the Reich
and Prussia as shareholders.103 The court internally assumed that a ﬁnal deci-
sion of the military government about the Reich and Prussian property would
follow the suggestions of the German administration.104 Evidently there was
a functioning cooperation between the ﬁnance administration and the British
military government.
The benchmark for the investigation of the audit court was the Reich
Budget Act (Reichshaushaltsordnung, RHO). According to  47 RHO, state
ownership required a public interest that could not be satisﬁed in another way.
At a meeting of the subcommittee for Reich and state property of the zonal
committee, a delegate of the Court of Audit presented preliminary results.
He concluded that a public interest for state-owned shareholdings does in
many cases not exist anymore due to the end of the war and changed public
tasks. Therefore, it has to be examined in which cases the shareholdings of
the Reich or Prussia should be kept and in which cases they should be given
up.105 An exemption was made for those industries that were subject to
Allied Law No. A 16 from 1951. See documentation in BArch B102/76389, Div. II B
BMF, 1.7.1953. (Dietrich (1996), p. 215).
102 BArch B102/75789,Verwaltung und Nutzung des Reichs- und Staatsvermögens in der
Britischen Besatzungszone  Kurzfassung.
103 BArch B102/75789, Rechnungshof des Deutschen Reichs (Britische Zone) to Verwaltung
für Wirtschaft des Vereinigten Wirtschaftsgebietes, Beteiligungen des Reiches und des
ehemaligen Landes Preußen, Hamburg 3.8.1948.
104 BArch B102/75789, Transcript: Verwaltung und Nutzung des Reichs- und Staatsver-
mögens in der Britischen Besatzungszone  Kurzfassung.
105 ein Interesse der öﬀentlichen Hand, selbst Gesellschafter von öﬀentlichen Unternehmen
zu sein, besteht infolge des Kriegsausgangs und der veränderten staatlichen Aufgaben
häuﬁg nicht mehr. Es ist deshalb geboten, zu prüfen, in welchen Fällen die Beteiligung
des Reichs und Preussens beizubehalten sowie in welchen Fällen sie aufzugeben ist,
BArch B102/75789, Die Überprüfung der Beteiligungen des Reiches und des ehemaligen
Landes Preußen in der britischen Besatzungszone durch den Rechnungshof des Deutschen
Reichs (Britische Zone) in Hamburg, Vortrag auf der Tagung des Unterausschusses für
Beteiligungen des Zonenausschusses für die Verwaltung von Reichs- und Staatsvermögen
am 7. September 1948 in Stadthagen, p. 4.
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socialisation plans: The decision about the shares of the Reich and Prussia
has to be postponed for those industries whose socialisation (transfer into
public ownership) is planned. This applies particularly to enterprises in the
coal mining industry and iron and steel production.106 This was probably a
reference to the recent socialisation decisions in North Rhine-Westphalia and
Hesse. Nevertheless, the court had made clear that state-ownership had to
comply with the regulations in place which were inherited from the Reich.
The burden of proof for the necessity of state ownership was according to the
RHO on the side of a government which intended to create or keep public
enterprises.
2.2.2 Saving the Holding Companies
The Reich and Prussian corporate property was defended on two sides in the
post-war years: Against dismantling and against the grasp of the German
states. The Potsdam Treaty stipulated that the German armaments industry
should be dismantled as a part of the war reparations. The list of companies
which should be partially or completely dismantled was reduced in the Peters-
berg Agreement from 16 October 1948, and in January 1951 the three Western
Allied high commissioners announced the end of all dismantling. Special reg-
ulations were imposed for the Reich owned ﬁlm assets and the air transport
industry.107
Hibernia was aﬀected by production restrictions through its participa-
tions in Scholven and Chemische Werke Hüls (CWH). Both companies were
on the dismantling list but removed in the Petersberg Agreement. Despite
this, neither Scholven nor Chemische Werke Hüls had the permission to resume
to production. Scholven regained its full legal capacity in 1952. Chemische
Werke Hüls was partially owned by I.G. Farbenindustrie AG. It was classiﬁed
as a prohibited industry II and had to ﬁnd new production ﬁelds since the
106 Die Entscheidung über die weitere Beteiligung des Reichs und Preussens wird bei den
Unternehmen derjenigen Wirtschaftszweige zurückgestellt werden müssen, deren Sozial-
isierung (Überführung in Gemeineigentum) geplant ist. In Betracht kommen hier in
allererster Linie die Unternehmen des Kohlenbergbaus sowie der Eisen- und Stahlerzeu-
gung., ibid.
107 See p. 89
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manufacture of its main product Buna was forbidden. The company resumed
production in 1953.108
The Reichswerke group was included in the dismantling list based on the
Potsdam Treaty. A number of plants were shut down and demolished from
1947. Due to the high inﬂow of German refugees, rising unemployment and
subsequent unrest of the population in 1950, the British occupation decided
to save the Salzgitter steel industry and to stop dismantling. In 1953, the
company was renamed AG für Bergbau- und Hüttenbetriebe. In 1948, the
zonal committee requested to postpone the dismantling of the Reichswerke
group from the Control Commission.109 The reconstruction of the iron and
steel works in Salzgitter began in 1953. In the same year, the companies which
belonged to Reichswerke were released from Allied control and responsibility
for reorganising the Reichswerke complex was handed over to the West German
government.
The distribution of subsidiary companies of the large holdings over several
occupation zones led to diﬃculties for the managers to hold `their' companies
together. Even more so, as the states became increasingly interested in taking
over those assets. This will be shown on the examples of VEBA and VIAG.
Both companies already suﬀered from the loss of many valuable production
facilities in former Eastern Prussia and Eastern countries.110
VEBA was mainly located within the British zone, but cohesion was
complicated because of split custody. In the British zone, Hermann Schilling
was appointed general custodian of VEBA by the property control, but cus-
tody for the subsidiary companies Preussag and Preussenelektra was with the
chief ﬁnance president Hanover. Schilling complained about this, but the split
custody was conﬁrmed by an order of the military government from 5 July
1948.111
108 Radzio (1979), pp. 183187.
109 BArch B326/256, Zonenausschuss für die Verwaltung von Reichs- und Staatsvermögen:
Niederschrift über die Tagung des Zonenausschusses für die Verwaltung von Reichs- und
Staatsvermögen am 4. Mai 1948 in Hamburg, 13.5.1948.
110 Pohl (1998), pp. 227228; Laufer and Stier (2005), pp. 393395
111 BArch B326/256, Zonenausschuss für die Verwaltung von Reichs- und Staatsvermögen:
Niederschrift über die Tagung des Zonenausschusses für die Verwaltung von Reichs- und
Staatsvermögen am 4. Mai 1948 in Hamburg, 13.5.1948; BArch B326/262, Niederschrift
über die Tagung des Unterausschusses für Reichsbeteiligungen in Stadthagen, 7.12.1948.
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VEBA's survival as a holding company in the immediate post-war years
succeeded mainly due to the inﬂuence of Hermann Schilling. Schilling had been
managing-director of Preußische Staatsbank and as such executive board mem-
ber of VEBA since 1933. As has been reported, Schilling transferred VEBA
from Berlin to Hamburg as the legal representative of the company. He intro-
duced himself as VEBA's representative to Hamburg's ﬁnancial administration
and successfully requested that the company would put under British property
control. Oﬃcially, Schilling did not have the power to represent VEBA. But
nevertheless he was successful  the normative power of the factual had won.
Schilling organised the appointment of a supervisory board with Her-
mann Brekenfeld as chairman. Brekenfeld had been on the management board
of VEBA since 1929 and was comparably politically unburdened as the only
board member who had been appointed before 1933. He had also been a
member of the supervisory board of Preussag. Together with Otto Klewitz,
Brekenfeld was appointed a member of the management board in 1945. The
other management board members had been dismissed due to their involve-
ments with the National Socialists. When Brekenfeld was imprisoned by the
Soviets because he had been assistant director of the Preußische Staatsbank,
Schilling himself took his position in the supervisory board, became chairmen
in January 1946 and kept this position until 1959.
While VEBA as a holding structure had been kept together, the cohesion
of the plants and factories of the three main subsidiary companies Hibernia,
Preussag and Preussenelektra was still unclear. Hibernia's top managers Wil-
helm Tengelmann and Stein were imprisoned and Walther Fimmen had gone
into hiding. Mining councillor Walter Bälz held the fort at the company's
headquarters in Herne and kept the production going. On 13 August 1945,
Bälz was oﬃcially appointed trustee of Hibernia and its subsidiary companies
by the North German Coal Control (NGCC) which wanted him to work to-
wards output maximisation. It has been argued that it was advantageous for
VEBA that Hibernia was under the control of the NGCC and as such pro-
tected from the grasp of North Rhine-Westphalia.112 The chairman of the
112 Laufer and Stier (2005), p. 398. The NGCC was established and charged with the
administration of black coal production in the British zone. In 1947, the US joined
Chapter 2. Public Enterprises in the Federal Setting 67
bizonal economic council requested that the bipartite control oﬃce should be
considerate of functional economic units such as Preussenelektra and not to
split them into several parts.113
In the case of VIAG, it was problematic that factories and subsidiary
companies were distributed over large areas and hence part of several occu-
pation zones. Bayernwerk, Innwerk and Süddeutsche Kalkstickstoﬀ-Werke, all
important subsidiary companies of VIAG, were based in the US zone. This
threatened the company's cohesion, it became increasingly diﬃcult to hold
the large holding companies together. VIAG's headquarters were relocated
from the Soviet sector to the British sector in Berlin where the company was
registered on 23 May 1945 by Hans Rosinsky, accountant of VIAG. The ﬁ-
nance authority supported the company's resumption of business. Yet, VIAG
had no management board. All former board members were either dead, im-
prisoned or had escaped. In June 1945, Ludger Westrick and Georg Rotzoll
were appointed commissary board members. Westrick later became secre-
tary of state in the Ministry of Economics.114 VIAG's ﬁrst general assembly
took place on 5 July 1945 and served to dismiss former Nazi members from
the supervisory board. Heinrich Nickel was appointed trustee by the Soviets.
Production was only gradually resumed in the plants. In 1948, Innwerk, sub-
sidy of Vereinigte Aluminium-Werke AG (VAW) was granted the permission
to produce aluminium as the ﬁrst West German factory. Westrick's inﬂuence
on VEBA grew when he became trustee of some of VIAG's shareholdings in
the Western occupation zones. On 10 June 1947, Ludger Westrick was one
of two appointed general and authorised administrators of the West German
plants of VAW, which was subject to a ban of production because of its pre-
vious military equipment production, the Vereinigte Leichtmetall-Werke AG,
and the organisation was renamed in US/UK Coal Control Group (US/UK CCG) (later
Deutsche Kohlenbergbau-Leitung (DKBL)).
113 BArch B102/75787, Vorsitzer des Verwaltungsrates des Vereinigten Wirtschaftsgebietes
(Hermann Pünder) to Bipartite Control Oﬃce, Joint Secretariat Frankfurt, 14.5.1949.
114 Ludger Westrick had been working for the VAW, one of VIAG's largest subsidiary com-
panies, since 1933 and in 1939 he had transferred as chairmen and managing-director to
VIAG. Between 1939 and 1945, he served as main trustee of the company and as such
belonged to the Wehrwirtschaftsführer, the elitist group of Nazi top managers. After
the German surrender, he was imprisoned by the Soviet but set free shortly afterwards.
Between 1948 and 1951, Westrick was ﬁnancial manager of the DKBL.
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the Rheinische Blattmetall AG and the Vereinigte Werke by the chief ﬁnance
president of Cologne.
A large number of the remaining plants of VIAG and its subsidiary com-
panies were located in Bavaria and put under Bavarian trusteeship. This be-
came a diﬃcult situation given the closed oﬀ borders between the occupation
zones. Accountant Rosinsky was the only one allowed by the Soviets to travel
to Bavaria to visit VIAG's industrial property and to conﬁrm VIAG's claims of
ownership. The situation became worrying when the US property control as-
signed trusteeship for VIAG's subsidiary company BAWAG and Bayernwerk,
which was owned by the Bavarian state, to one and the same trustees to the
disadvantage of VIAG. Westrick and his team feared that the Bavarian state
would try to control the Bavarian energy market with the help of Bayernwerk.
The conﬂict between Bavaria and VIAG worsened when Bavaria started to ap-
point members for the subsidiary boards of the subsidiary companies under its
trusteeship. Westrick ﬁnally travelled himself to Munich and insisted on seats
for VIAG representatives in the boards. On the Bavarian side, Ludwig Erhard
(CDU), at that time Minister of State, argued against him. Negotiations be-
tween Bavaria, VIAG and later also the federal government continued for years.
As a holding company, VIAG's business system depended on the horizontal
integration of energy production and supply from Bavaria and the production
of energy-intensive aluminium and nitrogen.115 According to Radzio, Gerhard
Breme, specialist advisor of the chief ﬁnance president in Hamburg, later re-
membered about attempts from the side of the states to take over heirless
property: Most eager in this matter were the Bavarians, especially concerning
VIAG plants and factories. But also Lower Saxony was not idle. It wanted
to take over Preussag and Preussenelektra.116 VIAG's ownership situation
was not resolved until the adoption of the Reich Property Act in 1961. In the
meantime, the company set up a second headquarter in Bonn in order to be
closer to the federal government.117
115 Pohl (1998), pp. 223254.
116 Am begierigsten waren in in den ersten Nachkriegsjahren in dieser Beziehung die Bayern,
besonders, was die Werke der VIAG anging. Aber auch Niedersachsen war nicht untätig.
Es wollte die Preussag und die Preussenelektra übernehmen.Radzio (1979), p. 188.
117 Pohl (1998).
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2.3 Solving the Ownership Question:
Portfolio-Redistribution in the Federal
Framework
With the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany, a new phase be-
gan. In the centre of the beginning reorganisation of shareholdings stood the
question as to who would exert the rights of the shareholder of the companies
which had so far been labelled as heirless. The ownership question was dis-
cussed between the federal government and the German states for more than
a decade, a ﬁnal allocation was settled by law in 1961.
Article 134 of the German constitution assigned property of the Reich
and the former state of Prussia in principle to the federal level. It provided that
details about the distribution should be speciﬁed by law. This law required the
approval of the federal Council, the second chamber representing the states.
It was however not entirely clear whether the federal government had already
become the owner or whether he held administered the property as trustee
until further legislation had been passed. One major issue was the character
of Art. 134 Abs. 1 GG: In case of an identity of the Federal Republic and the
former Reich (identity theory), Art. 134 GG only had declaratory character.
This was the view adopted by the federal level. However, the German states
insisted on the provisional character of Art. 134 and on their position as
trustees.
It was obvious early on that Art. 134 GG might lead to problems. An
internal note of the chief ﬁnance president Hamburg from 19 May 1949 men-
tioned the two diﬀerent approaches of the US and the British military govern-
ments and their consequences for the state property. According to the note,
the British military government assumed that the German Reich continued to
exist. This would have meant that control over the property within the zones
would continue to be exercised by the zonal administration. The US view did
not assume a legal continuance which made the property a `hereditas iacens'
(ownerless property) which would later belong to the newly established Federal
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Republic.118
A meeting of the bipartite administrative council for the economy on
23 September 1949 conﬁrmed the position of the federal government that the
Federal Republic was the legal successor of the Reich (Identity theory) and Art.
134 Abs. 1 GG therefore had only declarative character but did not provide a
new legal basis. It was advised to sign standstill agreements with the states
in the US and French occupation zone to prevent them from changes of the
status quo of public enterprises that would be diﬃcult to reverse later. At this
point it was still assumed that the military government might command the
unbundling of public enterprises and a re-distribution of shareholdings.119
At this point, the Allied military laws were still legally binding. Records
of the courts of audit reveal that the auditors were still worried that the Allies
might allocate public enterprises to the German states.120
Finally, Allied law no. A16 from 4 May 1951 repealed British decree no.
202, US law no. 19 and French decree no. 217 and left the decisions over pub-
lic enterprises to the German government.121 Subsequently, the chief ﬁnance
presidents and ﬁnance administrations gradually transferred control of state
property over to the Ministry of Finance. In reverse, the Ministry of Finance
entrusted the administration with tasks such as liquidation of companies.122
The attempt to come to a solution with the states in form of an admin-
istrative agreement failed. Even though there was a conservative majority in
both chambers, Bundestag and Bundesrat, the interests of the federal govern-
ment and the state governments were too diﬀerent, so that party aﬃliation was
not decisive in this case. State legislation did sometimes not comply with with
the German constitution: The Hessian Constitution for example provided that
118 BArch B326/262, Internal note: Besprechung grundsätzlicher Fragen mit dem Rech-
nungshof des Deutschen Reiches (Britische Zone)  Abwicklungsstelle, 19.5.1949.
119 BArch B102/75787, Niederschrift über die Sitzung am 23. September 1949 betr. das
Reichsvermögen und das Vermögen des früheren Landes Preussen.
120 BArch B102/75789, Verwaltung von Reichseigentum durch die Verwaltung des Vere-
inigten Wirtschaftsgebietes, Presidents of the Courts of Audit in the British Zone and
Bizone to the President of the Administrative Board of the Bizone, Hamburg, 20.4.1949.
121Gesetz Nr. A -16: Aufhebung von Rechtsvorschriften der Besatzungsbehörden über
das Vermögen des früheren Reiches und der Länder, in: Gazette of the Allied High
Commission of Germany, p. 881.
122 BArch B326/265, OFD Hamburg, Verwaltungsstelle für Reichs- und Staatsvermögen, to
BMF, 15.12.1951.
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all Prussian property located within Hesse was transferred into Hessian prop-
erty. This would have aﬀected mainly VEBA plants. The German states based
their ownership claims on Allied regulations which had assigned administrative
tasks to the states.123
The federal government therefore opted for a legislative provisional solu-
tion as soon as Allied legislation had been lifted. The Provisional Prussian and
Reich Property Act (Gesetz zur vorläuﬁgen Regelung der Rechtsverhältnisse des
Reichsvermögens und der preußischen Beteiligungen, short: Vorschaltgesetz )
conﬁrmed the federal government as the legitimate owner, but listed a number
of companies which were of no national importance and whose administration
was assigned to the states. The law assigned a majority of seats in the su-
pervisory bodies of public enterprises to the federal level. The ﬁnal regulation
was left to a future federal law, as was already provided in Art. 134 Abs. 4
and 135 Abs. 6 GG.
Negotiations continued for an entire decade. Since 1949, meetings with
representatives of the German states regularly took place in Bad Ems nearby
Frankfurt.124 The federal position was that enterprises with regional im-
portance should be transferred to the states, while enterprises with super-
regional importance should remain with the federal level. The Reich Property
Act (Gesetz zur Regelung der Rechtsverhältnisse des Reichsvermögens und der
preußischen Beteiligungen, short: Reichsvermögen-Gesetz ) from 1961 ﬁnally
clariﬁed the ownership rights and widely conﬁrmed the working solution.
2.4 Public Sector Size and Relevance
The public corporate sector which came under Allied control and was later
handed over to the new German state was a heterogeneous and unstructured
portfolio of shareholdings. Unfortunately, no data are available about the vol-
ume of public enterprises in immediate post-war Germany. In the early 1950s,
the federal government started with an inventory of state property. From the
123 For the negotiations, see documentation of the BMF in BArch B126/10211, 10214, 10215
and 10217.
124 The minutes can be found in BArch B102/75766.
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mid-1950s onwards, the Ministry of Finance published lists of federal share-
holdings in the annual budget reports. The federal administration measured
public enterprises in the number of directly and indirectly owned shareholdings
and the volume in nominal capital. Heinz Maria Oeftering,125 head of division
in the Ministry of Finance, suggested in an internationally published article to
use the workforce as measurement for the importance of state ownership since
no better data was available.126
According to the Ministry of the Treasury, in 1958, the federal industrial
complexes VEBA, VIAG, Volkswagenwerk, Saarbergwerke and Howaldtswerke
had 318,540 employees. This is just 1.3% of the total of 24,180,000 employees
in 1958.127 Also, since the currency reform, the concerns had invested 8.236
billion DM and had achieved a turnover of 10.373 billion DM in 1958.128 Since
1953, federal enterprises had been paying dividends, which had increased from
6,256 million DM in 1953 to 39,008 million DM in 1957. A main share of
investments can be ascribed to high internal ﬁnancing opportunities : 77% of
the investments of 872 million DM in 1957 had been ﬁnanced by special depri-
vations. In 1955 and 1956, depreciation opportunities based on the Investment
Aid Act (Gesetz über die Investitionshilfe der gewerblichen Wirtschaft, Investi-
tionshilfegesetz ) from 1952 were even higher. While some enterprises did not
pay dividends at all until the mid to late 1950s, federal enterprises (without
Saarbergwerke) paid an average dividend of 8.8% by 1960.129
By 1957, the nominal value of federal enterprises had slightly increased
to 1.7 billion DM from 1.5 billion DM in 1954, excluding Volkswagenwerk.
However, according to a publication of Deutsche Bank, this did not reﬂect
the real value. One problem was the issue of accounting. Since none of the
shareholdings were traded, accounting basis was the corrected nominal cap-
ital with some exemptions. This led to a structural underestimation of the
value of shareholdings. The book shareholders' equity of VEBA, VIAG and
125Oeftering was a lawyer and worked for the Ministry of Finance from 1950 to 1957. From
1957 to 1972, he was president of the German Federal Railway and from 1972 to 1977
president of the company's supervising board.
126Oeftering (1953).
127German Statistical Yearbook 1961, p. 142.
128 Bundesministerium für wirtschaftlichen Besitz des Bundes (1960), pp. 1213.
129 Bundeschatzministerium (1962), pp. 1012.
Chapter 2. Public Enterprises in the Federal Setting 73
Salzgitter AG was already 2.5 billion DM. Estimations of the real value of
federal enterprises ﬂuctuated. The value of federal enterprises in 1957 exclud-
ing Volkswagenwerk was estimated to be ﬁve billion DM.130 In the Bundestag
debate about the Volkswagenwerk privatisation in 1958, values of up to seven
billion were suggested, including Volkswagenwerk, which accounted for a ﬁfth
to sixth of this sum.131 In 1960, the value had increased to estimated nine
billion DM.132
Some data is available on the relative importance of federal enterprises
in speciﬁc markets. Table 2.1 contains the share of domestic production of
federal owned state enterprises in speciﬁc sectors in 1958 and for comparison
in 1983, as it was published in the annual federal reports. The data cover the
enterprises where the federal government was a majority shareholder. Earlier
data for the period since 1955 exist, but they do not yet include Saarbergwerke
and Volkswagenwerk.
Table 2.1: Share of federal enterprises in national production
Industry National
production
Federal share Federal share
1958 1958 1983
Coal 148,838,000 t 25.7 12.4
Lignite 93,487,000 t 9.2 5.4
Coke 42,967,000 t 15.1
Steel bars 25,713,000 t 5.1 8.7
Rolled steel 10.2
Oil 4,432,000 t 16.3 9.9
Aluminium 137,000 t 70.1 50.3
Electricity 98,243 mill kWh 16.2 28.9
Car industry 1,365,000 pc. 40.3 36.3
Shipbuilding 1,251,000 brt 18.0 14.1
Sources: Bundesministerium für wirtschaftlichen Besitz des Bundes (1960) pp. 1112
and Bundesministerium für Finanzen (1984).
130 Bundesministerium für wirtschaftlichen Besitz des Bundes (1958), pp. 24.
131DBA V01/2143, Das Bundesvermögen, in Wirtschaftliche Mitteilungen DB März
1958, p. 4.
132 Bundeschatzministerium (1962), pp. 1012.
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For the year 1961, now without VW and Preussag, the Ministry of the
Treasury estimated the share in total West German industrial production to
be 2.5%.133
In the 1980s, the European Centre of Enterprises with Public Participa-
tion and of Enterprises of General Economic Interest (CEEP) collected and
published data on public sector size. Table 2.2 contains the share of public
enterprises in gross value added in West Germany for the years 1979 to 1982.
Correspondingly, Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 contain the proportions in gross ﬁxed
capital formation and in the labour force. These data include all political lev-
els, federal level, German states and municipalities.134
Table 2.2: Share of public enterprises in gross value added
Year Gross value added Share of public
(nominal billion DM) enterprises (PE) (in %)
All Sectors Corporate Public All Sectors Corporate
1979 1,342.7 1,158.8 140.5 10.5 12.1
1980 1,425.8 1,226.5 145.1 10.2 11.8
1981 1,493.3 1,280.8 155.1 10.4 12.1
1982 1,559.3 1,339.4 167.2 10.7 12.5
Source: CEEP (1984)
Table 2.3: Share of public enterprises in gross ﬁxed capital formation
Year Gross ﬁxed capital formation Share of PE
(nominal billion DM) (in %)
All Sectors Corporate Public All Sectors Corporate
1979 304.8 255.3 36.2 11.9 14.2
1980 338.0 282.8 43.0 12.7 15.2
1981 338.2 286.1 46.4 13.7 16.2
1982 329.1 281.8 48.4 14.7 17.2
Source: CEEP (1984)
133 Bundeschatzministerium (1962), p. 8.
134 Earlier accounts of CEEP statistics can be found in Corti (1976).
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Table 2.4: Share of public enterprises in labour force
Year Share of PE (in %)
Labour force Employees all sectors Employees corporate sector
1979 7.5 8.6 10.9
1980 7.6 8.7 10.9
1981 7.7 8.8 11.1
1982 7.8 8.9 11.4
Source: CEEP (1984)
According to a World Bank publication, the share of public enterprises
in GDP in West Germany has decreased from 8.3% to 6.4% between 1978 and
1985. These ﬁgures are based on the CEEP data and include transport, in-
dustry and commerce on federal, state and local levels, and exclude housing,
credit and insurance. Table 2.5 shows data for Germany, France, Italy and the
UK in comparison.
Table 2.5: Share of public enterprises in GDP
Country Share of PE in GDP in %
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Francea 9.3 9.1 11.3 12.9 10
Germanyb 8.3 8.4 6.4 6.5 6.5 6.4
Italy 6.6 6.8 5.6
UK 6.1 5.6 6.2 6.4 6.6 6.4 5.2 4.4 4.4 3.4 3
Source: World Bank (1995), pp. 268271.
a excluding housing and the ﬁnancial sector
b excluding housing, credit and insurance
Short (1984) estimates the share of public enterprises in GDP in several
countries from the 1950s onward. Some results are shown in Table 2.6. He
estimates that in West Germany, the share in GDP was 10.3% for the period
from 1976 to 1977 and 10.2% for from 1978 to 1979, slightly higher than the
world average of 9.4% and the industrial countries average of 9.6%. The share
in gross ﬁxed capital formation has slightly increased from 10.4% in the period
from 1962 to 1965 to 10.8% in the period from 1978 to 1979, with a peak of
Chapter 2. Public Enterprises in the Federal Setting 76
14.5% from 1974 to 1975. This is slightly under the world average of 13.4%
and the industrial country average of 11.1%. The numbers include all sectors
excluding housing and includes enterprises in which at least 50% of the equity
or voting capital are publicly owned. His data are based on CEEP data and
Keyser and Windle (1978).135 These ﬁndings indicate an expansion of public
enterprises in the mid-1970s.
Table 2.6: Share of public enterprises in GDP and capital formation in selected
countries
Country Year Share in GDP at
factor cost (in %)
Share in gross ﬁxed
capital formation
(in %)
France 195961 12.7 23.0
196265 12.8 20.6
196669 12.8 19.0
197073 12.2 15.4
1974 11.9 14.0
Germany 196265 10.4
196669 11.0
197073 12.3
197475 14.5
197677 10.3 12.3
197879 10.2 10.8
UK 195861 21.3
196265 10.3 19.8
196669 10.4 20.1
197073 10.0 16.3
197477 11.3 18.6
19788 10.9 16.8
1982 11.2 17.1
Source: Short (1984), pp. 116117.
From the federal annual reports, we also have information about the net
value added by selected federal enterprises, excluding states and local services.
Table 2.7 contains those data for 1983.
The data on public enterprises show that the federal enterprises repre-
sent only a small part of the economy and the public sector. They account
for about 1 to 2% of the working population. In all federal annual publica-
tions, information about the Lufthansa AG are missing unfortunately. This
had to do with diﬀerent political responsibilities: The Ministry of Transporta-
tion was in charge of Lufthansa, hence the Ministry of the Treasury did not
135 Short (1984), p. 184.
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Table 2.7: Net value added of federal enterprises in 1983
Company Net value added in 1983
in billion DM
Majority Shareholdings
Salzgitter 2.342
VIAG 1.857
Saarbergwerke 1.695
IVG 0.323
Total Majority Shareholdings 6.217
Minority Shareholdings
VEBA 6.662
VW 9.381
Total Minority Shareholdings 16.493
Total 22.710
Source: Bundesministerium für Finanzen (1984).
reveal any information. Also, the German Federal Railway and the German
Federal Post Oﬃce are missing. Those two were not considered as enterprises
but as special assets and as such part of the federal administration. In charge
were the Ministry of Transportation and the Ministry of Posts and Telecom-
munications. For many decades, the German Federal Railway and Bundespost
were the largest employers in West Germany. However, a transfer into legally
independent, incorporated enterprises was not considered before the 1990s, so
that they will not play a signiﬁcant role in the scope of this thesis, despite
their size.
2.5 The Legal Framework for Public
Enterprises
Post-war Germany not only inherited state enterprises, but also the corre-
sponding legislative framework. The most important legal foundation for state
ownership was the Reich Budget Act from 1922 and the Reich Economic Regu-
lations (Reichswirtschaftsbestimmungen) from 1929. The framework was com-
pleted by speciﬁc laws for types of enterprises and the public service code. As
will become evident, these regulations were incomplete and even contradictory
in some cases.
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The Reich Budget Act provided conditions for the establishment of and
control and surveying of shareholdings. According to  48 RHO, Reich share-
holdings were restricted to private law companies with supervisory boards.
This only included joint stock companies (Aktiengesellschaft, AG), limited
liability companies (Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung, GmbH) and part-
nerships limited by shares (Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien, KGaA). Legally
responsible was the Minister of Finance. The purchase of a participation re-
quired his approval. The Law provided that the government had to exert the
necessary inﬂuence on the public enterprises, in particular by sending members
to the supervisory boards.  47 speciﬁed that a sale of a participation had to
be at market prices. In the case of exceptions from this rule, parliamentary
approval was required.
Within the ﬁrst decades, it became obvious that the rules and regulations
codiﬁed in the Reich Budget Act were incomplete. In particular, the role of the
Bundestag was very limited and unclear. Hence, the law was interpreted such
that the Federal Minister of Finance had to seek permission of the Bundestag
for the sale of and capital injections for direct shareholdings in the value of
250,000 DM or more.136 In 1969, the Reich Budget Act was replaced by the
Federal Budget Act (Bundeshaushaltsordnng, BHO) and the Act on Budget
Principles (Haushaltsgrundsätzegesetz, HGrG) which clariﬁed the role of the
Bundestag and restricted the powers of the Minister of Finance. The Federal
Budget Act from 1969 provides two options for privatisation: privatisation can
either be integrated in the annual budget plan by disclosure of the revenues, or
the Minister of Finance can seek approval in a direct decision from Bundestag
and Bundesrat.
Both Reich Budget Act and Federal Budget Act assign a supervisory
function to the Federal Court of Audit. The court's role is to control not the
companies, but the government as a shareholder. For that purpose, supervi-
sory board documents, minutes and reports of the federal representatives in
the supervisory boards have to be submitted to the Federal Court of Audit
136 Hellwig in Parliamentary Debate, Bundestag Plenarprotokoll 03/63, 20.2.1959. See also
Bulletin der Bundesregierung no. 36, 24.2.1959, p. 339, copy in BArch B102/75797, and
BArch B126/40185, Federal Audit Court to BMF, 6.8.1952.
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according to  69 BHO. The court examines the ministerial administration
according to  92 BHO and is also entitled to examine the companies directly
if a company receives subsidies ( 91 Abs. 1 Nr. 3 BHO) or if audit rights are
speciﬁed in the company statutes ( 54 HGrG). The Federal Court of Audit
reports to the Bundestag.
The Federal Budget Act additionally regulates the acquisition and sell-oﬀ
of participations when the purchasing or selling company was either a direct
shareholding or an indirectly held participation in which a state-owned parent
company holds a majority stake.  65 Abs. 2 BHO lists the business transac-
tions which require the approval of the Minister of Finance:
• change of the nominal capital
• change of the company objectives
• change of the impact of the federal government
• acquisition and sale of participations
• exertion of subscription rights and renunciation of such rights
• liquidation of companies
• agreement, change and termination of controlling agreements
• change of legal form
• mergers and contributions
In all cases, documents have to be passed on to the Federal Court of Audit
according to  69 BHO. These regulations extend ownership rights deﬁned by
private law regulating private law companies, which is the second legislative
pillar. Still, they seem to have been widely adopted and were not questioned
by the respective companies.
The Reich Budget Act and Federal Budget Act only set the general
framework. Additionally, the law regulating private law companies applies
and speciﬁes the ownership rights of the state. VIAG, VEBA, Reichswerke,
Howaldtswerke, Saarbergwerke and Lufthansa were organised in the form of
joint stock companies; Volkswagenwerk and IVG had initially the form of lim-
ited liability companies. Volkswagenwerk was transformed into a joint stock
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company during its partial privatisation in 1960. Both types of companies left
only little scope for the state as an owner to exert inﬂuence.
Joint stock companies were regulated by the stock company law (Gesetz
über Aktiengesellschaften und Kommanditgesellschaften auf Aktien) from 1937
until it was succeeded by a new law in 1965 (Aktiengesetz, AktG). The state
as the owner of a joint stock company forms or participates in the share-
holder's assembly, represented by the Minister of Finance. The shareholder's
assembly is one of three main bodies of joint stock companies but its role is
fairly limited. The most important decisions made by the general meeting
are capital increases, which was relevant for later privatisation decisions. It
also appoints the supervisory board, which in turn appoints and controls the
management board. The law regulating private companies protects public en-
terprises to some degree against too much state interference: The law provides
that companies have to operate in a proﬁt-oriented manner. This allows public
enterprises to argue against measures that would inhibit their proﬁtability.137
In practice, this did not imply that the federal government eﬀectively con-
trolled the advisory board and also indirectly the management board. First of
all, stakeholders had to be considered. Similarly to privately owned stock com-
panies, representatives of banks and other stakeholders had seats on the board.
Second, the states were granted the right to send delegates to the supervisory
boards because of ongoing ownership conﬂicts between the federal govern-
ment and the states. Third, regulations that speciﬁed the co-determination
of employees would later limit the inﬂuence on the constitution of the su-
pervisory boards further. VIAG, Reichswerke, Hibernia and Preussenelektra
were aﬀected by the Act on the Co-Determination in the Coal, Iron and Steel
Industry (Montan-Mitbestimmungsgesetz, MontanMitbestG) from 1951. The
law provided that in mining companies which were organised as joint stock
companies or companies with limited liability, half of the members of the
advisory boards and management boards had to be appointed by the em-
ployees. All other companies fell in the scope of the Works Council Con-
stitution Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz, BetrVG) from 1952 and the Act on
137 Laufer and Stier (2005), pp. 428429.
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Co-Determination (Gesetz über die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer, short
Mitbestimmungsgesetz or MitbestG) from 1976 which both provided a lower
degree of co-determination of employees compared to regulations for the coal,
iron and steel industries. For indirectly held shareholdings,  32 MitBestG
speciﬁed that the representatives of shareholders in the supervisory boards of
the parent company appoint the shareholder representatives in the supervisory
boards of the subsidiary companies.
The legal situation was complicated by conﬂicts between the stock com-
pany law and the civil service code. Until 1953, the relationship between the
federal government and its civil servants was regulated by a version of the
Reich civil service code from 1937 (Deutsches Beamtengesetz ) which had been
modiﬁed in 1950 (Bundesfassung des Deutschen Beamtengesetzes); in 1953 it
was replaced by the federal civil service code (Bundesbeamtengesetz ). The civil
service code provided that appointed civil servants in the advisory boards were
generally bound by instruction of their superiors, lastly the respective minister
him- or herself ( 62 BBG) Civil servants had to advise and support their su-
periors and follow their orders and principles with the exception of such cases,
where they were explicitly not bound to instructions or had to follow speciﬁc
laws. The question of whether the private company law accounts for such an
exception has never oﬃcially been clariﬁed by a court decision, to my knowl-
edge. The contradictory legislative framework led to an ambivalent situation:
The minister in charge (superior) had to orient his or her actions towards the
beneﬁt of the state whereas the civil servant who represented the state had to
orient his or her actions towards the beneﬁt of the company ( 111 AktG). As
will be seen later, this legislative conﬂict led to a severe political conﬂict in
the case of the privatisation of VEBA in 1965.138
The analysis of the legislative framework shows that there was little scope
for the government to determine management decisions of shareholdings on a
legal basis. In practice, this became apparent in the mid-1950s during the
debates on shareholdings as public policy instruments.139
According to the budget law, the Ministry of Finance had the lead-
138 See chapter 4.5.
139 See chapter 3.4.2.
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ing responsibility for federal participations. Due to overlapping competences,
the Ministry of Economics was co-responsible. The Ministry of Transporta-
tion took on responsibility for participations in the transport sector, such as
Lufthansa. The German Federal Post Oﬃce and the German Federal Railway
did not fall in the scope of the budget laws and laws regulating private com-
panies since they were regarded as special assets of the government and not
corporations. Instead, they were treated as part of the federal administration
and assigned to the Ministry of Transportation and the Ministry of Posts and
Telecommunications .
Given the institutional framework, the Ministry of Finance was faced
with two diﬀerent problem sets: Smaller shareholdings with a value up to
250,000 DM and those above that value. According to the legal view of the
time, a Bundestag approval for the purchase (and also for capital increases)
of indirect shareholdings and of direct shareholdings in a value of less than
250,000 DM was not necessary. Based on the Reich Budget Act, the Minister
of Finance had the decision-making powers concerning these shareholdings.
Above 250,000 DM, approval of the Bundestag was required for the sale and
capital increase.
Parliamentary approval followed the general Bundestag decision-making
process, which was based on a committee system. Proposed motions were
passed on to the corresponding Bundestag committee or committees and some-
times further to a subcommittee or subcommittees. When motions were ac-
cepted in the subcommittees and committees, they were passed back to the
Bundestag for a ﬁnal decision. Hence, committees had a veto position in the
Bundestag decision mechanism. In 1951, the Bundestag budget committee,
economics committee and legal committee formed a joint subcommittee for
Reich property.
State-owned enterprises initially beneﬁted from three substantial tax
privileges, but two of these were removed or restricted in the 1960s and 1970s.
First, enterprises in full state ownership were exempted from paying wealth
tax. The normal tax rate was 0,6% for corporations. This privilege was sub-
stantially restricted in the wealth tax reforms 1961 and 1974 and wealth tax
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as a whole was abolished in 1995 due to legal issues. Second, public enter-
prises beneﬁted from a turnover tax privilege. This was removed in the Value
Added Tax Act in 1967. The third exemption which still exists is that enter-
prises which are 100% in public hands are exempt from paying company tax
if they served the public interest. Historically, this was interpreted broadly;
Lufthansa AG was for example excluded from paying company tax before pri-
vate investors were allowed to participate.140 However, the exemption is not
directed at public enterprises in general but aims at supporting public authori-
ties in providing public goods. Nowadays, this applies mainly to municipalities
where public services are organised in the form of private law companies in-
stead of administrative units.
A ﬁnal fact which is worth mentioning is that there were no ﬁnancial
incentives for civil servants to serve as supervisory board members. The remu-
neration for state oﬃcials who were members of supervisory boards as part of
their jobs was fairly low. According to  8 Verordnung über die Nebentätigkeit
der Bundesbeamten from 1964, oﬃcials were allowed to keep between 1,500
and 3,000 DM per year. The rest, approximately 500,000 DM per year in 1964,
had to be passed on to the federal state because the positions were treated as
a secondary employment. Also, in 1983, the Federal Court of Audit noted
that the remunerations were usually lower than remunerations in the private
sector.141
140 Bozdag-Yaksan (2008), p. 111.
141 BArch B126/136047, Bundesrechnungshof VIII 5, 31.5.1983, Attachment 3: Internal
Note by II A3.
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Public enterprises were not a central topic during the ﬁrst post-war years and
existed rather in the shadow of debates about the future economic system.
In the second legislation period, the topic of public enterprises was put on
the political agenda. The federal elections in September 1953 conﬁrmed the
existing government coalition of CDU, CSU and FDP which was joined by
the national-conservative Deutsche Partei (DP) in 1953. Konrad Adenauer
(CDU) remained Federal Chancellor, Fritz Schäﬀer (CSU) Minister of Finance
and Ludwig Erhard (CDU) Minister of Economics. After an administration
for public enterprises had been set up, the Ministry of Finance under Schäﬀer
started to sell participations to single investors and groups of investors. But
it soon became apparent that political approval for this form of privatisation
was very limited. Both CDU/CSU business wing and employees association
criticised the resulting concentration of ownership. As a consequence, new
forms of privatisation were developed.
The FDP clearly favoured private ownership and expressed that in several
Bundestag motions and requests. The DP only a marginal role for economic
policy, the role of agenda-setting regarding privatisation was in the hands of
the CDU/CSU. The CDU/CSU represented a broad political spectrum and
was characterised by a high degree of heterogeneity. Interest groups in the
CDU/CSU have been organised as internal associations. Today, there are
seven such organisations. Of particular importance for the privatisation pro-
84
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cess were the business wing (Mittelstands- und Wirtschaftsvereinigung) and
the employees' faction (Christlich-Demokratische Arbeitnehmerschaft (CDA),
Christian Democratic Employees, or CDU-Sozialausschüsse, Christian Social
Committee). The internal associations have been formally recognised in the
party statutes. The broad spectrum of opinions of CDU and CSU was re-
ﬂected in a high degree of proportionality in the Bundestag faction and the
government. Therefore, the decision-making process had to be organised in a
consensus-orientated way. The diﬀerences between the market-oriented wing
and the employees' wing of the CDU had a strong impact on the party's early
economic programme. The Ahlen Program, the economic and social party
programme of the North Rhine-Westphalian CDU from 1947, still spoke of
the nationalisation of key industries and had been largely inﬂuenced by the
party's left wing. It was later revised by the Düsseldorf Principles (Düssel-
dorfer Leitsätze) in 1949, the party programme for the ﬁrst federal elections,
which can be understood as a success of the liberal-economic forces around
Ludwig Erhard (CDU) and a commitment of the party to the paradigm of
a social market economy. Still, a high degree of heterogeneity between the
party factions continued to exist and led to a number of conﬂicts over policy
directions in the following decades.
3.1 Set-up of the Federal Administration
In 1949, no administration for public enterprises existed on the federal level,
so responsibilities had to be organised. Based on the Reich Budget Act, the
Federal Ministry of Finance became in charge of the largest part of the portfolio
of participations. The Reich Budget Act assigned responsibility for public
enterprises in general to the Finance Ministry, But given that the Ministry
of Economics was in charge of fundamental policy decisions in sectors where
public enterprises operated, the ministry argued that it should have decisive
role in the control of shareholdings by taking over seats on the advisory boards.
The result was a shared responsibility between the ministers which led to a
number of conﬂicts between the ministries.
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In the leading Ministry of Finance, a division for federal assets and a sub-
division for federal enterprises and participations were established. In charge
of federal enterprises in the Ministry of Finance was Friedrich Krämer. As
a lawyer, Krämer had been working for the Prussian and the Reich admin-
istration until he was entrusted with the liquidation of state-owned property
in 1945.142 He was supported by Hans Birnbaum, who later became chief of
Salzgitter AG, and Gerhard Breme. Breme had been specialist advisor of the
chief ﬁnance president in Hamburg after 1945 and had in this position been in
charge of the administration of public enterprises. Later, Breme transferred to
the Ministry of the Treasury where he remained, probably until his retirement,
until the end of the 1960s.
In the Ministry of Economics, Secretary of State Schalfejew appointed
Ludwig Kattenstroth to be personally in charge of public enterprises.143 At
that time, Kattenstroth, a lawyer, was head of the economic policy division and
had the reputation of a hard-working, meticulous, intelligent man. He became
a very inﬂuential ministerial oﬃcial in the 1950s and 1960s and a conﬁdant of
Erhard (CDU).144 As Kattenstroth was personally in charge, he took the task
with him when he switched ﬁrst to the central division and later to the energy
division. On behalf of the Ministry of Economics, Kattenstroth was also in
charge of negotiations with the states about the ownership question.145
Kattenstroth's team in the Ministry of Economics was small. For many
years, he was assisted by Werner Fenge and Henneberg.146 Fenge and Hen-
neberg formed the subdivision ZA2 which was directly subordinated to Katten-
stroth as head of the central division.147 Both transferred with him to division
142 Laufer and Stier (2005), pp. 407408.
143 This can be drawn from BArch B102/75766, Lübke, Verwaltung für Wirtschaft, to Kat-
tenstroth, II1, 1.3.1950, and Josten to Kattenstroth, 14.3.1951, including Kattenstroth's
handwritten notes from 22.3., 6.4., and 4.6.1951.
144 See Löer (2002), p. 234.
145 BArch B102/75766, Circular note to other Divisions, Kattenstroth (Div. II), 24.2.1950.
146 Fenge had been working for the Reich Ministry of Justice from 1935 to 1938 and became
district court councillor in 1938. From 1938 to 1945, he was working in the presiden-
tial oﬃce, interrupted by military service. In 1953, he was employed by the Ministry
of Economics. From 1958 to his death in 1966, he was on leave and board member
of VEBA's subsidiary mining company Braunschweigische Kohlenbergwerke in Helmst-
edt. Information from ministerial schedule of responsibilities and personnel ﬁles in Die
Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung online.
147 Löer (2002), p. 219.
Chapter 3. Orientation Phase 87
III later on148 and were involved in the conceptualisation of privatisation.
The federal government exercised its ownership rights by sending leading
ministry oﬃcials to the supervisory bodies. For large and important compa-
nies, these were mainly secretaries of state. Since 1955, the annual published
reports on the federal budget and later the reports of the Ministry of the Trea-
sury contained information about the composition of the supervisory boards.
In 1955, the federal government was represented in the supervisory boards of
VEBA and its subsidiary companies Hibernia, Preussenelektra and Preussag,
VIAG and its subsidiary companies Innwerk, Bayernwerk and VAW, Saarberg-
werke, IVG and AG für Berg- und Hüttenwerke and its subsidiary company
Hüttenwerk Salzgitter by only eight ministerial oﬃcials: the three Secretaries
of State Alfred Hartmann (Ministry of Finance), Eduard Schalfejew (Ministry
of Economics) and Ludger Westrick (Ministry of Economics), and the higher
government oﬃcials Hans Birnbaum, Josef Rust, Johannes Schwandt, Heinz
Maria Oeftering, and Carl Krautwig. Most of these oﬃcials had already been
part of the Reich ministerial bureaucracy or the Reich economic administration
before 1945.
3.2 Portfolio Streamlining and Reorganisation
Within the ﬁrst decade after the end of the Second World War, an inventory of
state ownership took place and the federal government took possession of and
reorganised its portfolio. According to the federal budget report of 1955, the
federal portfolio consisted of 83 direct participations which had been ascribed
to the federal level by the Provisional Prussian and Reich Property Act and
additionally 68 participations in companies in liquidation. The complete list
of participations in which the federal government held 25% or more comprised
306 companies.149
Of the nominal capital of 1.5 billion DM, 1.1 billion DM belonged to
VEBA, VIAG and AG für Berg- und Hüttenbetriebe. In 1953, dividend pay-
148 There, they probably formed one of three divisions which were directly subordinated to
Kattenstroth. See schedule of responsibilities.
149 Bundesministerium für Finanzen (1955), pp. 359365; 373385.
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ments had resumed with a total dividend of 6 million DM, mainly from VIAG.
The low dividend payments, in particular in the case of VEBA, had to do
with special depreciation opportunities in the framework of the Investment
Aid Act.150 The group of (re-)established companies consisted of 20 enter-
prises in 1955, including Lufthansa AG and IVG. Between 1950 and 1955,
capital injections for participations had added up to 77 million DM. Of these,
the main shares had been for the reconstruction of the smelting plant of AG
für Berg- und Hüttenbetriebe (35 million DM) and for the Bavarian electricity
infrastructure development of VIAG (30 million DM). Also, credit in the vol-
ume of 19.9 million DM had been granted; 14.9 million for the reconstruction
of Scholven-Chemie AG, and 5 million for Deutsche Werke Kiel AG. Eight
smaller direct and indirect participations had been sold by 1955. Not included
yet in the list of owned participations were Volkswagenwerk due to its unclear
ownership situation and Saarbergwerke AG which was only re-established in
1957.151
3.2.1 Winding-up of the War Economy
The ﬁrst task for the new government was to take care of the war economy
from the Third Reich and streamline the portfolio of shareholdings. The Min-
istry of Finance under Minister Fritz Schäﬀer (CSU) conducted a number of
liquidations and sales of divested ﬁrms. The initial portfolio comprised nu-
merous corporations which had been part of the war economy. Some of these
had been directly under the control of the Speer Ministry. Others belonged
to the asset complex Bank der deutschen Luftfahrt AG (short Luftfahrtbank
or Aerobank), which had been used for ﬁnancing the NS aircraft industry.152
Most of these corporations had lost their reason to exist, some had lost a sub-
stantial part of their assets due to the war and its aftermath. Another large
complex was UfA Film GmbH (UFI) which comprised the ﬁlm assets of the
Third Reich. The ﬁrst report about the volume of state ownership counted
150 See p. 129.
151 Bundesministerium für Finanzen (1955), pp. 327331.
152 Bank der deutschen Luftfahrt AG was established in 1940 and goes back to Luftfahrtkon-
tor GmbH, a bank which had been set up in 1933 for the takeover and administration of
the aircraft company Junkers. See Bähr (2006).
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67 companies in liquidation which were directly held by the federal govern-
ment.153 This number decreased to 52 in 1959, still including Ufa Film GmbH
and Bank der deutschen Luftfahrt AG.154
The dissolution of UFI took several years. According to Allied regula-
tions, UFI had to be unbundled and liquidated.155 In 1956, the two remaining
subsidiaries Bavaria156 and Universum Film AG (UFA)157 were outsourced.
Bavaria was sold to a consortium including Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank
and is the foundation of today's Bavaria Film GmbH. UFA was sold to a
consortium led by Deutsche Bank, where it served as the basis for the newly
established Universum-Film AG. Ufa-Film GmbH remained in the list of com-
panies in liquidation until its dissolution in the 1960s.
Bank der deutschen Luftfahrt was in liquidation from March 1954, and
ﬁnally liquidated in the 1960s. The process involved outsourcing and sell-
ing several subsidiaries, among these Rheinmetall-Borsig and Mitteldeutsche
Spinnhütte GmbH. Rheinmetall-Borsig, subsidiary of Bank der deutschen Luft-
fahrt, was sold to privately owned Röchlingsche Eisen- und Stahlwerke GmbH158
in June 1956. In August of the same year, Borsig was separately resold to the
state-owned Salzgitter AG.159
A liquidation of war companies (Kriegsgesellschaften) required the set-
tling of their debts. War companies were exempted from the Act regulating
the Consequences of War (Allgemeines Kriegsfolgengesetz ) from 1957 which
regulated the conversion of debts into DM. The Act regulating the Liquida-
153 Bundesministerium für Finanzen (1954), pp. 192193.
154 Bundesministerium für Finanzen (1959), pp. 525527.
155 Lex UFI from September 1949 was imposed by the American and British military
government. In June 1953, the German Bundestag decided the liquidation of UFI by
law (Gesetz zur Abwicklung und Entﬂechtung des reichseigenen Filmvermögens). For
the cabinet decision see Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung online, Federal
Cabinet, minutes of the 96th meeting on 7 September 1955, agenda item 8: Gesetz zur
Abwicklung und Entﬂechtung des ehemaligen reichseigenen Filmvermögens.
156 Bavaria had been established in 1919 as a private company and fully integrated in the
UFI in 1942.
157 UFA had been established as a private company in 1917 and had become part of the
Reich-owned UFI in 1942.
158 Today Saarstahl; the company was the operating company of the ironwork Völklinger
Hütte, located in Saarland, until its closure in 1986.
159 Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung online, Economics Committee of the Fed-
eral Cabinet, minutes of the 55th meeting on 27 July 1956, agenda item 2: Verkauf der
Beteiligung der Bank der Deutschen Luftfahrt AG i.L. an der Rheinmetall-Borsig AG an
die Röchling'sche Eisen- und Stahlwerke GmbH.
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tion of War Companies from 1960 (Gesetz über die Abwicklung der Kriegsge-
sellschaften) provided the liquidation of war companies and deﬁned war com-
panies as companies which had been established with the purpose of warfare
and war ﬁnancing in the Third Reich and had belonged to the Reich. The
liabilities of these companies of about 64.4 million DM were converted with a
ratio of 10:1. A list of 19 companies which had been classiﬁed as war compa-
nies up until that point can be found in the draft law which was presented to
the Bundestag.160
As a consequence of the law, the list of public enterprises in liquidation
or without business operation in the annual federal report dropped from 52 in
1959 to 35 in 1960. It was also reported that up until 1960, 92 corporations had
been liquidated and 73 corporations dissolved for lack of assets. Additionally,
83 corporations had been dissolved after transferring their assets onto their
parent companies. 88 companies were still in liquidation, and 16 directly and 87
indirectly federal participations had been sold.161 According to a report of the
Ministry of the Treasury from 1963, 62 participations under the responsibility
of the ministry had been sold to private investors by then, including UFA,
Bavaria and subsidiary companies of the Bank der Deutschen Luftfahrt AG.162
Not much is known about the revenues of asset sales in the course of the
dissolution of the war economy. At a meeting of the Bundestag subcommit-
tee for federal property in February 1955, Oeftering, head of division in the
Ministry of Finance, declared that by then, participations to the value of 20
million DM had been sold and that negotiations about the sale of sharehold-
ings of the value to 100 million DM were pending.163 The latter sum probably
included the Howaldtswerke, for which negotiations were conducted at that
160 List of companies in Bundestagsdrucksache 03/1421, Entwurf eines Gesetzes über
die Abwicklung von Kriegsgesellschaften. See also Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bun-
desregierung online, Federal Cabinet, minutes of the 77th meeting on 9 September 1959,
agenda item 3: Entwurf eines Gesetzes über die Abwicklung der Kriegsgesellschaften.
Documentation on the preparation in the Ministry of Finance can be found in BArch
B126/8929.
161 Bundesministerium für wirtschaftlichen Besitz des Bundes (1960), pp. 1011.
162 BArch B126/34720, Bericht an den Herrn Bundeskanzler über die Entwicklung im
wirtschaftlichen Zuständigkeitsbereich des Bundesschatzministers in den Jahren 1949
1962, 24.6.1963.
163 BArch B126/40181, Minutes of the 2. meeting of the subcommittee Bundesbeteiligungen
on 8 February 1955.
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time. A Bundestag debate prior to the Preussag privatisation in February
1959 revealed that by then, 33 companies and participations had been sold
which had led to revenues of more than 85 million DM.164 The largest part of
this sum probably stemmed from the privatisations in the contexts of UFI and
Bank der deutschen Luftfahrt.
In the course of winding up the war economy, all privatisations were
block sales to private investors, or groups of investors. Since most of these
were sales of a small scope, they took place behind closed doors, administered
by the Ministry of Finance. No Bundestag decision and hence no broad po-
litical approval was needed. A public debate about how privation should be
implemented was not led yet. But in the mid-1950s, it became obvious that
the privatisation design of block sales was not fully accepted.
3.2.2 Portfolio Reorganisation
Most participations which did not belong to the war economy were bundled
in the large holding companies. Since these had developed in diﬀerent histori-
cal circumstances, a reorganisation and adaptation of shareholdings was being
discussed in the mid-1950s. However, the Ministry of Finance and the Min-
istry of Economics could not agree on a joint strategy which inhibited larger
plans. In 1951, the Ministry of Finance developed the idea to create a federally
owned bank called Bank der Bundesunternehmen which was intended to be
jointly held by federal enterprises for ﬁnancing purpose and limited regarding
normal banking business, following the example of Preußische Staatsbank.165
Adenauer found the idea interesting, Erhard's Ministry of Economics however
164 Große Anfrage der FDP betr. Privatisierung des Bundesvermögens, Bundestag Ple-
narprotokoll 03/63, 20.2.1959. Summary of the debate inBulletin der Bundesregierung
no. 36, 24.2.1959, p. 339, copy in BArch B102/75797.
165 Preußische Staatsbank, also Seehandlungsbank or Preußische Seehandlung, was originally
founded in 1772 as Seehandlungsgesellschaft, a public enterprise that had its own ﬂeet
with the task to promote Prussian foreign trade. In 1820, it oﬃcially became an indepen-
dent trade and ﬁnancial institution, following the broadening of its ﬁeld of operation. In
1904, it was renamed as Königliche Seehandlung (Preußische Staatsbank), and in 1918
as Preußische Staatsbank (Seehandlung). The bank served ﬁnancial, military and trade
purposes and worked closely with Prussian state enterprises, particularly VEBA. After
Prussia had oﬃcially ceased to exist in 1947, the bank was put in liquidation. After its
ﬁnal liquidation in 1983, its capital was the basis for the foundation Stiftung Preußische
Seehandlung.
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opposed strongly and the idea was buried at the end of 1951.166
Nevertheless, the Ministry of Finance assumed that privatisations and a
reorganisation of the large corporations in the federal portfolio would have to
take place at some point.167 At the same time, the Ministry of Finance was
aware of the diﬃculties which could come along with a large-scale privatisa-
tion. In an article in English which was published in the Annals of Collective
Economy in 1953, Oeftering, oﬃcial in the Ministry of Finance, pointed to
the diﬃculties in the context of the ownership unbundling of the steel and
coal industry. He assumed that investors with the capacity and willingness to
purchase large share volumes could only be found abroad.168
In 1954, the Ministry of Finance made inquiries about re-privatisation
options on a larger scale and asked Deutsche Bank for advice. In particular, the
Ministry was worried about the absorption capacity of German stock markets.
Franz Heinrich Ulrich, member of the management board of Norddeutsche
Bank169 met with Birnbaum to discuss options and summarised his advice in
a subsequent letter to Birnbaum. He warned against a ﬁxed schedule and
design because the state-owned portfolio was in his view too big. Since each
privatisation case would face unique social, political and economic problems,
Ulrich also found it inadvisable to integrate all participations in one holding
company or to pass them on to a bank consortium. Instead, he recommended
selling those shareholdings for which there was an interested investor or group
of investors, such as Howaldtswerke, in order to draw attention to the policy.
According to Ulrich, the capital markets were developed enough to be able
to absorb considerable asset volumes. However, since the overall success of
privatisation policy was immensely dependent on how the ﬁrst case would be
publicly perceived, he advised starting with a small share volume. To secure
a successful placing, the ﬁrst asset sale through initial public oﬀering should
be a ﬁrst-class company and a low sale price should incentivise investors to
purchase shares. Since it would impede the sale success considerably if the
166Documentation about this can be found in BArch B102/75783.
167 BArch B126/40183, BMF, IIB (Krämer/Birnbaum) to IV4, 7.5.1952.
168Oeftering (1953).
169 Norddeutsche Bank was part of Deutsche Bank since 1929. In 1957, Ulrich became
member of the executive board of the reunited Deutsche Bank.
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federal government kept a majority of shares in the long-run, Ulrich suggested
starting with a sale of shares of a ﬁrst class company with a nominal value of
approximately 25 million DM. If demand was high enough, a bank consortium
should place additional shares in several tranches for the same price within
a certain time window. If the demand was strong enough, this could lead to
an immediate full privatisation. Ulrich further highlighted the importance of
a good issuing potential of the consortium participants and suggested a small
bank consortium where Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank and Commerzbank
would take the lead.170 Following this conversation, Ulrich even contacted
Schirner from VIAG himself about a possible privatisation of the Vereinigte
Aluminiumwerke. Schirner seemed interested, but indicated possible problems
due to the cross-links with public electricity providers. Ulrich further suggested
that Deutsche Bank chief Abs should discuss the topic with Secretary of State
Westrick (Ministry of Economics).171
However, no larger privatisation was conducted in the next couple of
years. In 1954, an oﬀer from a US investor for the mining company Hibernia,
subsidiary company of VEBA, was rejected by the cabinet committee for eco-
nomics. A US group had signalled an interest to purchase a company of the
coal and iron or chemical industry of the value of 20 to 100 million US Dol-
lars. However, at a meeting of the cabinet economics committee in September
1954, Schäﬀer expressed his concerns about an increase of foreign inﬂuence on
the German coal industry. Similarly, Secretary of State Westrick (Ministry of
Economics) declared that he was not in principle against foreign investors, but
that Hibernia was Germany's second largest coal company and the sale could
therefore disturb the internal German coal market organisation. The cabinet
decided not to start negotiations.172
Instead of privatisations, two new public enterprises were re-established
until the end of the 1950s: Lufthansa and Saarbergwerke. The predeces-
170DBA V01/2143, Letter from Ulrich to Birnbaum, 31.7.1954; the letter can also be found
in BArch B126/40186.
171DB A2143, Internal Note for Abs, 11.9.1954.
172 Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung online, Economics Committee of the
Federal Cabinet, minutes of the 42nd meeting on 2 September 1954, agenda item
4: Veräußerung von Bundesvermögen, hier: Bergwerksgesellschaft Hibernia AG,
Herne/Westfalen.
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sors of both Lufthansa and Saarbergwerke had been state-owned companies.
Lufthansa was newly established as Luftag on 6 January 1953 with an equity
capital of 6 million DM and set up as a state-owned joint stock company. This
legal form was chosen to allow for more ﬂexibility than a public unit such
as the German Federal Railway. Due to the chosen legal form, private capital
participations were generally possible. The Bundestag committee for transport
suggested a nominal value of 100 DM for shares. Minister of Transportation
Hans-Christoph Seebohm (DP, since 1960 CDU) however followed the advice
of Hans M. Bongers, a former transport manager of the old Lufthansa whose
consultancy prepared the foundation of the new Lufthansa, and decided for
a nominal value of 1,000 DM. Possibly, the decision for such a large nominal
value would not have been accepted politically later on, but at this time the
concept of small shareholders was not prominent enough yet. Seebohm at-
tempted to establish Lufthansa on a broad shareholder basis and asked the
states to participate with a share of 24.5%, but the states, except for North
Rhine-Westphalia, refused because they feared a commitment to cost con-
tributions. Except for Scandinavian Airlines, no other European airline was
running proﬁtably at that time, so this concern was not unjustiﬁed. The ini-
tial shareholder constellation was the federal level with 75% (4.5 million DM),
North Rhine-Westphalia with 8.3% (0.5 million DM) and the German Federal
Railway with 16.7% (1 million DM).173 Saarbergwerke were re-established in
1957 as a joint stock company by law. Saarland held 26% of the shares and
the federal government 74% of the shares.174
Other than Lufthansa and Saarbergwerke, there were no intentions in
the government coalition to actively extend public enterprises. This played a
role during the rearmament debate. In January 1955, Minister of Economics
Ludwig Erhard (CDU) announced that the rearmament would be based purely
on market mechanisms. In particular, no federal in-house undertakings should
be used for providing military commodities and the federal government would
not allow armament cartels, such as in 1936. The market mechanism would
173On the establishment of Luftag see Bozdag-Yaksan (2008), pp. 105110.
174Gesetz über die Einbringung der Steinkohlenbergwerke im Saarland in eine Aktienge-
sellschaft, see Bundestagsdrucksache 02/3420.
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make sure that, in contrast to 1936, the channelling of capital in the arma-
ment industry would not decrease living standards. He assumed that ﬁnancing
the necessary investments for rearmament through capital markets would not
pose a problem.175 Erhard passed a corresponding note in the Ministry of
Economics. There, he enforced that the most important principle was that
the military commodities had to be provided as part of the market-based eco-
nomic order and that it had to be ensured that the armament industries did
not develop a life of their own176 A conﬁdential internal note from Fenge
to Kattenstroth dealt extensively with the question of shareholdings and the
state in the rearmament process. Fenge noted that the ﬁnancing of armament
investments through federal shareholdings would be the strongest form of a
subsidy of armament projects177 and had to be strictly rejected. Investments
were to be ﬁnanced by the corresponding companies themselves. Subsidies in
the form of interest subsidies on loans and special loans and federal guarantees
were rejected by the department. The only subsidies discussed were acceler-
ated depreciation allowances. Fenge considered the takeover of shareholdings
in the armament industry as dangerous because this would lead to a further
concentration of industries in public hands like before and during the Second
World War.178 The Ministry of Economics and Ministry of Finance agreed in
February 1955 that IVG would not be involved in the rearmament process.
The company should solely keep its status as a holding for liquidation com-
panies.179 In contrast to Erhard's plans, the Federal Ministry of Defence later
became increasingly involved with in-house undertakings and shareholdings for
the purpose of military equipment. In the early 1960s, Franz Josef Strauß was
for that reason accused of trying to transform IVG into a new armament com-
pany.180 The secretary of state in the Defence Ministry, Rust, was appointed
to the supervisory board of IVG in 1958 to secure the interests of his Ministry.
175 Rüstung nach marktwirtschaftlichen Grundsätzen, Bulletin der Bundesregierung no. 7,
12.1.1955, p. 53.
176 Eigenleben, BArch B102/75797, Erhard to heads of departments, 1.7.1955.
177 die stärkste Art einer Subventionierung von Rüstungsvorhaben, BArch B102/75797,
Fenge to Kattenstroth, 25.11.1955.
178 BArch B102/75797, Fenge to Kattenstroth, 25.11.1955.
179 BArch B102/75797, Fenge to Kattenstroth, 15.2.1956.
180 Hopmann (1996), pp. 199206.
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Federal enterprises were not maintained under all circumstances. Dur-
ing the 1950s, two unproﬁtable plants of Preussag were closed: the coal mine
Steinkohlenwerk Barsinghausen and the lead ore mine Gewerkschaft Mecher-
nicher Werke. The mine Barsinghausen, located close to Hanover, was part
of the hard coal mining industry in Lower Saxony. The mines were not prof-
itable and it was highly questionable whether investments would be able to
turn them into proﬁtable mines. The energy crisis in 1951 and the subsequent
price increase for coal and investment aids for the coal sector deferred the
decision to shut down the mines. Instead, Preussag suggested establishing a
consolidation company for all state-owned hard coal mines. This would allow
for cross-ﬁnancing and loss compensation for the Lower Saxon coal mining
industry. The idea was rejected by Secretary of State Westrick (Ministry of
Economics), who pointed out that it was VEBA's responsibility to ﬁnd a so-
lution. A loss of 13 million DM in 1953 of the coal mines in Obernkirchen
and Barsinghausen stressed that further consolidation eﬀorts had to be made.
At the same time, public discussions about the proﬁtability of shareholdings
followed reports of the Federal Court of Audit. In 1954, Preussag decided to
shut down Barsinghausen mine despite protests from employees and from the
SPD federal Bundestag group. However, the ﬁnal agreement included large
compensatory measures that cost the Preussag ﬁve million DM. (Preussag was
later able to pass a share of the costs involved with the shutdown over to
the European heavy industry, using subsidies from the European Coal and
Steel Community.) Also, Preussag and the Ministry of Finance sought an
enterprise that would relocate to Barsinghausen in order to create new jobs.
Hopes that Volkswagenwerk would establish a new factory in Barsinghausen
were dashed when Volkswagenwerk decided on a location closer to Hanover
 Oeftering's interventions as chairman of the supervisory board of Volkswa-
genwerk had remained without success. Finally, negotiations with the bakery
Hermann Bahlens Keksfabrik KG and Alfred Teves GmbH were successful.
Gewerkschaft Mechernicher Werke, which had already been unproﬁtable when
Preussag was forced to take over the mine in 1937,was shut down in 1957. 181
181 Laufer and Stier (2005), pp. 413414.
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3.2.3 Parliamentary Veto: The Case of Howaldtswerke
Besides the rejected sale of Hibernia, another case which revealed the lack
of political approval for single investor purchases was Howaldtswerke. The
example shows that the question of the privatisation design was inherently
important for the necessary consensus in the 1950s and 1960s. The single
investor design failed to address two points: preventing ownership from falling
into foreign hands and preventing a concentration of ownership.
In Winter 1951/52, the Ministry of Finance had started negotiations
about a sale of Howaldtswerke Hamburg and Kiel AG with several groups of
investors.182 However, the sale failed because the Bundestag did not give its
consent. Resistance in the Bundestag subcommittee in charge led to a failure
of the privatisation although the ministry had found a purchase consortium,
sales negotiations had taken place and the contract had already been signed by
the purchasers. The Ministry of Finance had been negotiating with potential
buyers since 1951. After some oﬀers had been received, the issue was discussed
in a cabinet meeting on 11 December 1951. As a result, Minister of Finance
Schäﬀer was authorised to conduct sales negotiations. The supervisory board
of Howaldtswerke discussed the possible privatisation in a meeting in February
1952. Except for the two chairmen of the works council, there was wide support
for privatisation.183 Furthermore, Hamburg's state government agreed to the
privatisation.184
The Ministry of Finance proceeded particularly carefully in its choice of
potential investors. The prospective sale was the largest in the history of the
Federal Republic and aﬀected many employees. Negotiations with the ﬁrst
potential buyer, a US American group of investors, failed. One factor seems
to have been the German concern that no more than 49% of the ﬁrm should
come under foreign control.185. Another interested purchaser, a consortium
of Rheinische Röhrenwerke AG and Thyssen AG, withdrew their oﬀer due to
182 BArch B126/40181, Stichworte für den Bericht vor dem Unterausschuss `Bundesbeteili-
gungen' am 8.2.1955.
183 BArch B115/3212, Subdiv. II B to Secretary of State, 11.2.1952.
184 BArch B115/3213, Behörde für Wirtschaft und Verkehr der Stadt Hamburg to Schecker,
18.8.1954.
185 BArch B115/3212, press announcement, 22.8.1952.
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ﬁnancial diﬃculties.186 A third potential buyer, Henry S. Thomas, was con-
sidered as too ﬁnancially unreliable. Thomas was the brother-in-law of indus-
trialist Alfred Krupp and oﬀered ten million DM for the Howaldtswerke Ham-
burg.187 He was considered to have access to ﬁnancial resources stemming from
the Krupp property.188 Thomas owned the main share of the company Vent
und Co. which was engaged in litigation with Deutsche Werke Kiel and tried
to combine the purchase of Howaldtswerke with a settlement of the litigation
to lower the purchase price. The Ministry of Finance regarded this as inadmis-
sible and doubted Thomas' ﬁnancial situation.189 At ﬁrst, Thomas dropped
out of negotiations190 but later increased his oﬀer to 12.5 million DM191 and
then to 15 million DM, but the ministry was no longer interested.192 In 1954,
an anonymous Austrian consortium approached the Ministry of Finance193 but
the Ministry rejected the oﬀer because of the buyer's anonymity.194
A valuation report of the federally-owned Deutsche Revisions- und Treuhand-
AG (Treuarbeit) from 11 November 1952 estimated an intrinsic value of 69 mil-
lion DM for both Howaldtswerke Hamburg and Kiel. According to the Ministry
of Finance, 36 million DM were attributable to Hamburg and 33 million DM to
Kiel.195 In 1953, Howaldtswerke Hamburg and Kiel were separated. The main
reason was that the sale of a single company was considered easier.196 After
1954, serious negotiations about a sale of Howaldtswerke Hamburg were con-
ducted with a consortium of Dortmund-Hörder Hüttenunion AG (Dortmund-
Hörde), Siemens and Deutsche Bank. The Ministry of Finance considered
Dortmund-Hörde as an adequate investor, as it operated in the heavy industry
sector. Therefore, a true economic interest was assumed. Dortmund-Hörde
would purchase 48% of the shares and Siemens and Deutsche Bank 26% each.
186 BArch B115/3212, Sal. Oppenheim to Oeftering, 29.9.1954.
187 BArch B115/3213, Thomas to Schäﬀer, 25.11.1952.
188 BArch B115/3213, Subdiv. II B to Secretary of State, 25.9.1952.
189 BArch B115/3213, Subdiv. II B to Secretary of State, 25.9.1952.
190 BArch B115/3213, Thomas to BMF, 9.12.1952.
191 BArch B115/3213, Internal note, 18.2.1953.
192 BArch B115/3213, BMF to Thomas, 28.10.1953.
193 BArch B115/3212, Haerpfer to BMF, 2.2.1954, as well as Haerpfer to BMF, 16.7.1953.
194 BArch B115/3212, BMF to Haerpfer, 18.2.1954.
195 BArch B115/3213, Internal note about the valuation report from 13 November 1952
(Report H 3052), 4.12.1952.
196 BArch B115/3213, BMF to Secretary of State (BKAmt), Attachment cabinet proposal,
1.8.1954.
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This was a compromise that would make sure that Dortmund-Hörde owned
less than half of the shares. Dortmund-Hörde was owned by the Dutch steel
company Koninklijke Nederlandsche Hoogovens en Staalfabrieken which was in
turn partially owned by the Dutch State and the Amsterdam municipality.197
At a cabinet meeting on 8 September 1955, Schäﬀer presented a cabinet
paper about the sale. He expressed concerns regarding the purchase price of
20 million DM but assumed that this would not be a suﬃcient reason for a
failure of the sale.198 Surprisingly, Schäﬀer also expected that the fact that
Dortmund-Hörde was partially in foreign ownership would not play a decisive
role. However, Adenauer and Erhard found the oﬀered price too low. Also,
the resulting foreign inﬂuence was highly criticised during the meeting. The
Minister of the Interior demanded that defence interests should be considered
before the sale. Finally, Schäﬀer was asked to continue negotiations, to exam-
ine the adequacy of the purchase price and to demand a higher participation of
Siemens and Deutsche Bank. Also, it should be examined whether it was pos-
sible to integrate terms to secure social and economic situation in the contract.
Additionally, the government considered a distribution of shares through more
than one purchasing consortium. After an agreement within the cabinet could
be reached, on 9 June 1955 the federal government announced that it intended
to sell Howaldtswerke Hamburg to the consortium led by Dortmund-Hörde at
a price of 26,250,000 DM and that it would request approval from Bundestag
and Bundesrat. A new valuation report had assumed a value of 21 to 30 mil-
lion DM for Howaldtswerke Hamburg.199 The purchasers had by then already
signed the contract.200
Resistance from the Bundesrat and Bundestag was not expected. The
minutes of the meeting of the supervisory board of the Howaldtswerke Ham-
burg on 4 July 1955 assumed that approval would be granted within a few
weeks.201 But, until this point, negotiations had only been discussed within
the cabinet and the ministries. The Bundestag had not been involved.202 The
197 BArch115/3213, Internal note, 11.8.1954.
198 BArch B115/3213, Oeftering to Ziegeler, 29.9.1954
199 Bundestagsdrucksache 02/1433, 3.6.1955.
200 BArch B115/3213, BMF to Howaldtswerke Hamburg, 1.7.1955.
201 BArch B115/3213, Internal Note about the meeting, 4.7.1955.
202 Response to oral request no. 24, 18.2.1955, Bundestagsdrucksache 02/1199.
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Bundesrat committee in charge approved to the sale on 30 June 1955. Ham-
burg's representative Senator Schulze-Schlutius abstained from voting and an-
nounced the start of negotiations with the Ministry of Finance about an in-
vestment loan.203 The Bundesrat ﬁnally gave its approval on 8 July 1955.204
It was expected that the Bundestag would also approve. This was ob-
viously a misjudgement, the bill did not pass the Bundestag subcommittee
for federal property. In June, Birnbaum from the Ministry of Finance warned
that the subcommittee should not be a retarding element for privatisation and
should decide the case before the summer break.205 The request of the federal
government for approval for the sale of Howaldtswerke Hamburg was discussed
at a meeting on 5 July 1955. A representative of the Ministry of Finance de-
fended the request. Worries from the side of the SPD focused on the purchase
price which was perceived as being too low. Heinrich Deist (SPD) expressed
concerns about private ownership in the wharf industry. He referred to the
susceptibility of this sector to crisis and wondered whether in bad times, the
federal government would have to take over again. Kurlbaum (SPD) worried
about the inﬂuence of Siemens becoming too strong, as a partial sale of 30%
of Howaldtswerke Kiel to Siemens was also considered at that time. He ques-
tioned in general the advantage of public-private mixed-ownership companies.
Sabaß (CDU) shared these worries.206 At the next meeting on 7 July 1955,
the subcommittee criticised the incompleteness of valuation documents and
doubted the valuation method of the Treuarbeit. Finally, a proposal from
Sabaß (CDU) was accepted which requested further negotiations with the aim
of a higher purchase price from the government.207Despite the conservative-
liberal majority in the subcommittee , a majority for the sale could not be
found until the summer break. Schäﬀer had made the mistake of not integrat-
203 Hamburg requested that the federal government should defer the purchase price payment
to allow for an early repayment of an investment loan that the Hamburg State Bank had
given to the Howaldtswerke. This was conﬁrmed by a public statement of Hamburg's
state government. BArch B115/3213, BMF to Howaldtswerke Hamburg, March 1955;
Howaldtswerke Hamburg to BMF, 17.3.1955.
204 BArch B115/3213, BMF to Howaldtswerke Hamburg, 30.6.1955.
205 BArch B126/40181, Birnbaum to Secretary of State Hartmann, 10.6.1955.
206 BArch B126/40181, Minutes of the 7th meeting of the Bundestag subcommittee Bun-
desvermögen on 5 July 1955.
207 BArch B126/40181, Minutes of the 8th meeting of the Bundestag subcommittee Bun-
desvermögen on 7 July 1955.
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ing the parliamentarians early enough in the process. After this ﬁasco, the
Ministry of Finance dropped the idea to sell Howaldtswerke. Instead, public-
private-partnerships between Howaldtswerke Hamburg and Dortmund-Hörde
were considered.
In 1956, the Ministry attempted to build a ship repair wharf with pri-
vate participation. The Ministry and the purchase consortium considered
that the privately owned Dortmund-Hörder Hüttenunion AG should partic-
ipate in a new military repair wharf in Wilhelmshaven instead of purchasing
Howaldtswerke Hamburg. That way, they could circumvent Bundestag ap-
proval.208 Erhard approved this plan and recommended that Howaldtswerke
Hamburg should only keep a veto minority of 25% instead of the initially
planned 51%. The veto minority was requested by the Ministry of Defence
with the warning that otherwise, the Ministry would consider building its own
repair wharf.209 Later, for an unknown reason the plan was changed such that
Dortmund-Hörde should participate with a veto minority in Howaldtswerke
Hamburg to ﬁnance the latter's share in Wilhelmshaven.210 The Ministry
of Finance suggested that Howaldtswerke Hamburg could purchase the wharf
Schichau-Bremerhaven as a basis for the planned repair wharf.211 However, this
led to the earlier problem again because a 25% veto minority of Dortmund-
Hörde in Howaldtswerke would require Bundestag consent.212 Apparently, all
plans to integrate Dortmund-Hörde in a public-private-partnership project
failed. In 1957, the German Navy started to establish its own naval bases
and repair wharfs.
208 BArch B115/3214, Internal note about the supervisory board meeting on 18 June 1956,
6.6.1956.
209 BArch B126/3214, BMF to Howaldtswerke Hamburg, 13.12.1956.
210 BArch B126/3214, Internal note, 4.1.1957.
211 BArch B126/3214, Notes about the supervisory board meeting of Howaldtswerke Ham-
burg on 2.3.1957.
212 BArch B126/3214, Internal note about the meeting with Howaldtswerke Hamburg on 7
May 1957 (Korﬀ), 11.5.1957.
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3.3 Privatisation Initiatives
In 1952, industrial circles started a campaign against public enterprises.213 The
campaign became more intense after Adenauer's conservative-liberal govern-
ment coalition had won the federal elections in 1953. Key business organisa-
tions were the BDI and the DIHT as well as their aﬃliated media and research
institutes, the Cologne Institute for Economic Research (Deutsches Industrie-
institut, today IW Köln) and the Institut Finanzen und Steuern. In the federal
election year 1953, the campaign was enforced.214 The Cologne Institute for
Economic Research was an economic research institute founded in 1951 and
ﬁnanced by an aﬃliation of enterprises. Director of the Cologne Institute for
Economic Research between 1951 and 1959 was the MP Fritz Hellwig (CDU).
Hellwig was one of the key members of the CDU who represented the connec-
tion between the party's market-oriented wing and business interests.215 As
will be seen later, Hellwig became an important connection between banks,
industry and government.
The National Taxpayers Association, a business association which rep-
resents primarily small and medium enterprises, sharply criticised the lack of
publicly available information about public enterprises, accounting practices
and low dividend payments. The lack of publicity had already been criticised
by the Federal Court of Audit in a report on the federal budget in 1949 and
1950. The court identiﬁed many shortcomings concerning the publicity and
control of shareholdings.216 According to the federal government, the nominal
value of corporate shareholdings was 1.5 billion DM in 1955. In a publication
from 1954, the association argued that the real value was much higher, at
213 The oldest found newspaper articles dates back to August 1952: Dr. Duhmer (from the
industry-related Institut Finanzen und Steuern, working group Öﬀentliches Vermögen,
see Dietrich (1996), p. 214): Eine große Unbekannte, FAZ 7.8.1952.
214 From the numerous articles see for example: Reprivatisierung von industriellem Bun-
desvermögen, Kölnische Rundschau, 14.5.1953; Reprivatisierung von Bundesvermögen,
Handelsblatt 15.5.1953.
215 Hellwig was Chairman of the Bundestag committee on economic policy from 1956 to
1959 and the subcommittee for federal property from 1959 to 1965.
216 Bericht des Bundesrechnungshofes zu den Bundeshaushaltsrechnungen für die Rech-
nungsjahre 1949 und 1950 nebst Bericht über die Prüfung von Unternehmen mit eigener
Rechtspersönlichkeit  107 RHO, Denkschrift des Präsidenten des Bundesrechnungshofes
zu den Bundeshaushaltsrechnungen für die Rechnungsjahre 1949 und 1950.
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least 3.2 billion DM.217 Dividends amounted to 9 million in 1954/1955 and to
23.5 million DM 1955/1956 which corresponded to only 0.73% and was much
lower than dividends in the private sector. The association criticised the low
dividends as a a discrimination against private enterprises and added that the
resulting hidden reserves were like subsidies for otherwise unproﬁtable public
enterprises. It suggested selling public enterprises and bringing revenues from
the sale of shareholding into a special fund which should be used for the beneﬁt
of all German citizens.218
From 1953 onwards, the FDP started to promote a privatisation of indus-
trial participations.219 Before the federal elections in autumn 1953, the FDP
presented a privatisation programme named after its inventor Karl Atzenroth.
The idea was to unite all shareholdings in one holding company. This holding
company would then release share certiﬁcates to creditors of the Reich, whose
debts were still outstanding. This was considered as infeasible because the
general opinion was that the problem of outstanding debts had to be solved
independently,220 so that the idea was not followed up on.221
After the conservative-liberal government coalition had won the federal
elections in September 1953, the FDP reinforced the debate with numerous
Bundestag questions and motions. A couple of inquiries addressed the prac-
tice that federal agencies awarded service contracts to so-called Regiebetriebe.
The term describes non-corporate public in-house undertakings which were
part of the public administration. These in-house undertakings existed mainly
217 Bund der Steuerzahler (1954).
218 Bund der Steuerzahler (1955).
219 See for example Atzenroth: Privatisierung des Bundesvermögens, in Rheinischer
Merkur, 15.7.1955.
220 This was accomplished by the Act regulating the Consequences of War (AKG) from
1957 as part of the German Restitution Laws along with other acts including the Act
regulating the Compensation of the Victims of National Socialist Persecution (BEG).
221Documentation in BArch B102/75798. Shortly after the elections of 1957, a similar
suggestion was made by Gerhard Ziemer, chief executive director of the Lastenaus-
gleichsbank (Bank für Vertriebene und Geschädigte). However, the plan was classi-
ﬁed as not realistic and put aside. Documentation in BArch B126/34720: Vorzeitige
Erfüllung der Hauptentschädigungsansprüche durch Aktien-Zertiﬁkate, Ziemer to Lin-
drath, 13.11.1957, including suggestion from 5.11.1957; Internal note (Referat Beteiligun-
gen) Vorzeitige Erfüllung der Hauptentschädigungsansprüche durch Aktien-Zertiﬁkate
(Ziemer-Plan); Minutes of a meeting on 23 January 1958, 24.1.1958; Minutes of a De-
partment Meeting on 23 January 1958, 25.1.1958; Minutes of a meeting with the chairmen
of the federal corporations, 7.3.1958.
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on the municipal level in the public services sector, but also on the state and
federal level. A considerable number of in-house undertakings were part of
the German Federal Railway and the German Federal Post Oﬃce. In Novem-
ber 1954 for example, the FDP complained that dredging works in canals
were increasingly accomplished as public works by the waterways authority.222
In February 1955, Matthes (DP) requested information about the resulting
competition between the private and state sector.223 All these motions and
inquiries stimulated a public debate about state-ownership and attracted con-
siderable media attention. Nevertheless, concrete ideas about how privatisa-
tion could be implemented were still missing. Apart from the Atzenroth-Plan,
constructive suggestions remained scarce, even from the FDP.
In 1956, at the end of the legislative period, the FDP presented a leg-
islative proposal to limit economic activity of public authorities.224 The bill
suggested restricting state participation in economic enterprises on all levels
to cases in which the following four preconditions were fulﬁlled: (a) an ur-
gent public purpose exists, (b) that purpose cannot be fulﬁlled with the same
quality and eﬃciency by private enterprises, (c) private enterprises are not
discriminated against and (d) the size of the public enterprise is proportionate
to the size of the public authority. The FDP suggested that existing public
enterprises should be examined accordingly by a Bundestag committee and,
if they did not fulﬁl the preconditions, be sold, dissipated or liquidated. Fur-
thermore, the bill suggested restricting public in-house undertakings to cases
in which they were irrefutably necessary and would produce better results.
The suggested bill clearly went beyond the legal responsibilities of the federal
government. As an internal note in the Ministry of Economics conﬁrmed, the
law interfered with the legislative powers of states and municipalities and with
the constitutional rights of the states to decide on the legal requirements for
222 Kleine Anfrage 122 der Fraktion der FDP betr. Baggerarbeiten in den norddeutschen
Hauptstromgebieten, 3.11.1954. As a more general example see Kleine Anfrage 169 der
Abgeordneten Wieninger und Genossen betr. Abbau der Regiebetriebe in bundeseigenen
Behörden vom 31. März 1955, Bundestagsdrucksache 02/1318, 31.3.1955, answered in
Bundestagsdrucksachen 02/2013, 5.1.1956, 02/936, 3.11.1954 and 02/1088, 16.12.1954.
223Oral request Matthes (DP) about competition between the public and the private sector,
Plenarprotokoll 02/68, 23.2.1955, p. 3464.
224 Entwurf eines Gesetzes über die wirtschaftliche Betätigung der öﬀentlichen Hand, Bun-
destagsdrucksache 02/2712, 26.9.1956.
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state ownership and privatisation. Beyond this, the bill suggested extending
the rights of the Bundestag and hence to transfer executive tasks to the leg-
islative branch.225 It can be concluded that the legislative proposal had only
demonstrative character and that the FDP did not assume that it would be
adopted and implemented. The Bundestag discussed the bill in January 1957
and passed it on to the committee for economic policy.226 However, it was not
approved and passed back to parliament.
Similarly to private initiatives, the FDP requested more information
about public enterprises from the government. Like private companies, public
enterprises had to present annual balance sheets from 1949. An FDP motion
from November 1954 asked for disclosure of balance sheet information and in-
vestment plans of Volkswagenwerk.227 Another motion from December 1954
demanded that the government should pass on information about public en-
terprises to the Bundestag subcommittee Bundesvermögen.228 Also, a removal
of tax privileges for public authorities was unsuccessfully being discussed since
the mid-1950s229, after the FDP Bundestag faction had brought in a motion
for a removal of the wealth tax privilege in 1956.230
While the business wing of the CDU/CSU remained rather quiet regard-
ing public enterprises in the ﬁrst half of the 1950s, there were already some
signs of a critical assessment. While parliamentarians did not yet address ex-
isting public enterprises, the extension of public entrepreneurial activities was
sharply criticised. In February 1952 already, earlier than similar FDP ini-
tiatives, the CDU/CSU Bundestag faction requested a critical assessment of
in-house undertakings and demanded that the government should avoid using
them wherever possible.231 In March 1952, Secretary of State Westrick (Min-
istry of Economics) declared in Bundestag that in-house undertakings were
only used internally and to accomplish sovereign tasks, so that no competition
225 BArch B102/75798, Kattenstroth to Erhard and Secretary of State (Draft), 27.11.1956.
226 In the same session, a ﬁrst initial draft for the privatisation of Volkswagenwerk was
discussed and passed on to the committee for economic policy.
227 Bundestagsdrucksache 02/936, 3.11.1954.
228 Bundestagsdrucksache 02/1088, 16.12.1954.
229Documentation in BArch B126/40171.
230 Bundestagsdrucksache 02/2062, 2.2.1956.
231 Bundestagsdrucksache 02/3133, 2.2.1952.
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between the private and the state-owned sector existed.232
Hence, it would be wrong say that the FDP and the private sector ini-
tiated the debate. Critics of public ownership within the CDU also warned
about the expansion of the public sector early on. In February 1954, Hellwig
criticised the expansion of the public sector at a meeting of the CDU economic
advisory council and warned of a cold socialisation (kalte Sozialisierung).233
3.4 The Federal State as an Entrepreneur
While the privatisation debate accelerated in the mid-1950s, the fundamental
question about the role which the federal state should fulﬁl in the economy
remained open. However, it did become evident over the years that the power
which the federal state could exercise on its enterprises was fairly limited.
While public in-house undertakings were easy to control, the role of the owner
in incorporated enterprises was limited by company law. This circumstance
was publicly discussed in the context of inﬂation concerns in 1956 and again
in 1959.
3.4.1 Limitations and Self-Perception
The question of the role of the federal state as an entrepreneur has two dimen-
sions. First, to what extent the federal government had control over share-
holdings, and second, in what way it wanted to use its power. As described
above, the control of the shareholder is limited by the law governing private law
companies. Main inﬂuence channels were the general meeting and seats in the
supervisory boards.234 The public inﬂuence through supervisory boards was
even further restricted by the fact that the number of federal representatives
in the boards was relatively small for three reasons: First, in the German cor-
porate system, other stakeholders such as banks and insurance companies and
trade partners were traditionally represented on supervisory boards. Second,
232 Bundestag Plenarprotokoll 01/201, 26.3.1952, pp. 86548656.
233 Eine ernste Gefahr für die private Wirtschaft. Scharfe Kritik an der Reisetätigkeit der
öﬀentlichen Hand vor dem Wirtschaftsbeirat der Union, Tagesanzeiger (Regensburger
Anzeiger), 3.2.1954.
234 See chapter 2.5.
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the Provisional Prussian and Reich Property Act reserved some positions in the
supervisory boards for the states. And third, co-determination of employees
limited the inﬂuence of the federal government further. Co-determined public
enterprises included Hibernia, Preussenelektra, and Reichswerke/AG für Berg-
und Hüttenbetriebe. Here, it should be noted that the federal government did
not serve as a role model regarding co-determination but tried to secure its
own seats in the supervisory boards instead. In the case of the Preussag for
example, the government successfully argued against a co-determination.235
On average, public oﬃcials only had two to three seats in supervisory boards
which consisted of 15 or 21 members in total. Since the federal government
did not have much inﬂuence on the decisions of the supervisory boards, its
inﬂuence on the selection of managers and control over management decisions
was also limited.
Maybe even more decisive were the weak connections between politicians
and managers. The post-war managers of federal enterprises probably did not
feel as accountable to the government as it might have been the case when
the enterprises were ﬁrst set up prior to 1945. As seen above, the choice of
managers of the large holding companies were often based on historical circum-
stances and not an active choice of the government. In most cases, managers
were even chosen before the ﬁrst post-war government was established, such
as Hermann Schilling (VEBA). Most of these managers knew their enterprises
better than public oﬃcials ever could. VEBA probably had the closest relation-
ship with the government. Alfred Hartmann became chief executive director
of VEBA in 1959 after having served as secretary of state in the Ministry of
Finance for ten years. Symptomatically, the company's seat was relocated
from Hamburg to Bonn and settled in the building of the Ministry of Family
Aﬀairs. Hartmann did not perceive himself as a manager, but more as an ad-
ministrator. The relationship between other federal enterprises and the federal
government probably became closer later on, when some ministerial oﬃcials
transferred to federal enterprises, which tightened the connection between pol-
itics and management: Heinz Maria Oeftering was appointed chief executive
235 Laufer and Stier (2005), pp. 440442.
Chapter 3. Orientation Phase 108
director of the German Federal Railway in 1957. Hans Birnbaum, oﬃcial in
the Federal Ministry of Finance from 1950 to 1957 and in the Ministry of the
Treasury from 1957 to 1961, transferred to the Salzgitter AG management
board in 1961. There, he initially served as commercial director, becoming
deputy director in 1966 and managing director in 1968.236
The relationship between the federal government and Volkswagenwerk
was particularly diﬃcult. The British had appointed Heinz Nordhoﬀ as chief
executive director who remained in this position until his death in 1968. Nord-
hoﬀ had a very strong patriarchal position in the company and was a member
of Speer's kindergarden in the Third Reich: He was one of approximately
6000 young managers who were in charge of implementing Speer's armaments
programme on the company level and was therefore well connected with the
managers so-called Wundertäter  who participated in rebuilding the West
German economy.237 Unlike men who had an administrative background such
as Hartmann (VEBA), Birnbaum (Salzgitter AG) and Brekenfeld (VEBA),
Nordhoﬀ considered himself as a business man and did not let the federal gov-
ernment dictate any business decisions. One example was the controversial
price increase of Volkswagenwerk in 1951. The price increase was a reaction to
shortages in the supply of coal and steel.238 Another example was the intro-
duction of employee proﬁt sharing schemes of Volkswagenwerk in 1953. The
Ministry of Economics worried that this would create a costly precedent and
that the company's excellent employees' policy could lead to claims for a na-
tionalisation of industries, but it did not manage to stop the measure from
being implemented.239 Yet, Volkswagenwerk was an exception in several ways.
First, it did not previously have a tradition of state-ownership such as VEBA
and VIAG. Since Volkswagenwerk was organised as a limited liability company
at that time, establishing a supervisory board was not required. However, in
October 1949, the formation of an advisory board was recommended at the
last meeting of the Allied Control Council under British Colonel Radclyﬀe.240
236 Information from Birnbaum, Hans in Munzinger Online/Personen  Internationales
Biographisches Archiv.
237Grunenberg (2006), p. 28.
238 Edelmann (2003), pp. 123124.
239 Edelmann (2003), p. 155.
240 Edelmann (2003), p. 108.
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The Ministry of Finance sent Heinz Maria Oeftering, head of division in the
Ministry of Finance from 1950 to 1957, as a delegate to the advisory board.
The relationship between Nordhoﬀ and Oeftering has been described as cor-
dial, although Nordhoﬀ kept his autocratic leadership style and the advisory
board lived in his shadow.241 Even the later partial privatisation hardly af-
fected Nordhoﬀ's autocratic position. The supervisory board met regularly
but did not have much inﬂuence. It has been described that in the 1960s, the
relationship between Erhard and Nordhoﬀ cooled oﬀ. In 1962, Erhard tried
without success to prevent Volkswagenwerk's ill-timed price increase of 5%.242
The price increase was a reaction to the appreciation of the DM in 1961 which
hit the export industries hard and also to the realisation that the satisfaction
in the car market signalled that the golden 1950s were over.243
How did the ministerial administration perceive the role of the state as
an owner? There is no indication in government sources that there was an
attempt to systematically set up advantages for state-owned enterprises. The
self-perception was rather that of a responsible owner. Secretary of State
Westrick (Ministry of Economics) declared at a meeting of the Bundestag sub-
committee for federal property in February 1955 that shareholdings were not
considered an alien element in a market economy if they were perfectly in-
tegrated in economic competition and were not disproportionally advantaged
or disadvantaged because of state-ownership. Therefore, the starting condi-
tions had to equal those of private companies with whom shareholdings com-
peted. Tax beneﬁts or other forms of beneﬁts should be analogous to those
for privately owned ﬁrms. Second, the dividend policy had to equal that of
privately owned companies. Third, shareholdings had to apply business prin-
ciples. Fourth, no public money should be used to support shareholdings. And
ﬁfth, public enterprises should not be discriminated against because of the fact
that they were publicly owned. Westrick considered these conditions as gener-
ally met and did not see a fundamental diﬀerence between public and private
companies. Oeftering, head of division in the Ministry of Finance, supported
241 Edelmann (2003), pp. 129131.
242Grunenberg (2006), p. 232.
243Grunenberg (2006), p. 227.
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Westrick's line of argument.244 However, the argument had some weaknesses.
Public ownership did make a diﬀerence. First, regarding the condition of equal
starting conditions, an important exception existed: Entirely publicly owned
companies did not have to pay net wealth tax. This became a concern during
the partial privatisation of VEBA in 1965. Although there were voices in the
administration to abolish tax beneﬁts for the public sector, no political ma-
jority could be found for that until the tax reforms in the 1960s.245 A second
exception was that federal enterprises were asked to come to the rescue of
companies. The Hessian copper slate mining company Sontra was taken over
by Preussag in a rescue operation that was initiated by the federal government
and turned out to be very beneﬁcial for Preussag.246 Also, MUAG and VTG
were taken over by Preussag. The coal mine Emscher-Lippe was integrated
in Hibernia after the unbundling of Krupp corporation  which turned out
to be a good deal for Hibernia since the takeover was cheap and tax free. It
should be noted that the companies could not have been forced into these
takeovers. However, in many cases, the government seems to have reached
ﬁnancial compromises with the relevant enterprises. Third, many public en-
terprises beneﬁted strongly from the Investment Aid Act in 1952. However,
this was more due to the fact that most public enterprises operated in bottle-
neck industries such as coal and steel rather than due to the fact that they
were publicly owned. Also, while some federal enterprises beneﬁted from the
law, others were disadvantaged. It cost Volkswagenwerk for example seven
to eight million DM  a fact which complicated the relationship between the
Ministry of Economics and the company further.247
Westrick's justiﬁcation for public ownership addresses a broader ques-
tion: If public enterprises were not necessarily an alien element in the econ-
omy, what role did they have in economic policy, and did the current form of
shareholdings allow them to serve their purpose? Strictly following the above
argumentation, shareholdings must not be used as policy instruments as this
244 BArch B126/40181, Minutes of the second meeting of the subcommittee Bundesbeteili-
gungen on 18 February 1955.
245 See p. 82.
246 Laufer and Stier (2005), pp. 427428, 488.
247 Edelmann (2003), pp. 125126.
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would interfere with competition and disturb the market mechanism. Never-
theless, these questions did arise during the inﬂation debate in the mid-1950s.
Until then, a reassessment of traditional justiﬁcations for public entrepreneur-
ship had not taken place yet, possibly because there had simply been no need
for it. Public enterprises seemed to integrate well in the blossoming economy
and their performance was acceptable, given their diﬃcult starting points. But
in light of the economic boom in the mid-1950s and subsequent worries about
inﬂation and an overheated economy, these overdue debates ﬁnally took place.
Traditional justiﬁcations for state ownership were reconsidered. The privati-
sation debate was hence accompanied by a general debate about the role of
public enterprises in the economy, initiated by fears of inﬂation in 1955, and
the coal price debate in 1957.
3.4.2 Price Debates 1955 and 1957
The management decisions of public enterprises could neither be controlled
directly through the general meetings nor through the supervisory boards.
Hence, the cooperative behaviour of public enterprises could not be enforced.
An example of this provide the price debates in 1955 and 1957. In 1955, the
booming German economy led to inﬂation concerns. In this situation, the
question of public enterprises as an instrument of public policy came up. The
SPD, some media and parts of the CDU/CSU urged the government to force
public enterprises not to take part in price increases, hoping that such a policy
would have spill over eﬀects on market prices. As a response, the Ministry of
Economics requested a moderate price policy from public enterprises which in
turn informed the Ministry about their measures.248 While some public enter-
prises committed to not participate in price increases in the near future,249 this
was not considered to be suﬃcient. That the suitability of public enterprises as
public policy instruments was limited was not recognised throughout the polit-
ical sphere. In the big Bundestag debate on the topic, the SPD pointed to the
248 BArch B102/75792, Küster (VIAG) to Fenge, 11.11.1955; also VEBA to Fenge,
22.11.1955.
249 Erhard: Preisgestaltung bei Erwerbsunternehmen der öﬀentlichen Hand, Bundestags-
drucksache 02/2110.
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responsibility of shareholdings and urged Erhard to increase his eﬀorts. It was
primarily the ministerial administration which recognised the contradictions
between wish and reality.250
One historical justiﬁcation for public enterprises was their function as a
corrective mechanism in a market economy that was generally based on private
ownership. In this dualistic view of the economy, public enterprises had the
task of inﬂuencing the price setting in diﬀerent markets according to public
wishes. This function was based on cartel mechanisms: If a public enterprises
had a large enough share in a market, it was able to exert a certain inﬂuence
on the cartel price setting. If the federal state was able to exercise suﬃcient
inﬂuence on the public enterprises, it had an indirect market control mecha-
nism. The inﬂuence on public enterprises worked relatively well until 1945, as
previous research has shown.251 However, the removal of cartels as a price set-
ting institution for the entire sector changed this situation fundamentally. The
price inﬂuence mechanism through cartels did not function anymore. Cartels
only continued to exist in the Ruhr coal industry in the form of sales com-
panies, but the shares of public enterprises in these sales companies were too
low to exert any inﬂuence on prices, as the later coal price debate in 1957
revealed. Theoretically, shareholdings only were able to have an impact on
market conditions, if they had a large enough share in oligopolistic markets.
This would hence still presuppose that the government has an inﬂuence on
public enterprises.
The government's position about public enterprises as policy instruments
seemed ambivalent. When asked whether federal enterprises could be used as
instruments for economic policy, Westrick argued that this was possible only
as an exception and only if the measures were not implemented at the ex-
pense of proﬁtability.252 Ministerial oﬃcial Fenge argued similarly when he
prepared a speech about public enterprises and business cycle stabilisation
policy for Westrick for a meeting of the Association of the Bavarian Indus-
try in November 1955. In the preparatory notes, Fenge addressed the central
250 BArch B102/75792, Internal note, ZA2 (Kattenstroth), 3.11.1955.
251 See for example Winkler (1965).
252 BArch B126/40181, Minutes of the 2. meeting of the subcommittee Bundesbeteiligungen
on 8 February 1955.
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question of whether public enterprises had a special responsibility for mone-
tary stabilisation policy. He came to the conclusion that they did not have
a direct responsibility. But public enterprises had an indirect responsibility
because they had to integrate the interests of their owner into their decisions.
According to Fenge, the special tasks of public enterprises arose from the fact
that the interests of their owner were not solely of ﬁscal nature but comprised
a broad range of policy interests including political and social elements. In
the current situation, public enterprises therefore had the obligation to im-
plement a moderate price policy, but not at the expense of their proﬁtability.
The ambivalence that public enterprises should take public interests into ac-
count but that this should not decrease proﬁtability was never resolved, and
reappears throughout the entire inﬂation debate and also in the coal price
debate in 1957. Fenge concluded that selling public enterprises would release
the federal government from its ambivalent position as shareholder and pol-
icy maker. The economic boom would be advantageous for privatisation as it
stimulated the demand for shares. It would be important to make sure that
privatised companies in politically fragile253 regions would not be relocated,
and that the capital markets would not be troubled by too large privatisation
transactions.254
The FDP used the situation as an opportunity to request more detailed
information about the possibilities of the federal government exerting inﬂuence
on business policies of federally owned enterprises in a Bundestag motion.255
The motion was passed on to the committee for economic policy and, after con-
sultations, the committee recommended that the Bundestag should accept the
motion and demanded that the government examine the price policies of fed-
erally owned companies, making sure that all possibilities of price reductions
were exploited, urging states and municipalities to do the same and reporting
253 politisch gefährdeten, this probably hinted at zonal border areas. BArch B102/75792,
Kurze Gedankenführung zu dem Vortrag `Konjunkturpolitische Verantwortung der Be-
triebe der öﬀentlichen Hand, Möglichkeiten der Privatisierung' , Fenge to Westrick,
17.11.1955
254 ibid. Here, Fenge foreshadowed what would become the political programme in summer
1956, see chapter 3.6.4.
255 Antrag der Fraktion der FDP betr. Preisgestaltung bei Erwerbsunternehmen der öf-
fentlichen Hand, Bundestagsdrucksache 02/1766.
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back about these measures.256 Committee members criticised that the sub-
committee Bundesbeteiligungen had not yet been consulted and commented
on the question of whether ministerial civil servants in the supervisory bod-
ies of federally owned companies were subject to directives from the federal
government and were obliged to report to the Bundestag committees.257 Er-
hard explained the actions taken by his ministry and its achievements to the
Bundestag : He had requested that federally owned companies examine pos-
sible price reductions, postpone investments and avoid capacity expansions.
Also, Erhard had demanded by decree that all civil servants who represented
his ministry in the supervisory bodies should enforce moderate price policies.
In November, Erhard and Schäﬀer jointly repeated their request. The price
reductions which Erhard listed as consequences of his actions included reduc-
tions in the electricity sector that corresponded to approximately 30 million
DM shortfalls in receipts, reductions in the gas, aluminium, coal and chemical
industry sector, and some postponements of investments.258 The SPD news
service ascribed this small success to the control that the government still had
over public enterprises.259
The lessons learned from the 1955 price debate were apparently small. A
similar discussion took place shortly after the elections in 1957 in form of the
coal price debate: Right before the elections, the government had announced
that no price increases in the coal market would have to be expected in the near
future. Now, shortly after the elections in September 1957, the Ruhrverkaufs-
gesellschaften (Ruhr district sales companies) decided to increase the price for
black coal by 4.70 DM per tonne on average and for coke by 6.20 DM per tonne
on average as a response to price releases in the coal market, with eﬀect from 1
October 1957. Not surprisingly, the government was not too happy with these
price increases. Adenauer requested that Erhard prevent the federally owned
coal companies from participating in the increase and to urge them to try to
annul the decision. Also, he demanded an examination about the question of
256 Schriftlicher Bericht des Ausschusses für Wirtschaftspolitik (21. Ausschuß) über den
Antrag der Fraktion der FDP  Drucksache 1766  betr. Preisgestaltung bei Erwerbsun-
ternehmen der öﬀentlichen Hand, Bundestagsdrucksache 02/1922, 3.12.1955.
257 BArch B102/75792, Internal note (ZA2) 2.12.1955.
258 Bundestagsdrucksache 02/2110, 17.2.1956.
259 BArch B102/75792, press announcement in Volkswirtschaft, SPD Press Service, 1.3.1956.
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whether shareholdings would be able leave the sales companies.260
According to the Treaty of Paris, the German federal government was not
allowed to interfere in the coal price policy. These rights had been passed on to
the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community. The govern-
ment could only act as an owner. The federal government owned the following
shares in the Ruhr coal industry: Hibernia (100%) through VEBA, Emscher-
Lippe Bergbau AG (49%) through Hibernia/VEBA, Bergbau AG Ewald-König
Luwdig (90.1%) through AG für Berg- und Hüttenbetriebe, Gewerkschaft
des Steinkohlenbergbaus Haus Aden (90.1%) through Bergbau AG Ewald-
König Luwdig/AG für Berg- und Hüttenbetriebe and Märkische Steinkohlenge-
sellschaft (100%) through AG für Berg- und Hüttenbetriebe. Hibernia, Emscher-
Lippe, Ewald-König Ludwig and Aden were part of the sales companyMausegatt
Ruhrkohlenverkaufsgesellschaft mbH and held 436 of 1000 votes; Märkische
Steinkohle had a share in the Präsident Ruhrkohlenverkaufsgesellschaft mbH
and 68 of 1000 votes.261 It was obvious that federally owned coal companies
did not have a majority in either of the sales companies so that any attempt
to reverse the price increases would only have a demonstrative character. The
only result of Erhard's interference was that Preussag agreed to postpone its
participation in the price increase until 1 November 1957.262 Again, the Min-
istry of Economics started internal inquiries about the legal possibilities for
the government to interfere in the coal market through shareholdings business
policies.263 The response conﬁrmed the very limited possibilities. Also, federal
enterprises were not able to leave the sales companies, as a termination clause
was not part of the companies' contracts, which were valid until 31 March
1959.264
One can wonder whether the coal price issues did not come in handy for
Erhard. The move from coal to oil was unavoidable and Erhard was against
protective measures for the coal industry. His goal was rather to enhance
competition in the energy market and threaten the monopolistic position of the
260 BArch B102/75797, Adenauer to Erhard, 30.9.1957.
261 BArch B102/75797, Fenge to Kattenstroth, 8.10.1957.
262 BArch B102/75797, Fenge to Kattenstroth, 3.10.1957.
263 BArch B102/75797, Kattenstroh to Fenge, 4.10.1957.
264 BArch B102/75797, Thiesing to Kattenstroth, 4.10.1957.
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coal mining industry, including federal enterprises. On 5 October, Erhard sent
his ideas for a cabinet note about immediate measures to improve competition
to Adenauer. The suggestions were based on the assumptions that the price
for black coal would increase strongly in the future due to the high share of
labour costs, that the price for imported energy would increase slightly, and
that the price for nuclear energy would fall. The ﬁrst suggested measure was to
abolish extra taxes on imported coal (Umsatzausgleichssteuer) in the amount
of 2.40 DM per tonne, leading to a shortfall of tax income of approximately 31
million DM for the government. Second, extra taxes on heating oil should be
abolished, leading to a shortfall of tax income of approximately nine million
DM for the government, and third, railway freight tariﬀs for domestic and
imported coal should be adjusted. For the coal industry, Erhard proposed
reconsidering the participation of federal enterprises in sales associations and
to reorganise the Ruhr coal industry in general, including de-cartelisation and
shutting down under-performing mines, and the promotion of investments in
nuclear energy.265
Erhard defended his position to abstain from pursuing immediate ac-
tions in the coal industry in an article in the newspaper FAZ from 12 October
1957. He pointed to the legal independence of the Ruhr coal cartel and ap-
pealed instead to the cartels responsibility to serve the public interest after
having received state aid in diﬀerent forms over the previous years, including
tax reductions and subsidies from the Investment Aid Act. Furthermore, he
suggested an amendment of the European Coal and Steel Community treaty
to increase control of price increases.266 What he did not say was that he prob-
ably was against such measures anyway. Ollenhauer (SPD) mocked Erhard for
his apparently desperate attempts to exert inﬂuence on the companies' price
setting and for neglecting his pro-market ideals and concluded that he had
lost his pro-market consciousness. He then used the circumstances as a proof
that the SPD was right in demanding more state inﬂuence in the energy mar-
kets.267 An article of the SPD press service judged the government's inability
265 BArch B102/75797, Erhard to Adenauer, 5.10.1957.
266 Erhard: Kohlenpreis und Wettbewerb, FAZ No. 237, 12.10.1957.
267Ollenhauer in Bundestag Plenarprotokoll 04/3, 5.11.1957, p. 87.
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to impact on coal prices harshly and accused the government of shameful pow-
erlessness.268 It concluded that the social democratic demand for controlling
the economy, its costs and price policy was not unrealistic269 and also crit-
icised the governments dependence on the private economy and its inability
or unwillingness to make use if its capabilities, neglecting the fact that these
possibilities were simply non-existent. In a later press announcement, the SPD
pointed to the inconsistency of the government which had initially promoted
the idea of free markets and now unsuccessfully tried to regain some impact.
The SPD criticised the government for having failed to create the necessary
conditions for using public enterprises as policy instruments in previous years.
Therefore, the article demanded diﬀerent measures which should create these
conditions, such as reforms of the Federal Budget Acts and the law on stock
companies, a ﬁnal agreement with the states about the question of Reich and
Prussian property and a reorganisation and adjustment of shareholdings and
ministerial responsibilities.270
While the political consequences that the SPD proposed were a con-
testable political matter, the lack of reorganisation of public enterprises was
a fact. It had become obvious that public enterprises in their current form
had lost their initial reason for existence to some extent. One can speculate
whether this result was to some extent intended or at least willingly accepted
by Erhard who up to this point had not made any attempts to support his col-
league Schäﬀer in reorganising public enterprises. A reorganisation of federal
shareholdings would potentially have conﬁrmed the status of public enterprises
in the economy.
3.5 Financing Public Enterprises
While the political impact on management decisions of public enterprises was
small, the federal government's task of providing funds for enterprises was
268 Die beschämende Ohnmacht der Regierung, in: Volkswirtschaft, SPD press service,
26.9.1957, copy in BArch B102/75797.
269 Forderung nach Kontrolle der Wirtschaft, ihrer Kostenlage und Preispolitik, keine un-
realistische Forderung war, ibid.
270 BArch B102/75797, Der Einﬂuss des Bundes auf seine Unternehmen, SPD Press Service,
8.10.1957.
Chapter 3. Orientation Phase 118
substantial. Federal enterprises were growing, restructuring and adapting to
the new circumstances in a world which increasingly relied on oil. On top
of this, the re-establishment of Lufthansa and Saarbergwerke required large
amounts of capital.
Access to capital for public enterprises depended to a high degree on the
federal budget and was hence restricted by political decisions. Each increase of
capital stock needed parliamentary approval, either separately or by approval
of the annual budget, and required therefore a broad acceptance within the
government coalition. The result was that the capital ratio of equity to debt
was declining strongly in some cases. To some extent, the resulting ﬁnancing
issues were solved passively through internal ﬁnancing. Accumulated proﬁts
were a substitute for otherwise necessary capital increases. Internal ﬁnancing
opportunities were considerably increased based on depreciation opportunities
in the early 1950s.271 The federal government refrained from demanding high
dividends. This was much easier than organising a political majority for capital
increases. Additionally, the federal government deferred dividend payments.
A study by the Cologne Institute for Economic Research conﬁrms the high
degree of internal ﬁnancing of federal enterprises. In 1958, the average dividend
payment of shareholdings was 4%, whereas the average payment of privately
owned companies was on average 9.3%. While private enterprises had a rate of
70.6% of internal ﬁnancing to total investments, the rate of public enterprises
was 77%. The private sector denounced this as a discrimination against private
enterprises.272
Among the enterprises with the highest capital and investment needs in
the 1950s were Salzgitter AG, Preussag and Lufthansa. In each case, the fed-
eral government reacted in a diﬀerent way: Preussag was the ﬁrst company to
be partially privatised through issuing people's shares, Salzgitter AG remained
entirely state-owned and -ﬁnanced, and Lufthansa AG was co-ﬁnanced early on
by private equity investment. Salzgitter AG was not considered feasible for a
participation of private investment due to its insecure and highly unproﬁtable
271 See p. 129, also Bundesministerium für Finanzen (1955), p. 330.
272 Selbstﬁnanzierung der Bundesbetriebe. Quote betrug 1958 rd. 77 vH der Gesamtinvesti-
tionen, Kölnische Rundschau, 7.10.1960, copy in BArch B102/75792; see also Breidbach
(1960).
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situation. The federal budget plan for 1955 suggested an equity increase of 12
million DM ﬁnanced by a special budget. The FDP requested that this be can-
celled.273 In the Bundestag debate, Atzenroth (FDP) made clear that he did
not see the necessity for a capital injection by the government and demanded
that the increase should be ﬁnanced by a large share issue.274 Minister of Fi-
nance Schäﬀer (CSU) regarded Atzenroth's suggestion unfeasible. He argued
that it was unrealistic that Salzgitter AG would be able to place an issue of
such a volume. He added that under the current circumstances, even a bond
placement of a comparable volume was not possible without federal guaran-
tees.275 The SPD welcomed the equity increase.276 Hermann Lindrath (CDU),
who became the ﬁrst Federal Minister of the Treasury in 1957, defended the
equity increase but took the opportunity for a general critique. He described
public enterprises as a considerable amount of state capitalism within an eco-
nomic order of a social market economy277 and demanded stronger disclosure
provisions and more participation rights for the Bundestag.278
Preussag suﬀered from severe losses during and after the war. It had
lost its coal mines in Upper Silesia, its Middle German potash industry and
property located in Austria. With the ﬁrst two losses, Preussag had lost its
major income sources. The company's system which had been based on inter-
nal revenue sharing was threatened. Unproﬁtable plants which had received
regular subsidies until 1945 now caused serious problems. The DM opening
balance sheet in October 1951 for the reference date 21 June 1948 as well as the
annual ﬁnancial statement for 1950 took into account the severe asset erosion
and the losses carried forward since the currency reform. The capital stock
was reduced from 250 million RM to 75 million DM. Non-current assets were
valued at the upper limit at 100 million DM to allow for high depreciations
within the following years. Hence, in 1949 and 1950, balance sheet proﬁts of
273 Änderungsantrag der Fraktion der FDP zur zweiten Beratung des Entwurfs des
Haushaltsgesetzes 1955, Anlage 6, 2, Bundestag Plenarprotokoll 02/90, 22.6.1955, p.
5111.
274 Bundestag Plenarprotokoll 02/90, 22.6.1955, pp. 50955097.
275 Bundestag Plenarprotokoll 02/90, 22.6.1955, p. 5098.
276 Ritzel (SPD) in Bundestag Plenarprotokoll 02/90, 22.6.1955, p. 5088.
277 beachtliches Stück Staatskapitalismus innerhalb einer Wirtschaftsordnung der Sozialen
Marktwirtschaft, Bundestag Plenarprotokoll 02/90, 22.6.1955, p. 5052.
278 ibid.
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1.4 and 5.54 million DM were achieved, leading to an interest yield of 7.4% for
1950. Nevertheless, in 1951 it became evident that the investment needs for
repair, replacement and renewal works were high and that the company would
have high ﬁnancial needs within subsequent years.279 Before 1952, Preussag
made proﬁts mainly in the oil and metal industry. In 1950, prices for zinc and
lead had been released from control, which led to price increases. Preussag
also beneﬁted from the Korea Boom and the subsequent metal purchases of
the US government which increased prices further. The Investment Aid Act
from January 1952 improved the situation again. It allowed for generous de-
preciations that in turn reduced tax payments and allowed for a higher degree
of internal ﬁnancing. The law lead to a doubling of investments in the rele-
vant industries. The value of additional depreciations amounted to 55 million
DM between 1952 and 1956 for Preussag. Additionally, the Capital Market Aid
Law from 1952 (Erstes Gesetz zur Förderung des Kapitalmarkts) lowered taxes
on interest earnings for bonds and provided an incentive for debt ﬁnancing.
Preussag used the additional ﬁnancing sources for a widespread investment
programme that planned to invest 114 million DM of which 41 million DM
were ﬁnanced by depreciations. Nevertheless, due to sharp price decreases in
the metal market in 1952, Preussag did not make enough proﬁts to be able
to use the full depreciation options. The shut-down of Gewerkschaft Mecher-
nicher Werke and Barsinghausen280 was not suﬃcient to close this ﬁnancial
gap. This added to the motivation to make Preussag the ﬁrst company which
issued people's shares in 1959.281
In the case of Lufthansa, the government was highly pragmatic. Since
private investors were not interested in convertible bonds in the company, the
government oﬀered shares to private investors in December 1953 after an equity
increase of 19 million DM to 25 million DM had been decided. 19,000 bearer
shares with a nominal value of 1,000 DM were issued. 123 companies purchased
shares in a volume of 2.4 million DM. The main share of 1.3 million DM was
acquired by banks. The federal government participated in the equity increase
279 Laufer and Stier (2005), pp. 408409.
280 See p. 96.
281 See chapter 4.2.
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and the federal share increased to 84.5%. Five more equity increases between
1956 and 1960 raised the nominal capital to 250,000 million DM. Also, Luftag
was renamed as Deutsche Lufthansa AG in 1956. The participation of private
investors remained under 10%, the federal share over 85%.282
3.6 From Idea to Concensus
In the mid-1950s, privatisation discussions in conservative circles accelerated.
Due to the political constellation, advocates of privatisation were not able to
pursue their goals without the approval of the CDU/CSU's employees' faction.
At the same time, the employees developed their ideas of property formation
in the working class and needed the business wing's approval in order to imple-
ment measures. The result was that the CDU/CSU agreed on a social form of
privatisation which combined both sides. The common denominator was the
idea of a wide distribution of corporate ownership which should establish a new
class of shareholders from low-income households. The agreement was possible
because of the underlying insight that full public ownership was not necessary
in many cases. With this in mind, supporters of privatisation accepted some
social concessions, in order to raise support from politicians whose focus was
on the private asset accumulation.
3.6.1 Government under Pressure
Early on, the privatisation campaign focused on the case of Volkswagenwerk.
Yet, in the run-up to the elections, Minister of Finance Schäﬀer (CSU) pub-
licly declared that he would not support a privatisation of Volkswagenwerk.283
Shortly after the election, Erhard advocated a privatisation of Volkswagenwerk
internally, as an exchange of letters with Adenauer and Schäﬀer reveals.284 The
federal government knew that they had to come up with an idea to protect its
interests in Volkswagenwerk from Lower Saxony. A very early note from the
282 See Bozdag-Yaksan (2008), pp. 111114.
283 See for example Volkswagenwerk unter Bundesrecht, Handelsblatt 24.8.1953; Der
mißverstandene Pionier, Deutsche Zeitung und Wirtschaftszeitung, 29.8.1953.
284 BArch B102/76368, Erhard to Schäﬀer and Adenauer, 29.9.1953.
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Ministry of Economics assumed that Lower Saxony considered coupling the
company with Reichswerke and re-channelling Volkswagenwerk proﬁts to Re-
ichswerke.285 Despite this, the federal government did not pursue any actions
yet.
It can only be speculated how interested Erhard was in the matter at
that time. In any case, privatisation was not a priority. Rather, resources
were bound because he had to defend his idea of a social market economy
against various interests. The implementation of an antitrust law alone which
was an essential legal foundation for competitive markets took many years
and many disputes.286 Another time and energy absorbing topic in the mid-
1950s was a controversy about the independence of the Bundesbank. Adenauer
did not developed an interest in the matter of privatisation until 1954. In
1953, Adenauer was asked whether he would consider a privatisation of public
enterprises after a speech in Chicago. His response was that in general, he
preferred less public involvement. However, privatisation was not a priority at
the time because there were more severe problems to solve. The matter would
have to be discussed at a later time.287
Schäﬀer's role in this context is slightly controversial. He has often been
regarded as an opponent of privatisation because he tried to block the pri-
vatisation of Volkswagenwerk later on. But his role during the attempted
sales of Howaldtswerke contrasts with this view. Previous research has al-
ready pointed to the inconsistency of his behaviour.288 Schäﬀer often pointed
to the problem of the unclear ownership situation of Volkswagenwerk. A court
decision about property right claims from private investors was awaited in the
mid-1950s. Yet, it has been suggested that the real reason behind Schäﬀer's
hesitant approach to a Volkswagenwerk privatisation might have been ﬁscal
policy interests. Schäﬀer was known for his strict austerity policy. His budget
surplus was dubbed Juliusturm by his contemporaries.289 Schäﬀer was the
285 BArch B102/76026, Internal note, 18.9.1950.
286 For the long negotiations and the implementation of the antitrust law see Murach-Brand
(2004).
287 BArch B102/75797, BKAmt (Haenlein) to BMWi (Kattenstroth), 21.5.1953.
288Dietrich (1996), pp. 215217.
289 The Juliusturm (Julius tower) is the part of the Spandau Citadel in Berlin where the
Prussian government stored 120 million marks in gold coin, part of the war reparations
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only Federal Minister of Finance who managed to make a budget surplus since
1945. It has been indicated by government oﬃcials that Schäﬀer was concerned
that large extra revenues would lead to permanent ﬁnancial claims from other
ministries.290
Things began to turn in 1954. In response to the increasing public at-
tention on public enterprises, Adenauer requested information from Schäﬀer
about how and at what value public enterprises and participations could be
transferred into private ownership in May 1954.291 Schäﬀer replied that he gen-
erally supported the privatisation of shareholdings if these did not fulﬁl public
tasks. He suggested using privatisation revenues for the redemption of Reich
liabilities in the framework of the planned law regulating the consequences of
war. This idea seems to support the above hypothesis that Schäﬀer's intention
was to avoid the expected ﬁnancial desires of other departments in the case
of extra funds. Upon Adenauer's request,292 Schäﬀer sent Adenauer a list of
proﬁts and losses of state enterprises.293
A newspaper report from June 1954 about the losses in the publicly
owned wharf Deutsche Werke Kiel AG294 led to a second initiative Adenauer's:
In a cabinet meeting on 23 June 1954, the Federal Minister for Aﬀairs of the
Federal Council mentioned the article and suggested that the cabinet should
investigate the case. Adenauer joined in the criticism and found it an intol-
erable situation that control over Reich property was mainly allocated to the
Ministry of Economics and Ministry of Finance without publicity and control
of the delegates in the supervisory boards. A reorganisation had to follow
soon.295 Deutsche Werke Kiel was liquidated after the Howaldtswerke Kiel
paid by France after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870/71, until its restitution to France
in 1919. It has since become a synonym for government budget surpluses.
290 This was for example indicated in BArch B126/40185, internal note, 17.5.1954.
291 BArch B136/2345, Adenauer to Schäﬀer, 1.5.1954 and 14.5.1954.
292 BArch B136/2345, Adenauer to Schäﬀer, 27.7.1954.
293 BArch B136/2345, Schäﬀer to Adenauer, 18.7.1954.
294 Millionenverluste in Kiel. Wenn der Staat wirtschaftet, Heinz Brestel in FAZ, 22.6.1954.
Deutsche Werke Kiel AG was founded in 1925 as a result of a merger in the shipbuilding
industry. The company suﬀered from massive losses during the war and was subject to
serious dismantlement. Parts of the company were hived oﬀ and reorganised as the pri-
vately owned Maschinenbau Kiel (MaK) which later became part of the Krupp concern.
295 unhaltbarer Zustand, daß das frühere Reichsvermögen im wesentlichen auf die Bun-
desministerien der Finanzen und für Wirtschaft aufgeteilt und die von den beiden
Ressorts benannten Aufsichtsräte ohne ausreichende Kontrolle und Publizität tätig seien.
In der gesamten Frage müsse schnell und wirksam Ordnung geschaﬀen werden., in: Die
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had taken over its two remaining dry docks in 1954.
In October 1954, Adenauer asked Minister of Finance Schäﬀer repeat-
edly which shareholdings were suitable for privatisation. Additionally, he de-
manded a privatisation design and ideas for an appropriate usage of the rev-
enues.296 Later in the same year, Adenauer let Erhard and Schäﬀer know
that he expected plans for a privatisation of Volkswagenwerk as soon as the
federal supreme court had rejected the claims of the so-called Volkswagen
savers.297 Under pressure, the Ministry of Finance passed on the Deutsche
Bank expert report on privatisation from July 1954 which it had commis-
sioned. Warned by this, Secretary of State Westrick (Ministry of Economics)
responded that privatisation should under no circumstances lead to a dom-
inant position of banks. Instead, priority should be given to a widespread
distribution of shares.298 Here, Westrick mentioned an element which would
later become the core principle of privatisation: to aim at a wide distribution
of small shares in order to avoid concentrations of power and ownership. Just a
few days later, the Deutsche Industrie-Institut suggested a broad distribution
of shares in the form of people's shares as a privatisation mechanism for Volk-
swagenwerk.299 From this moment on, the direction was clear. Only the timing
was not right yet. Since Schäﬀer did not respond to Adenauer's request from
October 1954, Erhard send a list of companies which he considered suitable
for privatisation to Adenauer and Schäﬀer in January 1955, including notes on
suggested principles of privatisation. Erhard recommended the privatisation
of only those shareholdings which were not incorporated or only loosely con-
nected to other shareholdings and did not fulﬁl public tasks.300 Evidently, he
was not considering selling the holding companies themselves yet. This found
Schäﬀer's approval.301
Privatisation was discussed at a meeting of the economic committee of
Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung online, Federal Cabinet, minutes of the 36th
meeting on 23 June 1954, agenda item D.d.
296 BArch B136/2345, Adenauer to Schäﬀer, 12.10.1954.
297 BArch B136/2340, Globke (BKAmt) to Erhard and Schäﬀer, 31.12.1954.
298 BArch B126/40186, Westrick to Oeftering, 3.1.1955.
299Deutsches Industrieinstitut: Volkswagenwerk  Brücke zur Volksaktie?, DII Schnell-
dienst, 7.1.1955.
300 Erhard to Adenauer, 19 January 1955, BArch B136/2345.
301 BArch B136/2345, Schäﬀer to Adenauer, 17.2.1955.
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the federal cabinet in February 1955. Here, it became obvious that the cab-
inet was only at the start of an opinion-forming process. In the meeting,
Erhard favoured privatisation in the form of a transformation of the company
from a limited liability company into a joint stock company and subsequent
stock market issue of shares. Schäﬀer argued that a public oﬀering was not
possible before a ﬁnal settlement of debts from the NS regime because of po-
tential ﬁnancial burdens of the company. These risks would lower the sale
price signiﬁcantly. Schäﬀer's second main argument against a stock market
privatisation was the limited capacity of the stock market to absorb such a
share volume  a problem which had been brought forward by Deutsche Bank.
The meeting ended without concrete decisions. It was only decided that Er-
hard's privatisation conception would serve as a foundation for the subsequent
opinion-forming process of the federal cabinet.302 In spring 1956, the Oﬃce of
the Federal Chancellor had given up hopes that Schäﬀer could be convinced
to agree to a privatisation of Volkswagenwerk any time soon and decided to
not follow up on this matter further.303
3.6.2 Property Formation Policy
Increasing the participation of employees in capital accumulation was the main
political goal of the employees' faction of the CDU in the 1950s. Private capi-
tal formation was already being discussed and promoted at the CDU Hamburg
party convention in 1953.304 The employees' faction had been founded in 1946
as Christlich-Demokratische Arbeitnehmerschaft (CDA) (Christian Social Em-
ployees or Christian Social Committees). Since then, it constituted one of
the main groups within the party. It is recognised in the party's constitution
and has to be regarded as an important factor in the decision-making pro-
cess within the party. On the side of the CSU, something similar existed in
the form of the Arbeitnehmer-Union (CSA) (workers' union). The employ-
ees' factions did not represent the average German employee. Within the ﬁrst
302 Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung online, Economics Committee of the Fed-
eral Cabinet, minutes of the 25th meeting on 18 February 1955, agenda item 1: Bun-
desvermögen.
303 BArch B136/2340, Internal Note (Haenlein), 9.5.1956.
304 Eigentum für alle Schichten des Volkes, in Hintze (1995), p. 41. See also Zolleis (2008).
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post-war decades, the large German Trades Union Confederation (Deutscher
Gewerkschaftsbund, DGB) was closely connected to the SPD. Also, the rela-
tionship of CDA and CSA to the small Christian unions that were uniﬁed in
the Christian Trade Union Federation of Germany (CGB) was only loose. In
1947, the CDA had a huge impact on the Ahlener Programm, an economic and
social programme of the North Rhine-Westphalian CDU.305 The programme
was a compromise formula between bourgeois conservatives around Adenauer
and the Social Christian CDA. It comprised rather vague proposals for a co-
determination of employees, a socialisation of key industries and public econ-
omy. It was revised by the stronger market-oriented Düsseldorfer Leitsätze in
1949 which laid the party-political foundation of the social market economy.
With respect to social policy, the Düsseldorf programme recommended a broad
distribution of national wealth and assigned only secondary importance to the
question of a socialisation of industries.306
The employees' faction had since the early 1950s been working on how
to increase the savings and property formation for lower- and middle-income
classes. Their concepts were highly inﬂuenced by diﬀerent social movements
and doctrines which had developed in response to the social question in the
19th century. These include the Catholic social doctrine and the bourgeois
social reform movement. The social question arose with industrialisation, the
decreasing signiﬁcance of real property and the competition between labour
and capital. Whereas Marxism saw the answer in removing private ownership,
the solution for Catholic and bourgeois reformists was to change and equalise
the distribution of property. When the advancing industrialisation opened up
new opportunities for social policy, the ownership question lost signiﬁcance
but remained a central issue in both reform movements. In 1891, the papal
encyclical Rerum Novarum of Pope Leo XIII which became the ideological
foundation of Catholic social doctrine in the 20th century justiﬁed the insti-
tution of private property but advocated a more equal distribution. After a
period where representatives had focused on the importance of private sav-
305 Ahlener Programm, Zonenausschuß der CDU für die britische Zone, Ahlen / Westfalen,
3.2.1947.
306Dietrich (1996), pp. 124134.
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ings, the ownership question won signiﬁcance again after the First World War.
Christian and bourgeois ideas of co-ownership of employees and their partici-
pation in proﬁts contrasted with ideas of socialisation. The property formation
concept was connected with the idea of an abolition of the class society by a
de-proletarianisation of the working class.307 After the Second World War,
economic circulation theories in which distributional eﬀects played a decisive
role theoretically underpinned ideas of property and income formation. Three
diﬀerent concepts of property formation were developed: intra-corporate co-
ownership and proﬁt-sharing schemes, investment wages, and supra-company
co-ownership.308
The most discussed idea in the Christian Social Committee in the 1950s
was investment wages (Investivlohn).309 The basic idea was that employees
should invest a proportion of their salary in an investment saving scheme which
was, depending on the concrete concept, more or less subsidised and organised
by the state. One of the most important spokesmen for investment wages was
Erwin Häussler (CDU).310 In 1954, Häussler and his colleague German Stehle
(CDU) presented a detailed concept for private capital formation including
investment schemes for employees, based on 15 laws. For this purpose, they
considered a privatisation of federal enterprises aiming at dispersed ownership
through investment companies.311 When Erhard suggested privatisation via
investment companies in 1956, it is possible that he was indirectly inﬂuenced
by the Häussler-plan.
The Federation of German Trade Unions strongly criticised intra-company
solutions. Co-ownership and proﬁt-sharing were regarded as a cheap substitute
for the primary objective of co-determination rights for employees and as an
attempt to increase the dependency of workers from their employer. Another
criticism was that co-ownership would lead to a self-exploitation of workers.
307Dietrich (1996), pp. 2630.
308Dietrich (1996), pp. 2648.
309 The term Investivlohn was ﬁrst used in 1953 by trade union oﬃcial Karl Hinkel.
310 Häussler was strongly inﬂuenced by the Catholic social doctrine. From 1951, he was
member of the CDU Nordwürttemberg Regional Executive. He also was a member of
the Bundestag from 1953 to 1961 and from 1964 to 1972. Between 1965 and 1969, he
was deputy chairman of the Bundestag committee for federal property.
311Dietrich (1996), p. 71.
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Instead, the German Federation of Trade Unions favoured supra-company con-
ceptions such as the Gleitze-plan.312 In contrast to wage increases, a direct
participation of employees in the companies' capital accumulation was consid-
ered advantageous because it would not be absorbed by inﬂation.313
During the second legislation period, a number of ﬁnancial private savings
incentives were successfully implemented. The Housing Construction Premium
Act (Wohnungsbausprämiengesetz ) from 1952 and the Capital Market Aid Act
(Erstes Gesetz zur Förderung des Kapitalmarktes, Kapitalmarktförderungsge-
setz ) from 1952 subsidised private housing savings.314 In the third and fourth
legislation period, measures to subsidise private savings were extended, be-
ginning with the Savings Premium Act (Sparprämiengesetz ) from 1959 and
ﬁnancial beneﬁts for employee shares (Belegschaftsaktien) in 1960. The First
Capital Accumulation Act (Gesetz zur Förderung der Vermögensbildung für
Arbeitnehmer, short Erstes Vermögensbildungsgesetz, also 312-Mark-Gesetz )
from 1961 became the foundation for later property formation policy. It intro-
duced a general savings bonus scheme. The savings volume which was subject
to beneﬁts was later extended to 624 DM in 1965 (Second Capital Accumu-
lation Law), and to 936 DM in 1983 (Fourth Capital Accumulation Act). In
1990, the Fifth Capital Accumulation Act introduced the employee savings
allowance scheme Arbeitnehmersparzulage.
Private capital formation remained a major debate until the mid 1960s.
In 1964, the Protestant Church published two memorandums, pointing out the
importance of material security of each individual as a foundation for freedom
and social and economic participation.315 While property formation policy
was being discussed, the ownership concentration increased, in particular the
concentration of productive capital. A study which was initiated by the grand
coalition found that in 1960, 1.7% of the households possessed 35% of total
312 Bruno Gleitze was director of the Economic Institute of the Federation of German Trade
Unions. He suggested that large companies should have to account a share of their capital
gain achieved through internal ﬁnancing as social capital. This capital would become
part of a supra-company investment fund which would issue shares to employees.
313Dietrich (1996), pp. 7683.
314 Abelshauser (1983), p. 144.
315 Empfehlungen zur Eigentumspolitik and Eigentumsbildung in sozialer Verantwortung,
published in: Kirchenamt der evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland (1991).
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assets and 70% of the productive capital.316 Dietrich (1996) does not believe
that there was a causal link between ownership concentration and demands of
the employees' faction, since hardly any data were available yet in the 1950s.
Still, there might have been a desire on the employees' side to participate in
the economic boom. Also, some knowledge was already available at that time:
the Bank deutscher Länder reported in its annual publication that in 1955,
the public sector accounted for 41% of all capital formation and large stock
companies for another 30% whereas private involvement was low.317
One of the reasons for the increased concentration of ownership was that
in the ﬁrst legislation period, the federal government had implemented a se-
ries of measures to increase the productive capital stock for the purpose of
industrial reconstruction. As a consequence, a number of state subsidies in
the form of tax reductions and special depreciation allowances allowed for a
high degree of internal ﬁnancing. These measures included  36 of the Invest-
ment Aid Act from 1952, the DM Opening Balance Sheet Law (Gesetz über
die Eröﬀnungsbilanz in Deutscher Mark und die Kapitalneufestsetzung, short
DM-Eröﬀnungsbilanzgesetz ) from 1949 and  7 Income Tax Law. These indi-
rect subsidies increased the capital of comparably already wealthy industrial
elites.318 In this situation, the idea of a neutral privatisation was a very
obvious solution: Public enterprises constituted property which could be al-
located by avoiding a more direct redistribution. A subsidised sale of shares
to employees would increase the low- and middle-income households' net asset
position and at the same time provide ﬁnancial resources for the industry.
3.6.3 Dispersed Ownership
Advocates of privatisation and property formation became increasingly con-
nected in the mid-1950s. The result were two privatisation concepts: privati-
sation via small shares and via investment funds. Both concepts aimed at
a broad dispersion of shares. Two facts had become obvious in light of the
failed sale of the Howaldtswerke: ﬁrst, there was a broad political consensus
316 Abelshauser (1983), p. 141.
317 Jahresbericht der Bank deutscher Länder für 1955, p. 56.
318 Abelshauser (1983), p. 143.
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against an increase of the concentration of ownership. Second, block holdings
by foreign investors were strongly rejected. Hence, the desired privatisation
method had to make sure that shares were widely distributed in small pack-
ages to domestic shareholders. This reduced the options of possible designs
considerably.
The idea of small shares (Kleinaktien) had been circulating since the early
1950s. In January 1953 for example, Osthoﬀ, an oﬃcial in the Ministry of For-
eign Aﬀairs, published an article about small shares as the security paper of
the future in the Bulletin der Bundesregierung. He pointed to the culture of
share ownership in the US and referred to a possible privatisation of public en-
terprises via small shares. The article was not received well in the Ministry of
Finance.319 Secretary of State Westrick (Ministry of Economics) defended the
concept of a widespread distribution of shares against the Ministry of Finance
in 1955.320 In March 1955, Erhard adopted the idea of a broad distribution
as the privatisation design for Volkswagenwerk.321 About the same time, in
January 1955, the Cologne Institute for Economic Research published a press
announcement that suggested a privatisation of Volkswagenwerk in the frame-
work of a widespread distribution of small shares.322 The term Volksaktie was
used for the ﬁrst time in this article. Most likely, it was adopted from the Aus-
trian partial privatisation of banks in the form of issuing non-voting preferred
shares.323 In Germany, the term was ﬁrst used without a clear deﬁnition while
the terminology implied that the shares should be aﬀordable and available to
everyone. The economics committee of the Rhineland CDU under the leader-
ship of Konrad Adenauer Junior and lawyer Host Rheinfels, who later was a
founding member of the ﬁrst people's share association Aktionärsverein Düs-
319 BArch B126/40184, Birnbaum to Secretary of State Hartmann, 2.10.1956, and copy of
the article, Osthoﬀ: Die Klein-Aktie, das volkstümliche Wertpapier der Zukunft?, in
Bulletin der Bundesregierung, 1.10.1953, p. 1651.
320 BArch B126/40186, Westrick to Oeftering, 3.1.1955.
321 BArch B102/76368, Erhard to Schäﬀer, 15.3.1955.
322 Volkswagen  Brücke zur Volksaktie?, Cologne Institute for Economic Research Press
Service, 7.1.1955; also: Volkswagen-Aktie als Brücke zur Volksaktie?, Süddeutsche
Zeitung, 12.1.1955.
323 Stiefel (2011).
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seldorf,324 played a central role in promoting the people's shares concept.325
The second idea involved investment funds. This idea possibly goes back to
Erwin Häussler (CDU) and circles in the Baden-Wuerttemberg CDU. Häussler
was one of the key ﬁgures in the CDU's employees association. The idea that
an investment company should take over shareholdings and issue certiﬁcates
to employees in turn became known as the Häussler-Plan.326 At that time, a
law governing investment funds was being prepared but had not been passed
yet.
At the CDU National Party Conference on 29 April 1956, a joint res-
olution for a privatisation of industries featuring a dispersed distribution of
shares and favourable conditions for employees was passed. It demanded a
privatisation of federally owned companies in such a way as to avoid a new
concentration of wealth unless companies necessarily have to remain in public
ownership. A wide distribution of shares in smallholdings should be ensured.
Favourable conditions for employees should be granted.327 It can be spec-
ulated whether industrial circles accepted a social dimension of privatisation
because they were afraid of stronger distributional measures such as invest-
ment wages. Erhard himself had no sympathy for the idea of co-ownership.
He argued that acquiring ownership is better than acquiring co-ownership.328
Yet, after the party conference, the ground was prepared for a broad initiative
for the privatisation of Volkswagenwerk. All it needed was an additional im-
pulse which was delivered with the inﬂation debates of summer 1956. In some
respect it can be said that the intended privatisation scheme was consistent
with ordoliberal core ideas: One of the key ordoliberal ideas was the positive
relationship between concentration of ownership and concentration of power.
In order to prevent capture and the dominance of particular interests, owner-
324 See for example: Horst Rheinfels, Volksaktie contra Werksgenossenschaft, Indus-
triekurier No. 37, 9.3.1957.
325Dietrich (1996), pp. 220222.
326Dietrich (1996), p. 221.
327 Privatisierung bundeseigener Erwerbsunternehmen unter Vermeidung neuer Vermögen-
skonzentrationen, soweit dieser Besitz nicht zwingend in der Hand des Staates bleiben
muß. Auf Streuung dieser Anteile in Kleinbesitz ist zu achten. Arbeitnehmern sind
Vorzugsbedingungen einzuräumen, Documentation: 6. Bundesparteitag der CDU, 26.
29. April 1956 in Stuttgart, p. 138.
328 Eigentum zu erwerben ist besser, als Miteigentum zu erwerben, Erhard in Bundestag,
26.6.1956, Bundestag Plenarprotokoll 02/153, p. 8306.
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ship had to be de-concentrated. This was exactly what the consensus agreed
on.
3.6.4 Summer 1956: Inﬂation Debate
Erhard used the inﬂation debate in summer 1956 to bring the privatisation
topic back to the cabinet table. Faced with a booming economy and price
inﬂation, the Bank deutscher Länder had increased the discount rate from 3 to
3.5% on 4 August 1955, and later to 5.5%. In this situation, the federal reserves
which Minister of Finance Schäﬀer (CSU) had accumulated over the years
were strongly criticised. A CDU committee, the so-called Kuchenausschuss,
had set about distributing those reserves and subsequently state expenditures
rose. The restrictive measures of the central bank were criticised sharply by
Adenauer who began to question the independence of the central bank.329 For
Erhard and the market oriented party wing, the independence of the central
bank was one of the pillars of the social market economy. In the summer of
1956, the rift between Adenauer on one side and Schäﬀer, Erhard and the
central bank on the other side was deep and the party was faced with low
polls. In order to save the federal elections in autumn 1957, the CDU needed
to come up with something.
Another key ﬁgure in those years was Franz Etzel (CDU). Etzel was a
representative of the CDU liberal wing and at that time vice president of the
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). In order to absorb purchasing
power as a measure against inﬂation, he suggested promoting shares in stock
companies and improving tax conditions for share ownership.330 Maybe it was
this suggestion which prompted Erhard to promote privatisation as a measure
against inﬂation. In a meeting of the economics committee of the federal
cabinet in June, he suggested using investment companies for the privatisation
of shareholdings. The plan was that investment companies would take over
shareholdings and then issue shares which would be bought by employees.
This would absorb purchasing power, increase private capital formation and
329 This refers to the well-known Gürzenich-Rede, held at the BDI on 23 May 1956.
330Dietrich (1996), pp. 231235.
Chapter 3. Orientation Phase 133
decrease consumption.331 Only a day earlier, Erhard, Hellwig and Rheinfels
had discussed this policy in the Presseclub, a popular political TV talk show.332
The idea to sell participations through investment funds was accepted by
the government committee despite the resistance of Schäﬀer and became part
of the economic programme against inﬂation of the federal government from 22
June 1956. It was announced that in order to provide new, additional savings
incentives for the broad masses of savers, the federal government intends to
grant the savers access to an equity participation in shareholdings through the
purchase of securities of small nominal value from investment companies.333
As a direct consequence of the inﬂation debate, the Investment Company Act
which had been delayed for some time was ﬁnally adopted.
331 Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung online, Economics Committee of the Fed-
eral Cabinet, minutes of the 51st meeting on 12 June 1956.
332 See Dietrich (1996), p. 247.
333 Um der breiten Masse der Sparer neue, zusätzliche Sparanreize zu geben, hat die Bun-
desregierung die Absicht, dem Sparer über entsprechende Investment-Gesellschaften eine
Beteiligung an Bundesunternehmen durch Kauf von kleingestückelten Investmentpa-
pieren zu ermöglichen, Government Statement from 22.6.1956, Bundestag Plenarpro-
tokoll 02/152, 22.6.1956, p. 8147.
Chapter 4
People's Shares Privatisations
Between 1959 and 1965, the federal government partially privatised Preussag,
Volkswagenwerk and VEBA through the sale of people's shares. Volkswagen-
werk's partial privatisation was initially intended to be the ﬁrst project but
it was delayed signiﬁcantly by internal conﬂicts of the CDU/CSU about the
design of people's shares and by the ownership conﬂict between the federal
government and Lower Saxony. Instead, the government chose Preussag as
the ﬁrst subject of privatisation in 1959. Volkswagenwerk followed in 1961
and VEBA in 1965. In the cases of Preussag and VEBA, the privatisations
were connected with equity increases.
Parliamentarians brought a ﬁrst legislative draft for the privatisation of
Volkswagenwerk into parliament in July 1956. Until this point, the government
and politicians had discussed a possible privatisation behind closed doors and
in small circles. The legislative draft opened the public debate. Supporters
made huge eﬀorts to popularise the idea of people's shares, culminating in the
decision of the CDU party convention in Hamburg to turn the Volkswagenwerk
privatisation into one of the primary topics for the federal elections in autumn
1957. The core element of people's shares was the segmentation of equity
into small units of shares combined with a broad distribution of shares in the
population. Beyond these features, the design of shares and issue conditions
in all three partial privatisations diﬀered slightly and each adaptation was a
result of the respective political conditions.
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As argued above, the implementation of a Volkswagen law required a
broad majority because the approval of both political chambers Bundesrat
and Bundestag was necessary. In order to gain suﬃcient political support in
the sister parties CDU and CSU, an adoption of the law required an agreement
between the left and the right party wings. In addition to this, the government
needed to reach an agreement with Lower Saxony about the open ownership
question of Volkswagenwerk. In the pivotal year 1959, the CDU/CSU groups
found a joint solution which was to sell the shares to a large number of people
and to support the household's formation of property thereby. Symptomatic
of that is what Hans Katzer (CDU),334 representative of the CDU Social Com-
mittee, said in a Bundestag debate in 1959: the socio-political goal of the
CDU/CSU was not privatisation, it was property for all.335
4.1 Conceptualisation
After Erhard had suggested to sell public enterprises through investment funds
in order to absorb purchasing power and reduce the risk for inﬂation in the
economics committee of the federal government, parliamentarians of several
parties brought a legislative proposal for a Volkswagenwerk privatisation into
the Bundestag in July 1956. Parallel to this, the energy division in the Min-
istry of Economics under Ludwig Kattenstroth conducted work on a draft law.
In 1957, the ministerial oﬃcials provided a draft which became the basis for
the ﬁrst government proposal in Bundestag. The government proposal served
as a foundation for the privatisation designs of Preussag, Volkswagenwerk and
VEBA. Hence, the years between the summer of 1956 and the Preussag pri-
vatisation in 1959 can in hindsight be regarded as a conceptualisation period.
However, even after 1959, the privatisation design was developed and adapted
to the speciﬁc cases.
334 Hans Katzer was a founding member of the CDU. He was a member of the CDU Social
Committee and Federal Minister for Labour and Social Aﬀairs from 1965 to 1969.
335 Parliamentary debate about Große Anfrage der FDP betr. Privatisierung des Bundesver-
mögens, Bundestag Plenarprotokoll 03/63, 20.2.1959. Summary in BArch B102/75797,
Bulletin der Bundesregierung no. 36, 24.2.1959, p. 339.
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4.1.1 People's Shares versus Investment Funds
Around the time of the inﬂation debates, the MPs Alexander Elbrächter (DP,
since 1958 CDU) and Rudolf Vogel (CDU) agreed on a joint initiative for a
Volkswagenwerk privatisation. Their ﬁrst legislative proposal for a privatisa-
tion of Volkswagenwerk, the Elbrächter Antrag (Elbrächter proposal),336 was
oﬃcially proposed in the Bundestag in July 1956 and was signed by a group
of MPs of CDU, CSU, Free People's Party (FVP)337 and DP. Among the sig-
natories were the initiators of the proposal, Alexander Elbrächter (DP) and
Rudolf Vogel (CDU), the later Ministers of the Treasury Hermann Lindrath
(CDU), Werner Dollinger (CSU) and Kurt Schmücker (CDU), and Hellwig
(CDU). The Elbrächter proposal suggested the following:
• Volkswagenwerk GmbH to be transformed into a joint stock company.
• Shares to have a nominal value between 100 DM and 1,000 DM.
• Up to 25% of the share capital could be sold to investment companies.
• 25% of the shares to be registered shares.
• The revenues to be brought into a foundation for the promotion of science
and academic and technical education and development.
The Elbrächter proposal was a ﬁrst idea of how Volkswagenwerk could
be transformed into a mixed-ownership enterprise and served as a starting
point for further considerations. It suggested only a restricted participation
of investment companies. The reason why the authors of the bill intended to
sell 25% of the shares as registered shares with restricted transferability was
that this would avoid that foreign investors would sell large blocks of shares.
However, the bill was withheld in the Bundestag economics committee after it
had been passed on and was not even discussed in plenary before the end of
the legislation period.
Parallel to this, works in the ministerial administration had begun. When
Erhard announced privatisation through investment certiﬁcates in the govern-
ment programme against inﬂation in 1956, this idea was new to the oﬃcials
336 Bundestagsdrucksache 02/2614, 5.7.1956.
337 The Free People's Party (Freie Volkspartei) was a small short-lived political party which
had seceded from the FDP in 1956. Just a year later, it merged into the German Party
DP.
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in the Ministry of Economics. The lack of documents in the Ministry of Eco-
nomics before the meeting suggests that Erhard had not consulted with his
ministry about the idea before. After the programme had been presented,
Erhard gave orders to start working on possible solutions but did not want to
become involved himself. He was not interested in the practical side of privati-
sation and left the work with Kattenstroth who had just become head of the
energy division. In September 1956, Kattenstroth noted that Erhard wanted
the problem to be solved but that he did not care about the details: Erhard
was ﬁne with everything and did not care about how the problem would be
solved, it just had to be solved.338
The advantage of using investment companies was that the associated
risks for the future shareholders were smaller compared to directly held shares.
Yet, after works had begun, the oﬃcials realised that there were severe practi-
cal problems. In particular, the Investment Company Act from 1957 provided
that investment companies were not allowed to invest more than 5% of their
equity capital in shares of one company. The volume of federal sharehold-
ings which were meant to be brought into investment funds would therefore
require a large number of investment companies.339 Because of the problems
associated with investment companies, Henneberg and Fenge considered estab-
lishing a new special form of investment companies. They suggested that the
federal government in cooperation with banks would establish people's shares-
investment companies as special companies with speciﬁc regulation. These
companies would take over federal shareholdings which would be brought into
a special investment fund, and issued people's shares would certify rights in this
fund.340 These so-called Volksaktien-Gesellschaften (VAG) (people's shares in-
vestment companies), a mix of people's shares and investment companies, were
designed to reduce risks associated with shares.341
338 mit allem einverstanden (...) es sei ihm egal, wie das Problem gelöst würde, nur müsse
es gelöst werden., BArch B102/76101, Internal note, Kattenstroth, 5.9.1956.
339 BArch B102/76101, Internal note (Fenge), 28.8.1956.
340 BArch B102/75795, Gedanken über die Erweiterung der Privatisierungsmöglichkeiten,
Internal note (Henneberg), undated.
341 BArch B102/76101, Entwurf eines Gesetzes über die Errichtung von Volksaktien-
Gesellschaften und die Übertragung von der Bundesrepublik Deutschland gehörenden
Aktien auf diese Gesellschaften, 9.4.1957.
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Yet, the idea to set up special investment companies solely for the pur-
pose of privatisation faced strong resistance. In the Ministry of Economics,
the division for money and credit sharply criticised the idea.342 Birnbaum
(Ministry of Finance) had in 1955 already declared that he considered privati-
sation via investment companies as infeasible due to the legal restrictions.343
Nevertheless, the ministerial oﬃcials in the Ministry of Economics held on to
the idea of privatisation through investment companies until the 1960s, even
after the ﬁrst people's shares privatisations.
4.1.2 The Government Draft for a Volkswagen Law
CDU/CSU and DP proposed the government draft for a Volkswagenwerk pri-
vatisation law in Bundestag in May 1957.344 It was clear that there would be
no decision before the end of the legislation period. The government's main
goal was to initiate an open debate and to speed up the privatisation process,
in particular negotiations with Lower Saxony as part of this process. The key
idea was to transform Volkswagenwerk GmbH into a joint stock company and
to transfer the shares into private ownership by a share issue favouring domes-
tic natural persons. The government draft did not rely on investment funds as
privatisation vehicles. Why the Ministry of Economics had turned against the
idea of investment funds is not addressed explicitly in the documents reviewed
for this thesis. It seems likely that the decision was due to a combination
of internal resistance and the fact that the establishment of people's shares
investment companies would require a new special legislation. The fact that
there was hardly any internal communication about people's shares investment
companies also suggests that Fenge and Henneberg developed this idea further
without the consent of Kattenstroth and Erhard. In detail, the government
draft provided the following:
• Shares to be registered shares with restricted transferability. (A transfer
of shares needs to be approved by the supervisory board.)
• At least 25% of the share capital has to be issued as shares with a nominal
342 BArch B102/76101, Internal note, Subdiv. VIAI, 13.9.1956.
343 BArch B126/40187, Birnbaum to Secretary of State, 20.9.1955.
344 Bundestagsdrucksache 02/3534, 22.5.1957.
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value of 50 DM.
• Only natural persons (not legal entities) to be allowed to purchase shares.
• The purchase of shares per person to be restricted to 1/20,000 of the
nominal share capital.
• Voting rights per person to be restricted to 1/20,000 of the nominal share
capital.
• Proxy voting to be restricted to 1/500 of the nominal share capital per
proxy.
• Voting rights for investment companies according to the Investment Com-
pany Act to be restricted to 1/100 of the nominal share capital.
• Credit institutions to not be allowed to purchase shares.
• Domestic credit institutions can act as proxies; proxy voting for all do-
mestic credit institutions together to be restricted to 1/3 of the nominal
share capital.
• German purchasers with an annual income of 9,000 DM or less to receive
a 20% discount; purchasers with an income between 9,000 DM and 15,000
DM to receive a discount of 10%.
• If shares are re-sold within three years after the initial purchase, the
discount has to be paid back.
• Employees can purchase shares up to a nominal value of 1,000 DM with
a ﬁnancial discount.
The legislative proposal of the government was discussed in Bundestag
on 31 May 1957. The FDP criticised the intended ﬁnancial subsidies, whereas
the SPD found that a successful example of public ownership such as Volk-
swagenwerk should not be given up and that privatisations were not a feasible
instrument to equalise the distribution of national wealth.345 Yet, the coalition
partners did not yet approve the draft bill.
The draft intended to issue voting shares with a nominal value of 50
DM which was the lowest possible denomination for shares at that time and
suggested shares which contained voting rights because generating a real par-
ticipation of small investors was the core intention of left-conservative prop-
erty policy. This suggestion diﬀerentiated from the policies in Austria where
345 Bundestag Plenarprotokoll 02/214, 31.5.1957, pp. 1259412596 and pp. 1260312608.
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people's shares were used to partially privatise the nationalised Creditanstalt-
Bankverein and Länderbank AG. There, 10% of equity capital (in total 75
million OES) was issued as bearer shares, mainly to party-associated institu-
tional investors, and 30% of the equity capital (in total 225 million OES) was
issued as non-voting preferential shares with an intentionally low issue price.
This form of privatisation reached an over-subscription of 81%, shares were
preferentially allocated to smallholders.346 Beyond the intention to use voting
shares, the government draft contained a number of special clauses. In par-
ticular, the draft did not allow ﬁnancial institutions to purchase shares. Also,
proxy voting was limited. Earlier drafts of the law from February 1957 had even
more restrictive features. There, the oﬃcials from the Ministry of Economics
had suggested to restrict voting rights to 1/50,000 of nominal share capital
and to exclude proxy voting entirely.347 By suggesting registered shares with
restricted transferability, the government oﬃcials aimed at avoiding a situa-
tion in which single shareholders, particularly foreign shareholders, could gain
a major inﬂuence on the company. Possibly, this was initially a concession to
concerns in the Ministry of Finance. While the issue conditions ensured an
initial wide dispersion of shares, the government oﬃcials recognised the pos-
sibility of large share purchases after stock market ﬂotation. Using registered
shares was an idea of the legal division in the Ministry of Economics as a re-
sponse to these concerns.348 The involved ministries agreed early on that one
could only abstain from registered shares if the possibility of block-building
and foreign inﬁltration could be excluded in another way.349 The ﬁnancial
concessions for low-income households and the intended favourable purchase
conditions for employees were probably included for political reasons.
Like Germany, other European countries made attempts to increase share-
ownership among small and medium income households in order to stimulate
the supply of funds to ﬁnance the post-war reconstruction. The German me-
346DBA V01/2143, Volksaktie. Unterlage aus dem Vortrag vor der Industrie- und Handel-
skammer für Rheinhessen, am 28.5.57.
347 BArch B102/76368, Drafts from 11.1. and 4. and 9.2.1957.
348 BArch B102/76101, Fenge to Kötter, 20.10.1956.
349 BArch B102/76101, III3 (Henneberg), Preparatory notes for a departmental meeting
on 25 September 1957 with representatives of the Ministry of the Treasury, Ministry of
Economics, Justice Ministry and Treuarbeit, 21.9.57.
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dia observed such experiences attentively, reported extensively on asset sales
abroad which looked remotely like the planned people's shares privatisation
and subsumed them under this terminology. In most of the cases, enter-
prises abroad issued non-voting shares. International examples include the
issue of certiﬁcates in the French oil companies Société Nationale d'Aquitaine
and Compagnie Française des Petroles where each share was divided into four
or ﬁve certiﬁcates.350 The Italian government oﬀered registered shares of the
partially state-owned steel company Cornigliano Soc. per Az. Genua to 60,000
employees of the Finsider state-holding which was part of the IRI group (Isti-
tuto per la Ricostruzione Industriale, Institute for Industrial Reconstruction).
351 The media reported that in the UK, where nominal values of shares were
traditionally low, the conservative government planned to abolish the stamp
tax in order to encourage small-scale equity investments.352 Multiple articles
referred to the plans of the Swedish government to ﬁnance its state debt by
issuing bonds of small nominal values as people's bonds.353
The Board for Social Formation of Capital (Kuratorium für Soziale Eigen-
tumsbildung) became a platform for an exchange between academic, economic
and political circles, in particular the CDU and industry. The board was
formed in autumn 1957 as a mixed advisory board without any formal rights
or function; the president and founding member was Karl Arnold (CDU).354
Among the 25 members besides Arnold were the CDU politicians Erwin Häus-
sler, Horst Rheinfels, Hans Katzer, Fritz Burgbacher and Bernhard Tacke
(member of the CDU Social Committee and deputy head of the German Fed-
eration of Trade Unions) and from the administrative side Hans Birnbaum
350 Volksaktien in Frankreich, Die Welt, 26.9.1957.
351 Volksaktien für Italien, Handelsblatt no. 2011, 31.7.1959; Volksaktie und Aktiennomi-
nativität in Italien, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 31.7.1959.
352 Auch in Großbritannien Volksaktien? Londoner Wertpapierbörse arbeitet Vorschläge
aus, Die Welt no. 66, 19.3.1958; Auch England ist für die Volksaktie. Pläne zur Be-
seitigung der Stempelsteuer, FAZ no. 81, 8.4.1958; England sucht einen eigenen Weg
zur Volksaktie, FAZ no. 265, 14.11.1958; Diskussion über `Volksaktie' in England,
Frankfurter Rundschau, 19.3.1958
353 Die neue schwedische `Volksanleihe, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 4.11.1960; Schweden
legen eine Volksanleihe auf, FAZ, 29.10.1960;  `Volksobligation' wieder im Gespräch.
Schwedisches Vorbild regt die Überlegungen an, Handelsblatt no. 14, 19.1.1961.
354Karl Arnold was the second minister-president of North Rhine-Westphalia from 1947 to
1956 and the ﬁrst president of the Bundesrat before the election of Theodor Heuss. He
was a member and chairman of the CDU Social Committee.
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(Ministry of Finance). The main ﬁnancier was private industry which was
represented amongst others by representatives of the companies Bayer, Man-
nesmann, Rheinpreussen and Dresdner Bank. However, after Arnold's death
in June 1958 the board slowly disappeared.355 The board does not appear
to have played an active role in the privatisation process, but it is not un-
likely that it had an impact on the conceptualisation process in an informal
way. Besides the board, other informal discussion spaces might have helped to
spread the privatisation ideas further. Hans Janberg for example, member of
the management board of Deutsche Bank, was a member of the Rotary Club
in Düsseldorf where he promoted the planned privatisation through people's
shares.356
4.1.3 Federal Elections and Ministerial Reorganisation
The planned Volkswagenwerk privatisation and the ideas of private capital
accumulation and people's shares dominated the federal election campaign of
the CDU in 1957. Erhard and Katzer promoted the idea of people's shares
at the CDU party conference in May 1957 whereas suggestions of investment
wages and co-ownership in enterprises had widely disappeared. Erhard and
the chairman of the CDU Social Committee Karl Arnold jointly promoted the
privatisation of Volkswagenwerk in the form of a widespread distribution of
shares.357 The leading slogan for this form of privatisation was the policy of
`property for everyone', based on the title of Arnold's speech at the party con-
ference. The slogan promoted the idea that ordinary people should be enabled
to participate in the market economy and the post-war boom by becoming
co-owners of large industrial companies themselves. In a government publi-
cation, Erhard identiﬁed the accumulation of capital in modern societies as a
major problem which could be solved by spreading ownership of the means
of production more broadly across society.358 Volkswagenwerk seemed like the
355Dietrich (1996), p. 285.
356DB ZA40/37, Zum Meinungsstreit über die Volksaktie. Bericht von Rotarier Hans
Janberg im Rotary-Club Düsseldorf-Pempelfort am 6.6.1957.
357Karl Arnold: Eigentum für jeden, in Bundesparteitag der CDU, p. 163; Ludwig Erhard:
Wohlstand für alle, in: Bundesparteitag der CDU, pp. 151154.
358 BArch B126/32513, Miteigentum durch Volksaktie. Mittel zu einer weiteren Befreiung
des Menschen aus kollektivistischen Bindungen, Bulletin der Bundesregierung no. 126,
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perfect choice for the popularisation of people's shares: like a phoenix from the
ashes, the company was not only proﬁtable and growing steadily, it was also
the most popular public enterprise at the time and regarded as a symbol of
post-war reconstruction. Therefore, not only was it considered a vote-winner,
it was also assumed that purchasing shares would be relatively risk-free for the
investors. On top of that, the government wanted to avoid the impression that
the federal state wanted to take over the ownerless company and enrich itself
thereby. Press coverage before the elections was high and the ideas generally
well received. The popularisation was supported by media reports which for
example pointed to the idea of a `people's capitalism'.359
In the 1957 federal elections, the CDU/CSU won an absolute majority.
The CDU candidate Arthur Enk won the direct Bundestag mandate in Wolfs-
burg where Volkswagenwerk was located despite the announcement to privatise
the company. Before the elections, the CDU local group in Wolfsburg had po-
sitioned itself in the debate with the following statement: the best option for
Volkswagenwerk would be the status quo of a trustee administration. How-
ever, it was unlikely that this status could be maintained in the long-run. If
they had to decide between a nationalisation and a privatisation, privatisation
was the better option. A special status of public property was not acceptable
because it would be a quasi-nationalisation.360 That the CDU won the direct
mandate was hence an important signal for the broad acceptance of the pri-
vatisation plan among the local voters. Konrad Adenauer who was re-elected
as chancellor announced the privatisation of shareholdings in his ﬁrst govern-
ment statement. He also suggested extending people's shares to the private
economy.361
The federal election result led to a ministerial reorganisation which was
favourable for privatisation policy because Fritz Schäﬀer (CSU) was removed
from the position of Minister of Finance. That in the end the `right' people for
privatisation were in the right positions was the result of a series of diﬃcul-
13.7.1957, p. 1189.
359 BArch B126/32513,Volkskapitalismus, FAZ, 1.10.1957.
360 BArch B102/76371, Stellungnahme der Wolfsburger CDU zur VW-Privatisierung:
Lieber Privatbesitz als Funktionärswirtschaft.
361Government declaration, Bundestag Plenarprotokoll 03/3, 29.10.1957.
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ties during the government formation: Adenauer wanted to replace Schäﬀer as
Minister of Finance because Schäﬀer focused too much on austerity policy in
his view. As the CSU insisted on Schäﬀer remaining a member of the cabinet,
Adenauer's plan was to create a new ministry with a small range of duties for
Schäﬀer, the Federal Ministry of the Treasury. This seems surprising given
that Adenauer was aware of Schäﬀer's reservations against a privatisation of
Volkswagenwerk. When Schäﬀer refused and became Minister of Justice in-
stead, Hermann Lindrath (CDU) was selected mainly for proportional reasons.
Franz Etzel (CDU) who became the new Federal Minister of Finance was a
trusted partner of Adenauer and Erhard in economic matters.362 The Min-
istry of the Treasury was established by organisational decree of the Federal
Chancellor from 30 October 1957.363 Hans Busch, until then secretary of state
in the Ministry for Labour and Social Aﬀairs, became secretary of state, and
Hans Birnbaum transferred from the Ministry of Finance to the Ministry of
the Treasury and remained in charge of federal enterprises and participations.
In his government speech after the elections in 1957, Adenauer declared
that a dispersion of ownership on a large scale is necessary in order to raise
a sense of self-assurance and belonging to the whole of the nation among the
citizens. (...) The implementation of the Housing Act and the introduction of
people's shares, which should not be limited to federal enterprises, are some
of the best measures to increase savings.364 What exactly people's shares
362On the circumstances around the formation and reorganisation of the federal cabinet see
Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung online, Federal Cabinet, 1957, Introduc-
tion, 3. Bundestagswahlen und Regierungsbildung.
363 BArch N1256/96, Secretary of State of the Federal Chancellor to the Federal Ministers,
30.10.1957. The Ministry of the Treasury was oﬃcially named Federal Ministry for the
Federal Patrimony at ﬁrst. Unoﬃcially, it was called Ministry of the Treasury from the
start and it was oﬃcially renamed in 1961. In 1969, the Ministry of the Treasury was
abolished by the ﬁrst social-liberal coalition under Chancellor Willy Brand. During the
ministry's twelve years of existence, ﬁve ministers followed each other: Hans Wilhelmi
(CDU) succeeded Lindrath after his death in 1960. After the federal elections in 1961,
the FDP claimed the position and Hans Lenz (FDP) took over. When he resigned in
the aftermath of the `Spiegel aﬀair' in 1962, he was followed by Werner Dollinger (CSU),
who after six years succeeded Walter Scheel as Minister for Economic Cooperation and
Development in 1968. The last Minister of Economics was Kurt Schmücker (CDU). Quick
personnel changes also occurred in the highest administrative position of the ministry:
in its twelve years of existence, there were seven secretaries of state. The short periods
of oﬃce might have weakened the ministry compared to the Ministry of Economics and
Finance.
364 Streuung von Besitz in weitem Umfang ist nötig, um einer möglichst großen Zahl von
Staatsbürgern Selbstgefühl und das Gefühl der Zugehörigkeit zum Volksganzen zu geben.
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should be was however not clear yet. The conceptualisation received new
momentum when Lindrath came into oﬃce as Minister of the Treasury. In
an interview in December 1957, he underlined that people's shares had to be
full-value shares, not non-voting shares like in Austria. A division of the stock
market into two classes of shares should be avoided. In contrast, one should
aim at making shares per se people's shares.365 According to Lindrath, the
main reason for the low level of share-ownership in the society was a lack of
knowledge about shares and joint stock companies. In order to popularise
shares, it was therefore not suﬃcient to improve the legal and tax conditions.
Also, media activities and better public information were necessary. Lindrath's
approach to privatisation was highly pragmatic. The procedure should be
kept simple and decided case by case, one should not aim at a comprehensive
privatisation programme. At several occasions, Lindrath highlighted that the
implementation would need to be as simple as possible, even primitive and
understandable for the common people.366 A universal recipe for privatisation
could and should not exist.367 He reinforced this in a Bundestag debate in
June 1958.368
4.1.4 The Long Negotiations
On 20 December 1957, the CDU/CSU Bundestag group introduced the Volk-
swagenwerk privatisation bill unchanged for the second time.369 The bill was
discussed in a Bundestag debate in January 1958.370 Given the ongoing dis-
pute with Lower Saxony about the ownership question, none of the proposals
had a chance to be implemented. Although privatisation discussions were ac-
(...) Die Durchführung des Familienheimgesetzes und die Einführung der Volksaktie, die
sich nicht etwa nur auf Betriebe, die dem Bund gehören, erstrecken soll, sind einige
der geeigneten Mittel, die Spartätigkeit anzuregen. Bundestag Plenarprotokoll 03/3,
29.10.1957
365 Man sollte (...) bestrebt sein, die Aktie schlechthin zur Volksaktie zu machen., Bulletin
der Bundesregierung no. 232, p. 2142, 14.9.1957.
366 möglichst einfach, ja geradezu primitiv, BArch B102/75795, Breite Streuung des Eigen-
tums, Bulletin der Bundesregierung no. 42, 4.3.1959, p. 398. See also Lindrath on pri-
vatisation in Bulletin der Bundesregierung no. 208, 30.10.1957.
367 ibid; also: Die Privatisierung beginnt, Industriekurier No. 19, 5.2.1959, p. 1, copy in
BArch B102/75795.
368 Bundestag Plenarprotokoll 03/30, 12.6.1958.
369 Bundestagsdrucksache 03/102, 20.12.1957.
370 Bundestag Plenarprotokoll 03/8, 22.1.1958, pp. 251291.
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celerating in the election year, things were far from moving fast. Rather, the
federal elections in 1957 marked the beginning of a long negotiation period.
Volkswagenwerk chief Nordhoﬀ had not been oﬃcially informed about
the planned privatisation until it was brought into the Bundestag. Erhard ex-
plained to him that this was due to the intention to keep the draft secret, but
promised a closer communication in the future. An internal note from June
1957, before the elections, declared that Nordhoﬀ did not have fundamen-
tal objections against a dispersed ownership privatisation and that he would
support the government.371 However, just shortly afterwards, Nordhoﬀ criti-
cised the privatisation plans harshly, so that the Ministry of Finance found it
necessary to demand that Nordhoﬀ should not comment on the privatisation
publicly.372 Nordhoﬀ might have been concerned that Volkswagenwerk could
loose its employment tariﬀ independence in the case that more representatives
from banks and industry would join the supervisory board after a privatisa-
tion. The special Volkswagenwerk employment tariﬀ Haustarif was the basis
for wages which were signiﬁcantly above average. The high wages had repeat-
edly been criticised by Erhard who feared that this could adversely aﬀect his
price stabilisation policy. 373
After the ﬁrst government draft had been proposed to parliament, criti-
cism from various sides became louder. The state elections in Lower Saxony on
5 May 1959 made the situation even more diﬃcult: Prior to the elections, the
federal CDU wanted to abstain from shedding bad light on the current con-
servative state-government under Heinrich Hellwege (CDU) by arguing about
Volkswagenwerk.374 However, CDU and DP lost the elections and SPD, FDP
and BHE formed a government coalition and Hinrich Wilhelm Kopf (SPD)
became the new minister-president. The law which was ﬁnally adopted was
less restrictive than the original government draft and implied more generous
ﬁnancial concessions. These changes were the result of long negotiations both
within the CDU/CSU and with external interest groups.
371 BArch B102/76371, Internal note about a meeting of Erhard and Nordhoﬀ on 14 June
1957, 2.7.1957.
372 BArch B102/76371, Secretary of State (BMF) to Nordhoﬀ, 2.7.1957.
373 Edelmann (1999), pp. 64; 70.
374 Edelmann (1999), p. .
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4.1.4.1 Lower Saxony, the SPD and the Foundation Idea
A special issue in the case of Volkswagenwerk was the question of what to do
with the revenues from privatisation. This was of particular importance be-
cause Volkswagenwerk was classiﬁed as ownerless. The federal government was
keen to prevent the impression that the federal state enriched itself by retaining
the revenues. In 1957, the idea to use the revenues to establish a foundation
came up. Where the idea originated from is not entirely clear. Possibly it goes
back to an article of chief editor Wirsing in the Christian journal Christ and
Welt from 1958 which he also sent to the Ministry of Finance.375 The Ministry
of Finance, Ministry of the Treasury and Ministry of Economics agreed that
in general, earmarking of revenues was not possible, but that Volkswagenwerk
was a special case where special rules could be applied.376 Wirsing had met
Volkswagenwerk chief Nordhoﬀ in December 1957 already and was able to con-
vince him of the idea. Now, they attempted to convince those circles within
the CDU/CSU which had so far remained reticent.377
Volkswagenwerk was a diﬃcult case for the SPD. This was still the time
before the adoption of the Godesberg programme, in which the SPD oﬃcially
distanced itself from socialist ideas of a nationalisation of key industries. How-
ever, the automobile plant was not oﬃcially classiﬁed as publicly owned nor
was it a key industry which required nationalisation. On the other side, the
party argued that the company had never been private, so why should it be
transferred into private ownership now. Hence, the SPD needed to develop
a suggestion which would avoid both federal ownership and privatisation. A
second argument of the SPD against a privatisation of Volkswagenwerk was
that the government should not sell its most prosperous enterprise. This ﬁs-
cal argumentation would actually became the most fundamental diﬀerence
between social-democratic and conservative views for many decades. The ar-
375 BArch B126/20879, Wirsing to Secretary of State (BMF) Hartmann, 17.1.1958, attach-
ments: Nationalstiftung für den technischen Nachwuchs, Um die Zukunft des Volk-
swagenwerkes. Der Vorschlag einer Nationalstiftung, in: Christ und Welt, special print,
Stuttgart, January 1958.
376 BArch B126/20879, VI A6 (Bennigsen), 28.2.1958, Internal note for Secretary of State
about a departmental meeting in BMBes on 25 January 1958.
377 Edelmann (1999), p. 66.
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gument that the federal government should not sell oﬀ the family silver and
be left only with the loss-making enterprises can be found repeatedly during
the second privatisation wave in the 1980s.378
In general, the SPD welcomed the intended increase in private savings
of employees. But they criticised the fact that people's shares would only re-
channel existing income and not create a new source for generating savings.379
Similarly, Deist (SPD) argued later in a debate about the Preussag privati-
sation that the rate of internal ﬁnance of large enterprises should be reduced
and that the share of private savings in funding enterprises should increase.380
In 1960, the SPD presented their own concept for private capital formation
where privatisation did not play a role.381
The German Federation of Trade Unions, which was politically linked to
the SPD, had protested against a privatisation of Volkswagenwerk since such
an idea was ﬁrst brought up.382 A statement of the Federation of German
Trade Unions from May 1957 demanded that public enterprises which had
never been privately owned should remain in public ownership. Also, the
government should also keep its proﬁtable shareholdings in order to balance
the losses of those enterprises which could never become proﬁtable because
they were fulﬁlling public tasks. In the long run, this would reduce the tax
load.383
Left with the problem of having to come up with an alternative, the
SPD adopted the idea to establish a foundation and extended it. In January
1958, just ﬁve days after Wirsing's article which suggested the establishment
of a foundation and about month after the government bill had been brought
into parliament for a second time, the SPD parliamentary faction introduced
a proposal to transform Volkswagenwerk itself into a foundation which would
378 See p. 267.
379Ollenhauer (SPD) in Bundestag Plenarprotokoll 04/3, 5.11.1957, p. 50.
380 Bundestag Plenarprotokoll 03/63, 20.2.1959. Summary in Bulletin der Bundesregierung
no. 36, 24.1.1959, p. 339, copy in BArch B102/75797.
381 Eigentum für Arbeiter. Gegenvorschlag der SPD zum Gesetzentwurf der Regierung,
Die Welt no. 216, 15.9.1960, p. 8, copy in BArch B102/75792.
382 For documentations on this, see Dietrich (1996), p. 215; Edelmann (1999), p. 63; Nico-
laysen (2002).
383 Citation of the statement in: DGB trennt die Probleme: Zur Volksaktie wird nichts
gesagt. VW Privatisierung wird abgelehnt, Handelsblatt no. 61, 24.5.1957.
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promote young technical talent.384 That way, the company would be protected
from large private investors and could be regarded as a real people's company.
After the SPD had won the elections in Lower Saxony in 1959, the new state
government under Kopf took over the idea and demanded that Volkswagenwerk
should be transformed into a foundation. 385 In 1960, a compromise was
reached: the federal government and Lower Saxony each kept 20% of the
shares and the other 60% were sold to private investors. The revenues from
selling shares were brought into a foundation. This was not only a concession
to Lower Saxony, also parts of the CDU/CSU were convinced by this idea.
4.1.4.2 Banks and the Question of Special Shares
The initial government draft for a Volkswagen law featured special and restric-
tive conditions. Some of these conditions were criticised sharply, primarily by
ﬁnancial institutions, and changed for the ﬁnal draft. Not debated was the
provision that in the initial oﬀering, only persons and not legal entities should
be allowed to purchase shares and that the purchase of shares per person
should be restricted . Also, it was relatively undisputed that voting rights
per person should be restricted. The restriction was however loosened in the
ﬁnal law and increased from 1/20,000 to 1/10,000 of the nominal share capi-
tal. Also, the decision to issue voting shares instead of non-voting shares was
widely welcomed in industry and bank associations.386 Three main points were
discussed: whether shares should be registered shares with restricted transfer-
ability, whether voting rights for investment companies should be limited to
1/100 of the nominal share capital and whether and how much proxy voting
should be restricted.
The types of shares were intensely discussed in negotiations which in-
volved several ministries. The Ministry of the Treasury under Herrman Lin-
drath (CDU) and the Ministry of Finance under Franz Etzel (CDU) argued
384 Antrag der Abgeordneten Dr. Deist und Genossen betr. der Errichtung einer Stiftung
`Deutsches Volkswagenwerk' , Bundestagsdrucksache 03/145, 22.1.1958.
385 Edelmann (1999), p. 68.
386 For example DBA ZA15x/2052, Bundesverband des privaten Bankgewerbes, Comment
on the draft for a Volkswagen law from 6 February 1958, signed by Pferdmenges and
Dermitzel.
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that ordinary shares should be used rather than registered shares. Their main
reason were concerns about the eﬀect of a limited tradeability on the attrac-
tiveness of shares.387 Birnbaum argued that bearer shares with a small nominal
value and voting right restrictions would best represent the idea of people's
shares and were easy to administer. He suggested that in order to avoid block
building, the government should only sell 48% of shares and transfer the re-
maining shares into a foundation, for example for the promotion of technical
talent, as the articles by Wirsing had suggested.388 Lindrath argued that a
restriction of voting rights was suﬃcient as a protective measure against block-
building.389 Gessler from the Oﬃce of the Federal Chancellor highlighted that
small shareholders would have to be able to sell their shares oﬀ and that
block-building could not be forbidden. This was of particular importance be-
cause of the idea that people's shares should be adopted by the private sector
later on.390 The ministerial concerns were shared by Volkswagenwerk chief
Nordhoﬀ. Nordhoﬀ was against registered shares because these were not fully
tradeable and might hence produce mistrust in shares. Instead, Nordhoﬀ pre-
ferred bearer shares in combination with a restriction of voting rights.391 On
the other side, the oﬃcials in charge in the Ministry of Economics, supported
by the Ministry of Justice, insisted on strict measures to prevent future foreign
inﬁltration and block-building of shares and wanted to use special shares for
this purpose. They argued that only registered shares with limited tradeabil-
ity could eﬀectively avoid unwanted majorities392 However, registered shares
were not supported by everyone in the Ministry of Economics. Division VI
(Money and Finance) in the Ministry of Economics was much more liberal
and seemed to cooperate with oﬃcials in the Ministry of Finance in order to
387 For the Ministry of the Treasury see BArch B126/20879, VIA6 (BE: Birnbaum) to Secre-
tary of State Hans Busch, 8.11.1957; for the Ministry of Finance see BArch B126/20879,
Note of Div. III3 about a meeting on 25 September 1957 in the BMWi, contributions of
Korﬀ (BMF).
388 BArch B126/20879, VIA6 (Birnbaum) to Secretary of State, 8.11.1957.
389 BArch B126/20879, VI A6 (Bennigsen), 28.2.1958, Internal note for Secretary of State
about a departmental meeting in BMBes on 25 January 1958.
390 BArch B126/20879, Note of Div. III3 about a meeting on 25 September 1957 in the
BMWi.
391 BArch B102/76371, Internal Note about a meeting with Minister and Nordhoﬀ on 14
June 1957, 2.7.1957.
392 BArch B126/20879, VI A6 (Bennigsen), Internal note for Westrick about a departmental
meeting on 25 January 1958, 28.2.1958.
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avoid registered shares.393 Hence, the Ministry of Economics oﬃcials realised
early on that there was a tendency to adopt bearer shares with restriction of
voting rights.394
The next question was the restriction of voting rights which was con-
sidered necessary in the case of bearer shares. Division IV in the Ministry of
Economics suggested that voting rights should be restricted to only 1/1,000
of the equity capital.395 The Ministry of the Treasury suggested an exemp-
tion for the federal government from the voting right restriction and a legally
implemented veto minority for the government of 25% for ﬁve years, and was
supported herein by the Ministry of Finance. Yet, such an extra role or the
government was rejected by Division III in the Ministry of Economics. The
Ministry of Justice suggested solving this question in the company statutes,
not by law.396 Similar diﬀerences between the ministries and divisions existed
with respect to proxy voting. In the initial draft, Kattenstroth and his team
had intended to restrict proxy voting to 1/500 of the nominal share capital.
Birnbaum from the Ministry of the Treasury argued that proxy voting should
not be excluded because it was a question of the general stock corporation law
and not of a special Volkswagen law.397 Division VI A 4 in the Ministry of
Economics also found proxy voting less problematic. To accommodate desires
for a proxy voting restriction, they suggested that instead of regular proxy
voting, banks should only be allowed to exert voting rights on behalf of their
clients only with a speciﬁed mandate for each individual decision and stating
their clients names and nominal values of shares.398
When faced with the Elbrächter proposal for a Volkswagen law, the Con-
federation of German Employers' Associations (BDA) and the Federation of
393 BArch B126/20879, Unknown to Korﬀ, 11.3.1958, Anhang: 2 internal notes from Division
VI (vom Hofe) which the unknown sender had conﬁdentially received.
394 BArch B126/20879, Note of Div. III3 about a meeting on 25 September 1957 in the
BMWi.
395 BArch B126/20879, BMWi, Div. VI A 4 (vom Hofe) to Kattenstroth, 3.10.1958, referring
to a meeting from 25 September. Earlier, they had argued that a voting right restriction
of 3% of the share capital was suﬃcient. BArch B126/20879, BMWi, Div. VI A4 (vom
Hofe) to Div. III 3, 19.2.1958.
396 BArch B126/20879, VI A6 (Bennigsen), 28.2.1958, Internal note for Secretary of State
about a departmental meeting in BMBes on 25 January 1958.
397 BArch B126/20879, VIA6 (Birnbaum) to Secretary of State, 8.11.1957.
398 BArch B126/20879, BMWi, Div. VI A 4 (vom Hofe) to Kattenstroth, 3.10.1958, referring
to a meeting from 25 September.
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German Industries (BDI) formed a joint working group on the topic. They
were concerned that it would be diﬃcult to achieve much change since the
topic was so highly political.399 The ﬁnancial sector had an ambivalent atti-
tude towards people's shares and the government draft for a Volkswagenwerk
privatisation law. On the one hand, ﬁnancial institutions welcomed measures
to increase the popularity of shares and the sale of public enterprises through
asset sales. On the other hand, they found investment certiﬁcates, for which
the legal foundation had just been established with the Investment Company
Act, less risky and hence better investment opportunities for small incomes.
A report from the German banking association welcomed the idea of us-
ing voting shares. Registered shares with restricted transferability and without
blank endorsement were uncommon in the German market, impractical for an
issue of this size, and would hinder the attractiveness of shares immensely.400
The same point was raised by the Association of German Stock Exchanges.
They demanded that shares should be fully tradeable, with no disadvantages
due to the share type.401 The banking association report found that in gen-
eral, Volkswagenwerk was a good choice to start privatisations because it was
an excellent example of a well-managed company in public ownership but be-
yond the role of the state. Also, the idea of people's shares was generally
seen positively. Yet, the banking association found that general measures to
make shares more attractive, in particular the removal of tax disadvantages,
would be more beneﬁcial and appropriate than people's shares in order to fos-
ter share-ownership. Also, investment certiﬁcates were considered to be more
suitable for small investments than people's shares because the associated risks
were smaller and better distributed.402
Similarly to the report of the banking association, an internal note of
Deutsche Bank from October 1957 contrasts people's shares with investment
399DBA ZA 40/37, Vallenthin to Janberg, 29.10.1957.
400DBA ZA15x/2052, Bundesverband des privaten Bankgewerbes, Comment on the draft
for a Volkswagen law from 6 February 1958, signed by Pferdmenges and Dermitzel.
401DBA ZA15x/2052, Auszug aus der Niederschrift über die Sitzung der Arbeitsgemein-
schaft der deutschen Wertpapierbörsen am 7. Februar 1958.
402DBA ZA15x/2052, Bundesverband des privaten Bankgewerbes, Comment on the draft
for a Volkswagen law from 6 February 1958, signed by Pferdmenges and Dermitzel.
Similar: DBA ZA 40/37, Wilhelm Vallenthin, Zusammenfassung einiger Grundgedanken
aus meinem Referat vom 23.10.1957, 28.10.1057
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certiﬁcates and suggests that investment saving in comparison would be the
much better option for small private investors, since the risks associated with
investment certiﬁcates were much smaller. In general, people's shares can be
regarded as a suitable instrument to privatise state ownership. However, it was
doubted that the concept would be more successful than investment companies
to create a new class of shareholders. Also, share price falls could lead to doubts
about the economic order among new shareholders and the expenditure-income
ratio for a share with a small nominal value were disproportionate and did not
make sense ﬁnancially, even more so due to the double taxation and a dividend
tax of 25%. Despite all criticism, the authors of the note recommend that banks
should `sceptically restrain' for the moment and only criticise the privatisation
plan openly in the case that the planned Volkswagen law would be presented
unaltered for approval to the Bundestag.403 In line with Ulrich's earlier advice
to Birnbaum and the Ministry of Finance, an internal article from Deutsche
Bank recommended a step by step sale of assets. A full privatisation of the
federal corporate shareholdings would require an absorption capacity of four
to ﬁve billion DM. This was almost as much as the entire capital ﬂow into the
German security market in 1957.404
While the banking sector generally welcomed privatisation, they criti-
cised one element of the Volkswagen law sharply: the suspension of proxy
voting rights. Proxy voting by banks on behalf of their clients has a long
tradition in the German corporate system and has led to a close connection
between banks and enterprises. In addition to proxy voting rights, banks
owned considerable shares in industrial enterprises. This applied especially to
the 'big-three' banks, Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank and Commerzbank.405
Banking association representatives, supported by German industry associa-
tions, were worried that a solution which would restrict proxy voting rights
could set a precedent. They assumed that the Volkswagenwerk people's shares
would become a prototype for people's shares privatisations and hence, that
the speciﬁcations could become a precedent. This was perceived as even more
403DBA V01/2143, Internal Note, Volksaktien, 7.10.57, signed by two unknown authors.
404DBA V01/2143, Das Bundesvermögen, in Wirtschaftliche Mitteilungen DB März
1958, p. 4.
405 Fohlin (2005), pp. 257258.
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dangerous because a revision of the law governing corporations was still out-
standing. So they urgently appealed to not create some kind of special share
type. Alarmed, the banking association referred to bad experiences associ-
ated with the suspension of proxy voting in unbundled corporations after the
Second World War.406 There, banks were only allowed to act as a proxy if
shareholders submitted written instructions. Since most shareholders did not
do this, shareholder participation was very low as a result. The report argued
that the underlying assumption that banks would utilise their powers in their
own interest was wrong. To the contrary, it was argued that banks tended to
support management decisions and that these were usually beneﬁcial for the
shareholders. Also, banks were obliged to report objectively to their clients
and these reports were subject to public control. Besides, proxy voting should
not be regulated in the Volkswagen law but should be addressed more generally
in a reform of the law regulating stock companies.407
The ﬁnal decisions about share types and proxy voting were outsourced
to the CDU/CSU working group Eigentum (ownership) which included
Hellwig, Burgbacher and Katzer. The working group decided on ordinary
shares with a nominal value of 100 DM and to restrict voting rights to 1/20,000
of the nominal share capital. Also, the working group initially decided to pass
on the question of proxy voting rights to the imminent reform of the stock
corporation law.408 However, a restriction of proxy voting rights of 1/50 of
the nominal shares capital was reintroduced due to pressure from the CDU
employees' wing.
4.1.4.3 The Social Question
The initial government draft for a Volkswagen law provided signiﬁcant ﬁnan-
cial discounts for low-income households. German purchasers with an annual
income of 9,000 DM or less would receive a 20% discount for purchases of
406 For a Deutsche Bank report on this topic see DBA ZA40/37, Bericht über die bei der
Entﬂechtung mit der Einführung von Namensaktien gemachten Erfahrungen, 21.1.1958.
407DBA ZA15x/2052, Bundesverband des privaten Bankgewerbes, Comment on the draft
for a Volkswagen law, 6.2.1958, signed by Pferdmenges and Dermitzel.
408 BArch B126/20879, Busch to Lindrath about a meeting with Burgbacher on 9. March
1959, 12.3.1959.
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shares up to a nominal value of 1,000 DM, and purchasers with an income of
9,000 DM to 15,000 DM a discount of 10%. These provisions represented more
a political concession to the CDU employees' wing than the conviction of the
ministerial oﬃcials. A letter from Erhard to Theodor Blank, Defence Minister
from 1955 to 1956 and Minister for Labour and Social Aﬀairs from 1957 to
1965, dated from May 1957 indicated that social concessions were necessary
to bring the employees' wing on board and to avoid more unwanted measures
such as investment wages. In the letter, Erhard expects that the employees'
wing will bring in a suggestion about co-ownership, and continues: It will be
necessary to agree on a statement about the problem of property formation
which highlights the importance of a promotion of property formation of em-
ployees, but remains within the boundaries of our economic and social order
and can be supported by the CDU/CSU as a whole. (...) It will require some
considerations and a cooperation of all those who want to ﬁnd a way between
ownership concentration and collectivisation of property. (...) I believe that
making parts of the federal property available for this purpose is a good start
which can serve as an example and maybe lead to similar actions from the
private economy.409
In the ministerial administration, the social question was seen diﬀerently.
Concerns about ﬁnancial discounts prevailed not only in the Ministry of the
Treasury, but also in the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Economics,
and the Ministry of Justice. Oﬃcials worried that social concessions would
camouﬂage the risky nature of shares. Hence, alternatives such as a low issue
price, the possibility of instalment payments and priority allocation of shares
to certain population groups was considered.410 Erhardt disapproved of the
409 Es wird hierbei wichtig sein, zu einer Stellungnahme zu dem Gesamtproblem der Eigen-
tumsbildung zu kommen, die die Bedeutung der Förderung der Eigentumsbildung in
Arbeiterhand unmißverständlich herausstellt, die Bemühungen hierum aber in Bahnen
lenkt, die den Grundsätzen unserer Wirtschafts- und Sozialordnung voll entsprechen und
von der CDU/CSU als ganzer vertreten und getragen werden können. (...) Es wird
daher noch mancher Überlegungen und eines Zusammengehens aller derer bedürfen, die
den Weg zwischen einseitiger Besitzanhäufung und Kollektivierung des Eigentums gehen
wollen. (...) Ich glaube, dass gerade die Zurverfügungstellung eines Teils des Bundesver-
mögens hierfür ein guter Anfang sein wird, der beispielhaft wirken und vielleicht weitere
Aktionen auch in der privaten Wirtschaft nach sich ziehen kann. BArch B102/76101,
Erhard to Blank, 7.5.1957.
410 BArch B126/20879, Subdiv. VI A3, Internal note, 27.11.1958; BArch B126/20879, VI
A6 (Bennigsen), Internal note for Secretary of State about a departmental meeting in
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concept of employee shares in general because the holders of employee shares
would bear a double risk of losing their job and losing asset value in the case
that enterprises were performing badly.411 Lindrath however argued that it
would not be possible to get the required Bundestag approval without a social
discount scheme when he presented his cabinet proposal from February 1959
in a meeting of the cabinet economics committee in April 1959. His suggested
compromise was that only those who would comply with a blocking period
before reselling shares should beneﬁt from the discount. In the framework
of the Savings Premium Act, this blocking period was ﬁve years. Lindrath
indicated that personally, he would prefer to remove the discount and only oﬀer
a social issue price at the lower bound. Etzel was strictly against discounts
but found the option of a social price feasible. He achieved that the federal
cabinet decided against ﬁnancial discounts was taken.412 This raised resistance
from the left wing of the CDU/CSU and Häussler protested sharply.413
Since the partial privatisation of Volkswagenwerk required the approval
of the Bundestag, a compromise had to be found. The problem was outsourced
to the working group Eigentum of the CDU/CSU Bundestag faction.414 The
working group gave in to the protest of the employees' wing and decided to
implement ﬁnancial concessions instead of a `social' issue price. Burgbacher
and Katzer agreed on ﬁnancial discounts for employees and a blocking period
for shares which would be bought with subsidies under the framework of the
Savings Premium Act.415
4.2 Preussag: Trial Run for Volkswagenwerk
Since the negotiations about Volkswagenwerk took such a long time, the gov-
ernment decided to focus on the partial privatisation of Preussag ﬁrst. Preussag
the BMBes on 25 January 1958, 28.2.1958.
411 BArch B126/20879, Div. III3, Minutes of a meeting on 25 September in the BMWi,
statement of Kattenstroth.
412 Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung online, Economics Committee of the Fed-
eral Cabinet, minutes of the 14th meeting on 2 April 1959.
413 BArch B126/20879, Erwin Häussler to Franz Etzel, 23.9.1958 and 28.1.1959.
414Dietrich (1996), p. 329.
415 BArch B126/20879, BMF, Secretary of State to Minister about a meeting with Burg-
bacher on 9 March 1959, 12.3.1959.
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was initially chosen for ﬁscal reasons. The decision to start with Preussag can
also be understood as a trial run for the privatisation of Volkswagenwerk. A
share issue with a planned volume of 30 million DM was much smaller than the
intended volume of a partial privatisation of Volkswagenwerk. This enabled
the government to observe the eﬀects of a people's share issue on stock markets
in a smaller scale.
Preussag's situation had improved due to a boom in the petroleum mar-
ket and rationalisation eﬀorts since the mid-1950s. Preussag was able to pay a
dividend of 5% in 1955 and 7% in 1956. At the same time, the capitalisation
worsened because the restructuring was costly. The equity ratio decreased from
53% in 1949 to 28% in 1956.416 In 1957, it was estimated that Preussag needed
additional capital of approximately 30 million DM. VEBA was already slightly
undercapitalised and not able to support an equity increase. The impulse to
consider a partial privatisation in order to solve these ﬁnancial diﬃculties came
in March 1957 from Secretary of State Alfred Hartmann (Ministry of Finance)
who was chairman of VEBA's supervisory board.417 In the summer of 1957,
the idea was discussed with Preussag and VEBA. When it became evident
by the end of the year that the privatisation of Volkswagenwerk would take
longer because of diﬃculties with Lower Saxony and within the CDU/CSU, the
government focused on Preussag ﬁrst. The partial privatisation of Preussag
was much easier to implement because it did not require Bundestag approval.
According to the legal view at that time, the Bundestag did not have any par-
ticipation rights concerning the privatisation decision because Preussag was
not a direct shareholding. The equity rise simply had to follow the provisions
of the law on stock companies which required a resolution of the general meet-
ing, in that case of the VEBA management. Since all purchases and sales
of participations by public enterprises had to be approved by the Ministry of
Finance, a cabinet decision was required. The modalities of the privatisation
could be decided on the ministerial level, without a complicated negotiation
process like in the case of Volkswagenwerk.
The board of the German Federation of Trade Unions informed Lindrath
416 Laufer and Stier (2005), pp. 418445.
417 BArch B102/76017, Hartmann to BMWi, 18.3.1957, and BMWi to BMF, 5.4.1957.
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that they rejected a partial sale strictly, but were not heard.418 Also, the super-
visory and management board of VEBA were sceptical, but ﬁnally convinced
by the argument that it was ﬁnancially necessary for the company. VEBA
Director Schilling then promoted the privatisation in the Preussag supervisory
board, where he served as the chairman.419 In December 1958, the suggestion
to partially privatise Preussag was approved by the federal cabinet.420 The de-
cision was conﬁrmed by the supervisory board of Preussag in a crucial vote of
18 to 8 votes in January 1959, against the employees representatives votes.421
Etzel's Ministry of Finance and Lindrath's Ministry of the Treasury
agreed that it was in line with the goals of the government to generate these
resources on capital markets. But the Ministry of Finance immediately de-
clared that they would under no circumstances approve discounts for low in-
come households and employee shares because these measures would limit the
capital inﬂow and hence be costly for Preussag. If the government wanted
to implement a social dimension, it would have to be ﬁnanced in another
way. The Ministry of the Treasury had suggested a social discount of 15%
for households with an income of up to 16,000 DM per year like in the case
of Volkswagenwerk. A discount would be a squandering of federal property
with negative consequences for the wage structures. Measures to support the
purchase of normal-priced shares were acceptable.422 Lindrath's Ministry of
the Treasury however insisted on social discounts for low-income households
and families with many children, including a sales restriction for discounted
shares. Secretary of State Hans Busch (Ministry of the Treasury) shared the
concerns of the Ministry of Finance, but saw it as an obligation to create social
discounts since it was the declared goal of the government to combine it with
418 BArch B102/76017, DGB Bundesvorstand to Lindrath, 25.4.1958.
419 BArch B102/76017, Minutes of the VEBA Supervisory Board meetings on 24 Febru-
ary and 12 April 1958; also ibid., Fenge to Kattenstroth, 27.2.1958; BArch B115/3283,
Internal note (Birnbaum) 26.2.1958.
420 BArch B102/76017, cabinet paper of the Ministry of the Treasury, 4.12.1958; Die Kabi-
nettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung online, Federal Cabinet, minutes of the meeting on
19 December 1958; see also BArch B136/2348, press announcement, 20.12.1958.
421Minutes of the supervisory board meeting on 19 January 1959. BArch B115/3283, Inter-
nal note (Birnbaum) 20.1.1959. For more details about the course of events see Laufer
and Stier (2005).
422 Verschleuderung von Bundesvermögen, BArch B126/9002, Internal Note about a supra-
ministerial meeting on 12 November 1958, Division VIA3 (Sturm/Rannow/Bennigsen),
10.11.1958; ibid., letter from BMBes from 5.11.1958.
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people's shares.423 The Ministries ﬁnally agreed to not implement discounts.
The CDU Bundestag faction was so dissatisﬁed with this decision that as a
political concession it was decided to choose an issue price at the lower bound
of the reasonable commercial price range.424
The modalities were jointly ﬁnalised in December 1958: Bearer shares
with a nominal value of 100 DM should be sold. The terms of issue provided
that the right to purchase shares was restricted to Preussag employees and
to persons with a maximum income of 8,000 DM for singles or 16,000 DM
for married couples. Additionally, the purchase was restricted to a maximum
of 5 shares per person. In case of an over-subscription, employees would re-
ceive the full allocation of the shares they had demanded, all other investors
a proportional allocation. Financial concessions for employees and low income
households, which were being discussed for Volkswagenwerk, were not granted.
Instead, the issue price was ﬁxed at 145%. This was the lower bound of the
acceptable price range set by the auditors and was therefore referred to as a
social price.425 The initial plan was to raise equity capital from 75 million
DM to 120 million DM and ﬁnance this increase by issuing shares in the vol-
ume of 90 million DM, which corresponded to a privatisation of 75% of the
nominal share capital.426 This plan was replaced by a new plan with a lower
degree of privatisation: Nominal share capital was to be raised by 30 million
DM, from 75 million DM to 105 million DM through the sale of 300,000 shares
to the nominal value of 100 DM. This corresponded to a privatisation of 28.6%
which would have led to a capital inﬂow of more than 40 million DM.427
The demand for Preussag shares was unexpectedly high. An internal
note dating before the end of the oﬀering period mentioned a triple oversub-
423 BArch B126/9002, Internal Note about a supra-ministerial meeting on 12 November
1958, VIA3 (Rannow, Bennigsen) to Secretary of State, 19.11.1958.
424 BArch B126/9002, Minutes of a meeting in the BMBes on 17 February 1959, VIA3
(Rannow) to Secretary of State, 19.2.1959.
425 BArch B126/9002, cabinet paper of the BMBes, 5.11.1958; BArch B126/20880, State-
ment of the BMF on the cabinet paper of the BMBes, 25.11.1958; ibid., cabinet Paper
of the BMBes, 4.12.1958.
426 BArch B115/3287, BMBes to Schilling, 14.2.1958; BArch B102/76017, Fenge to Kat-
tenstroth, 27.2.1958; ibid., Internal note Henneberg to Westrick about the supervisory
board meeting on 12 April 1958, 14.4.1958.
427 Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung online, Federal Cabinet, minutes of the
meeting on 25 March 1959.
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scription and discussed three possibilities of dealing with it. First, allocating
shares to the nominal value of 30 million DM as planned. This was consid-
ered psychologically unwise as it might lead to frustration among those who
would not get the shares for which they had subscribed. Also, a correspond-
ing high demand for the shares after stock market ﬂotation bore the danger
of a quick resale. Second, allocating all subscribed shares. In this case, a
full privatisation that was intended in the medium run would soon be possi-
ble. Third, keeping only a blocking minority of 26% and allocating the rest of
the shares.428 Lindrath informed Adenauer about the positive result and rec-
ommended an extension of the share allocation to prevent disappointment.429
The issue was discussed in two federal cabinet meetings and a meeting of the
economics committee of the federal cabinet in March and April 1959.430 The
cabinet decided to extend the allocation of shares, but not to the full extent
of the subscriptions. That limitation can be ascribed to resistance from the
Federal Chancellor who favoured a VEBA blocking minority in order to allow
the federal government to protect smaller shareholders.431 At the end of the
oﬀering period on 31 March, 216,119 individuals had subscribed for shares in
the nominal value of 100,088 million DM. Among the subscribers were pri-
marily employees and many women. Preussag employees subscribed for fewer
shares than expected.432 The oﬃcials in the Ministry of the Treasury agreed
on an allocation of 83 million DM and decided that a blocking minority of
25% for VEBA was neither economically nor politically desirable or necessary.
But it was also agreed that the federal government had to keep an inﬂuence
in order to secure a fruitful development of the ﬁrst people's share.433 The
government cabinet approved despite earlier resistance.434 An additional 51.5
428 BArch B115/3288, II B (Birnbaum) to Lindrath, 1.4.1959.
429 BArch B115/3288, Lindrath to Adenauer, 1.4.1959.
430 Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung online, Federal Cabinet, minutes of the
meetings on 25 March and 3 April 1959; BArch B126/9002, Kabinettsausschuss für
Wirtschaft 2.4.1959.
431 This was indicated in a letter from the Ministry to the Chancellor which mentioned
that at Adenauer's suggestion, the sale of shares was stopped on 31 March and for the
employees on 3 April 1959. BArch B115/3288, BMBes to Adenauer, 1.4.1959.
432 BArch B115/3288, Preussag to BMBes, 30.4.1959.
433 um eine gedeihliche Entwicklung der ersten Volksaktie zu gewährleisten, BArch
B115/3288, Internal note on a meeting in the Ministry of the Treasury, 2.4.1959.
434 Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung online, Federal Cabinet, minutes of the
61st meeting on 3 April 1959, agenda item C: Zeichnungsergebnis und Höhe der
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million shares were allocated so that 77.6% (81.5 million DM) of the nominal
equity capital were transferred into private ownership. VEBA kept shares in
the volume of 22.4% (23.5 million DM). This meant that everyone received
their subscribed shares; only those who had subscribed for ﬁve shares received
four. Instead of a blocking minority, maximum-voting rights of one thousandth
of the share capital and a secured right for VEBA to delegate four members
to the supervisory board were introduced by amending Preussag's statutes.435
VEBA had not only lost its blocking minority but also the tax privilege of a
substantial holding that applied to shareholdings of 25% and more. Only in
1965, VEBA bought shares back to regain this privilege.
Table 4.1: People's shares privatisation of Preussag 1959
Equity increase 30 million DM (from 75 to 105 million DM)
Remaining share of VEBA 22.39 %
Nominal value of public oﬀering 81.5 million DM (30 million DM new shares
plus 51.5 million DM old shares)
No. of shares sold to private investors 815,000
Issue price 145% ( social price)
No. of applicants / purchasers 216,119
- of these: Preussag employees 2,384
Purchase restricted to German citizens, minimum age 21 years or less
when in employment
Max. eligible income of purchasers 16,000 DM (taxable income)
Subscription limit 5 shares per person
Max. allocation 4 shares per person
Special conditions for employees - No income limit (except for executives)
- Preferential allocation
Staggered allocation Yes, based on taxable income
Restriction of voting rights 1/1,000 of share capital
Restriction of proxy voting rights No
Delegation right for VEBA 4 seats in the supervisory board according to
the company statutes
Bank consortium 51 banks
Lead management Deutsche Bank
Co-leaders Dresdner Bank, Commerzbank
Recipient of revenues from sale of shares VEBA
Sources: Bundesministerium für Finanzen (1960), pp. 326327; Barch B102/49880,
Einzelfragen zur Teilprivatisierung der VEBA.
Resistance against the privatisation came from various sides, in particular
Preussag employees, unions and the SPD. Although the Bundestag was oﬃ-
cially not involved in the decision, the privatisation was discussed in plenary in
Zuteilung von Preussag-Aktien.
435 BArch B115/3288, Preussag to Ministry of the Treasury, 30.4.1959.
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June 1958, following a request from the SPD.436 One argument against privati-
sation was the important role which Preussag would play in case of a German
reuniﬁcation.437 Other arguments referred to the subsidies that Preussag had
already received and was still receiving, and to the oligopolistic situation in
markets in which Preussag operated.438
In the case of Preussag, the deep ambivalence of the early privatisation
policy becomes evident: On the one hand, only companies with a good and
stable performance were considered eligible for privatisation. But one of the
main incentives for the choice of Preussag was ﬁnancial distress of the company
in the midst a restructuring process. It has therefore been argued that the
lack of publicity for the internal problems of the company might have led to
the low subscription of Preussag employees, because they knew the actual
situation of the company better than outsiders.439 While this might be true,
it is fairly safe to say that Preussag would not have been partially privatised
if the government had assumed that this might lead to diﬃculties. Since the
sale of Volkswagenwerk shares was imminent, the government would not have
risked a negative development and subsequent disappointment.
Politicians of the CDU/CSU raised concerns about a small inﬂuence of
smallholders on the company after the privatisation.440 Shareholders had two
ways of exerting inﬂuence: via the general meeting and through their represen-
tatives in the supervisory board . Yet, in both bodies, the inﬂuence remained
rather limited. The main reason were proxy voting rights of ﬁnancial institu-
tions which managed the portfolios of private investors. At the ﬁrst general
meeting after the partial privatisation, ﬁnancial institutions represented 96.4%
of the votes based on proxy voting rights. This result reﬂects that the voting
right restriction per shareholder of one thousandth of the nominal share capital
436 Bundestagsdrucksache 03/335.
437 This argument was also brought forward by Berlin's mayor Willy Brandt (SPD), BArch
B115/3287, Brandt to BMBes, 17.5.1958, and by the Minister-President of Lower Saxony,
B115/3288, Minister-President of Lower Saxony to Lindrath, 23.4.1959.
438 Bundestag Plenarprotokoll 03/30, 12.6.1958, pp. 16261674; press announcement of the
SPD Bundestag group, 13.1.1959, copy in BArch B115/3287; and for the government re-
sponse: Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung online, Federal Cabinet, minutes
of the meetings on 12 February and 11 June 1958.
439 Laufer and Stier (2005), pp. 465466.
440 BArch B115/3284, Adenauer to BMBes, including note on a meeting on 6 July 1959,
9.7.1959; BArch B115/3287, Häussler to BMBes, 29.1.1959.
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also applied to VEBA. Of these 96.4%, 55.1% were represented by large banks.
To a request from Lindrath, Wilhelm Vallenthin, chairman of Deutsche Bank,
responded that the wishes of the shareholders were being correctly expressed
at the general meeting.441 However, shareholder associations sharply criticised
the strong inﬂuence of the banks.442 The low inﬂuence of smallholders was
reﬂected in the composition of the supervisory board which was elected at the
ﬁrst general meeting after the share issue. Of the 21 seats, seven were re-
served for the employees and four for VEBA. Of the remaining ten seats, three
were assigned to banks, three to industrial circles, one to an auditor and only
three to smallholders and shareholder associations. The idea to implement an
advisory body with delegates of smallholders was considered by the ministe-
rial administration but dropped again. This was mainly due to legal concerns
and resistance from the employees who feared the inﬂuence of return-oriented
shareholders.443 Instead, the Ministry of the Treasury and Preussag agreed on
strengthening the communication between management and small sharehold-
ers by supporting shareholder associations.444 However, no further steps were
taken to actively support such associations. Instead, in addition to the general
assembly, regional shareholder meetings were introduced in 1962 and attracted
approximately 10,000 of initially 216,000 total shareholders per year.445 Horst
Rheinfels, one of the initiators of the German people's shares, was among the
critics of the failed restriction of banking power. He argues that a restriction
of voting rights for shareholders was not enough, as the latest Preussag general
meeting had shown. To increase transparency, he suggested that the names
of all the shareholders which were represented by banks through proxy voting
should be displayed. Also, banks should maintain close relationships with the
shareholders who it is representing and, for example, initiate local shareholder
441 BArch B115/3288, Deutsche Bank (Vallenthin) to BMBes, 2.7.1959.
442 See for example BArch B115/3288, Interview with Franz Ove, founding member of the
shareholder association Bund der Volksaktionäre e.V..
443 BArch B102/76015, Draft Henneberg for Kattenstroth for the supervisory board meeting
of the Preussag on 28 March 1960, 24.3.1960; see also BArch B102/76015, draft Hen-
neberg for Kattenstroth, 21.5.1960; BArch B126/40692, Minutes of the Studienausschuss
des Aufsichtsrates für die Frage der Bildung eines Aktionärsbeirats bei der Preussag,
2.5.1960; ibid., Internal note.
444 B115/3288, Note about the supervisory board of the Preussag, 6.8.1959; Preussag to
BMBes, 23.10.1959.
445 Laufer and Stier (2005), p. 464.
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meetings. On top of that, the Preussag management should organise regional
meetings.446 Two of these ideas were later taken up again: the idea of regional
shareholder meetings in the case of VEBA, and the idea to display the names
of represented shareholders in the case of Volkswagenwerk.
4.3 Volkswagenwerk: Compromise with Lower
Saxony
After the partial privatisation of Preussag in 1959, it took two more years until
Volkswagenwerk GmbH was ﬁnally transformed into the joint stock company
Volkswagenwerk AG and partially privatised in 1961. Since no agreement was
in sight in 1959, the federal government forced Lower Saxony with a new initia-
tive to ﬁnally consent to an agreement: on 10 July 1959, the CDU/CSU Bun-
destag group introduced a bill which would transfer ownership to the federal
level.447 After that, Lower Saxony agreed to a contract which ﬁnally clariﬁed
the ownership rights and transferred 20% of the shares to Lower Saxony.448
The federal government also kept 20% of the shares, and the remaining 60%
were privatised according to the Volkswagen Privatisation Act (Gesetz über
die Regelung der Rechtsverhältnisse bei der Volkswagenwerk-Gesellschaft mit
beschränkter Haftung) from May 1960.
Compared to the Preussag privatisation, there were two main diﬀerences:
First, in addition to a relatively low subscription price, ﬁnancial concessions
for low-income households were introduced. Second, proxy voting rights were
restricted. These special terms were a concession to left circles within the
CDU/CSU. Still, the Volkswagen law was much less restrictive than the ini-
tial draft had been. Subscribers with an annual income of 6,000 DM (12,000
DM for couples) received a discount of 20%, those with an annual income of
8,000 DM (16,000 DM) 10%; families with two or more children received an
446 Rheinfels: Können Kleinaktionäre praktisch mitwirken? Die Ausübung des Stimmrechts
bei den privatisierten Gesellschaften, Handelsblatt, 30.12.1959.
447 Gesetz über die Regelung der Rechtsverhältnisse bei der Volkswagenwerk GmbH, Bun-
destagsdrucksache 03/1217.
448 Bundestagsdrucksache 03/1522, Vertrag über die Regelung der Rechtsverhältnisse bei
der Volkswagenwerk-GmbH und über die Errichtung einer `Stiftung Volkswagenwerk' ,
12.11.1959.
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additional discount of 5%. The discount had to be repaid if the purchaser
sold his or her shares within two years. Purchasers could subscribe for up to
ﬁve shares, employees received a preferential allocation. Voting rights were
restricted to 1/10,000 of the share capital. Yet, the federal government and
Lower Saxony were exempted from the voting right restriction, but the exemp-
tion was limited to only ﬁve years. Lower Saxony had insisted on an unlimited
exemption. Proxy voting was restricted to 2% of the nominal share capital per
institution. This restriction had been suggested by the Bundestag economic
committee. Hence, banks were not allowed to represent all of their customers.
According to a newspaper report, this played a role mainly in the case of three
large banks: Deutsche Bank had been awarded mandates for representation for
12% of all small shareholders, Dresdner Bank 8 to 9%, and Commerzbank 8%.
This meant that 22% of small shareholders would not be represented at all at
general meetings.449 The restriction of proxy voting was sharply criticised from
diﬀerent sides. A group of people's shares associations ﬁled an unsuccessful
constitutional appeal against the provision. They argued that the restriction
oﬀended the principle of equal treatment. An opinion of the legal department
of Deutsche Bank had actually expressed doubts that the clause was in confor-
mity with  3 GG, the principal of equal treatment. Also, the clause enabled an
arbitrary choice of represented shareholders by ﬁnancial institutions.450 How-
ever, Deutsche Bank decided to not make the latter point public.451 Another
appeal had been ﬁled regarding the social price of the share issue. However,
the federal constitutional court rejected the appeal. It argued that while it
was the government's duty to demand a reasonable price, a certain deviation
from the market price was acceptable for socio-political reasons and the actual
price was still within the government's scope of discretion.452 A group of ﬁ-
nancial and industrial sector associations consisting of the Federal Association
449 VW-Aktionäre kündigen Verfassungsbeschwerde an, Deutsche Zeitung no. 143,
24.6.1961.
450DBA ZA40/38, Opinion about the Verfassungsmässigkeit der Vorschläge des Wirtschaft-
sausschusses des Bundestages zu dem Komplex `Vertretung bei der Stimmrecht-
sausübung' , probably from March 1960.
451DBA ZA40/38, Deutsche Bank Zentrale Frankfurt to Zentrale Düsseldorf and Hamburg,
21.3.1960.
452Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court from 16.5.1961.
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of German Industry, the Federal Association of German Banks, the German
Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Confederation of German Em-
ployers' Associations unsuccessfully addressed the problem in a ﬁnal appeal to
the Bundestag legal and economic committees. They argued that the danger
that the voting restrictions could be circumvented by proxy voting was almost
non-existent. In order to do so, a shareholder would have to mandate a large
number of proxies. Therefore, they recommended to remove the restriction of
proxy voting.453
The subscription period started in March 1961. The demand for shares
was again so high that a full allocation of shares was not possible. However,
due to the binding contract with Lower Saxony, a release of additional shares
was not possible at that time. The revenues from the share issue were passed
on to the new Volkswagenwerk Foundation.
453DBA ZA40/38, Group of private economy associations (Federal Association of German
Industry, Federal Association of German Banks, German Chamber of Commerce and
Industry and Confederation of German Employers' Associations) to Members of the
Bundestag Justice Committee, 25.2.1960.
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Table 4.2: People's shares privatisation of Volkswagenwerk 1961
Equity increase No, but adjustment of nominal capital
from 300 to 600 million DM from com-
pany funds before the privatisation
Remaining federal share 20%
Nominal value of public oﬀering 360 million DM
No. of shares sold to private investors 3,600,000
Issue price 350% (excluding discounts)
No. of applicants / purchasers 1,547,503
- of these: Volkswagenwerk employees 63,484
Purchase restricted to Persons with domicile in Germany, min-
imum age 18 years
Max. eligible income of purchasers Taxable income of 14,000 (singles)
/28,000 (couples) DM
Subscription limit 5 shares per person
Maximal allocation 2 shares per person
Special conditions for employees - Subscription limit of 10 shares
- preferential allocation
Staggered allocation Yes, according to the taxable income
Price discounts when:
- income <6,000 /12,000 DM 20%
- income <8,000/16,000 DM 10%
- children >1 5%
Restriction of voting rights 1/10,000 of share capital; exception for
the federal government and for Lower
Saxony (limited to 10 years)
Restriction of proxy voting rights 1/50 of share capital for commercial
representatives and:
- Open representation with power of at-
torney and instructions
- Disclosure of names of all represented
shareholders
Delegation rights 2 seats in the supervisory board for
the federal government and 2 seats for
Lower Saxony per law and company
statutes
Special provisions in Volkswagen law - Veto minority reduced to 20% (com-
pany law: 25%)
- Establishment and relocation of busi-
ness premises requires approval of su-
pervisory board with 2/3 majority
Bank consortium 87 banks
Lead management Deutsche Bank
Co-leaders Dresdner Bank, Commerzbank,
Deutsche Girozentrale, Deutsche
Genossenschaftskasse
Recipient of revenues Stiftung Volkswagenwerk
Incentive to keep shares Discount has to be paid back when
holding period <2 years
Sources: Bundesministerium für wirtschaftlichen Besitz des Bundes (1960), p. 7;
Bundeschatzministerium (1961), pp. 57; Barch B102/49880, Einzelfragen zur
Teilprivatisierung der VEBA.
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4.4 Hesitation and New Initiatives
After the partial privatisation of Volkswagenwerk, privatisation came to a halt
for several years although several companies were being discussed. This might
have had to do with the fact that after Herrman Lindrath's death in February
1960, two Ministers of the Treasury with very short terms of oﬃce followed.
Hans Wilhelmi (CDU) succeeded Lindrath in May 1960. After the next federal
elections, the FDP requested the ministry and Hans Lenz (FDP) held oﬃce
from November 1961 until all FDP ministers resigned as a reaction to the
`Spiegel aﬀair' in November 1962. During that time, Erhard's Ministry of
Economics was stronger and blocked privatisation attempts. The next more
inﬂuential Minister of the Treasury became Werner Dollinger (CSU).
4.4.1 Privatisation versus Consolidation
Up until the end of the 1950s, the government had not produced a comprehen-
sive privatisation programme and not addressed general questions. In Septem-
ber 1959, Ludwig Kattenstroth (Ministry of Economics) criticised this situa-
tion in an internal note and pointed to the lack of a conceptual framework for
privatisation and public enterprises in general. In the same note, Kattenstroth
complained more generally about a high degree of tiredness among the advo-
cates of a free market economy who had in previous years persistently been
facing resistance from various sides. According to Kattenstroth, now, that the
economic reconstruction period was over, the social market economy had to
face its practical test. Yet, the ﬁrst results were not satisfying. He found that
the Anti-Trust Law which was ﬁnally adopted after long negotiations in 1957
was rather incomplete and that in the Ministry of Economics resignation was
prevailing.454
Given the lack of a general privatisation concept, there were no well
deﬁned criteria for the suitability of companies and the timing of privati-
sation. Hence, privatisation was implemented pragmatically and public en-
454 nur Resignation festzustellen, BArch N1256/36, Einige ungelöste grundsätzliche Fragen
der bundesdeutschen Wirtschaftspolitik (III 1) 1.9.1959.
Chapter 4. People's Shares Privatisations 169
terprises were examined on a case by case basis. A second attempt to sell
Howaldtswerke failed because it was considered as too risky. After its establish-
ment in 1957, the Federal Ministry of the Treasury continued the negotiations
with a group of investors which the Ministry of Finance had started. Birnbaum
organised a meeting with Howaldtswerke Hamburg and Dortmund-Hörde and
hoped that this matter will be accomplished before the Bundestag summer
break.455 A full sale of Howaldtswerke Hamburg to the consortium was recon-
sidered. The city of Hamburg was interested to acquire a participation of 25%
of the shares456 and the sales negotiations led to a preliminary agreement of
a purchase price of 34 million DM.457 MP Heinrich Gewandt (CDU) criticised
that the sale would lead to a concentration of economic power and suggested
that a part of the shares should be issued as people's shares.458 Lindrath
rejected this with the argument that the shares would not provide a secure
investment opportunity for purchasers. The wharf industry was a high-risk
industry and required participations of large and well-performing companies
such as Dortmund-Hörde. Stock market declines would be able to undermine
the newly gained trust in shares among the population.459 In May 1958, the
SPD Bundestag group requested to stop the sales negotiations.460 The strategy
of the Ministry of Finance was to delay further steps as much as possible and
wait for a better opportunity. An expert report was ordered to clarify whether
Howaldtswerke were suitable for a broad distribution of shares and the oﬃcials
in charge hoped that this would buy some time.461 However, the plan to sell
Howaldtswerke Hamburg was apparently soon given up. Instead, the company
455 dass diese Angelegenheit noch vor der parlamentarischen Sommerpause in diesem Jahre
ihre Erledigung ﬁndet, BArch B126/3214, Birnbaum to Elshoﬀ (Dortmund-Hörde),
2.1.1958.
456 BArch B115/3214, Internal note, 27.3.1958.
457 BArch B126/3214, express letter from to BMWi and BMF, 25.4.1958; see also ibid.,
report of the Treuarbeit, 23.4.1958.
458 BArch B115/3214, Gewandt to Lindrath, 14.5.1958.
459 das kaum gewonnene Vertrauen breiter Kreise in die Aktien wieder zu erschüttern.,
BArch B115/3214, Lindrath to Gewandt, 21.5.1958.
460 Bundestagsdrucksache 03/367, 7.5.1958, for the discussion see Bundestag debate about
the Große Anfrage der SPD betr. Bundesunternehmen Bundestagsdrucksache 03/335,
in connection with Antrag der Fraktion der SPD betr. Howaldtswerke Hamburg AG,
Bundestagsdrucksache 03/367, Bundestag Plenarprotokoll 03/ 30, 12.6.1958, pp. 1627
1674.
461DBA ZA15x/2052, Note about a meeting of Klasen (Deutsche Bank) with Birnbaum and
Secretary of State Busch in the Ministry of Finance on 5 December 1958, 8.12.1958.
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was merged with Howaldtswerke Kiel and the privately owned Deutsche Werft
in 1967 as a response to the crisis in the shipbuilding sector. Together, they
became the mixed ownership company Howaldtswerke Deutsche Werft AG.
That privatisation would continue was conﬁrmed by all Ministers of the
Treasury. Hans Lenz (FDP) considered partial privatisations as a way to ﬁ-
nance equity increases. He estimated that during the previous ten years, invest-
ments of federal enterprises in a volume of half a billion DM had been ﬁnanced
by capital contributions of the federal government, of which Saarbergwerke
alone had received 285 billion DM. Yet, net revenues from public enterprises
had amounted to 475 billion DM and hence outbalanced investments. Lenz
considered convertible bonds as an alternative to direct privatisation462 and
announced that privatisation would continue with fewer ﬁnancial concessions
than in the case of VW.463 He added that privatisation would be easier now
that the Reich Property Act had been adopted. However, Lenz admitted that
the timing was unfavourable in light of the disappointment of shareholders
with the development of Preussag and VW shares.464 The Ministry of Eco-
nomics responded with hesitation to privatisation initiatives of the Ministry of
the Treasury. In December 1960, Erhard warned that in the current economic
situation, privatisation should not be resumed until the eﬀects of the Volkswa-
genwerk privatisation had been suﬃciently studied. Also, the topic should not
be debated publicly because that could lead to negative eﬀects for the CDU
election result in the next federal elections in 1961465 although the CDU/CSU
working group Eigentum recommended that at least one next privatisation
object should be announced before the elections.
In December 1962, Werner Dollinger (CSU) became Minister of the Trea-
sury and remained in this position for four years. During this time, the Min-
462 BArch B102/75797, dpa press announcement, 3.11.1962.
463 Privatisierung geht weiter, Industriekurier, 2.12.1961, copy in BArch B102/49880. See
also Weiter Verbreiterung der Vermögensbildung. Die Privatisierung des Bundesvermö-
gens wird fortgesetzt in Bulletin der Bundesregierung no. 29, 10.2.1962, S. 244, copy in
BArch B102/49880; BArch B102/75797, dpa press announcement, 3.11.1962.
464 Schatzministerium: Freie Bahn für weitere Privatisierungen., vwd press announcement,
13.7.1962, copies in BArch B102/75797, BArch B126/32513 and BArch B102/49880.
465 BArch B102/75797, Internal note about a meeting in the Ministry of the Treasury on
20 December 1960 with Erhard, Wilhelmi, Westrick, Busch, Kattenstroth and Wilhelmi,
28.2.1961, and Erhard to Wilhelmi, 25.3.1961.
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istry of the Treasury gained signiﬁcance and was able to stand up against the
Ministry of Economics. This had to do with an important personnel decision:
Dollinger won Kattenstroth, who had previously left the Ministry of Economics
and had become head of the economics division in the Oﬃce of the Federal
Chancellor, for the position as secretary of state. The choice for the chief
privatiser, as the weekly newspaper Der Spiegel called Kattenstroth, led to
expectations from media and public. However, later on, Der Spiegel noted that
Kattenstroth had only been second choice for the position as secretary of state.
Dollinger's ﬁrst choice Hans Birnbaum, another `privatiser', was not available
for the position as he had become ﬁnancial director of the management board
of Salzgitter AG in 1961 and did not want to leave his position. 466 In a report
to Adenauer in June 1963, Dollinger announced that his primary ambition was
to create the necessary conditions for the transfer of federal enterprises into
private ownership. In particular, Salzgitter AG and Saarbergwerke AG had to
be consolidated. Also, he considered public enterprises in the energy market
as necessary for an overdue market reorganisation (which he did not further
deﬁne).467
Between 1959 and 1865, the Ministry of the Treasury considered partial
privatisations of VIAG and Salzgitter several times although the Ministry of
Economics was against a privatisation of VIAG due to expected diﬃculties
with Bavaria due to the interwoven ownership situation of Bayernwerke.468
Lindrath's successor Hans Wilhelmi (CDU) announced that he would exam-
ine whether VIAG could be privatised despite a share of 70% in the German
aluminium market.469 About a year later, Hans Lenz (FDP) intended a par-
tial privatisation of VIAG in order to raise funds of 100 million DM.470 He
calculated that VIAG und Salzgitter together would need funds of 200 billion
466 Dürfen Beamte im Aufsichtsrat ungehorsam sein?, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 15.10.1965;
Note on the death of Birnbaum, Der Spiegel 48/1980, 21.11.1980.
467 BArch B126/34720, Bericht an den Herrn Bundeskanzler über die Entwicklung im
wirtschaftlichen Zuständigkeitsbereich des Bundesschatzministers in den Jahren 1949
1962, 24.6.1963.
468 For example BArch B102/76404, Internal Note, Ministry of Economics, III 3, 21.11.1960;
BArch B102/75797, Henneberg to Westrick, 3.6.1959; Internal note, 14.10.1959.
469 BArch B102/75797, Div. III 3 (Kattenstroth) to Erhard/Westrick, 19.12.1960.
470 Schatzministerium: Freie Bahn für weitere Privatisierungen, vwd press announcement,
13.7.1962, copies in BArch B102/75797, BArch B126/32513 and BArch B102/49880.
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DM within the next two years which could be ﬁnanced through partial privati-
sations.471 As the latest attempt, the FDP Bundestag group unsuccessfully
proposed a privatisation of VIAG in 1965.472
A privatisation of VEBA or its subsidiary companies was being discussed
since the sale of Preussag shares in 1959. The Ministry of the Treasury pre-
ferred Preussenelektra.473 The Ministry of Economics agreed that a next pri-
vatisation would have to be VEBA or one of its subsidiary companies. The
question was just whether it should be VEBA as a whole or of one of the
subsidiaries, such as in the case of Preussag. In October 1959, an internal note
from the Ministry of Economics discussed Preussenelektra, Hugo Stinnes AG
and VEBA as possible subjects of privatisation.474 Preussenelektra was gener-
ally considered to be suitable because it connected a low investment risk proﬁle
with high expected proﬁts. But municipalities who held approximately 20% of
the shares in the company might resist a privatisation because Preussenelektra
would loose the wealth tax privilege of a public enterprise which served the
public interest. The ministry therefore suggested to remove tax exemptions for
public enterprises as a whole to the CDU committee for property formation.475
The next Minister of the Treasury Hans Wilhelmi (CDU) assumed that dif-
ﬁculties with the co-owning municipalities would be diﬃcult to solve.476 In
November 1960, Secretary of State Ludger Westrick (Ministry of Economics)
brought attention to Hibernia, VEBA's third subsidiary company.477 However,
Wilhelmi did not ﬁnd that Hibernia was a suitable subject of privatisation at
that time because of the ongoing coal market crisis.478
Another focus was on Hugo Stinnes AG. Hugo Stinnes AG was owned by a
bank consortium which was managed by Deutsche Bank and where the federal
government had an indirect participation through KfW. The consortium had
purchased the company from the U.S. Oﬃce of Alien Property, Department of
471 BArch B102/75797, dpa press announcement, 3.11.1962.
472 Bundestagsdrucksache 04/3100, 19.2.1965; Bundestag debate in Plenarprotokoll 04/178,
7.4.1965, pp. 89808982.
473 BArch B102/75797, Henneberg to Westrick, 3.6.1959.
474 BArch B102/75797, Internal note, 14.10.1959.
475 BArch B102/75797, Internal note, 14.10.1959.
476 BArch B102/75797, Div. III 3 (Kattenstroth) to Erhard/Westrick, 19.12.1960.
477 BArch B102/76404, Internal Note, Ministry of Economics, III 3, 21.11.1960.
478 BArch B102/75797, Div. III 3 (Kattenstroth) to Erhard/Westrick, 19.12.1960.
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Justice in 1957. The federal government had participated in the purchase be-
cause it was interested to bring the company back into German ownership. It
had been intended from the start that the participation could at some later be
sold to private investors.479 The consortia agreement from 24 June 1957 stated
that Stinnes should be privatised at a convenient time. In May 1961, Wilhelmi
suggested, against Erhard's request to not speak about privatisation until the
federal elections, to sell either the remaining Preussag shares or the federal
Stinnes shares.480 Henneberg in the Ministry of Economics found that in gen-
eral, there were no objectives against the sale of the remaining 22% Preussag
shares. However, instead of people's shares, which would not be worth the ef-
fort for such a small share volume, Henneberg returned to his earlier ideas from
1957 and proposed to sell the shares to investment companies. In the case of
Stinnes, he regarded people's shares as unsuitable because Deutsche Bank had
the leadership position in the consortium and chief executive director Abs was
highly sceptical about the concept of people's share issues. Also, Henneberg
found it not advisable to privatise a coal mining company while problems in the
coal market persisted. He added for consideration that in the case of Preussag,
the shutdown of mines had proven to be more diﬃcult after the privatisation
than before.481 Erhard adopted this view.482 Nevertheless, at a meeting of the
CDU/CSU working group Eigentum in July 1961, Wilhelmi ignored Erhard
and announced to sell the remaining Preussag shares through a public oﬀering
in combination with a capital increase of VEBA. This was sharply criticised in
the Ministry of Economics.483 In 1962, the Ministry of Economics attempted
an integration of Hugo Stinnes AG into VEBA, but Deutsche Bank refused
and insisted on a privatisation. A sale of Stinnes shares required a decision by
common content of the consortium. In October 1963, Deutsche Bank accepted
an integration of Hugo Stinnes AG in VEBA on the condition that a corre-
479 Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung online, Federal Cabinet, minutes of the
185th meeting on 12 June 1957, agenda item 9: Zwangsverkauf von Anteilen der Hugo
Stinnes Corporation, New York, durch das Oﬃce of Alien Property Department of Jus-
tice.
480 BArch B102/75797, Wilhelmi to Erhard, 31.5.1961.
481 BArch B102/75797, Internal note (Henneberg), 6.6.1961.
482 BArch B102/75797, Erhard to Wilhelmi, 12.6.1961.
483 BArch B102/75797, Internal note, III3 (Henneberg), 16.6.1961.
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sponding share of VEBA itself would be privatised later.484 The integration
took place in the context of the partial privatisation of VEBA in 1965.485
A question which came up in September 1963 was the usage of privatisa-
tion revenues. A division in the Ministry of the Treasury suggested to include
the earmarking of privatisation revenues in the government programme.486 A
second note from November 1964 discussed possibilities of an earmarking. The
unknown author of the note suggested that revenues should be allocated to the
ERP Special Fund with the obligation that the money has to be used for spec-
iﬁed purposes. Thereby, he referred to a meeting of the CDU/CSU working
group Eigentum which had agreed in November 1964 that privatisation rev-
enues should be used for the sole purpose of capital formation of the lower and
middle income households and had rejected the idea of using the revenues from
the imminent VEBA privatisation for an equity increase of Salzgitter AG.487
These ideas were not followed up on, probably because earmarking of revenues
raised legal issues.
4.4.2 People's Shares for the Private Sector?
Besides the privatisation of public enterprises, an extension of the concept
of people's shares to the private sector was considered in the early 1960s.
Adenauer's government statement from 1957 had already spoken of people's
shares for the private sector. In 1965, Minister of the Treasury Dollinger
adopted the idea and suggested subsidies for private investors who would pur-
chase shares in privately owned joint stock companies. This led to an argu-
ment between Dollinger and Minister of Economics Kurt Schmücker (CDU),
who was a representative of the CDU's Small-Business Association and later
succeeded Dollinger as Minister of the Treasury in December 1966. The argu-
ment between Dollinger and Schmücker, or rather between their secretaries of
state Kattenstroth and Wolfram Langer, evolved around the case of Hütten-
484 Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung online, Federal Cabinet, minutes of the
86th cabinet meeting on 31 July 1963, agenda item 4: Eingliederung der Hugo Stinnes
AG in den Bereich der bundeseigenen Vereinigte Elektrizitäts- und Bergwerks-AG
(VEBA).
485 See chapter 4.5.
486 BArch N1256/83, Division II (Süsskind) to Division I, 12.9.1963.
487 BArch N1256/83, Internal note, Subdivision II B, 12.11.1964.
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und Bergwerke Rheinhausen AG which was part of the Krupp complex. The
Mehlem Treaty from 1953 between Alfred Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach,
owner of the Krupp corporation, and the French, US and British military gov-
ernments provided that Hütten- und Bergwerke Rheinhausen AG had to be
detached from the rest of the company and sold. However, a sale had not taken
place yet in 1965 and the Ministry of the Treasury considered to subsidise a
sale in form of a widespread share issue. On behalf of Schmücker, Secretary of
State Langer (Ministry of Economics), criticised the market distortions which
would be caused by subsidies for share purchases. First, only large companies
would beneﬁt because they were considered to be less risky. This would lead
to a segregation of the stock market and a discrimination of non-subsidised
shares. Second, by recommending the purchase of speciﬁc shares, which sub-
sidies would eﬀectively do, the federal government would take over a moral
obligation and therefore would have to oﬀer price supports in the case of a bad
performances of the shares. Such a socialisation of losses would be followed
by a socialisation of proﬁts and could ﬁnally turn into a socialist economic
order. However, if the government did not oﬀer price supports in such cases,
it would do more harm than good for the popularisation of shares and savings
in general. Potential recipients of subsidies would prefer subsidised shares and
the assessment and selection of shares and therewith the takeover of risks
which was an inherent part of holding stock would be omitted.488 Finally,
Langer criticised that subsidies for savings had already been costly enough
in recent years. By 1964, subsidies had been granted for almost half of the
total volume of private savings of 28 billion DM. Costs for these measures had
had amounted to 3,1 billion DM and would increase to 5,4 billion DM in 1965
which was the acceptable maximum. Last but not least, a speciﬁc promotion
for shares would not be consistent with the necessary harmonisation of sav-
ings schemes and a neutral treatment of all forms of savings.489 A draft for a
response letter, probably written by Kattenstroth, defended the idea and re-
ferred to the concentration of ownership in the private economy: in 1960, only
488 Prüfung and Auswahl der Aktie und damit die Übernahme eigenen Risikos, die zum
Wesen des Aktionärs gehört, würde entfallen, BArch N1256/83 and BArch B126/51418,
Langer to Dollinger, 3.9.1965.
489 ibid.
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660 of 2,500 stock companies were publicly listed; of those, 520 had owners
with a veto minority of 25% or more. This was interpreted as a proof for the
fact that access to ownership rights in German companies through the stock
market was limited. The author ascribed this to the fact that market forces
were not strong enough to dissolve the concentration of ownership.490 He sug-
gested to subsidise share purchases mainly for ﬁrms who would go public and
not for equity increases of already listed ﬁrms. However, the measure could
in certain cases also be used to dissolve large blocks of shares. Indeed, the
responsibility of the state for the performance of the respective companies was
a problematic issue. The subsidies would therefore have to be accompanied
by a corresponding information policy. The author referred to the case of
VEBA: the price drop of VEBA shares had to be seen as a valuable lesson
for all shareholders in the sense that shares remained a risky asset despite all
promotion. He assumed that share purchasers were realistic enough not to
expect an eternal guarantee by the federal government. He also did not see
a discrimination because the credit standing of companies was dependent on
a number of inﬂuence factors.491 An unsigned and undated comment in the
Ministry of Economics, probably also by Kattenstroth, justiﬁed interventions
in the form of setting incentives. The author argued that the privatisations of
Volkswagenwerk and Preussag did not solely serve the purpose of a transfer
to private hands but also social objectives  otherwise, the CDU/CSU's left
wing would not have agreed to privatisations. Dissolving blocks of shares and
incentivising private companies to aim at a broad ownership distribution was
necessary to achieve these objectives.The author stressed that the goal was not
to propagate certain shares, nevertheless, it was necessary that the government
gave recommendations to people with little knowledge about shares.492
Dollinger abandoned the idea of promoting people's shares for the pri-
490 die Kräfte des freien Marktes nicht ausgereicht haben, die Eigentumsstruktur bei den
Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik in wünschenswertem Umfang aufzulockern, BArch
N1256/83, Draft for a letter from Dollinger to Schmücker (probably written by Katten-
stroth), October 1965.
491 ibid.
492 BArch N1256/83, Unknown author (probably Kattenstroth), attachment to an internal
note from Süsskind, to Katzer, Burgbacher, Dufhues, Seeger, Russe, undated.
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vate sector in December 1965.493 Around the same time, an argument about
the imminent VEBA privatisation led to a rift between Dollinger and Kat-
tenstroth.494 Yet, the idea of dissolving private blocks of shares by issuing
people's shares nevertheless shows how deeply the concept of people's shares
was rooted in socio-political ideas. A related concept were `people's bonds',
government bonds with small nominal values.495 In 1969, people's bonds were
introduced in 1969 as Bundesschatzbriefe' and existed until 2013.
4.5 VEBA: The Problem Case
In 1964, the privatisation discussion focused increasingly on VEBA as a whole
instead of its subsidiaries. In general, the conditions for a privatisation were
beneﬁcial. There was a broad agreement of the government parties in favour
of privatisations. Katzer, chairman of the CDU/CSU workers association,
stepped in for a privatisation of VEBA at the Christian-Social Workers Congress
in January 1964.496 Despite the good starting conditions, the partial privati-
sation of VEBA in 1965 turned out problematic. The stock market downturn
in 1965 led to a sharp fall of the popularity of people's shares. Additionally,
arguments about personnel decisions led to a severe dispute between Minister
of the Treasury Dollinger (CSU) and his Secretary of State Kattenstroth which
gave the impression of a rather chaotic privatisation. In light of the above, the
federal government did not continue privatisation policy after VEBA's partial
privatisation.
The choice of VEBA can partially be explained by ﬁscal reasons. Despite
the partial privatisation of Preussag, VEBA was largely underﬁnanced. Both
Preussenelektra and Hibernia were in the middle of a restructuring process
and needed equity increases. A second reason for the choice of VEBA was
that the partial privatisation allowed the integration of Hugo Stinnes AG in
493 BArch N1256/99, Vorläuﬁg keine Privatisierungspläne  Dollinger gegen den Plan einer
Energie-Verwaltungs AG, VWD Montan no. 291, 14.12.1965.
494 See refsec:veba.
495DBA ZA15x/2052, Sekretariat an Vallenthin, Betr.: Volksobligationen, 11.9.1967.
496 Katzer macht es sich zu leicht. Veba-Privatisierung bringt Problem der Steuerprivilegien
hoch, Handelsblatt, 23.1.1964, copy in BArch B102/49880.
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VEBA according to the agreement with Deutsche Bank from 1963.497 From
its establishment in 1923 until 1965, VEBA had been a pure ﬁnancing holding
company without control over and in the shadow of its three strong subsidiary
companies. Its own budget was comparably small. In 1948, VEBA had only
one employee: lawyer Lilliluise Ristow, who managed the company together
with trustee Hermann Schilling and was compensated later with a position in
the management board of the company. In the early 1950s, Hibernia, Preussag
and Preussenelektra beneﬁted from state subsidies in form of tax reductions
and special depreciations which allowed for a high degree of internal ﬁnanc-
ing. Additionally, VEBA issued bonds in 1954 and passed the sum of 3,5
million DM on to its subsidiary companies. But VEBA's own income sources
were scarce and entirely based on dividend payments of its shareholdings. In
1951/52, only Preussenelektra began paying dividends (6%), while Hibernia
and Preussenelektra used all their proﬁts for the purpose of internal ﬁnancing.
Hibernia resumed to pay dividends in 1954 (5%). In 1955, VEBA was able to
start paying dividends itself, but it was undercapitalised. The book value of
VEBA was 462 million DM, the book value of the shares owned by VEBA was
468 million DM. Of these, 300 million DM alone belonged to Hibernia, which
reﬂects the low degree of capitalisation of Preussag and Preussenelektra. Due
to losses during the war, the Preussag had to lower its book value from 250
to 50 million DM in 1948. Preussenelektra was also poorly capitalised with
111,6 million DM where VEBA held 83,2% of the shares. All three subsidiary
companies had high ﬁnancing needs due to their restructuring and reconstruc-
tion processes. Between 1948 and 1957, Preussenelektra invested 1,27 million
DM, Hibernia 956 million DM and Preussag 564 million DM. At the end of
the 1950s, it became evident that internal ﬁnancing alone would not solve the
companies ﬁnancial problems. The partial privatisation of the Preussag was a
ﬁrst step. To solve VEBA's ﬁnancial issues, the Ministry of the Treasury had
in 1963 suggested to issue option bonds that could be transferred into Volk-
swagenwerk shares. A partial privatisation was not intended as VEBA did not
seem ready for privatisation yet. Dollinger argued that a share issue privatisa-
497 See p. 174.
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tion was not possible because the diﬃcult situation in the coal market did not
allow for a proper evaluation of Hibernia.498 Hibernia was more problematic
than Preussenelektra, which is why there had been considerations to disinte-
grate Preussenelektra and privatise it. The coal mining company Hibernia had
to shoulder a restructuring programme away from the coal business towards
the chemical and processing industry. Also, the company had suﬀered massive
losses during and after the war, particularly due to the destruction of the Hy-
drierwerke Scholven AG which was used for the purpose of coal liquefaction and
nitrogen production in the Third Reich. Since it had become evident that due
to technical developments, coal-to-liquid production would be much less eﬃ-
cient than petroleum in the future, Scholven had started to process petroleum
in 1952. Between 1948 and 1965, Hibernia invested 2,43 million DM. Of these,
2 million DM had been ﬁnanced by depreciations and only about a quarter
had been invested in the coal sector. Rather, the high depreciation rates in
the coal mining industry had allowed for investments in other sectors. The
high degree of internal ﬁnancing had been supported by a moderate dividend
policy. By the mid-1960s, the chemical business had become the company's
most important sector and generated about 40% of the turnover.499 The eq-
uity capital requirements of Preussenelektra and Hibernia put pressure on the
company. Also, VEBA needed about 200 million DM to ﬁnance the takeover
of Hugo Stinnes AG. Hence, an equity increase was inevitable. At ﬁrst, the
government attempted to solve the problem by increasing internal ﬁnancing
opportunities and deferring dividend payments. However, this was a costly
option because of additional tax assessments. According to Radzio, privatisa-
tion was initiated when Secretary of State Karl-Maria Hettlage (Ministry of
Finance) vetoed against a costly deferral of dividends. After that, Dollinger
pursued the partial privatisation with determination. The timing seemed con-
venient: The Reich Property Act had been passed, the stock market trend was
positive and Volkswagenwerk and Preussag share prices were developing well.
VEBA's chief executive director Hartmann announced that a privatisation and
the takeover of Stinnes AG were political questions and that he would support
498 Bundestagsdrucksache 04/1284, 30.5.1963.
499 Radzio (1979), pp. 179210.
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any decision. He added that the board preferred a people's share issue over
an equity increase ﬁnanced by the federal government because it would be the
faster and easier solution.500 One drawback of the partial privatisation was
that VEBA lost the tax privileges for public enterprises. Neither the exemp-
tion of public enterprises from wealth tax neither the exemption from turnover
tax had been abolished yet.501 On top of this, a disadvantage for Hibernia was
that it lost its privilege to deliver coal to the German Federal Railway as an
in-house business, circumventing the Ruhr coal sales quotas.502
Since no general concept for privatisation existed, the conditions of the
share issue were discussed again. In July 1964, oﬃcials from several min-
istries met to discuss the privatisation and Breme (Ministry of the Treasury)
presented the envisaged issue conditions.503 The details were decided in a
small group consisting of Minister of the Treasury Dollinger, Secretary of State
Kattenstroth, MP Burgbacher and MP Katzer as representatives of the CDU
working group Eigentum in October 1964.504 This time, neither a social
price at the lower bound of the valuation nor ﬁnancial concessions for low
income households were adopted. A social price like in the case of Preussag
was ﬁrst considered but later rejected because it would generate less funds for
VEBA.505 This was not surprising because both Westrick and Erhard from
the Ministry of Economics had sharply criticised the ﬁnancial concessions in
the case of Volkswagenwerk.506 Yet, the decision was a major disappoint-
ment for the CDU/CSU employees' wing, even more since the CDU working
group Eigentum had stepped in for discounts for low income households.507
500 Radzio (1979), pp. 179210.
501 For a comment on this see Katzer macht es sich zu leicht. Veba-Privatisierung bringt
Problem der Steuerprivilegien hoch, Handelsblatt, 23.1.1964, copy in BArch B102/49880.
502 Bundestagsdrucksache 04/3616, 19.6.1965.
503 BArch B102/49980, Einzelfragen zur Teilprivatisierung der VEBA. Vergleichende
Darstellung zu den bei der Preussag und VW-Privatisierung getroﬀenen Maßnahmen.
504 BArch B102/49881, Minutes of a meeting on 6 October 1964 about the Teilprivatisierung
der Vereinigten Elektrizitäts- und Bergwerks-AG (VEBA), BMSchatz IVB4, 14.10.1964.
505 BArch B102/49880, Minutes about an inter-ministerial department meeting, BMSchatz,
IIB4, 21.7.1964; BArch N1256/99, Internal note on a meeting of Hibernia and Stinnes
works councils and Dollinger on 16.2.1965 (II B/4), 17.2.1965.
506 BArch B102/75797, Internal note about a meeting in the Ministry of the Treasury
on 20.12.1960 with Erhard, Wilhelmi, Westrick, Busch, Kattenstroth and Wilhelmi,
28.2.1961.
507 BArch B102/49880, Internal Note Teilprivatisierung der VEBA, BMSchatz, IVB4
(Bayer-Fehling), 17.9.1964.
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Staggered subscription rights were this time be based on the taxable income
instead of gross income to account for social circumstances.508 This was a con-
cession to the employees' wing, the government administration had favoured
on a maximum income of 24,000 DM but equal treatment of everyone be-
low that income.509 The shares were ﬁrst oﬀered to VEBA employees, then
to singles with an annual income up to 8,000 DM and married couples with
an annual income up to 16,000 DM, and then accordingly for incomes up to
11,000 DM/22,000 DM and the maximum of 14,000 DM/28,000 DM. After
the experiences with Preussag and Volkswagenwerk, the question of how to
proceed in the case of an over- or undersubscription was discussed prior to
the share issue. The plan was that in the case of an undersubscription, an
institution such as the KfW would take over the remaining shares on behalf of
the government and slowly sell them oﬀ at the stock exchange. In the case of
an oversubscription, Dollinger intended to request the right to sell additional
shares from the federal portfolio.510
One challenge for the government was to make sure that it would not lose
its voting majority, even in the case of additional share issues later on. It was
overall consensus that for (undeﬁned) energy political reasons, the federal state
should keep the majority of votes.511 The idea of multiple voting shares for the
government was ﬁrst considered but rejected by the Ministry of Economics.512
Also, non-voting preference shares were discussed. The CDU working group
Eigentum however insisted on ordinary shares with restricted voting rights.513
Finally, bearer shares were issued but two classes of shares were created: federal
shares in the value of 450 million DM were transformed into series A, and all
other shares constituted series B. While no restrictions of voting rights applied
508 BArch B102/49880, Minutes about an inter-ministerial department meeting, BMSchatz,
IIB4, 21.7.1964.
509 BArch B102/49880, Internal Note Teilprivatisierung der VEBA, BMSchatz, IVB4
(Bayer-Fehling), 17.9.1964.
510 BArch B102/49881, Minutes Teilprivatisierung der Vereinigten Elektrizitäts- und
Bergwerks-AG (VEBA), BMSchatz, IVB4, 14.10.1964.
511 BArch B102/49880, Internal Note Teilprivatisierung der VEBA, BMSchatz, IVB4
(Bayer-Fehling), 17.9.1964.
512 BArch B102/49880, Minutes about an inter-ministerial department meeting, BMSchatz,
IIB4, 21.7.1964.
513 BArch B102/49880, Internal Note Teilprivatisierung der VEBA, BMSchatz, IVB4
(Bayer-Fehling), 17.9.1964.
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to series A and therewith for the federal government, the articles of association
were amended such that voting rights of series B shares were restricted to
1/10,000 of the equity capital. As a compensation, holders of series B shares
received a preferential dividend of 1,5%. In the case of Preussag, a similar
special role for the VEBA as majority shareholder had been considered but
was ﬁnally not implemented.514
Another discussed issue was the participation of private shareholders in
the matters of the company. In August 1964, incidents at the general meet-
ing of Volkswagenwerk led to concerns in the Ministry of Economics.515 The
tensions arose because smallholders felt not suﬃciently informed about the
company's dividend and reserve policy.516 Subsequently, ministerial oﬃcials
discussed consequences for the case of VEBA. Henneberg suggested to anchor
regional shareholder meetings where federal government representatives should
be present in the company statutes and to enable shareholders to vote there
instead of having to attend the general meeting. Yet, the latter point was
considered as illegal by other oﬃcials. It was further discussed how the small-
holders right to information could be strengthened. Primarily, it was debated
whether the statutes should be amended such that the general meeting would
have to approve the annual accounts. However, this was rejected after Breme
had argued that the unwanted side eﬀect would be that the federal government
as a main shareholder would then become responsible for such decisions, which
should be avoided.517
Initially, the federal government planned to ﬁnance VEBA's equity in-
crease of 375 million DM, from 450 million DM to 825 million DM, by issuing
people's shares and to keep a majority of shares. The respective Bundestag
committee approved Dollinger's request to partially privatise VEBA in March
1965 but they declined to grant Dollinger the right to sell additional shares in
the case of an oversubscription. In that case, a solution based on the actual sub-
scription result should be negotiated. Additionally, the committee requested
514 BArch B126/40303, Draft for a letter from BMBes to BMJ, 6.2.1959.
515 BArch B102/49880, Langer to Kattenstroth, 14.8.1964.
516 BArch B102/49880, Internal Note Stellung der Hauptversammlung (HV) bei teilpri-
vatisierten Bundesgesellschaften, BMWi, III3 (Holzer), 3.8.1964.
517 BArch B102/49881, Minutes Teilprivatisierung der VEBA, BMSchatz, IVB4, 3.11.1964.
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that after the public oﬀering, a new supervisory board with adequate repre-
sentation of small investors should be elected and that the management board
would be extended in order to strengthen VEBA's leading role in the company.
The SPD committee members recognised the importance of an equity increase
and abstained from voting.518 The shares were issued by a consortium under
the leadership of Dresdner Bank and co-leadership of Deutsche Bank, Com-
merzbank and Deutsche Girozentrale/Deutsche Kommunalbank at a price of
210% between 24 May and 21 June 1965. As in the case of Preussag and Volk-
swagenwerk, the `big three' banks secured their proxy voting rights. The issue
price was set at 210%. Estimations about a fair price had diﬀered signiﬁcantly
beforehand.519
As in the cases of Preussag and VW, demand for shares was very high.
2,971,378 individuals subscribed for shares of a total nominal value of 1,33
billion DM. Of these, 2.6 million individuals belonged to the lowest income
group, 272,000 to the middle income group and 71,000 to the highest income
group. In order to satisfy the demand, the federal government would need to
release shares from its own portfolio. Diether Stolze, journalist (and later co-
editor) of the weekly newspaper Die Zeit evaluated that the citizens who have
been encouraged to form property since many years have foiled the politicians.
(...) Now, the CDU has to confess whether it regards privatisation just as
a comfortable way to ﬁnance federal enterprises (...) or whether it is serious
about the `ownership for all' policy.520 Given the high demand, Dollinger was
granted permission by the federal cabinet to transform series A shares into
series B shares and increase the volume of the share issue by 150 million DM,
so that the total nominal value of issued shares was 525 million DM. 521 The
518 Report of the committee for federal property, Bundestagsdrucksache 04/3248, 24.3.1965;
also: BArch B102/49881, Minutes of the 171. Meeting, 18.3.1965.
519 BArch B102/49881, Internal Note Teilprivatisierung der Veba, BMSchatz, VB3, March
1965; ibid., Internal Note, BMSchatz, IVA4, 10.3.1965; ibid., IVA4 to Head of Div. IV,
2.4.1965.
520 die Bürger, seit Jahren zur Eigentumsbildung angeregt, haben den Politikern einen
Strich durch die Rechnung gemacht.(...) Die CDU muß nun bekennen, ob sie in der
Privatisierung nur einen bequemen Weg zur Finanzierung von Bundesunternehmen sieht
(...), oder ob es ihr Ernst ist mit ihrer Parole vom `Eigentum für alle' ', Diether Stolze:
Die ganze VEBA soll es sein!, Die Zeit, 4.6.1965.
521 For the cabinet meeting on 16 June 1965 see Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bun-
desregierung online, Federal Cabinet, minutes of the 168th meeting on 16 June 1965,
agenda item D: Bereitstellung weiterer VEBA-Aktien für die Privatisierung, for the
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additional transfer of shares required the approval of the federal cabinet and
the Bundestag because the latter had decided in April 1965 that the federal
share should not fall below 51% due to the necessity to maintain a public
inﬂuence on the energy market.522 Dollinger highlighted that it was essential
to maintain a veto minority of 26% in VEBA because the federal government
had to be able to stop unwanted developments of the share price, which was
also in the interest of small investors.523
Including the additionally released shares, subscribers from the lowest
income group received maximally two shares per person, income groups II and
III were left empty-handed. The high demand turned the planned passive pri-
vatisation into an active transfer of shares to private investors. The remaining
federal share was 36%, so that the voting majority was lost. Nevertheless, the
CDU left wing, represented by Burgbacher, remained highly critical of privati-
sations of more than 50% of the share capital in general.524 The federal cabinet
decided to spend the the additional revenues for asset-creating measures such
as equity increases of other federal enterprises.525 VEBA received funds in the
amount of 787.5 million DM526 which were spend for the equity increases of
Hibernia (102 million DM), Preussag (87.4 million DM) and Preussenelektra
(209.1 million DM) and for the purchase of Hugo Stinnes AG (191.1 million
DM). The rest was used to cover the costs of the capital increase and to pay
deferred dividends and interest payments. By increasing its participation in
Preussag, VEBA regained the tax privilege that it had lost during the Preussag
partial privatisation.527 Table 4.3 summarises the issue conditions and features
of VEBA.
recommendation of the Bundestag committee for federal property on 1 July 1965 Bun-
destagsdrucksache 04/3707, and for the Bundestag decision on 2 July 1965 Bundestag
Plenarprotokoll 04/196, 2.7.1965.
522 Bundestag Plenarprotokoll 04/178, 7.4.1965, pp. 89658978.
523 Bundestagsdrucksache 04/3616, 19.6.1965.
524 See note about the communication between Burgbacher, Adenauer, Dollinger and
Westrick in Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung online, Federal Cabinet, min-
utes of the 168th meeting on 16 June 1965, agenda item D: Bereitstellung weiterer
VEBA-Aktien für die Privatisierung.
525 Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung online, Federal Cabinet, minutes of the
172. meeting on 14. July 1958, agenda item A: Maßnahmen zur Vermeidung eines
Haushaltsdeﬁzits 1965 und einer Unterdeckung in 1966; also BArch B102/229356, press
announcement, 19.8.1965.
526 Bundestagsdrucksache 05/265, 3.2.1966.
527 Radzio (1979).
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Table 4.3: People's shares privatisation of VEBA 1965
Equity increase Yes, nominal capital increase of 375 million
DM (from 450 to 825 million DM)
Remaining federal share in VEBA 36%
Government revenues from sale of
shares in the nominal value of
153 million DM 312 million DM
Nominal value of public oﬀering 528 million DM (375 million DM new shares
plus 153 million DM old shares)
No. of shares sold to private investors 5,280,000
Issue price 210%
No. of purchasers 2,628,458
No. of applicants 2,945,520
Purchase restricted to Persons with German citizenship or unre-
stricted tax liability in Germany, minimum
age 18 years
Max. eligible income of purchasers No
Subscription limit 5 shares per person
Max. allocation 2 shares per person
Special conditions for VEBA employees Yes, preferential allocation
Staggered allocation Yes, according to taxable income less al-
lowances: 8,000 (singles)/16,000 (couples)
DM; 11,000/22,000 DM; 14,000/28,000 DM
Restriction of voting rights Yes, limited to 1/10,000 of share capital (se-
ries B); exception for the federal government
(series A)
Restriction of proxy voting rights No
Delegation rights Yes, 4 seats in the supervisory board for the
federal government
Lead management Dresdner Bank
Co-leaders Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank, Deutsche
Girozentrale, Deutsche Genossenschaftskasse
Sources: Bundesschatzministerium (1966), pp. 79; Barch B102/49882, Minutes of the
meeting of the parliamentary budget committee on 26 January 1966; Barch B102/49880,
Einzelfragen zur Teilprivatisierung der VEBA.
While the share issue seemed a success story at ﬁrst, disappointment set
in soon afterwards. After the stock market ﬂotation, a strong price decline was
realised. This was not VEBA-speciﬁc but in line with the general stock market
trend. The reasons were restrictive measures of the Bundesbank: On 12 August
1965, the discount rate was raised from 3.5 to 4% and the lending rate from 4.5
to 5%. This was taken as a signal for a restrictive credit policy by investors
and led to signiﬁcant price drops in the stock market. The price of VEBA
shares fell by 10% within one day and continued to sink. In August 1965,
VEBA bought shares in the nominal value of one million DM back but this
did not help much. By 28 December 1965, the price had fallen to 189.5 point
and was now 20.5 points below the issue price of 210. Experts expected that it
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would continue to fall to 170 points. As per agreement, the bank consortium
bought shares back to support the price.528 Of the revenues of 312 million
DM from the sale of government VEBA shares, 70 million DM were spend for
price support measures.529 That way, the federal share increased again to over
40%. Bennigsen-Foerder,530 chief representative of VEBA, criticised that the
issue price had been too low.531 Subsequently, the VEBA privatisation led to a
decreasing public support for privatisation via people's shares and was the last
one of its kind. The stock market eﬀect which had led to the disappointment
was short-lived however. An expert report from Bayerische Hypotheken und
Wechselbank in 1971 found that people's shares and particularly VEBA shares
were performing comparably well.532
A second reason for the negative public perception of the VEBA partial
privatisation besides the price development were problems with the extension
of the management board which the Bundestag committee of federal property
had requested in order to strengthen the role of VEBA. Until the partial pri-
vatisation, VEBA had served as a pure ﬁnancial holding, without interfering
much in the subsidiary companies' business policies. Executive director Alfred
Hartmann understood himself rather as an administrator than a manager. This
independence of the subsidiary companies lead to the expression `tribal princes'
for the three chairmen of the executive boards Hans Werner von Dewall (Hiber-
nia), Heinz Peter Kemper (Stinnes) and Hoﬀmann (Preussenelektra). The fed-
eral government had since 1960 attempted to clarify the relationship between
the companies and strengthen the leadership of VEBA.533 In the run-up of the
partial privatisation, Ludwig Kattenstroth (Ministry of the Treasury) brought
528 BArch B102/49882, Minutes of the 7th Meeting of the Bundestag budget committee on
26.1.1966, Agenda item 3: VEBA-Privatisierung/Kurspﬂege.
529 Bundestagsdrucksache 05/265, 3.2.1966.
530 Rudolf von Bennigsen-Foerder had been working with Secretary of State Hartmann in the
Ministry of Finance and transferred with him to VEBA in 1959. There, he became chief
representative in 1965, member of the management board in 1969 and was chief executive
director from 1971 until his death in 1989. During that time, Bennigsen-Foerder became
an inﬂuential industrial manager. Amongst other things, he was a board member of the
Confederation of German Employers' Associations BDA and of the Federation of German
Industry BDI.
531 BArch B102/49882, Internal Note Höhe des Ausgabekurses der VEBA-Aktien, BM-
Schatz, II1, 18.3.1966.
532 Volksaktien  Der richtige Weg, in Die Börse. Tendenzen, Berichte, Analysen no. 7,
18.2.1971, copy in BArch B126/51418.
533 BArch B102/76404, Internal Note, BMWi, III 3, 21.11.1960.
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the topic up again. He argued that a strong holding management was required
for VEBA's necessary restructuring processes. For this purpose, Kattenstroth
raised the question of entity agreements between VEBA and its subsidiary
companies since VEBA had to be regarded as an entity.534 Such a measure
would have had severe consequences because Hibernia, Preussenelektra and
Hugo Stinnes AG were companies with co-determination based on the Act of
Co-determination in the Iron and Steel Industries, but VEBA itself was not.
This raised concerns among the employees that the status of co-determination
would be lost. Dollinger criticised Kattenstroth's initiative and underlined
that he did not intend to implement entity agreements.535 This argument was
the beginning of a serious conﬂict between Dollinger and his Secretary of State
Kattenstroth. Instead of establishing entity contracts, Dollinger intended to
increase VEBA's control over its subsidiaries by strengthening the manage-
ment forces. He had to come up with a solution because the Bundestag had
requested a restructuring of the company's board as a precondition for privati-
sation with the argument that a coordination of the subsidiaries' investment
policies was necessary.536
Until its partial privatisation, VEBA's management board consisted of
only two members: Alfred Hartmann and Lillliluise Ristow. In a presiding
board meeting on 9 September 1965, it was decided that the board would be
expanded by the three chairmen of the management boards of the subsidiary
companies von Dewall, Kemper and Hoﬀmann, who had to give up their cur-
rent positions for this. A fourth new member was meant to replace Hartmann
as spokesperson.537 The choice of the spokesperson was the reason for the ﬁnal
rift between Kattenstroth and Dollinger. Dollinger's favourite candidate for
the job was Hubertus Rolshoven, chief executive director of the management
534 BArch N1256/99, Kattenstroth to Dollinger, 30.12.1964.
535 BArch N1256/99, Internal note about a meeting with the Preussenelektra's workers'
council on 3.12.1964 (II B/1), 4.12.1964; BArch N1256/99, Internal note about a meeting
with the workers' councils of Hibernia and Stinnes on 16.12.1965 (II B/4), 17.2.1965.
536 Report of Burgbacher as head of the committee for federal property in Bundestagsdruck-
sache 04/3248, 24.3.1965, p. 3; report of Häussler about a meeting of the Bundestag
committee for federal property on 30 June 1965, Bundestagsdrucksache 04/3707, pp.
12.
537 Report on the meeting on 9 September 1965 (Rannow), 10 September 1965.
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board of Saarbergwerke AG.538 Rolshoven, an experienced mining councillor,
had been director of the `consolidation' coal mine in Gelsenkirchen, managing
director of Steinkohlenbergbauverein in Essen and director of Hansa-Bergbau
AG before transferring to Saarbergwerke in 1957. Nevertheless, Kattenstroth,
who was chairman of the VEBA supervisory, board did not believe that Rol-
shoven was powerful enough for the position as VEBA chief. Hence, Kat-
tenstroth and the supervisory board members Fritz Neef (Ministry of Eco-
nomics) and Walter Grund (Ministry of Finance) announced that they would
not vote for Rolshoven at the decisive supervisory board meeting because they
did not believe that he would be able to stand his grounds against von Dewall,
Hoﬀmann and Kemper.539 Kattenstroth did not obey Dollinger's subsequent
instruction to go on leave and remained in his positions until the personnel
decision had been made.540 In the decisive supervisory board meeting on 12 Oc-
tober 1965, Rolshoven was not elected. He remained chief executive director of
Saarbergwerke and became chairman of its supervisory board in 1969. Instead,
von Dewall, Hoﬀmann and Kemper were appointed management board mem-
bers and Kemper succeeded Hartmann as chief executive director.541 Dollinger
repeated his request that Kattenstroth should take leave of absence542 and Kat-
tenstroth refused again.543 Dollinger's last option to remove Kattenstroth from
oﬃce was to assign him to non-active status  a measure which would have re-
quired a cabinet resolution. Instead, Kattenstroth transferred to the Ministry
for Labour and Social Aﬀairs as secretary of state after the federal elections
in September 1965. Due to this transfer, he lost his inﬂuential position for
federal enterprises and privatisation. Kattenstroth's successor as secretary of
state became Rolf Thiessen. Just a year later, Thiessen was replaced by Wol-
fram Langer who had beforehand been secretary of state in the Ministry of
Economics and later became managing director of the federal Depfa bank.
538 BArch N1256/99, Dollinger to Kattenstroth, 17.9.1965.
539 BArch N1256/99, Dollinger to Kattenstroth, 29.9.1965; and Internal note (Kattenstroth),
1.10.1965.
540 BArch N1256/99, Kattenstroth to Dollinger, 15.10.1965, and response Dollinger to Kat-
tenstroth, 15.10.1965.
541 BArch N1256/99, press announcement, undated.
542 BArch N1256/99, Dollinger to Kattenstroth, 15.10.1965.
543 BArch N1256/99, Kattenstroth to Dollinger, 19.10.1965.
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The argument between Kattenstroth and Dollinger led to a public de-
bate about the question of whether ministerial representatives in supervisory
bodies were bound by instruction of their Ministers  a question which had
already been discussed earlier. In general, civil servants were bound to the in-
structions of their supervisors unless the assigned task was a violation against
the law according to the Civil Service Code ( 56 BBG). The stock company
law provided that a member of the supervisory board violated the law if he of
she acted against the detriment of the company ( 295 AktG,  81 GmbHG).
Doubts about the legitimacy had to be addressed according to  56 BBG.544
Hence, the question was whether the case where a civil servant acted against
the law if he or she followed the instructions of a superior against his or her
own conviction about what was beneﬁcial for the company was a case of vi-
olation of law in the sense of  56 BBG. This question was not legally but
politically solved when Kattenstroth transferred to the Ministry for Labour
and Social Aﬀairs. The conﬂict between Dollinger and Kattenstroth added to
the inglorious story of the VEBA partial privatisation. Press comments were
correspondingly negative.545 The SPD found that the privatisation had turned
out as a disaster and was not beneﬁcial for the popularisation of share owner-
ship.546 The election year 1965 was as much a key year as 1957 for the question
of privatisation. The combination of the downturn in the stock market due
to a contractionary monetary policy and the subsequent problematic VEBA
privatisation, a slowdown of the post-war boom and the federal elections led
to the dissolution of the political majority for privatisation.
4.6 Lufthansa Stock Market Launch
The Lufthansa stock market launch in 1966 serves as a counter example to
people's shares. The federal government pragmatically decided that the com-
pany should go public to meet ﬁnancial demands. In July 1965, the general
544 BArch N1256/99, Weisungen an Aufsichtsratsmitglieder, Circular note of the Minister
of Finance, 5.7.1963, Gazette of the Minister of Finance, p. 331.
545 For example Am Beispiel der Veba: Glücklose Eigentumspolitik des Bundes, Stuttgarter
Zeitung, 22.11.1965.
546 Parlamentarisch-Politischer Pressedienst no. 16, p. 120, 18.10.1965.
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meeting decided an equity increase of 400,000 million DM in order to ﬁnance
an investment programme of 200,000 million DM and to list the company at
the stock exchange. The intention was that as much as possible should be
ﬁnanced by private investors. Subsequently, the company went public in April
1966. Although Lufthansa AG had never been paying dividends until then,
private investors subscribed for shares in the nominal value of 461.1 million
DM, including subscription rights. This was much more than in previous of-
ferings and more than the government had expected. It is possible that part
of this was a side eﬀect of the popularisation of people's shares, although these
addressed a diﬀerent social and ﬁnancial group of shareholders. The federal
government decided to keep a qualiﬁed majority of 75% of the shares in order
to maintain inﬂuence and to avoid that foreigners could purchase controlling
blocks of shares. Aside from subscription rights for existing private investors,
no private subscriber received more than two shares with a nominal value of
1,000 DM each.
The banking consortium of the Lufthansa stock market launch was com-
posed of the big German banks: Deutsche Bank was consortium manager
and placed 19% of the shares. Dresdner Bank also placed 19% of the shares,
Commerzbank 12%, Bayerische Hypotheken-Wechsel-Bank 9% and a group 19
smaller banks 41%, with a share of under 5% each.547 In contrast to people's
shares, the Lufthansa privatisation was not directed at small investors and not
part of a programme to promote share ownership. Moreover, equity demands
of the growing company were clearly paramount. In order to limit the inﬂuence
of private shareholders, the federal government decided to switch from issuing
voting shares to non-voting preferential shares in 1969.548
4.7 Epilogue & Evaluation
The federal elections in September 1965 conﬁrmed the government coalition
of CDU/CSU and FDP. The CDU/CSU had won votes and Erhard remained
federal chancellor. Der Spiegel commented that the Federal Republic has
547 See Bozdag-Yaksan (2008), pp. 121129.
548 See p. 215.
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elected the symbol of its wealth in a situation of total satisfaction.549 But
the coalition did not last long: Due to inter-governmental conﬂicts, the FDP
ministers stepped back on 28 October 1966 and the government coalition was
dissolved only about a year after the elections. It was succeeded by a grand
coalition of CDU/CSU and SPD until the federal elections in 1969. Neither of
the government coalitions pursued further privatisations.
Evidently, the CDU had become much more hesitant about privatisa-
tion after the problematic VEBA privatisation. The decline of the popularity
of people's shares probably led to fears to lose voters. But also, the gov-
ernment was facing other economic problems in the mid-1960s which seemed
more urgent: the post-war growth had declined and the federal budget became
negative for the ﬁrst time ever.
Werner Dollinger (CSU) remained Minister of the Treasury until the
dissolution of the coalition and was succeeded by the previous Minister of
Economics Kurt Schmücker (CDU). In December 1965, Dollinger announced
that there were currently no further privatisation plans because the VEBA pri-
vatisation had not been `digested' yet. However, Dollinger regarded a future
privatisation of VIAG and and other federally owned companies as inevitable
because of their immense capital needs. Future privatisations would not imple-
ment social elements because these were not aﬀordable. While no immediate
privatisations were planned, Dollinger indirectly announced that the federal
government would probably not participate in a capital increase of Volkswa-
genwerk and thereby reduce its share of 20% in the company.550
One of the last acts of the conservative-liberal government before its
dissolution was the implementation of the long overdue joint stock law reform
in 1965. The minimal nominal value of shares was lowered from 100 DM
to 50 DM in an attempt to attract more low-income households. The once
intended restriction of proxy voting rights was not part of the reform. The
initial government draft had intended a minimal nominal value of 100 DM,
549 Die Bundesrepublik im Zustand totaler Zufriedenheit hat sich für das Symbol ihres
Wohlstandes entschieden. in: Einer allein, Der Spiegel no. 39, 22.9.1965, p. 2123.
550 BArch N1256/99, Vorläuﬁg keine Privatisierungspläne - Dollinger gegen den Plan einer
Energie-Verwaltungs AG, VWD Montan no. 291, 14.12.1965.
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lowering it to 50 DM might have been a concession to the CDU left wing.551
It has been argued that the privatisation attempts of the Adenauer gov-
ernment remained unsuccessful. If this is measured purely by the extent of a
transfer of public enterprises to private ownership, it is indeed true that privati-
sation remained fairly limited. In total, shares of a nominal value of almost one
billion DM had been distributed and had led to a transaction volume of over
2 billion DM. A full withdrawal from public ownership in the industrial sector
had not been intended yet. Rather, after initial enthusiasm had diminished,
the government started to feel a responsibility to protect small shareholders
from unexpected losses, to exercise a monitoring role in partially privatised
companies and to maintain an inﬂuence in the energy market which was no
further deﬁned.
The questions remains whether the government was successful in promot-
ing share-ownership. Previous research has negated this.552 Only few data are
available about the change of ownership structures caused by people's shares
privatisations. According to information from the Ministry of the Treasury, the
total number of German shareholders was 500,000 before the Preussag partial
privatisation and over 2 million after the share issues of Preussag and VW.
Preussag shares were purchased by more than 200,000 investors, VW shares
by 1.5 million investors. After the stock market ﬂotation on 9 August 1965,
VEBA became the world's second largest public company553 with 2.6 million
shareholders after AT&T Corporation (American Telephone & Telegraph Com-
pany) with 2.674 million shareholders, which means that approximately 3.5%
of the population bought VEBA shares. In total, 9.6 million people's shares
were sold to to 4.3 million shareholders, so the total number of shareholders
increased more than ﬁvefold.554
Another question is who purchased the shares. Table 4.4 compares the
structure of applicants for people's shares in the cases of Preussag, VW and
VEBA.
551 Bundestagsdrucksache 04/3269, p. 4.
552 See for example Abelshauser (1983), p. 54.
553 As argued on p. 1, according to common notion, the term public company relates to
companies listed at the stock exchange and should not be confused with public (state-
owned) enterprises.
554 Bundesschatzministerium (1966), p. 9.
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Table 4.4: People's share privatisations 19591965
Preussag VW VEBA
Capital increase (million DM) 120 - 375
Nominal value of public oﬀering (million DM) 81.5 360 525
No. of Shares 815,000 3,600,000 5,250,000
No. of Purchasers 216,119 1,547,000 2,628,458
Average portfolio 4 2 2
No. of Applicants 216,119a 1,484,019b 2,945,520c
- Workforce 2,384 n.a. n.a.
(- in%) (1.10) n.a. n.a.
- Workersd 11,025 110,984 300,661
(- in%) (5.10) (7.50) (10.20)
- Employeese 62,844 449,825 894,695
(- in%) (29.08) (30.30) (30.40)
- Civil Servants 17,752 106,949 210,433
(- in%) (8.21) (7.20) (7.10)
- Self-employed merchants and tradesmenf 16,397 82,368 124,520
(- in%) (7.59) (5.60) (4.20)
- Self-employed farmers and foresters 16,356 26,039
(- in%) (1.10) (0.90)
- Freelancers 27,274 27,495 38,109
(- in%) (12.62) (1.80) (1.30)
- Pensioners 22,139 211,947 389,836
(- in%) (10.24) (14.30) (13.20)
- Students and Apprentices 127,156 192,286
(- in%) (8.60) (6.20)
- Housewivesg 56,304 350,939 768,671
(- in%) (26.05) (23.50) (26.50)
Source: For Volkswagenwerk and VEBA: Bundesschatzministerium (1966), p. 8;
for Preussag: Bundesministerium für wirtschaftlichen Besitz des Bundes (1960), p. 3.
a including Preussag workforce
b excluding Volkswagenwerk workforce
c excluding VEBA workforce
d Arbeiter, comparable to blue-collar workers
e Angestellte, comparable to white-collar workers
f Preussag: Self-employed persons
g Preussag: Women
While the Preussag share issue was comparably small, the Volkswagen-
werk and VEBA share issue reached over 1.5 million shareholders. Main group
of buyers were employees. These represent mainly medium income groups, with
an average income above workers. Not all of the subscribers might have been
allocated shares due to the income restriction, so the distribution of subscribers
does not necessarily equal the distribution of purchasers. The share of self-
employed persons and freelancers was relatively low in all cases. Surprisingly
high is the number of subscribers from the groups pensioners and housewives.
This might have had to do with the fact that individuals from these groups
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potentially bought shares on behalf of others. The ﬁgures indicate that there
was an increase of shareholdings in the lower income classes, but mainly among
the higher income subgroups within the group of eligible incomes.
The third question is how the structure of shareholders changed over
time and whether shares moved towards higher income groups. According
to information from the Ministry of Economics, in May 1962, 77.4% of the
initial buyers of Volkswagenwerk shares were still holding their shares.555The
Ministry of Finance estimated in October 1970 that roughly 38% of Preussag
shares, 35% of VW shares and 42% of VEBA shares were still held by the
initial buyers.556
Two Allensbach surveys from 1961 and 1962 comprise detailed informa-
tion about general shareholder structures in 1953 and 1961 and the shareholder
structure of VW in 1962. This allows us to compare the structure of VW share-
holders to shareholders in general. Also, we can compare the structure of VW
shareholders to the composition of subscribers for shares and identify possible
shifts in the short timespan between the share issue and the survey. Table 4.5
summarises the results for general share-ownership in 1953 and 1961, Table
4.6 contains the results for VW in 1962.
555 BArch B102/49880, TN/BMWi no. 4191, 28.5.1962, p. 3.
556 BArch B126/51418, Internal Note, Ministry of Finance, VIIIB1, 13.10.1970.
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Table 4.5: Share ownership in West Germany 1953 and 1961
Proportion of Composition of Proportion
of group
share owners (in %) share owners (in %) in
population
(in %)
1953 1961 1953 1961 1961
Adult Population
all 2 7
men 3 9 58 58 46
women 2 5 42 42 54
100 100 100
Age Group
1829 Years 1 6 9 24 21
3044 Years 2 8 24 30 29
4559 Years 3 7 38 25 16
60 Years and older 4 7 29 21 34
100 100 100
Education Level
Volksschule 1 4 32 47 81
Mittlere Reife 5 17 38 36 14
Abitur 12 21 30 17 5
100 100 100
Profession
Workers 1 3 11 24 49
Landarbeiter x (2) 1 1 2
Farmers 3 4 13 5 9
Employees 3 11 28 33 20
Civil Servants 2 11 5 11 7
Freelancers 8 6 3
Self-employed
(incl. Freelancers
unless disclosed
separately)
7 14 34 20 10
100 100 100
Net Income of
Main Earner
below 250 DM n.a. 3 n.a. 4 8
250399 DM n.a. 3 n.a. 6 17
400499 DM n.a. 4 n.a. 15 25
500599 DM n.a. 7 n.a. 21 22
600799 DM n.a. 10 n.a. 24 16
800 DM and more n.a. 17 n.a. 30 12
100 100
Source: Wer besitzt Aktien?, Pressedienst Institut Allensbach, November 1961.
Representative survey based on approximately 2,000 interviews. Values in brackets:
under 100 interviewed persons.Printed with kind permission of the Institut für
Demoskopie Allensbach, own translation.
In 1961, 7% of German population from the age of 18 years possessed
shares, more than twice as much as in 1960. This is only slightly higher
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than the 6% who owned shares in VW in 1962, which indicates that the VW
share issue might have driven the increase in total share-ownership. Since
1953, the number of shareholders had more than tripled: In 1953, only 2%
of the population were share-owners. Share-ownership increased particularly
strong from one to 6% in the lower age class from 18 to 29 years. Whereas
in 1953, only 10% of shareholders were under 30, it was about 25% in 1962.
Workers participated only little in the increase in shareholders: 1% of all
workers held shares in 1953 and 3% in 1961, compared to 11% of employees
and civil servants. Every forth shareholder was a worker, although workers
accounted for about half of the population. One third of all shareholders were
employees which makes this the largest shareholder group. Share ownership
increased with the education level: Share ownership among the population who
had completed primary school had increased from 1% in 1953 to 4% in 1961.
In the group of those who had completed Mittlere Reife (secondary school), it
had increased from 5 to 17%, and among those who had graduated from high
school from 12 to 21%.
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Table 4.6: Share ownership in VW 1962
Proportion
of VW share
owners
Composition
of share
owners
Proportion
of group in
population
in % in % in %
Adult Population
all 6 100 100
men 6 49 46
women 5 51 54
100 100
Age Groups
1629 Years 5 22 28
3044 Years 7 31 24
4559 Years 5 25 28
60 Years and older 7 22 20
100 100
Profession
Farmer 5 8 11
Landarbeiter 5 3 3
Workers 4 30 48
Employees 8 28 19
Civil Servants 8 9 6
Self-employed traders 9 15 11
Freelancers 19 7 2
100 100
Net Income of Main Earner
below 400 DM 4 16 24
400500 DM 4 28 38
600799 DM 6 22 23
800999 DM 11 17 9
10001249 DM (14) 10 4
1250 DM and more (15) 7 2
100 100
Region
North 5 20 20
(Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, Bre-
men, Lower Saxony)
North Rhine-Westphalia 8 38 28
Rhine-Main/South West 5 24 31
(Hessen, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saar-
land, Baden-Württemberg)
Bavaria 5 15 17
West-Berlin 3 3 4
100 100
Place of Residence
Village (less than 2,000 inhabitants) 5 21 23
Small town (2,00019,999 Inhabitants) 5 24 28
Large towns (20,000100,000 inhabi-
tants)
8 21 16
Cities (100,000 inhabitants and more) 6 34 33
100 100
Source: In welchen Händen beﬁnden sich die VW Aktien?, Pressedienst Institut
Allensbach, October 1962. Representative survey based on approximately 2,000
interviews. Values in brackets: under 100 interviewed persons. Printed with kind
permission of the Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, own translation.
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The survey which was conducted two years after the VW partial privati-
sation reveals that 6% of the population from the age of 16 years possessed
VW shares; 1% of these had bought the shares on behalf of another family
member or person, potentially to circumvent the allocation restriction. 70% of
the shareholders were workers, employees or civil servants, and 83% of share-
holders had a monthly net income of 999 DM or less. Among those with a
monthly income of 1000 DM or more, approximately 15% were holding VW
shares. These ﬁndings indicate a migration of shares from low- and medium- to
higher-income classes who were not eligible to purchase shares in the original
share issue. The geographic distribution shows that the groups of the popula-
tion living in rural areas, small towns, medium towns and large cities purchased
shares approximately according to their share in the entire population, with a
small tendency towards medium towns, where 8% of the population possessed
shares, compared to 5 to 6% in all other groups. This ﬁnding might be driving
the eﬀect that the densely populated North Rhine-Westphalia had the high-
est share of shareholders with 8% of the population, compared to 3% in West
Berlin and 5% elsewhere.
Table 4.7: Income distribution among shareholders 1961/1962
Net income/month Proportion of income group among
(main earner of household) all shareholders (1961) VW sharesholders (1962)
in DM in % in %
below 400 10 16
400599 36 28
600799 24 22
800 and more 30 34
all 100 100
Sources: Pressedienst Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach: Wer besitzt Aktien?,
November 1961, p. 5; In welchen Händen beﬁnden sich die VW Aktien?,
October 1962.
Table 4.7 compares the structure of Volkswagenwerk shareholders to the
general structure of shareholders. There is a higher representation of the lowest
income group among the Volkswagenwerk shareholders, but also of the high-
est income group. Again, this is a clear indication that the Volkswagenwerk
share issue initially reached new groups of share owners, but that shares were
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sold towards upper income classes, which led to an upward shift of the initial
distribution. However, the government had intended from the start to create
shares which would be fully tradeable, instead of cementing an initial alloca-
tion by imposing strict regulations about the transferability of shares. That
was the reason why the government had decided against registered shares or
other restrictive share characteristics. In that sense, the result of the people's
share issue can be regarded as successful: The government had created a new
investment opportunity which was attractive enough to be traded. Also, the
government had initially managed to achieve a dispersed ownership distribu-
tion. However, the portfolio sizes of lower income groups were comparably
small, so that there was hardly a signiﬁcant wealth eﬀect of people's shares.
In 1960, prior to the the VW share issue, the Allensbach Institut con-
ducted a large survey about share ownership and the German attitude towards
money and savings. The results are presented in Table 4.8.
Table 4.8: Share of population with security papers 1960
Proportion of adult population (in %) who possesses
shares/ obligations neither nor
investment certiﬁcates
All households 3 2 96
Profession 1 1 98
Workers, employed craftsmen (6) (6) 90
Civil servants, executive staﬀ 4 1 95
Self-employed persons, freelancers 4 5 93
Farmers, forest managers x x 100
Net income of main earner
less than 300 DM 1 x 99
300399 DM 1 1 98
400499 DM 2 x 98
500599 DM 2 1 98
600799 DM 5 3 92
800999 DM (2) (2) (96)
1,000 DM and more (17) (11) (81)
Source: Umgang mit Geld. Ergebnisse einer Repräsentativ-Erhebung in den Privat-
haushalten der Bundesrepublik, 1960, Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, pp. 6370.
Printed with kind permission of the Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, own translation.
The popularity of saving through investment in securities was relatively
low. Only 3% of all households possessed investment certiﬁcates and/or shares
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(including Preussag shares), 2% of all households possessed bonds, 96% did not
possess either or. 6% of the households indicated that they had at least once
acquired or sold security papers in the past, and only 4% of the households
currently held security papers. Security papers were more popular among
higher income classes: While only 1% of workers and employed craftsmen
held shares and/or certiﬁcates and the same percentage held bonds, 6% of
senior executives and civil servants held shares and/or certiﬁcates and the
same percentage held bonds. The likelihood to hold securities increased with
the income: Of households where the main wage earner had a net income of
up to 399 DM per month, only 1% held shares and/or certiﬁcates, between
400 and 1000 DM that ﬁgure increased to two to 5%, and for incomes of 1,000
DM or more it was 17%. Of the households which possessed shares and/or
certiﬁcates, only 26% were workers and employed craftsmen (who accounted
for 48% of the population) 30% were employees (who accounted for 16% of the
population) and 11% were senior executives and civil servants (who accounted
for 5% of the population). Of the share- and/or certiﬁcate-holders, one third
had a monthly net income of 1,000 DM or more although this group accounted
for only 5% of the total population. The second largest group, 22%, had an
income between 600 DM and 699 DM (this group accounted for 10% of the
population), and only 4% had a net income of under 300 DM (this group
accounted for 18% of the population).
As one of the reasons for the low degree of share ownership, the study
identiﬁed insecurity and a lack of knowledge about shares. Half of all heads
of households agreed with the statement that shares were a good investment
opportunity but required some knowledge in order to avoid risks. Only 13%
agreed with the statement that shares were a good investment opportunity
because they provided ownership titles in solid enterprises and were unlikely to
lose value quickly. To the question of what they would do with a lottery win of
10,000 DM, only 4% of the heads of household and 2% of housewives responded
that they would invest in people's shares, other shares, investment certiﬁcates
or bonds. By far the most attractive option with approval rates of above one
quarter was to deposit the money in a savings account. Also popular was the
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purchase of property, house building and home loan and savings contracts. But
the study also found an increasing interest in equity markets. The popularity
of savings accounts was strongest in lower income households. More than a
quarter of all heads of households and 10% of housewives indicated that they
felt informed about stock price developments, but only few had recently spoken
about people's shares.
Based on these results, the study found it not surprising that mainly
those households were interested in purchasing people's shares which already
were shareholders: Of all households, 4% declared that they want to purchase
people's shares, 18% were interested and were either considering to buy peo-
ple's shares or were not allowed to buy them because their income was too
high. Approx. 50% did not want to purchase people's shares and 27% had
never heard of people's shares. This looks slightly diﬀerent for existing share-
holders: One third of the households which possessed shares or certiﬁcates
wanted to buy people's shares, one ﬁfth maybe wanted to buy or were not al-
lowed. 41% were not interested and only 7% had never heard about them. The
study concludes that there were three strategies which would be able to raise
an interest in people's shares: establishing smaller nominal values, minimising
price risks by mixing security papers such as investment funds did, and better
connecting shares with the idea of savings.557
By August 1964, ownership in security papers had increased to 10% of the
population. Ownership in shares and investment certiﬁcates increased over-
proportionally within the category of securities in the 1960s: In March 1967,
11% of all households possessed shares or investment certiﬁcates, while 6%
possessed obligations. This is likely to be an eﬀect of people's shares.558 Share
ownership stagnated and even decreased slightly in the 1970s: Between 1975
and 1980, the percentage of households holding shares decreased from 8% to
7%, and the percentage of households owning investment certiﬁcates remained
at 3%. In 1980, share ownership was still strongly dependent on the profession
and hence the income and education level: While only 2% of unskilled workers
557 Umgang mit Geld. Ergebnisse einer Repräsentativ-Erhebung in den Privathaushalten
der Bundesrepublik, 1960, Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, pp. 6370. The study
has been kindly provided to me by the Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach.
558 Noelle and Neumann (1967), p. 273.
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held shares, approximately 15% of managerial employees, public servants and
self-employed professionals were share owners.559
Besides ownership, another issue is the question of control over compa-
nies. The shareholders of a joint stock company express their interests at the
general meeting and can in the German system be proxied by banks. Due to
the exertion of proxy voting rights on behalf of their customers, banks tend
to have a signiﬁcant say in the general meetings. Since the government ab-
stained from restricting proxy voting rights except for the case of VW, it can
be assumed that banks potentially beneﬁted from privatisation. In particular
the big-three banks Deutsche Bank, Dredner Bank and Commerzbank secured
large parts of the proxy voting rights by placing large share volumes as con-
sortium leaders.
Proxy voting was sharply criticised by Franz Ove, deputy of the CDU
youth organisation Junge Union in Hamburg. Deutsche Bank attested him
egotism, joy in clubby cultures and addiction to publicity.560 Ove addressed
the tendency of large banks to use proxy voting rights to bring their own
representatives into the supervisory boards. He suggested that supervisory
boards should be elected with proportional representation, or that minorities
of at least 25% should be guaranteed a seat on the supervisory board. A
government representative held against this that it has never been proven that
banks use proxy voting rights to the detriment of the shareholders561 Proxy
voting was again discussed in a meeting of the Bundestag subcommittee for
federal property in February 1966.562
However, control was not handed over to banks. To the contrary, in
the cases of VW and VEBA, the federal government and Lower Saxony had
been excluded from restrictions of voting rights in order to secure a public
inﬂuence. Yet, in the case of VEBA, this was costly for the government as
it renounced higher dividend payments.Yet, the public perception prevailed
that federal and bank representatives often made common course. In 1968 for
559 Noelle-Neumann (1981), p. 338339.
560 Geltungsbedürfnis, Freude an der `Vereinsmeierei' und Sucht nach Publicity, DBA
V01/00A17, Note Tagung der Jungen Union am 3./4. September 1960 in Reinbek
561 ibid.
562 BArch B126/51418, Dollinger to Chairman of the Bundestag committee for federal prop-
erty, 6.4.1966.
Chapter 4. People's Shares Privatisations 203
example, Minister of the Treasury Kurt Schmücker received negative publicity
when he achieved that his CDU colleague MP and former Federal Minister
for Labour and Social Aﬀairs Theodor Blank was send as a delegate to the
VEBA supervisory board as a ﬁfth federal delegate besides the four oﬃcial ones
to replace the deceased former Secretary of State Alfred Hartmann. Private
investors had strongly protested against this choice, but Blank was elected at
the general meeting by Breme (Ministry of the Treasury) and bank delegates,
who represented approximately 45% of all votes through proxy voting. The
election was supported by chairman of the supervisory board Hans Birnbaum
who had in the meantime transferred to the management board of Salzgitter
AG.563
Nevertheless, the federal government was not satisﬁed with the federal
representation in supervisory boards and resulting lack of inﬂuence. In March
1965, Federal Chancellor Ludwig Erhard (CDU) requested an examination of
the position of representatives in the supervisory bodies of state shareholdings
at a cabinet meeting and demanded that all delegates should make sure that
the companies take federal interests into consideration.564 Minister of the Trea-
sury Dollinger (CSU) highlighted the importance of a strict selection process
for representatives and speciﬁc instructions.565 Partially, the perceived weak
position of the federal state might have had to do with a lack of cooperation
and coordination between the ministerial representatives in supervisory bodies
which had earlier been addressed in the Ministry of Economics.566
A comprehensive reorganisation of public enterprises and participations
had not taken place until 1966 but a number of ideas had been discussed. In
the post-war years already, Brekenfeld, chief executive director of Preussag,
had suggested to regroup public enterprises according to the sectors coal, steel
and electricity, nitrogen, non-ferrous metals and oil, where Preussag should
take over the latter three sectors.567 The Ministry of the Treasury discussed
563 See for example Blank macht krank, Der Spiegel 19/1968, 6.5.1968; Volksaktionäre
mucken auf, Die Zeit, 19.4.1968.
564 156. cabinet Meeting, 9.3.1965.
565 BArch B102/76404, Dollinger to Chief of the Oﬃce of the Federal Chancellor, 8.3.1966.
566 BArch B102/76404, BMWi, III3, Henneberg to Langer Aufsichtsräte der bundeseigenen
Gesellschaften, 9.12.1963.
567 Laufer and Stier (2005), pp. 417418.
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a possible reorganisation of enterprises in 1960 under Hans Lenz (FDP). Sug-
gestions included a closer cooperation between Preussenelektra and Hibernia
as well as between Saarbergwerke, Preussenelektra and Bayernwerke. Another
idea was that Preussenelektra could take over Braunschweigische Kohlenberg-
werke (short: BKB) and VIAG could transfer its BKB shares to Preussenelek-
tra in exchange for a participation. Also, a merger of Hugo Stinnes AG with
Hibernia or Saarbergwerke was considered.568 In 1964, Federal Chancellor
Ludwig Erhard (CDU) suggested a merger of shareholdings in the energy sec-
tor to Dollinger,569 but Dollinger rejected this.570 Instead, he favoured an
increased cooperation of shareholdings, organised by the federal government.
This marked the beginning of a discussion about a cooperation between public
enterprises which was preceding developments in the 1970s.571
While the federal shares in Preussag, VW and VEBA were considerably
reduced until 1966, neither a systematic privatisation strategy nor a systematic
conception of public ownership had been developed by then. The partial pri-
vatisations had not resolved the general lack of direction. Three factors turned
out to have an inﬂuence on privatisation choices: the expected development
of shares after a privatisation, expected resistance from veto players such as
the states, and ﬁnancial needs of companies. An exception was Volkswagen-
werk, where the initial primary concern was to solve the ownership conﬂict
with Lower Saxony. The idea to popularise shares was based on one crucial
element: people's shares had to be successful. Disappointment of purchasers
could lead to a lack of public approval and hinder future privatisations. Hence,
only proﬁtable companies with small market risks were considered eligible for
privatisation because only these would oﬀer secure investment opportunities.
It was considered irresponsible to transfer shares of companies in distress to
small private investors. Exemplary for this position is a published interview
with Dollinger, Federal Minister of the Treasury between 1962 and 1968.572
A consolidation of public enterprises was thus considered a precondition for
568 BArch B102/76404, BMWi, Henneberg to Westrick, III3, 10.4.1962.
569 BArch N1256/96, Erhard to Dollinger, 1964.
570 BArch N1256/99, Vorläuﬁg keine Privatisierungspläne  Dollinger gegen den Plan einer
Energie-Verwaltungs AG, VWD Montan no. 291, 14.12.1965.
571Documentation in BArch B126/34721.
572Mahnke (1983).
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privatisation. Financial needs accounted as a second argument for the choice
of speciﬁc companies for privatisation. In the 1950s and 1960, most public
enterprises were in a process of restructuring and reconstruction. Despite the
high level of internal ﬁnancing, necessary investments had in many cases been
delayed. Often holding companies were not able to ﬁnance their subsidiaries'
needs. In this situation, it seemed like an obvious solution to tap the capi-
tal markets and mobilise additional assets of ordinary people in the form of
people's shares. This led to an ambivalent situation. The popularisation of
shares required that public enterprises had to be consolidated prior to privati-
sation. However, consolidation cost money which the federal government was
reluctant to spend. However, the ﬁnancial argument turned out to be more
relevant. The partial privatisations of Preussag and VEBA were primarily
connected with the need for capital of the expanding, under-ﬁnanced enter-
prises. At the same time, it can not be argued that the companies were mature
enough for privatisation since both Preussag and Hibernia were in the middle
of a diversiﬁcation process away from their traditional focus on coal mining.573
A complementary policy of public ownership had never been introduced.
Hence, the government's own role in partially privatised companies was not
entirely clear. The balancing of power and interests between public and private
shareholders had not systematically been thought through. The same was the
case for the question of how the state should secure its impact in companies
in private law form, particularly in partially privatised ones, and whether and
how small investors should be protected and represented. The lack of a clear
conception for public ownership left the door wide open for an increase of
public entrepreneurship in the 1970s. During that decade, public enterprises
were increasingly used for structural policy and extended due to diversiﬁcation
and acquisition strategies.
573 Laufer and Stier (2005), p. 450.
Chapter 5
Stagnation 19661982
Between the dissolution of the conservative-liberal government in 1966 and the
next federal elections in 1969, a grand coalition of CDU, CSU and SPD formed
the government. The CDU/CSU nominated Kurt Georg Kiesinger as Federal
Chancellor candidate. In 1966, the SPD entered the federal government for the
ﬁrst time. After the federal elections in 1969, the grand coalition was replaced
by a social-liberal government under Federal Chancellor Willy Brandt (SPD),
although the CDU remained the strongest political party. The Ministry of
the Treasury was abolished and its tasks were shifted back to the Federal
Ministry of Finance. The period between 1966 and 1982 can be described as
a period of stagnation and attempts to consolidate federal enterprises. In the
mid-1960s, the economic post-war boom slowed down. Political and public
support for privatisation decreased signiﬁcantly, although privatisation was
never oﬃcially abolished. Globalisation, market crisis and structural problems
aﬀected federal companies intensely in the 1970s. During those years, a focus
was on the consolidation of unproﬁtable public enterprises, and their utilisation
for structural, regional and sectoral stabilisation policy.
On the administrative side, a change of generation had started to take
place during the 1960s. Ludger Westrick had transferred with Ludwig Erhard
(CDU) to the Oﬃce of the Federal Chancellor as secretary of state in 1963,
had become Federal Minister for Special Aﬀairs  a position which had been
created for him  in 1964 and retired in 1966. Birnbaum had transferred from
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the Ministry of the Treasury to the federal Salzgitter AG in 1961, Ludwig
Kattenstroth had transferred to the Ministry for Labour and Social Aﬀairs in
1966 and retired in 1969, the lower ministerial oﬃcials Henneberg and Fenge
did not play a role anymore and probably retired in the mid-1960s. Their
successors in the administration for federal participations were Ulrich Engel-
mann, Ulf Lantzke, Werner Lamby, Ernst Pieper (SPD) and Fritz Knauss. In
the Ministry of Economics, Ulrich Engelmann became head of subdivision IIIC
(iron and steel, federal industrial property) in 1967. Engelmann had started
as personnel advisor of Minister of Economics Schmücker (CDU) in 1963. En-
gelmann became head of division IV in 1973 and succeeded Lantzke as head
of division III (energy) in 1974. The energy pope of the federal government,
as the newspaper Die Zeit labelled him later, became lobbyist for RWE in
1991.574 Ulf Lantzke succeeded Woratz as head of division III (energy) and
Engelmann's superior in 1968. Before that, he was head of subdivision IIIA
(mining). Lantzke later made an international career: In May 1974, he be-
came advisor for energy policy for the general secretary of the OECD and ﬁrst
executive director of the newly established International Energy Agency of the
OECD from 1975 to 1984.575 Werner Lamby had started his career as a civil
servant in the Oﬃce of the Federal Chancellor in 1952. Between 1960 and
1966, he worked as a specialist for development in the Ministry of Economics
and later in the Ministry of Economic Cooperation, from 1966 to 1967 he was
president of the UN World Food Programme. In 1968, he transferred to the
Ministry of the Treasury as head of division I (industrial property), in 1969 to
the Ministry of Finance as head of division VIII (industrial property). In 1973,
he became managing director of VIAG.576 Ernst Pieper (SPD), an economist,
had been working for Klöckner-Werke before transferring to civil service. From
1964 to 1974 he worked in the Ministry of Economics under Engelmann and
became a consultant for federal industrial property in 1968. In March 1974,
he became head of division VIII (industrial property) in the Ministry of Fi-
nance as successor of Lamby, who had just become managing director of VIAG.
574 Bonner Kulisse, Die Zeit, 15.2.1991.
575 Lantzke, Ulf in Munzinger Online/Personen  Internationales Biographisches Archiv.
576 Biographical notes in Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung online.
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Pieper returned back to the industry and succeeded Birnbaum as managing
director of the federal Salzgitter AG in 1974, he remained in that position un-
til 1994.577 Pieper and Lamby were supported by Fritz Knauss. Knauss had
started his career in the Federal Oﬃce for Trade and Industry (Bundesamt für
gewerbliche Wirtschaft) and the Ministry of Economics. In 1964, he became
advisor for industrial participations in subdivision IB1 in the Ministry of the
Treasury under Dollinger and transferred with Lamby to subdivision VIIIA2 in
the Ministry of Finance in 1969. He is also author of a number of publications
about the federal industrial enterprises. Lamby and Knauss became advocates
of the federal holding idea around 1970.
5.1 Grand Coalition: From Privatisation to
Consolidation
In the ﬁrst grand coalition under Federal Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger
(CDU), Werner Dollinger (CSU) became Minister of Posts and Telecommu-
nications, while Kurt Schmücker (CDU) succeeded him as Minister of the
Treasury. Karl Schiller (SPD) became Minister of Economics, and Franz-Josef
Strauß (CSU) Minister of Finance. Wolfram Langer transferred with Kurt
Schmücker (CDU) from the Ministry of Economics to the Ministry of the
Treasury as secretary of state. Privatisation as a political goal was not abol-
ished during these years but it was subordinated to more important political
matters. After the experiences with VEBA and in light of a slowdown of eco-
nomic growth, the CDU/CSU was probably not interested in risking a similar
scenario and went for a consensus-oriented low-risk economic policy without
further privatisation attempts instead. This ﬁnding is consistent with the em-
pirical observation that privatisation tends to be more likely when the overall
economic situation is good. Practically, it would probably not have been possi-
ble to implement privatisation due to likely resistance from the SPD. Between
1966 and 1969, several attempts were made to reorganise the industrial share-
holdings and to develop a more systematic privatisation approach. However,
577 Hlawatschek (2001).
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most ideas remained far from being implemented. Some concepts were later
taken over by the social-liberal coalition.
A few months after taking oﬃce, Schmücker published an article about
the diﬃculties of privatisation in the current economic situation, and advocated
a shift from privatisation to consolidation and reorganisation.578 The main
issues in these years were a restructuring of the loss-making Salzgitter AG and
Saarbergwerke and a consolidation of the Ruhr coal mines. Since none of the
federal enterprises was considered to be ready for privatisation yet, the focus
was on creating the necessary conditions.
Unlike the CDU Ministers of the Treasury Herrmann Lindrath, Hans
Wilhelmi and Werner Dollinger, Schmücker had not been in the line of sig-
natories of the ﬁrst Volkswagenwerk bill and can be regarded as more open
towards continuous state interventions based on Christian democratic ideals.
At the CDUWirtschaftstag (business forum) in 1965, the annual meeting of the
Economic Board (Wirtschaftsrat) of the CDU, he rejected the frequently en-
countered opinion that economic policy was a necessary but annoying evil.579
A diﬀusion of ownership through people's shares was possible if all people are
handling ownership in a responsible way.580
Lamby (Ministry of the Treasury) took the idea of investment funds
up again and suggested it to Schmücker and Langer. The basic idea was to
transfer shares of federal enterprises which were ready to be partially privatised
into an investment fund and to sell shares in this fund to private investors.
The fund should use the revenues from selling shares to buy further shares of
federal enterprises. Lamby suggested starting with VEBA and VIAG. Both
companies needed capital increases within the following years. In light of the
current federal budget situation, it was diﬃcult for the federal government
to ﬁnance these, so that alternative measures had to be found. Yet, Lamby
admitted the persisting legal problem: the Investment Company Act provided
that no investment fund was allowed to own a share volume in a company
578Kurt Schmücker: Die Grenzen der Privatisierung, in: Rheinischer Merkur, 9.6.1967,
copy in BArch B126/51418.
579 ein zwar notwendiges aber dennoch ärgerliches Übel.
580 wenn alle (...) vernünftig mit dem Eigentum umgehen. BArch N1256/83, Schmücker:
Die Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftspolitik der CDU/CSU, Speech at the CDU Business
Forum, 8.7.1965.
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which exceeded 5% of its own share value. This limit would be exceeded in the
envisaged conception, either the law would have to be changed, or a special
law for federal investment funds would have to be created.581 Just half a year
later, Lamby came to the conclusion that the establishment of an investment
fund was not a feasible solution due to practical and legal diﬃculties.582
In Spring 1968, the Ministry of the Treasury oﬃcially announced a pri-
vatisation of VIAG in the Bundestag for the time when the company was
consolidated and hence the necessary preconditions were achieved.583 In Jan-
uary 1969 however, Lamby proposed to not initiate a partial privatisation of
VIAG in the current legislative period because there was not enough time left
and the transaction might be mistakenly perceived as an election gift. Instead,
he suggested announcing a binding date for a privatisation after the elections
in autumn 1969 as part of the electoral campaign.584 In May 1969, Norbert
Blüm (CDU), a representative of the CDU employees' faction, declared that
the time of people's shares was over.585
Meanwhile, three other initiatives remained without success between
1968 and 1969. First, circles within the SPD apparently had started to work
on a law to establish a federal holding company. A draft Bundestag proposal
which can be found in documents of the Ministry of Finance is dated from June
1968.586 Second, a group of CDU politicians from Baden-Württemberg around
Häussler promoted the idea of employee participation again in 1969. Their idea
was to dampen claims for co-determination by extending co-ownership. The
proposal included plans for a privatisation law. This was meant to secure
enough supply of shares to satisfy the expected demand. However, ministerial
oﬃcials found the idea not realisable. The main reason was that the federal
enterprises which were regarded as feasible for such a privatisation because
they would allow a suﬃciently secure investment were regarded as too small
581 BArch B126/51418, BMSchatz, Div. I (Lamby) to Schmücker and Langer, 28.5.1968.
582 BArch B126/51418, BMSchatz, Head of Division I (Lamby) to Schmücker and Langer,
13.8.1968.
583 Bundestagsdrucksache 05/2805, 20.3.1968.
584 BArch B126/34805, BMSchatz, Lamby to Schmücker and Langer, 9.1.1969.
585 Hat die Volksaktie noch eine Chance?, Der Volkswirt no. 18, 2.5.1969, copy in BArch
B136/7391.
586 BArch B126/34805, Entwurf, Antrag der Fraktion der SPD, Errichtung einer Bundesh-
olding, 24.6.1968.
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for this purpose.587 And third, Kurt Georg Kiesinger (CDU) and his Oﬃce
of the Federal Chancellor supported a proposal of the Stifterverband für die
Deutsche Wissenschaft, an industry initiative to support research and higher
education, to use revenues from a partial privatisation of federal enterprises
for special tasks. This could be a foundation for industrial or structural policy
or, like the Volkswagenwerk Foundation, for educative purpose. The founda-
tion would solve the problem that it was in principal not possible to earmark
revenues from privatisation for special purpose, as soon as they had been ac-
credited to the federal budget.588
While there was a standstill situation on the political level, the adminis-
tration in charge worked towards mixed ownership solutions in order to keep
a balance between political interests in public enterprises and their ﬁnancing
requirements. Oﬃcials in the Ministry of Economics started an internal ex-
amination about the federal holding idea in April 1968, possibly after having
heard about the SPD proposal, and found it very problematic.589 Several of-
ﬁcials in the Ministry of the Treasury were also rather sceptical about the
holding idea. Knauss (Ministry of the Treasury) prepared an elaboration for
a federal holding company which could take over all federal shareholdings for
a meeting of a committee of the CDU/CSU Bundestag faction. He warned
that proﬁt expectations should not be set too high, given the diﬃculties which
the respective companies were facing. Also, he argued that it might become
diﬃcult to steer such a large holding company.590 It seems obvious that a fed-
eral holding solution would not eliminate the tension between proﬁt-oriented
interests of the companies and political public interests.
Despite his initially hesitant attitude, it was Knauss who became the
supporting oﬃcial for the holding idea for the following years  ﬁrst in the
Ministry of the Treasury, later in the Ministry of Finance. After the disso-
lution of the Ministry of the Treasury, the idea of a federal holding company
was taken up in the Ministry of Finance and advocated by Möller (SPD).
587 BArch B126/51418, BMSchatz, Div. IA1 (Kunze) to Head of Div. I, 8.7.1969, p. 5.
588 BArch B126/76980, BMSchatz, IB2 (Keussen) to Head of Div., 24.4.1969.
589 BArch B126/34805, Engelmann (BMWi) to Langer (BMSchatz), 29.4.1968, and attached
note.
590 BArch B126/34805, BMSchatz, Div. I to Schmücker and Langer, 27.3.1968.
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In April 1969, Knauss presented an elaboration on privatisation to Lamby in
which he examined the two options of establishing an investment fund or a
holding company as possible solutions for federal enterprises. He concluded
that the investment fund was not realistic because the portfolio of suitable
companies was too small in order to create an attractive low-risk investment
fund; it would only be feasible if German or US obligations were integrated
in the fund. Knauss considered only Volkswagenwerk, VEBA and VIAG as
ready for privatisation; Saarbergwerke and Salzgitter AG were too risky, and
all other enterprises were not feasible for privatisation due to their special
circumstances. Thus, he concluded that a federal holding was the better al-
ternative. The holding should take over listed companies ﬁrst and include all
other companies, if possible also enterprises owned by the states, later. In or-
der to secure a public inﬂuence, Knauss suggested that the federal government
should keep 51% of the shares while the rest could be privatised. That way,
he suggested, property formation and industrial policy could be combined.591
Breme (Ministry of the Treasury) was rather sceptical about creating a
federal holding. He considered the plan unrealistic and named expected diﬃ-
culties: the leadership problem would become even more diﬃcult because the
federal administration would not only have to deal with the individual company
managers but also with an additional holding management. A holding-internal
distribution of proﬁts and losses would only partially be possible and required
controlling agreements. This would require a compensation oﬀer to current ex-
ternal shareholders of those companies which were not 100% federally owned.
A partial retention of proﬁts however would lead to supplementary taxes and
therefore lower dividends.592 Despite these objections, Lamby, head of division
I, started to favour the holding model. While he still recommended a partial
privatisation of VIAG to Minister of the Treasury Schmücker in March 1969,593
he proposed the holding model shortly afterwards and argued that compared
to a direct privatisation of VIAG, which needed a capital increase until 1971,
the holding model would allow for a larger privatisation volume by still keep-
591 BArch B126/76980, BMSchatz, Subdiv. IB1 (Knauss) to Head of Div. I (Lamby),
14.4.1969.
592 BArch B126/76980, BMSchatz, Breme to Knauss, 11.4.1969.
593 BArch B126/34805, BMSchatz, Internal Note, Div. I (Lamby) to Schmücker, 25.3.1969.
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ing a federal voting majority.594 However, the Ministry of the Treasury was
abolished after the federal elections in autumn 1969.
Two elaborations of Knauss from 1969 reﬂect the political change which
had manifested since the mid-1960s. Knauss describes a trade-oﬀ between
industrial, structural and regional policy on one side and property formation
policy on the other side. Whereas until the mid-1960s priority had been given
to property formation policy, industrial policy was becoming more and more
important now and federal enterprises should be utilised for this purpose.595
While the three people's shares privatisations were very successful, Knauss un-
derlines that privatisation could not continue in the same way due to changed
circumstances. The remaining public enterprises were either too small or not
proﬁtable enough or too risky and hence not suitable as secure investments for
the broad population. Economic developments in 1965 and 1966 had shown
that competition would become stronger and more international in the future.
Initial steps had been taken to adapt Saarbergwerke and Salzgitter AG to these
circumstances, including changes in the corporate managements and their pro-
duction programmes. While public enterprises had to be managed according
to business principles they also had the obligation to fulﬁl tasks of regional and
sectoral structural policy. These competing elements had to be brought into
balance. In light of increasing challenges from international competition, the
question of public versus private was not central anymore. Rather, national
interests demanded that West Germany was equipped with large and strong
enterprises independently of the ownership question. Good examples of this
were HDW-Deutsche Werft AG and RAG, which had been established as a
consolidation company for black coal mines in the Ruhr district in 1968.596
With the temporary abandonment of privatisation, ﬁnancing capital in-
creases became a major issue. The problem was that if the government wished
to maintain its percentage share in a company it had to participate in all the
capital increases. Rejecting capital increases of public enterprises on the other
hand would impede the companies' growth and was hence not an option ei-
594 BArch B126/34805, BMSchatz, Internal Note, Subdiv. IB1, 29.4.1969; ibid., BMSchatz,
Div. I (Lamby) to Schmücker and Langer, 14.5.1969.
595 BArch B126/76980, BMSchatz, Breme to Knauss, 11.4.1969.
596 BArch B126/76980, Dem Ziel der Privatisierung näher gerückt, BMSchatz, 8.9.1969.
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ther. To solve this, Schmücker came up with a third party model where the
federally-owned KfW bought and held the federal shares in trusteeship for the
federal government. This uncoupled equity increases from the federal budget.
The revenues from the sale of shares or subscription rights were accredited
to the federal budget at the moment of the takeover by KfW and the KfW
committed by contract to sell the shares only upon the government's request.
This model was ﬁrst used for a capital increase of VIAG in 1968:597 Based on
a contract from July 1968, the KfW took over shares in the nominal value of
50 million DM at a price of 220%, i.e. 110 million DM.598 This arrangement
where the KfW acted as a placeholder was used several times later on when
control rights should not be transferred to private investors, for example in the
case of VEBA in 1971 and also in the case of Deutsche Telekom AG.
Schmücker's primary political goal during his time as Minister for the
Treasury was a consolidation of Salzgitter AG and Saarbergwerke. His project
for Salzgitter AG was the Nordstahl AG, an attempt to establish a large
national steel corporation under the umbrella of Salzgitter AG. The idea was
a merger of the steel businesses of Salzgitter AG, Ilseder Hütte and Klöckner-
Werke AG. Nordstahl AG would have been Germany's second largest steel
company after Thyssen. The KfW bank had supported the merger in an expert
report because only together would the three steel producers have a produc-
tion volume above four million tonnes raw steel which was considered to be the
required minimum size for a modern steel company. According to an article
in the weekly newspaper Die Zeit, Klöckner-Werke withdrew from the project
because of Salzgitter AG's pile of debt.599 As a small solution, Ilseder Hüt-
ter and Salzgitter merged in 1970 and the steel businesses were brought into
the new combined Stahlwerke Peine-Salzgitter AG. When Klöckner-Werke AG
went bankrupt in 2001, about 30 years later, Salzgitter AG bought 78% of the
shares and has since increased its participation to 100%. The consolidation
plan for Saarbergwerke was to shift away from coal, widen the product range
and set foot in the oil business. In 1965, Saarbergwerke acquired Erdölwerke
597 Bundestagsdrucksache 05/2805, 20.3.1968.
598 BArch B126/34805, BMF, Internal Note, Subdiv. VIIIB1 (Quadt), 3.12.1969.
599 Nicht geredet, Die Zeit, 11.4.1969.
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Frisia AG, but the reﬁnery was re-sold to the Gulf Oil Corporation only ﬁve
years later. In 1967, the oil reﬁnery Saarland-Raﬃnerie was established and
put into operation. However, due to the strong price increases of crude oil in
the early 1970s, the production of petrochemical products was given up in the
1970s. In addition to that, Saarbergwerke acquired a couple of participations
in other sectors as part of a broad diversiﬁcation strategy. As a third project
during the time of the grand coalition, RAG was established as a consolidation
company for black coal mines in the Ruhr district in 1968. The federal govern-
ment played a managing role in this process. The measure was considered to
be necessary because demand for coal was declining due to the availability of
oil. The federal government was directly aﬀected by this development through
VEBA and its subsidiary companies Hibernia and Stinnes. VEBA contributed
its shares in Hibernia and Stinnes and received a share of 30% in RAG in
return. Hence, the federal government indirectly held a participation although
RAG had not been set up as a public enterprise. In the following years, RAG
achieved a share of 80% of the German black coal production. Following a
diversiﬁcation strategy, RAG also increased its market share in the German
oil industry to 25% until the mid-1970s.600
In the election year 1969, it became obvious that Lufthansa AG would
soon need another equity increase to ﬁnance its planned investment programme
of 900 million DM until 1972. Since the federal government did not want to
risk losing its qualiﬁed voting majority in future share issues and the fed-
eral share had already decreased to 75% during the stock market launch in
1966, the federal government decided to exchange voting for non-voting shares
with preferential dividends. The Bundestag committee for federal property
approved the request of Minister Strauß.601 Existing private shareholders were
oﬀered the chance to exchange their shares for non-voting shares with pay-
ment of a retroactive dividend of 5% and holders of option bonds from 1967
were granted the right to decide whether they wanted to purchase voting or
non-voting shares. Owners of shares with a nominal value of 47.1 million DM
600 For developments in the coal markets and the establishment of RAG see Abelshauser
(1984).
601 Bundestagsdrucksachen 05/4324, 9.6.1969, and 05/4403, 17.6.1969.
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decided to take the oﬀer and voting equity decreased from 400 million to 352.9
million DM. Private voting capital decreased to 6.6%. In 1969, Lufthansa paid
a dividend for the ﬁrst time ever  5% for non-voting shares and 4% for voting
shares. From 1969 until the 1980s, the voting majorities did not change sig-
niﬁcantly: in 1973, equity was increased to 600 million DM and in 1978 to 900
million DM. The federal government participated both times so that it kept a
qualiﬁed voting majority and a capital majority of 74.31%.602
5.2 Social-Liberal Coalition: From
Reorganisation to Structural Policy
After the federal elections in 1969, a social-liberal coalition of SPD and FDP
under Willy Brandt (SPD) was formed. The Ministry of the Treasury was
abolished in the aftermath of the elections and the Ministry of Finance un-
der Alex Möller (SPD) regained the leading role for industrial shareholdings.
Möller focused on a reorganisation of public enterprises in the form of a holding
company but resigned in 1972 as a protest against the deﬁcit-spending gov-
ernment policy. Schiller (SPD) remained Minister of Economics and became
additionally Minister of Finance when Möller resigned. When Schiller himself
resigned in 1972 as a protest against the monetary and ﬁscal policy of the gov-
ernment, he was succeeded by Helmut Schmidt (SPD) who remained Minister
of Finance whereas Hans Friderichs (FDP) became Minister of Economics in
1972. The Ministry of Economics under Schiller and later under Friderichs
took the leadership position for public enterprises and the focus shifted from
reorganisation to structural policy.
The 1970s were marked by several market crisis, an expansion of public
ownership and a shift to sectoral and regional structural policy. Privatisation
faded into the background although it was at no point oﬃcially abolished.
Beyond the external circumstances, the political constellation made it very
unlikely that one of the coalitions partners could have made a successful move:
the FDP would probably not have accepted a categorical no to privatisations,
602 Bozdag-Yaksan (2008), pp. 129130.
Chapter 5. Stagnation 19661982 217
whereas the SPD was extremely hesitant towards it. As a consequence, the
status quo of a mixed ownership economy was maintained and the federal
government took on a more active role in the economy.
Now that the SPD was in the government, the party had to take a stand
on the issue of public ownership for the ﬁrst time. Since Deist's (SPD) idea of a
national foundation, no conceptualisation had been presented. In the decisive
Bundestag debates of the 1950s and 1960s, the SPD had defended sharehold-
ings as an important policy instrument. Thereby, they had been ignoring
the fact that control over shareholdings was limited and required mutual con-
cessions between managements and the government. The discussions around
Möller's holding idea showed that SPD politicians had competing opinions re-
garding the question of public ownership. The Oﬃce of the Federal Chancellor
interpreted discussions of the SPD at their party convention in Saarbrücken in
1970 as a decision against privatisations.603
In the 1970s, privatisation temporarily lost its importance for the FDP.
The party's focus shifted from economic liberalism to social liberalism. Whereas
FDP parliamentarians had in the 1950s bombarded the government with ques-
tions and suggestions, even while the FDP was part of the government coali-
tion itself, privatisation was hardly an issue anymore after the holding plan
had been dropped. When Hans Friderichs (FDP) became the ﬁrst liberal Min-
ister of Economics, this did not mark a turn of economic policy away from
interventionism. Friderichs later massively supported a concentration of own-
ership in the energy market and gave the ﬁrst ministerial merger approval in
the history of the Federal Republic for the merger of VEBA and Gelsenberg
AG (GBAG). Knauss observed the attitude of the FDP towards state own-
ership and privatisation and found it highly pragmatic. He ascribed this to
some extent to a closer and more successful cooperation between government
and federal companies within the previous years and improved insights into
the companies' speciﬁc business policies and problems.604
When the FDP entered the social-liberal coalition in 1969, a program-
matic shift to the left was taking place in the party. The election programme
603 BArch B136/7391, BKAmt, Div. IV (Ehrenberg) to Minister, 15.12.1970.
604 BArch B126/63961, BMF, Internal Note, Subdiv. VIIIA2 (Knauss), 24.8.1977.
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from 1969 still promoted the privatisation of industrial shareholdings in a so-
cial form which allowed a participation of ordinary people in the growth of
productive capital.605 The Freiburg Program demanded that public and pri-
vate enterprises from a certain size onwards should enable co-ownership by
employees.606 In an election brochure of the FDP Bundestag faction from
1972, the FDP held on to its idea of social privatisation to enable a broad dis-
tribution of ownership.607 The election programme from 1976 did not mention
privatisation anymore. In July 1977, the party published two programmes:
an economic programme Grundzüge liberaler Wirtschaftspolitik, which had
been prepared by a commission under Minister of Economics Friderichs, and
a programme Aktuelle Perspektiven des Sozialen Liberalismus. In these pro-
grammes, it was stated that a strict and clear division of tasks between public
and private actors was necessary, but that it was impossible to specify which
tasks had to be fulﬁlled by the state on a general basis. Instead, this had to be
examined on a case by case basis which implies that a privatisation discussion
could only take place on such an undogmatic basis.
Given the historical connection between the SPD and the unions, there
were concerns that SPD representatives and employees' representatives on su-
pervisory boards would collaborate and block company decisions. Shares in
companies with a majority of government and employees representatives were
therefore called red shares (rote Aktien) among experts, according to an ar-
ticle in Die Zeit in 1971. The background was that the current left-dominated
supervisory board of Volkswagenwerk had recently appointed an SPD member
to the management.608 However, this does not seem to have become problem-
atic. Also, the Ministry of Economics was in the hands of FDP politicians in
the 1970s.
605 FDP, Nürnberger Programm, 25.6.1969.
606 FDP, Freiburger Thesen, 27.10.1971.
607 According to BArch B126/63961, Stichworte zur Wirtschafts-, Finanz- und Agrarpolitik.
Eine Bilanz 19691972, BMF, Internal Note, Division VIIIA2 (Knauss), 24.8.1977.
608 Die VEBA-Aktie wird nicht `rot' , Die Zeit no. 32, 6.8.1971, p. 24.
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5.2.1 Capital Requirements and the Federal Holding
Idea
When the Ministry of the Treasury was dissolved in October 1969, the lead
management for public enterprises was transferred back to division VIIIB1 in
the Ministry of Finance under Alex Möller (SPD). Also, the oﬃcials Lamby
and Knauss transferred to that division. At that time, two ideas were compet-
ing within the ministerial administration: the idea to keep separate companies
but to increase cooperation between them and the idea to bundle all sharehold-
ings in one large federal holding company. Lamby, head of division VIIIB1,
presented a draft for a federal holding to Möller in November 1969. The draft,
which had probably been prepared by Knauss, noted that the current conglom-
eration of public enterprises was not systematically but historically determined.
The political goal of creating ownership had once led to the privatisation of the
most proﬁtable shareholdings. A continuation of this policy would imply that
the federal government would be left only with the least proﬁtable enterprises.
This would make a general conception for public enterprises more diﬃcult
and would not harmonise with the recent shift from an ownership-creating
policy to regional and structural policies. The note highlighted that public
enterprises would beneﬁt from a streamlining of the federal administration: a
better knowledge of the companies' situation, a higher personnel continuity
of federal representatives and less administrative distance could improve the
communication between the government and its companies. A handwritten
note from Möller shows his openness towards the idea: he thanked for the ex-
cellent draft and mentioned that he approved of the holding idea. Therefore,
he wished to receive a more detailed memorandum as soon as possible.609
Practical preparatory work on the federal holding progressed quickly in
winter 1969/1970 and discussed legal and other aspects of the holding model.610
609 BArch B126/34805, BMF, Lamby to Minister and Secretary of State, 18.11.1969.
610Documentation in BArch B126/34805: Rechtsfragen betreﬀend Bundesholding,
4.12.1969; Internal Note on internal task distribution (Knauss), 12.12.1969; Grundsät-
zliche Anmerkungen zur Aufstellung einer Gründungsbilanz, Subdiv. VIIIB2 (Keussen),
6.1.1970; Internal Note, Subdiv. VIIIB2 (Keussen), 3.2.1970; Alternativrechnung zur
Holdingvorlage vom 12.2.1970, Div. VIII (Lamby), Note about the alternative to use
VEBA as a holding company, 27.5.1970; Div. VIII (Lamby), Note about antitrust and
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In February 1970, Knauss presented a comprehensive exposé for the establish-
ment of a federal holding which included a discussion of a partial privatisation
of the holding. He suggested that the government should transfer 49% of the
shares into private ownership and keep the majority of 51%. This would allow
a nominal privatisation volume of 735 to 848 million DM and, with an issue
price of 200%, lead to revenues of 1.47 to 1.696 billion DM. This was above 1.1
billion DM which Knauss considered to be the minimal volume for a privatisa-
tion aiming at a wide distribution of shares, based on previous experiences.611
As an alternative, Knauss presented a model where VIAG would serve as a
holding for all other federal shareholdings and where 33.3% of VIAG would be
sold to private investors. This model would imply privatisation revenues of up
to 1.043 billion DM. 612 The threshold for a successful partial privatisation of
a potential holding company was set at a dividend of 10% or higher, in order
to guarantee proﬁtable private investments.613
The plan to establish a holding company became public in April 1970.614
The ministerial administration assumed that this was due to an indiscretion.615
In April 1970, about the same time, the CDU/CSU Bundestag faction added
additional pressure on the federal cabinet by unsuccessfully proposing a partial
privatisation of 40% of VIAG.616 Obviously, this initiative had rather symbolic
legal aspects, 1.6.1970.
611 BArch B126/34805, Vorschlag einer Neuorganisation des industriellen Bundesvermö-
gens, Subdiv. VIIIB1 (Knauss), 12.2.1970, p. 2324.
612 BArch B126/34805, BMF, Internal Note, Div. III, 6.5.1970. After two valuation reports
of the federally-owned Treuarbeit and the privately-owned Karoli had criticised the as-
sumptions about costs and future returns of investments which had been used in the
calculations as too optimistic (BArch B136/7392, Internal Note, BMF, Subdiv. VIIIB1
(Winkeler), 11.8.1970, pp. 68.), the ministry corrected its calculations and chose a more
prudent approach.
613 BArch B136/7392, Internal note about a departmental meeting on 28 July 1970, BMF,
Subdiv. VIIIB1 (Winkeler), 31.8.1970.
614 See for example In Möllers Ministerium erarbeitet, and Junghans: Erst nach vier bis
fünf reif zur Teilprivatisierung, Braunschweigische Zeitung, 16.4.1970; Ein Abgeord-
neter liegt quer. Wiederstand gegen die Zusammenfassung der Bundesunternehmen,
Die Zeit, 24.4.1970; Die VIAG benötigt neues Eigenkapital and Bundes-Mischmasch,
Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12.5.1970, copies in BArch B126/34805.
615 BArch B136/7391, BKAmt III3 (Geberth) to Minister, 14.4.1970. It is not entirely clear
who Geberth is addressing here, but very likely it is Minister of Economics Schiller. From
1968 to 1970, Rolf Geberth was head of subdivision III/3 (BMWi; Deutsche Bundesbank;
Kabinettsausschuss für Wirtschaft) in the Oﬃce of the Federal Chancellor and as such
in charge of aﬀairs in the area of responsibility of the Ministry of Economics. In 1971,
Geberth transferred to the Ministry of Economics himself. Information from personnel
ﬁles in Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung online.
616 Bundestagsdrucksache 06/652, 21.4.1970.
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character: CDU and CSU were not in power and it can be questioned whether
they would have initiated a privatisation if they had been part of the govern-
ment coalition. Yet, it is possible that the CDU/CSU hoped for some votes
from the FDP who would never have rejected such a proposal a couple of years
before.
Other ministries were involved in the holding plan at a late stage. A ﬁrst
cross departmental meeting about the plan in May 1970 revealed scepticism
in both the Ministry of Economics and in the Ministry of the Interior.617 The
Minister for Labour and Social Aﬀairs Walter Ahrendt (SPD) worried that the
holding structure might undermine co-determination of workers for Salzgitter
AG and Saarbergwerke AG. Both companies were parityco-determined in the
scope of the Act on Co-Determination in the Coal, Iron and Steel Industry
from 1951, whereas the holding would only be co-determined in the scope of
the general Act on Co-Determination from 1952.618
The Ministry of Economics had several objections against the holding
plan.619 The ministry's antitrust division criticised the resulting concentra-
tion of economic power in federal hands. The Ministry of Finance argued
that such a concentration of ownership already existed and that it would not
make a diﬀerence whether the shareholdings were combined in a holding or
not.620 Knauss in the Ministry of Finance argued that the holding would only
be on the last rank of the ten German companies with the highest turnovers:
due to the earlier partial privatisation of VEBA, the holding would only have
a 40% participation in VEBA which would be below the control threshold
so that VEBA's turnover would not count for the holding calculation. Ad-
ditionally, the participation in Volkswagenwerk was only held in trusteeship
for the Volkswagenwerk Foundation by the federal government so that that
participation would not count as federal property anyway. All other public
enterprises had a total turnover of 5.7 billion DM in 1969. This would put the
617 BArch B126/34805, BMF, Minutes of the meeting, VIII (Lamby), 29.5.1970.
618 BArch B136/7392, Minster of Labour and Social Aﬀairs Ahrendt to Federal Chancellor
Brandt, 17.9.1970.
619 BArch B136/7392, BMWi, IIIC2 (Pieper), Stichworte für die Hausbesprechung am
5.6.1970.
620 BArch B126/34805, BMF, Internal Note, VIIIB1, 8.6.1970; and BArch B136/7392,
BMWi, IB5 (Kartte), 4.6.1970.
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ﬁctive holding on rank ten, far behind Volkswagenwerk on the ﬁrst rank with
a turnover of 13.9 billion DM and behind VEBA on rank eight with a turnover
of 6.0 billion DM. Other companies which were larger than the ﬁctive holding
were Siemens, Thyssen, Daimler-Benz, BASF, Farbwerke Hoechst, Bayer, and
AEG-Telefunken.621 As a second problem, the Ministry of Economics warned
that an integration of VEBA in a large holding company could be perceived
as if the government wanted to increase its inﬂuence on the company again
after the voting majority had been lost during the partial privatisation.622
And third, the ministry was worried that unproﬁtable companies would drag
proﬁtable companies down and that the holding would not be suitable to be
partially privatised in the near future as a consequence.
The Minstry of Economics' energy division III therefore proposed estab-
lishing two holdings instead of one: Holding I should incorporate the healthy,
proﬁtable shareholdings which were ready to be privatised, including VEBA,
VIAG; holding II should take over Deutsche Industrieanlagen Gesellschaft
(DIAG), the deﬁcient Saarbergwerke and Salzgitter AG, and the remaining
share in Volkswagenwerk in order to stabilise revenues. Holding I could im-
mediately be partially privatised in order to please the FDP, whereas holding
II should be kept in federal ownership in order to satisfy the SPD's wish for
a structural policy instrument. The division argued that two smaller holdings
would be less market-dominant.623 The advantage which the Ministry of Eco-
nomics saw in a holding was that the administration of enterprises would be
taken out of reach of the Ministry of Finance.624 The subsequent agreement
was that the Ministry of Finance should additionally examine the alternative
to establishing two holding companies.625
Resistance against the holding idea also came from the political parties.
621 BArch B136/7392, BMF, Internal Note, VIIIB1 (Knauss), 13.7.1970. The ﬁgures used
in this calculation were backed up by two surveys of the state-owned Treuarbeit and
the privately owned accountancy ﬁrm Karoli. BArch B136/7392, Zusammenstellung der
Untersuchungsergebnisse der Gutachter zum Modell `Bundesholding' und Stellungnahme
zu den Gutachteräußerungen.
622 BArch B136/7392, Internal Note, BMF, VIIIB1 (Winkeler), 11.8.1970, p. 4.
623 BArch B136/7392, BMWi, III3 (Koch) to Head of division III, 4.6.1970, and ibid., Inter-
nal Note, BMF, VIIIB1 (Winkeler), 11.8.1970, p. 5.
624 BArch B136/7392, Internal note about a departmental meeting on 28 July 1970, BMF,
Subdiv. VIIIB1 (Winkeler), 31.8.1970.
625 BArch B136/7392, Internal Note, BMF, VIIIB1 (Winkeler), 11.8.1970.
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It became obvious early on that Möller's suggestion did not have the full ap-
proval of the SPD Bundestag faction. After the holding plans had become
public, Junghans (SPD) indicated a general approval to a holding arrange-
ment based on VIAG but rejected all privatisation attempts, at least for the
time being. According to him, he himself had suggested the holding idea a
few years ago.626 The parliamentarians were hardly involved in the ongoing
discussions which took place on the ministerial level. A meeting of FDP, SPD
and representatives of the Ministry of Finance in May 1970 revealed fundamen-
tal diﬀerences between the parties. The Ministry of Finance oﬃcials pointed
to the indispensable necessity of capital injections for federal enterprises until
1972. Therefore, they intended to establish the holding and to ﬁnance a sub-
sequent equity increase by issuing shares in such a volume that in the end up
to one third of the holding would be privately owned. This would be suﬃcient
to ﬁnance equity requirements in the amount of 700 million DM and would
maintain a strong role for the state. It was further planned that the Minis-
ter of Economics himself should become chairman of the supervisory board.
Junghans (SPD) rejected an immediate partial privatisation and demanded
that a sale of maximal 49% of the holding should become part of a broader
property formation programme in three to ﬁve years time. Yet, an immediate
privatisation was a precondition for the approval of the FDP to the holding.627
In a press announcement, Mischnick, chairman of the FDP Bundestag faction,
named a privatisation of 40 to 50% of the planned federal holding the minimum
condition for the approval of his party.628
After no agreement had been reached on the administrative level, the
Secretaries of State in the Ministry of Economics Philip Rosenthal (SPD) and
Detlev Rohwedder (since 1971 SPD) called on Minister Schiller to take care
of the matter personally. The main concern was the integration of the strug-
gling Salzgitter AG in the holding, an idea which Rosenthal and Rohwedder
strongly rejected. Also, they criticised the whole project and warned about
626 BArch B126/34805, Betr.: Bundesholding, Informationen der Sozialdemokratischen
Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag, 14.4.1970.
627 BArch B126/34805, BMF, VIIIB1 (Knauss), 21.5.1970.
628 BArch B126/34805, Keine faulen Kompromisse bei VIAG Privatisierung, fdk - freie
demokratische korrespondenz (FDP press service) 161/70, 11.5.1970.
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expected resistance from VEBA and also from VIAG: the VIAG management
might not like the idea that its own proﬁtability was to be used to cross-ﬁnance
weaker companies. Rosenthal and Rohwedder suggested that for the time be-
ing only the proﬁtable companies VEBA, VIAG, IVG, Prakla-Seismos GmbH
and maybe Deutsche Schachtbau- und Tiefbohrgesellschaft mbH should be in-
tegrated. They also stressed that Salzgitter AG chief Birnbaum was against
an integration of his company into the holding.629 Schiller and Möller ﬁnally
agreed that only VIAG, VEBA, IVG and Prakla should be brought into a hold-
ing. What should happen to Salzgitter AG was left open: Möller suggested
that the company should be held in trusteeship by VIAG, Schiller rejected
this idea. Drafting a ﬁnal agreement was left to the ministerial oﬃcials Lamby
(Ministry of Finance) and Lantzke (Ministry of Economics).630
As Rohwedder and Rosenthal had predicted, resistance from the compa-
nies grew. At ﬁrst, internal notes from the Ministry of Finance seemed rather
optimistic: According to them, the VIAG management board did not reject
the idea, but stressed that in a new holding company the rules of stock com-
pany law would still have to apply. They also suggested adding rules about
the composition of the supervisory board in the company statutes to ensure
a role for the representation and knowledge of the private economy. It was
agreed that establishing the holding would be the ﬁrst step, privatisation the
second step, and the timing of an eventual partial privatisation should depend
on the overall economic situation. If the established holding needed a capital
injection before the timing for issuing shares was beneﬁcial, the KfW should
take over shares, such as in the cases of VEBA and VIAG.631 The Ministry of
Finance also noted that the management boards of the other concerned enter-
prises generally agreed to the holding plan. Only Prakla-Seismos was worried
about its independence in a federal group, and VEBA preferred to serve as
holding company itself.632 And IVG was worried about its special status for
the Ministry of Defence.633
629 BArch B136/7392, BMWi, Rohwedder and Rosenthal to Schiller, 25.9.1970.
630 BArch B136/7392, BMWi, Rohwedder to Reischl, 16.10.1970.
631 BArch B126/34805, BMF, Internal Note, VIIIB1 (Knauss), 20.5.1970.
632 BArch B126/34805, BMF, Div. VIII (Lamby) to Secretary of State, 8.6.1970; also ibid.,
BMF, Div. VIIIB1, Minutes about a meeting with IVG.
633 BArch B136/7391, IVG to Oﬃce of the Federal Chancellor, 14.12.1970.
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Opposition from the companies became stronger over the months and
the Ministry of Finance started to perceive this as a threat to their plans.
Knauss urged Salzgitter AG's management board member Bigge to approve
the company's integration in the holding. According to an anonymous note
from the Oﬃce of the Federal Chancellor, he warned that if the management
board was not able to secure a dividend of at least 5% in the foreseeable
future, the board should decrease its own royalties from nine to four monthly
salaries (Knauss denied this when confronted by Lamby). According to internal
information, another ministerial oﬃcial threatened Bigge on behalf of Knauss
that if Salzgitter was not integrated into the holding, it would not receive the
capital injection of 300 million DM because in that case a consolidation was
not necessary anymore. According to the same source, the Prakla management
was warned that the company might be sold to a private investor if it would
not agree to the holding.634 VEBA rejected the holding idea strongly. Not
only did the management board object to the proposition, the supervisory
board also rejected it at a crucial meeting in November because the employees
representatives voted against the holding.635 VEBA would account for two
thirds of the consolidated value of the holding, so its integration was crucial.
Meanwhile, the CDU/CSU had increased the political pressure on the
government by bringing in another Bundestag proposal to partially privatise
VIAG and VEBA and combine all other participations in a ﬁnancial holding.636
This put the government into a diﬃcult situation: A government agreement
about the holding would not be reached until the CDU/CSU draft law would
be read in Bundestag. Hence, no counterproposal could be presented, which
would make the government look bad.637 Therefore, the coalition partners de-
cided to forward the proposal directly to the Bundestag committees without
634 BArch B136/7392, Anonymous, Streng Vertraulich, 24.11.1970.
635 BArch B136/7392, BKamt III3 (Geberth) to Minister, 24.11.1970.
636 Entwurf eines Gesetzes über die Überführung von Anteilsrechten der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland an der VIAG und der VEBA AG in die Hand von breiten Bevölkerungss-
chichten und über die Errichtung einer Aktiengesellschaft für Bundesbeteiligungen
(Gesetz zur weiteren sozialen Privatisierung von Bundesunternehmen im Rahmen der
Vermögensbildung), Bundestagsdrucksache 04/1434, 16.11.1970.
637 BArch B136/7392, Rohwedder to Schiller, 23.11.1970, and attachment Oﬀene Fragen
zur Realisierung des Holding-Konzepts für VIAG, VEBA, IVG und PRAKLA.
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reading it in plenary ﬁrst to avoid public attention.638 The Bundestag eco-
nomics committee decided to postpone the debate until further information
had been provided. This never happened, so no recommendation was sent to
plenary and the proposal got lost in the legislative process. That way, the
government had successfully avoided a public discussion about privatisation.
The FDP had proven its commitment to the social-liberal coalition although
rejecting the CDU/CSU draft was clearly against the party's economic convic-
tions.
Möller now came up with a modiﬁed solution: the participation in VEBA
should not be brought into VIAG but should be held in trusteeship by it.639
This was the basis for a cabinet proposal from December 1970. It suggested
a smaller holding solution: VIAG should remain entirely federally owned and
IVG and Prakla should be brought into VIAG. This would result in a ﬁnan-
cial holding with a turnover of 1.7 billion DM. VIAG should also hold the
federal shares in VEBA and in Volkswagenwerk in trust. The federal govern-
ment should not participate in the planned equity increase of VEBA in 1971.
This would reduce the federal share from 40% to 34% and the voting majority
would be lost. Whether the government would participate in later equity in-
creases was left open, but the share should not sink below 26% in the future.
The revenues from the sale of VEBA subscription rights in the amount of 150
million DM should be used to ﬁnance an equity increase of VIAG in 1974.
Saarbergwerke, Salzgitter AG and DIAG should remain direct shareholdings
until they would be consolidated.640 Möller's plan was supported by the Min-
istry of Economics, according to a conversation between Schiller and Möller,
although the Ministry of Economics criticised that the Ministry of Finance
had added a clause to the originally agreed solution to ensure that the federal
share would not sink under 26% in the future.
While the Ministries of Economics and Finance had come to a jointly sup-
ported solution, now the Minister of the Interior Genscher (FDP) expressed
reservations because the originally intended VIAG privatisation had been re-
638 BArch B136/7391, Div. VI (Ehrenberg) to Minister, 8.12.1970.
639 BArch B136/7392, Koch to Head of Div. IV, 1.12.1970.
640 BArch B136/7391, Minister of Finance (Möller) to BKamt, 4.12.1970.
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moved.641 Genscher's objection was, according to a note from the Ministry
of Economics, the reason why Schiller's and Möller's compromise was not ac-
cepted by the federal cabinet.642 The Oﬃce of the Federal Chancellor con-
ﬁrmed that the planned discussion at the cabinet Meeting on 10 December
1970 about Möller's cabinet proposal from 7 December had been cancelled on
Genscher's request. Neither the SPD nor the FDP faction had been informed
about the proposal up to this point, but Mertes and Junghans had signalled
approval from their factions if the suggestion would explicitly say that it was
just a ﬁrst step.643
After Genscher's veto, Chancellor Willy Brandt (SPD) interfered. Up to
this point, the Oﬃce of the Federal Chancellor had observed the negotiations
in the Ministry of Finance without interfering.644 Now, Brandt requested that
the cabinet should form a working group Bundesholding, chaired by Par-
liamentary Secretary of State Gerhard Reischl (SPD, Ministry of Finance).
Other members were Minister of the Interior Genscher, Parliamentary Sec-
retary of State Philip Rosenthal (SPD, Ministry of Economics), Secretary of
State Rohwedder (SPD, Ministry of Economics), Herbert Ehrenberg (Min-
istry of Economics), Secretary of State Ernst Wolf Mommsen (SPD, Defence
Ministry), and the MPs Hans-Jürgen Junghans (SPD), Gerhard Kienbaum
(FDP), Helmut Lenders (SPD) and Werner Mertes (FDP).645 Additionally,
a committee consisting of the three ministers, the chief of staﬀ of the Oﬃce
of the Federal Chancellor and the MPs Junghans and Kienbaum was put in
charge of personnel decisions in federally-owned companies and the KfW by
Chancellor Brandt.646
The progress of the working group was slow. At the ﬁrst meeting it
was agreed that the share in VEBA should be further reduced to 26%.647
VIAG should fully remain in federal ownership whereas its subsidiary compa-
641 BArch B136/7392, Div. III (Lantzke) to Minister, 8.12.1970.
642 BArch B126/59381, Ministry of Economics, Div. III (Lantzke) to Minister and Secretaries
of State, 1.3.1971, p. 4.
643 BArch B136/7391 and BArch B136/7392, Div. IV (Ehrenberg) to Minister, 15.12.1970.
644 BArch B136/7391, BKAmt III3 (Geberth) to Minister, 14.4., 14.9., 19.10. and
24.11.1970; Internal Note Div. III5 (Donezik), 24.4.1970.
645 BArch B126/59381, Report, BMF to BKamt, 24.2.1971, pp. 12.
646 BArch B136/7392, Brandt to Schiller, 18.12.1970.
647 BArch B136/7392, BMF, Div. VIIIB1 (Knauss), 18.1.1971.
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nies should be opened up to private capital.648 However, Rosenthal doubted
that this would be practically possible. In most subsidiary companies, VIAG
had a share of 50% or less. If VIAG renounced its subscription rights in the case
of equity increases, it would lose its impact almost entirely and it would risk
co-owners becoming too big. Rosenthal complained that such impractical so-
lutions were a consequence of limited knowledge of leading ministerial oﬃcials
and that for future meetings, lower ranked oﬃcials with a better knowledge
of the cases should join.649 After two meetings, the working group recom-
mended to commission an independent report from a committee which should
consist of selected personalities.650 Möller however found it little helpful to
commission another report because the decision of what do to with federal
enterprises was ﬁrst and foremost a political decision and could not be solved
by reports.651 However, the Oﬃce of the Federal Chancellor insisted on com-
missioned report.652 But Möller and Schiller were not even able to agree on a
formulation for the instruction of the expert report. The Ministry of Finance
oﬃcials intended an expert report only based on their own ideas and wanted
to include a premise that the government should keep majority participations
above 50%, that a solution should not require federal resources and that all
three suggested holding models should be assessed. In contrast, the Ministry
of Economics opposed any restrictions about the size of shareholdings and use
of federal budget resources in the instructions. The Ministry of Finance sus-
pected an attempt of the Ministry of Economics to make VEBA the centre of
federal activities in the energy market at the expenses of the importance of
VIAG. As a counterproposal, it suggested that VIAG and RWE should collab-
orate. The Ministry of Finance was even more careful because it recognised
that a plan which would just aﬀect one company could have a prejudicial ef-
fect and work against the big holding solution.653 Again, Schiller and Möller
648 BArch B136/7392, Jochimsen to Head of Div. IV, 8.1.1971.
649 BArch B136/7392, Rosenthal to Reischl, 20.1.1971.
650 BArch B136/7392, BMF, Minutes about the Meeting on 4 June, 5.6.1971.
651 BArch B126/59381, Möller to BKamt, Kabinettsache, 24.2.1971, pp. 12.
652 BArch B136/7391, Vermerk für die Kabinettsitzung am 4. März 1970, VI3 (Weiss),
2.3.1971.
653 BArch B136/7392, BMF, Ausarbeitung aus dem BMF (handwritten comment), Notes
about a meeting with representatives of the BMWi on 22 March 1971.
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came to an agreement and the restrictions outlined in the ﬁnal instructions for
a commissioned expert report were a compromise: in the case of companies
with majority shareholdings, the federal impact on the respective companies
should essentially be maintained; a reorganisation should not require federal
resources and the collaboration between federal and private companies should
be examined.654 At a coalition meeting in April 1971 it was ﬁnally decided to
commission an independent expert report by Professor Potthoﬀ.655
Just a few weeks later, Alex Möller quit on 12 May 1971. The oﬃcial
reason was dissatisfaction with the government's deﬁcit spending policy. His
frustration about the failing holding plan might have added to his decision. The
Ministry of Finance was subsequently merged with the Ministry of Economics
and Schiller became the minister of the combined super-ministry. The holding
plan was immediately given up.656 The commissioned report from Potthoﬀ
was received in December 1971 but the Oﬃce of the Federal Chancellor did
not ﬁnd it helpful as a guideline for future political decisions.657
Der Spiegel suspected that the entire holding plan was driven mainly
by the ministerial oﬃcials Lamby and Knauss in an attempt to create an
opportunity for themselves to take on management jobs in the newly created
federal corporation. According to the article, Lamby had in 1970 already
applied to succeed the soon retiring VEBA chief executive director Kemper658,
and Knauss had made an eﬀort to get a management position at Salzgitter or
Diag. Secretary of State Reischl and SPD politician Junghans also were said to
have such ambitions.659 If the article was right, Lamby was successful. Only
three years later, he transferred from the Ministry of Finance to the VIAG
management board.
During the holding discussions, VEBA requested a capital increase in
654 BArch B136/7392, Minutes of the meeting of the working group Bundesholding on 22
March, 23.3.1971.
655 BArch B126/59381, Div. III (Lantzke) to Secretaries of State Rosenthal and Rohwedder,
20.4.1971.
656 See Bundestag inquiry of CDU and CSU in Bundestagsdrucksache 06/2382, 28.6.1971,
and Schiller's response in Bundestagsdrucksache 06/2452, 14.7.1971.
657 BArch B136/7391, BKamt, VI2 (Weiss) to Head of Div. VI, 7.2.1972.
658 After his retirement in 1971, Kemper was chairman of the VEBA supervisory board from
1971 to 1976. Also, he was chairman of the supervisory board of RAG from 1969 to 1976.
659 Mit sanftem Druck, Der Spiegel no. 6, 1971, p. 43.
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January 1971. The VEBA management board informed the Ministry of Fi-
nance that it intended to suggest an increase of authorised equity of nominal
412.5 million DM at the next general meeting. The capital increase should
take place in two tranches of 206.25 million DM each in 1971 and 1973. This
would lead to a capital inﬂow of 825 million DM which would partially ﬁnance
planned investments of VEBA and its subsidiary companies in the amount of
5.4 billion DM. VEBA needed a response from the Ministry of Finance as soon
as possible because the supervisory board had to decide on the agenda for the
next general meeting in March. There at the latest, the government represen-
tatives would have to take a stand. The Ministry criticised that VEBA had
doubled its request for equity capital since July 1970 but generally approved
an increase.660
While there was unanimity about the urgency of an equity increase of
VEBA in the federal cabinet, a pragmatic solution had to be found in light
of the ongoing holding discussions. The solution should not be prejudicial for
future politics.661 In order to participate in the capital increase, the federal
government would have to spend 165 million DM in addition to the already
decided federal budget. The funds had been declared for the budget plan 1973
initially, but were deleted again based on the notion that a federal holding
company would be established soon and would be partially privatised until
1972. Möller did not want to spend this money and therefore proposed using
the third party model which had been used in the case of VIAG in 1968 and
approving the capital increase of nominal 206.25 million DM for 1971. The
KfW or a bank consortium should exercise the subscription rights on behalf of
the federal government and keep the shares until a precedent-setting decision
had been reached.662 The working group Bundesholding agreed, with the
additional request of the FDP members that not only the state-owned KfW
but also a private bank consortium should be asked to submit an oﬀer.663 The
660 BArch B136/7392, BMF, VIIIB1, 26.1.1971.
661 BArch B136/7392, Minutes of the meeting of the working group Bundesholding on 4
February, 5.2.1971.
662 BArch B126/59381 and BArch B136/7392, Möller to BKamt, Kabinettsache, 24 .2.1971,
pp. 69.
663 BArch B136/7392. BMF, VIIIB1, Minutes of the meeting of the working group Bun-
desholding on February 11, 1.3.1971.
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federal cabinet subsequently decided to get oﬀers from KfW and from a private
bank consortium.664 In the end, KfW and a bank consortium each took over
50% of the shares on behalf of the government, with the contractual promise
to sell them back to the government at any time.665
The banks' participation in trust was planned as an interim solution but
would become a long-term solution. While the ﬁnance divisions of the com-
bined Ministry of Economics and Finance intended giving the shares which
had been placed with the banks up entirely in light of the tight federal budget
situation later on, the economics divisions, supported by the Oﬃce of the Fed-
eral Chancellor, preferred the current solution and did not want to give up the
indirect participation.666 The discussion about the necessary federal impact
on VEBA as an important energy company was an ongoing topic throughout
the entire holding discussion, although the federal interest was never speci-
ﬁed. But it is likely that what was meant was the Ministry of Economics'
next project which was being prepared at the time with the intention to create
concentration in the energy market: the merger of VEBA and GBAG.667
Möller's holding idea was the last attempt of a systematic reorganisation
of shareholdings. All the issues which should play an important role in the mid
and late 1970s were already anticipated or discussed throughout the holding
discussion: the importance of a suﬃcient federal impact in mixed-ownership
enterprises, the role of the state in the energy market, the consolidation of
unproﬁtable state-owned enterprises as a prerequisite for privatisation and the
role of DIAG in West Berlin as an example of regional policy.
5.2.2 The Public Role in VEBA and Volkswagenwerk
In the course of the VEBA equity increase, the federal government also ap-
proved VEBA's request to equalise the two types of shares which were a result
of the partial privatisation in 1965. This meant that the federal government
would lose its exemption from voting rights restrictions: in the cases of Volk-
664 BArch B126/59381, BMWi, Div. III (Lantzke) to Rohwedder, 18.5.1971.
665 BArch B136/7392, Schiller to the President of the Bundestag, 24.8.1971.
666 BArch B136/7391, BKamt, Div. IV2 (Dehmel) to Head of Div. IV, 4.7.1972.
667 See chapter 5.2.3.1.
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swagenwerk and VEBA, measures to prevent a concentration of power aside
from the government had been implemented in the course of the people's shares
privatisations. This entailed an exemption for the federal government from
voting right restrictions.668 Now, in combination with the equity increase,
VEBA's management board demanded the right to exclude existing share-
holders from subscription rights which would imply the possibility of a second
large investor besides the government. Ministerial oﬃcial Pieper (Ministry of
Economics) perceived VEBA's suggestion as an attempt to gain more inde-
pendence from the government. He stressed that the idea of using authorised
capital was generally beneﬁcial but that the government should insist that the
issue conditions had to be approved by the federal government, not only by the
supervisory board, for both tranches. The management board also suggested
removing the diﬀerentiation between the two types of shares which had been
created for the partial privatisation in 1964. This implied either a removal of
the restriction of voting rights for the shares which had been privatised (se-
ries B) or a removal of the dividend disadvantage for the government shares
(series A). The latter solution was estimated to increase dividend payments
to the government by 4.5 million DM per year  and corresponding costs for
VEBA. The Ministry of Finance approved of this. The Ministry of Economics
warned that a full removal of voting rights restrictions bore the danger of a
concentration of ownership and power besides the government. It would also
be a step away from the original political goal to create a wide distribution of
ownership. Hence, the ministry suggested to change the voting rights restric-
tion from 1/10,000 to 25% of share capital so that no investor would be able to
exceed more power than the federal government.669 The Ministry of Finance
also found a veto minority of 25.1% for the federal government suﬃcient670
and the compromise was accepted by the government coalition.671
The exemption in the case of Volkswagenwerk had even been given up
before: The voting right privilege for the federal government and Lower Saxony
according to the Volkswagen law had been limited to ten years and was due to
668 See p. 165 for Volkswagenwerk and p. 182 for VEBA.
669 BArch B126/59381, BMWi, Pieper to Lantzke and Engelmann, IIIC3, 3.2.1971.
670 BArch B136/7392, BMF, VIIIB1, 26.1.1971.
671 BArch B126/59381, BMF to BKamt, 24.2.1971.
Chapter 5. Stagnation 19661982 233
expire in 1970. The government probably found that it was not appropriate
and possibly also legally diﬃcult to renew the special role for Lower Saxony and
the federal government. As an alternative, the restriction of voting rights was
lowered from 1/10,000 to 20% of share capital. This secured a veto minority
for the federal government and Lower Saxony who each held 20% of the shares
but did not imply a special role for the state which might have been perceived
critically. In any case, the solution would prevent an investor from being able
to exercise more power than the federal government and Lower Saxony unless
they reduced their stakes.
The voting right restriction to 20% of share capital, which is still valid
today, has repeatedly been criticised in the past, in particular by major share-
holder Porsche. Since a reform of the stock company law in 1998, voting right
restrictions are in general forbidden, based on the principal of equal treat-
ment. Since 2004, the Volkswagen law has been subject to a legal dispute
between Germany and the European Commission. Besides these voting right
changes, an amending act from 1970 (Zweites Gesetz zur Änderung des Geset-
zes zur Überführung der Anteilsrechte an der Volkswagenwerk Gesellschaft mit
beschränkter Haftung) has removed the restriction for proxy voting. This
strengthened the role of banks. The rule of a disclosure of names of repre-
sented shareholders however remained valid. Also, the special provisions that
a qualiﬁed majority in the general meeting requires 80% of votes and that the
relocation of business premises requires a two-thirds majority of the votes in
the supervisory board are still valid until today.
5.2.3 Structural Policy
The failure of the holding plan had made it obvious that SPD and FDP would
not be able to agree on a form of privatisation in the foreseeable future. Yet,
privatisation was not important enough for the FDP to risk the coalition. The
portfolio of federal shareholdings increased during the 1970s although there was
no attempt to increase the portfolio strategically. Rather, the development
was a side eﬀect of structural policy and diversiﬁcation strategies of federal
enterprises. Some ministerial oﬃcials did not abandon the idea of partial
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privatisations but they adapted to the political circumstances. Also, in light
of the diﬃcult economic situation and market crisis in several sectors, a co-
existence of public and private ownership was widely accepted.
Based on the Federal Budget Act, federal enterprises needed the approval
of the Minister of Finance to acquire and sell participations. This allowed for
a sectoral and regional structural policy which focused on three major goals:
defending national interests in the oil sector, supporting struggling federal
enterprises by allowing them to diversify, and improving the situation of eco-
nomically weak regions by keeping federal enterprises in such locations. In
particular, supporting the highly unproﬁtable DIAG in West Berlin remained
a political imperative until the German reuniﬁcation in 1989.
During the negotiations on the holding idea, Schiller and his Ministry of
Finance had another plan in mind: they attempted to bundle and reorganise
shareholdings in the energy sector in order to foster concentration in the oil
market and strengthen national forces in light of the increasing international
competition. Yet, the project did not turn out to be particularly successful.
5.2.3.1 Creating Concentration in the Oil Market
The oil industry became increasingly important in the 1970s as a result of the
rising global signiﬁcance of oil and the internationalisation of the oil market.
West Germany had already missed its chance to set foot in the international
crude oil business early enough in order to play a role in the global market.
An attempt to bundle forces in the oil exploration sector led to the foundation
of the Deutsche Mineralöl-Explorationsgesellschaft mbH (Deminex) in 1969.
The company was the state-led attempt to set up a German oil company of
international signiﬁcance. Deminex was founded as a joint venture of eight
German oil companies. Another German oil exploration company, Deutsche
Erdöl AG (DEA), had been taken over by the U.S. oil company Texaco in the
late 1960s .672 The foundation of Deminex was organised and subsidised by
the federal government. The main argument was to secure access to crude
oil and protect the German oil processing industry. VEBA held a 63% share
672 In 1988, DEA was purchased by RWE and became RWE-DEA AG.Stokes (2003), p. 379.
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in Deminex through its subsidiary company VEBA Oel, RWE and Winter-
shall each held 18.5%. Deminex received 2.2 million DM federal subsidies as
start-up capital which only had to be repaid in the case of suﬃcient proﬁts.
However, Deminex never became a proﬁtable company. In 1998, the company
was dissolved and its property and shareholdings distributed to the remain-
ing three shareholders.673 Also, the Ministry of Economics intended to foster
concentration in the German oil reﬁnery market. That market was shared
among a small group of companies around 1970: GBAG, Union Rheinische
Braunkohlen Kraftstoﬀ AG (UK Wesseling) and Wintershall. BGAB with a
market share of 25.5% was to 43% owned by RWE, and UK Wesseling with
a market share of 17.4% was owned by Rheinbraun, a subsidiary company of
RWE. Wintershall with a market share of 18.3% was a subsidiary company
of BASF. Saarland-Raﬃnerie, owned by Saarbergwerke, had a minor market
share of 3.4%. Wintershall, VEBA and GBAG were additionally joint owners
of the petrol service station operator ARAL.
Throughout the holding discussions, the Ministry of Economics favoured
a solution which would focus on VEBA instead of VIAG. While the Ministry
of Finance was rather interested in the administrative and ﬁnancial dimension,
the Ministry of Economics intended to use public enterprises politically. Its
suggestion to regroup shareholdings was based on the intention to create an
instrument for structural policy in the energy market, more precisely in the oil
market. This became obvious in an internal paper about the energy-political
dimensions of a potential holding company. The paper recommended a merger
of VEBA and VIAG to combine their joint interests in the energy market and
strengthen their market positions. This would require a strong impact of the
federal government on both companies. However, it was stressed that there
was no intention to create a 100% state-owned national energy giant such
as ENI in Italy. To the contrary, a merger would be in the interests of the
private investors and smallholders. This notice was a reaction to a number of
negative press comments about an internal ministerial memorandum on energy
politics. Besides the energy market, no further concentration was desired in
673 For the attempt to establish a national oil company and the general developments in the
oil market see Stokes (2003), pp. 359378.
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markets with federal enterprises: a concentration in the coal sector would
neither make sense from a political nor from a business point of view. In the
steel sector, market interventions were considered to be politically too risky
because a future cooperation of Salzgitter AG with private steel companies was
regarded as crucial and previous attempts to establish a Nordstahl group in
1969 had already failed due to resistance from the private sector. 674
Throughout the discussion about the holding idea, the Ministry of Eco-
nomics repeatedly brought attention to VEBA. Rohwedder (SPD) found the
participation in VEBA too small in order to generate the necessary state im-
pact on the crude oil market. Kienbaum (FDP) held against this that the
government should not even have an impact from a political point of view.675
The ministerial oﬃcials stressed that if VIAG was brought into VEBA, the
federal share in VEBA would increase to more than 50% of the equity capital
so that the federal government could regain the voting majority which had
been lost due to the people's shares privatisation.676 On 7 July 1972, Schiller
(SPD) resigned and Helmut Schmidt (SPD) took the combined Ministry of
Finance and Economics over for the remaining time until the federal elections
on 19 November 1972. After the elections, Schmidt remained Minister of Fi-
nance and Hans Friderichs (FDP) became Minister of Economics. For the ﬁrst
time, the Ministry of Economics was in the hands of the FDP. But diﬀerent
to what could have been expected a decade ago when the FDP was the driv-
ing force behind privatisation, no attempts in that direction were made now.
Instead, Friderichs followed up on Schiller's plans to foster concentration in
the oil market. Once Friderichs had taken oﬃce, Engelmann677 presented him
with the existing plans. In a note to Minister Friderichs and Secretary of State
674 BArch B136/7392, BMWi, Wirtschaftspolitische Gesichtspunkte zum Gutachten über
das industrielle Bundesvermögen, 20.4.1971.
675 BArch B136/7392, BMF, VIIIB1, Minutes of the meeting of the working group Bun-
desholding on February 11, 1.3.1971.
676 BArch B126/59381, BMWi, Div. III (Lantzke) to Minister and Secretaries of State,
1.3.1971, p. 4.
677 Engelmann was at that time head of division IV (commercial economy and business
development Berlin) for only one year, before transferring back as head of division III
(energy). The responsibility for federal property remained subordinated to Engelmann
and Pieper became head of subdivision IVB (capital goods, chemistry and sharehold-
ings). When Pieper transferred to the Ministry of Finance, the subdivision for industrial
property remained in division III under Engelmann.
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Rohwedder, Engelmann pointed to the usefulness of public enterprises for en-
ergy policy and sectoral structural policy. He suggested to continue eﬀorts
to bundle forces in the oil market for three reasons: gaining a stronger posi-
tion as buyer in the international oil market, becoming a stronger partner for
oil producing companies and countries, and making it easier to enforce policy
measures.
Engelmann suggested three models. Model A was that VEBA should
take over Wintershall from BASF in exchange for VEBA's shareholdings in
the chemical sector. This would give VEBA a market share of 12.1% in oil
processing and a reﬁnery capacity of 19.7 million tonnes, compared to 9.5%
and 14.8 million tonnes of its rival RWE. According to model B, VEBA should
take over a 48% share in GBAG and 100% share in UK Wesseling from RWE
and exchange some of its non-oil shareholdings against Saarland-Raﬃnerie
and Deutsche Schachtbau- and Tiefbaugesellschaft mbH (Schachtbau) with
Salzgitter AG. This would lead to a market share of 18% and a capacity of 28.2
million tonnes. In return, RWE could be given an inter-company participation
in VEBA so that the federal share would decrease. Engelmann suggested
that the federal share could nevertheless be maintained by bringing VIAG
into VEBA but mentioned that this might be problematic due to expected
resistance from Bavaria because of the jointly owned Bayernwerke. Also, this
model would lead to a strong concentration and would be diﬃcult from a
market competition point of view. This was even more signiﬁcant at that
moment because the federal government attempted to implement a stricter
merger control in the antitrust law. A third option, model C, intended that all
German oil shareholdings, private and state-owned, would be decoupled from
their parent companies and brought into a new company which would have
to be founded for that purpose. It would be problematic that RWE would
then have the main share in this company with a share of 42.9%, compared
to 35.4% owned by VEBA. This would put RWE in a dominant position in
the German oil market, after already being in the leadership position in the
electricity market, which was considered unacceptable for VEBA.678 Model A,
678 BArch B102/254379, Wirtschaftspolitische Möglichkeiten des industriellen Bundesver-
mögens, BMWi, Div. IV (Engelmann) to Rohwedder and Friderichs, 23.2.1973.
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the takeover of Wintershall, was soon given up, presumably because the result
would have been an increased concentration of 60 to 70% in the energy market
and the involved parties were concerned about a too strong federal involvement
in that case. Model B seemed easier to implement. VEBA could in that case
make an oﬀer to external GBAG shareholders to purchase additional shares.
The costs of approximately 300 million DM would be ﬁnanced by the federal
government so that its share would increase and it could regain the voting
majority which it had lost during the partial privatisation.679 This would
put VEBA into the leadership position in the German oil market. Unlike
his earlier suggestion, Engelmann recommended abstaining from a merger of
VIAG and VEBA because the concentration eﬀect would become too strong.
Also, by taking over VIAG's chemical business, VEBA would start to operate
in an additional market segment and might become too diﬃcult to steer as a
company.680 Hence, model B was suggested to Chancellor Brandt.681
Bundling shareholdings and creating a strong mineral oil group was con-
sensus in the government.682 In September 1973, just before the 1973 oil crisis,
the federal government presented its energy programme. The programme in-
tended a regrouping of shareholdings in line with national interests in the oil
market, the so-called project Kern VEBA, in order to secure the long-term
supply. VEBA immediately agreed to take on a leadership role in this deal.
RWE refused to sell its share in UK Wesseling but oﬀered GBAG and UK
Wesseling's share in Deminex instead. VEBA would then hold 81.5% of Dem-
inex.683 After Brandt's approval, Friderichs ﬁnalised the deal with Salzgitter
AG: VEBA would take over Gelsenberg, who had a share in Ruhrgas AG.
Salzgitter AG would then transfer its shares in Schachtbau to VEBA and re-
ceive Ruhrgas shares in return. The advantage for Salzgitter AG was that the
679 BArch B102/254379, Rohwedder to Friderichs, 2.5.1973, Engelmann to Rohwedder and
Friderichs, 7.5.1973, Note, Div. IV (Engelmann) 6.6.1973, and Div. III/IV to Friderichs,
29.6.1973.
680 BArch B102/254379, BMWi, Div IV (Engelmann) to Friderichs, 20.6.1973.
681 BArch B136/7392, Head of Div. IV (BMWi) to Head of BKamt and Brandt, 15.6.1973.
682 BArch B102/254379, Minutes of a meeting of Minister of Economics Friderichs and Min-
ister of Finance Schmidt about the energy political programme on 5 July 1973, Div. III
(BMWi) and Div. I/VIII (BMF), 5.7.1973.
683 BArch B102/254379, Benningson-Foerder (VEBA) to Friderichs, 4.7.1973, and Barth
(BMWi, VIB8) to Pieper, 16.7.1973.
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combination of Salzgitter Ferngas and Ruhrgas would strengthen its role in
the gas sector.684 The Bundestag budget committee approved the purchase of
the RWE share in GBAG of 48.3% at a price of 641 million DM by the federal
government on 28 November 1973. The purchase contract between the federal
government and RWE was signed on 5 December 1973. The package secured
the voting majority for VEBA in GBAG. Nevertheless, to be on the safe side,
the government bought additional shares from external shareholders and raised
its share to 51.3% in order to also have the capital majority.685 The Federal
Cartel Oﬃce rejected the purchase contract with RWE because of a resulting
market-dominating position of the federal government.686 As a shareholder,
the federal government, represented by the Minister of Finance, counted as one
person before the Antitrust Law.687 The rejection had not been expected.688
The takeover of Gelsenberg and merger with VEBA subsequently became the
ﬁrst case of a ministerial approval. This option had been integrated in the an-
titrust law only in 1973. On 1 February 1974, Minister of Economics Friderichs
approved the takeover because of the implied macroeconomic beneﬁts. Before
the approval, it had been decided that Minister Friderichs would not take on
the position as chairman of the VEBA/Gelsenberg supervisory board, as had
originally been intended, since this might be misinterpreted and might also
entail conﬂicts of interests between economic policy and business decisions.689
In the case of the merger of GBAG and VEBA, the federal government
was in a dilemma: On the one side it intended to secure national interests. At
the same time it defended its interests as a shareholder. This limited options
because the government had to weigh these two interests against each other.
Therefore, it was not willing to allow a dominant position of RWE instead
of VEBA, although this would have secured national interests as well. This
tension was accepted and is reﬂected in a memorandum from 1975 which pre-
pared a meeting of Secretary of State Rohwedder (Ministry of Economics) and
the monopoly commission. The memo highlighted the fact that the ministry
684 BArch B102/254379, Internal Note, 23.8.1973.
685 BArch B102/254379, Internal Note, BMWi, IVB8, Barth, 20.3.1974.
686 BArch B102/254379, BMWi, Kartte IB5 to Friderichs, 17.1.1974.
687 BArch B102/254382, Internal Note, BMWi, Div. IB5 (Stahl), 14.11.1973.
688 BArch B102/254383, Reinhardt to Engelmann, 11.1.1974.
689 BArch B102/254383, Speaking Note by IVB8, 11.1.1974.
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did not aim for an energy-political dirigisme and did not want to disadvantage
anyone. Instead, the only way to use shareholdings for policy goals was to
create a cohesion between the interests of the federal government and the re-
spective companies and investors. If necessary, this had to be done with ﬁnan-
cial incentives. The exchange of GBAG shares into VEBA shares for external
shareholders for example had been made attractive by a government subsidy of
145 million DM.690 Similarly, Rohwedder mentioned at the supervisory board
meeting of GBAG in November 1974 that companies who cooperated with the
government beneﬁted ﬁnancially from this, and VEBA chief executive director
Bennigsen-Foerder mentioned at the VEBA general meeting in December 1974
that there was full agreement between the company and the federal govern-
ment that VEBA's business decisions had to be strictly return-oriented.691 The
perceived need to secure national interests with the help of public enterprises
was a response to an increasingly international market, in combination with
the recognition that other countries also defended their national interests. It
entailed a balancing of national interests on the one side and the importance
of maintaining competition and private ownership on the other side. However,
a complete nationalisation of the oil or energy industry was never intended.
5.2.3.2 Expansion and Diversiﬁcation
In the 1970s, public enterprises were aﬀected by several market crises. As a
response, the Ministry of Finance started to monitor companies more closely.
VIAG suﬀered from the crisis in the aluminium industry. In 1960, its subsidiary
company VAW had a share of 70% in the total German aluminium production.
Due to the crisis in the 1970s and early 1980s, VIAG focused increasingly on
the energy sector. The aluminium crisis was partially home-made: In 1968,
the federal government had implemented tax increases for aluminium exports
and tax reductions on imports. The crisis of the energy intensive aluminium
industry was intensiﬁed by the oil crisis in the 1970s. Salzgitter AG was
severely aﬀected by the international crisis in the shipbuilding industry through
690 BArch B102/254388, Internal Note (BMWi), Reinhardt, IIIB6, 22.1.1975.
691 BArch B102/254388, Äußerungen zum Verhältnis Energiepolitik/Unternehmenspolitik
VEBA, BMWi, IIIB6, 22.1.1975.
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its subsidiary company Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft. The number of orders
had decreased signiﬁcantly since the 1970s. The wharf crisis reached its peak at
the end of the 1980s and continued until the beginning of 1990s. The privately-
owned shipyard Finkenwerder in Hamburg was the ﬁrst company which had
to shut down in 1973. In 1985, Salzgitter AG sold its shares in HDW692 to the
privately owned shipyard Blohm+Voss.
Given the perceived necessity of using public enterprises as instruments
of structural policy in the current situation, there was a broad acceptance to
keep mixed ownership structures with a dominant role of the federal state.
That privatisation was not feasible at the moment was regularly conﬁrmed in
the Ministry of Finance in the mid 1970s. Yet, this was not regarded as a
change of paradigm. Rather, company-speciﬁc reasons were given. IVG for
example fulﬁlled important tasks on behalf of the federal state such as prop-
erty management and defence tasks and therefore not eligible for privatisation.
In the case of VIAG, the diﬃcult economic circumstances in the aluminium
market and increasing international competition would not allow for a privati-
sation because it would be irresponsible to transfer these problems onto private
investors. VIAG held a major share in Germany's only internationally impor-
tant aluminium company VAW. Also, VIAG's shares in the energy sector were
important in order to provide energy for the electrochemical business branch
of the company.693 Salzgitter AG was too important to be privatised due to
its importance in the structurally weak region of south-east Lower Saxony,
and Saarbergwerke were not only of regional importance but also Germany's
second largest coal producer and should therefore remain state-owned. Volk-
swagenwerk was at that time going through a process of restructuring which
prevented a privatisation.694
Yet, the ministry stressed that public enterprises were no burden for
the federal budget. Between 1949 and 1975, 2.74 billion DM proﬁts had been
distributed whereas the federal government had invested additional equity cap-
692 The second shareholder was the privately owned Gutehoﬀnungshütte, mother company
of the Deutsche Werft until the merger of Deutsche Werft and Howaldtswerke.
693 BArch B126/76980, BMF, VIIIA6 (Kellner) to VIIIA2, 17.5.1976.
694 BArch B126/76980, BMF, VIIIA6, Keine Privatisierungspläne für Industrieun-
ternehmen.
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ital of about 2.2 billion DM.695An article of the Ministry of Economics for the
German-British economic committee conﬁrmed that experiences with state
ownership were rather positive in West Germany. The author referred to the
good integration of privately and state-owned companies in the framework of
a mixed economy where state enterprises are managed according to business
principles. He stressed that private entrepreneurship was always prioritised
and that state-owned companies did not restrict private entrepreneurship.696
Symptomatically, in 1977, the committee for economic and social change, an
external committee which had been commissioned by the government to pro-
duce a report on how to deal with the changing circumstances, recommended
mixed ownership and joint ventures as an instrument to promote and support
modernisation.697 Only a minority of the committee members criticised this
view as too interventionist.698
The focus of property formation policy had since the mid-1960s turned
away from people's shares and property formation on a supra-company level
and had shifted to other forms of property formation on the company level. Be-
cause of concerns that there would not be enough supply to meet the demand
for co-ownership, tax beneﬁts for employee share issues were suggested.699
Knauss described the change of property formation politics in an internal
note in 1976. According to him, property formation remained an important
political goal. However, it had to be reduced to what was politically achiev-
able at a given time. In recent years, the focus had shifted from state-driven
and -ﬁnanced methods to internal company schemes, such as employee shares.
However, this posed a problem for state-owned companies, because the issue of
employee shares implied a partial privatisation and such a creeping privatisa-
tion was not politically desirable at that time.700 One oﬃcial in the Ministry
695 ibid.
696 BArch B126/63962, Erfahrungen mit Staatsunternehmen und Privatisierung in der Bun-
desrepublik Deutschland.
697 BArch B126/63956, Gutachten der Kommission für wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Wan-
del, pp. 563584.
698 ibid, p. 562.
699 BArch B126/76980, federal press article Vermögensbildung stärker gefördert, April
1970.
700 BArch B126/76979, BMF, VIIIA2 (Knauss) to Pieper, 16.11.1976; VIIIA2 (Knauss) to
Head of Div. VIII, 16.10.1979.
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of Finance therefore suggested issuing registered proﬁt participation bonds as
a suitable alternative.701 Nevertheless, the Ministry of Finance agreed to con-
tinue to focus on co-ownership through employee shares whenever possible.702
This was relevant for example in the case of Lufthansa in 1979.703
Besides energy policy, regional policy was a second main concern in the
second half of the 1970s. In particular, improving the economic situation in
West Berlin played an important role. Symptomatically, the subdivision in
charge in the Ministry of Economics was a combined division for sharehold-
ings and West Berlin's economic development. Support for this policy came
from all political sides. A small interpellation of the CDU/CSU Bundestag fac-
tion requested information about what federal enterprises could do to support
the West Berlin economy. Public enterprises were asked to award contracts to
enterprises which were based in Berlin whenever possible. The idea that pub-
lic enterprises should be relocated to Berlin or that they should preferentially
invest and generate jobs in Berlin was however declined with references to the
current ﬁnancially tight situation of most enterprises.704 The federal govern-
ment itself had only one major shareholding in West Berlin, the armament
company DIAG. DIAG did however not belong directly to the government but
to the ERP special fund.705 DIAG became highly unproﬁtable in the 1970s
and needed regular capital injections. Yet, a sale or liquidation and possible
withdrawal of the company from West Berlin was considered politically not
acceptable.706
In January 1973, the newspaperFAZ published a company ranking which
led to some surprise and concerns in the Ministry of Finance. It contained
data on the proﬁts of 771 German industrial companies for the year 1971.
Proﬁts were calculated as geometric mean of net proﬁts before taxes divided
by annual turnover and divided by balance sheet total. Companies were ranked
701 BArch B126/76979, BMF, VIIIA2 (Breitenstein) to Head of division VIII, 13.11.1978.
702 BArch B126/76979, BMF, Internal Note, IA1, 8.10.1979.
703Documentation about Lufthansa 1979 in BArch B126/76979.
704 BArch B126/63962, BMF, VIIIA2 to Matthöfer, 15.3.1978.
705DIAG was in 1990 sold to Ferrostaal GmbH. It diverted from the armament industry
and focused more on civil plant engineering. In 2002, Ferrostaal brought its three share-
holdings DIAG, Fritz Werner Industrie-Ausrüstungen GmbH and MAN Ferrostaal Oil &
Gas GmbH into the new MAN Ferrostaal Industrieanlagen GmbH.
706 Elend Schwer, Der Spiegel, 1979.
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according to their calculated proﬁtability. Of the companies with signiﬁcant
federal participation, Preussenelektra was the most proﬁtable one on rank 212
with a proﬁtability factor of 8.3 and the only state-owned company in the ﬁrst
third of the list. VEBA followed on rank 369 with a proﬁtability factor of 5.4
and VIAG on rank 411 with 4.7 in the second third, and VW, Stinnes, VAW,
Audi, Salzgitter, HDW, and Saarbergwerke on rank 783 with -0.8 in the last
third.707
In the Ministry of Finance, the bad result was not interpreted as a prob-
lem which was speciﬁcally related to public ownership. It was rather regarded
as a problem of large companies in general which did on the whole not do well
in the statistics. Of the 100 largest companies, the best one landed on rank 107.
This result was explained by the fact that large companies had greater diﬃcul-
ties to adapt to changing market conditions and were facing disproportionally
higher costs in diﬃcult market situations. As a result, the ministry felt con-
ﬁrmed that before considering further privatisations, the emphasis had to be
on the consolidation of public enterprises. Salzgitter AG, Howaldtswerke and
Saarbergwerke were among the weakest companies in the list. This was per-
ceived as a conﬁrmation for the earlier choice to exclude these companies from
peoples shares because the companies were not ready yet to be privatised.708
Therefore, the Ministry intended to monitor the companies more closely and
requested regular planning reports from the respective managements.709
A survey of the Ministry of Finance among public enterprises from Jan-
uary 1974 found that the situation for most companies had not yet improved.
To the contrary, they were facing decreasing sales ﬁgures in most markets.710
In 1979, the economic situation started to improve. In the eyes of the Ministry
of Finance, VEBA had been successfully reorganised through diversiﬁcation
and concentration in the electro-chemical sector and oil sector. VIAG, Volk-
swagenwerk and Salzgitter AG beneﬁted from improvements in the energy,
aluminium, steel and automobile markets. Also, the diversiﬁcation strategy
707 Zahlen zur Ertragslage von Aktiengesellschaften 1971, FAZ, 22.1.1973, copy in BArch
B126/51435.
708 BArch B126/51435, Internal Note, BMF, VIIIB1, 13.3.1973.
709 BArch B126/51435, Internal notes, BMF, VIIIB1 (Knauss/Winkeler), 27.12.1973 and
21.12.1973.
710 BArch B126/51435, BMWi, VIIIA2 (Knauss) to Schmidt, 24.1.1974.
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of Salzgitter AG towards processing industries was considered to be successful
and Saarbergwerke had imposed an investment strategy in order to increase
productivity. Only the shipbuilding industry remained diﬃcult. It was stressed
that public enterprises fulﬁlled their labour market responsibilities despite the
diﬃcult market situations and had not laid oﬀ too many workers.711
After the CDU/CSU proposals for a privatisation of VEBA and VIAG
in 1970 and 1971, there had been only little political pressure towards more
privatisation from the political opposition and from external interest groups.
Only the German Taxpayers' Association had made an attempt in June 1972
and had come up with a plan which provided that federal, state and municipal
shareholdings should be privatised within the next 20 years. Excluded from the
plan were local public services, Deutsche Bahn and Deutsche Post. However,
the idea had been considered as unrealistic and was immediately rejected by
the Ministry of Finance.712
While the number of direct federal shareholdings stayed more or less
constant, the number of indirect shareholdings increased signiﬁcantly during
the 1970s. The Ministry of Finance administration did not see the growing
number of indirect participations as a problem speciﬁcally related to public
enterprises but more as a general problem. Hence, the problem should be
addressed with a proposed revision of the antitrust law and stronger merger
control.713
The active investment and diversiﬁcation strategies of federal enterprises
in the 1970s as a crisis response led to increased costs for the federal govern-
ment. The ﬁnancial burden due to public enterprises was mentioned in two
reports of the scientiﬁc advisory bodies of the Ministry of Economics and the
Ministry of Finance.714 The Ministry of Finance stressed that there was no
increased ﬂow of subsidies to federal enterprises. Yet, the federal government
could not evade its responsibility as shareholder and had to participate in eq-
711 BArch B126/63960, BMF, Breitenstein to Haehser, 9.4.1979.
712 BArch B126/76980, BMF, VIII to Emde, 13.6.1972.
713 BArch B126/63960, BMF, VIIIA3 to VIIIA2, 13.12.1979, and VIIIA1/VIIIA2 (Bubinger,
Pfaﬀeroth) to Secretaries of State Haehser and Lahnstein, 14.12.1979, ibid.
714Gutachten des Wissenschaftlichen Beirats beim BMF (1975) Zur Lage und Entwick-
lung der Staatsﬁnanzen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland; Gutachten des Wis-
senschaftlichen Beirats beim BMW (1976) Kosten und Preise öﬀentlicher Unternehmen.
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uity increases. According to the ministry, the federal government expected a
reasonable return in the form of dividend payments in the future. However,
the ministry admitted that dividend payments of state-owned companies were
signiﬁcantly lower than in privately owned companies. In 1977, the average
dividend payment of public enterprises relative to nominal share capital was
2.45%, compared to an average dividend of 13.87% of privately owned compa-
nies.715
The government response to a Bundestag inquiry from a group of CDU,
CSU and FDP parliamentarians from 1984, after the FDP had left the govern-
ment coalition, brought some numbers to light: the number of indirect federal
participations had increased from 697 to 858 between 1970 and 1982. The
total share in nominal capital of all participations, including the special assets
German Federal Railway and German Federal Post Oﬃce, had increased from
3.7 billion to almost 7 billion DM  an increase of approximately 90%. The fed-
eral income from all participations was 2.36 billion DM, including the dividend
from Volkswagenwerk of about 231 million DM, which had to be passed on to
the Volkswagenwerk Foundation. The federal expenses for equity increases had
amounted to 6.588 billion DM, so the net result was a loss of approximately
4.2 billion DM. In the same time, 125 federal civil servants had transferred
to the management of federal enterprises, about half of them to the German
Federal Railway and its undertakings. Among these were the former heads of
division Werner Lamby and Ernst Pieper from the Ministry of Finance who
had transferred to VIAG and Salzgitter AG.716 In light of this development,
voices which criticised the expansion of state ownership became louder and
press articles about public enterprises became increasingly negative at the end
of the 1970s.717
Hans Matthöfer (SPD), Minister of Finance from 1978 to 1982, chose to
respond actively to criticism. In July 1979, he defended the public enterprise
policy in an interview with the weekly business news magazineWirtschaftswoche
715 BArch B126/63960, BMF, VIIIA1 and VIIIA2 (Bubinger, Pfaﬀeroth) to Secretaries of
State Haehser and Lahnstein, 14.12.1979.
716 Bundestagsdrucksache 10/1887, 21.8.1984.
717 For example Subventionen zur Systemüberwindung. Steuergelder für unrentable Staats-
betriebe, Bayern-Kurier, 8.12.1979, copy in BArch B126/63960.
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and emphasised that the focus of federal enterprises was not on dividends
alone.718 In the same issue, the newspaper published an extensive article on
that topic and accused the federal government of taking on tasks which were
not inherently public.719 In October, Matthöfer published an article himself
where he defended public enterprises as an instrument to modernise the econ-
omy.720
A Bundestag inquiry of the CDU/CSU faction from 1980 started with
the question of whether the federal government was aware of the fact that not
only the UK was selling public enterprises, but also that France had started to
reduce its participations in public enterprises to 50% or 75% by issuing shares.
The inquiry moved on to the question of whether the government was willing
to consider such a policy.721 The expansion of the public sector as a response
to stagﬂation was also seen more and more critically by FDP members. In
1982, the FDP left the government coalition.
Knauss later summarised the period after the holding idea had failed:
In the 1970s, the federal property existed without a clear direction.(...) The
ministerial administration learned in the 1970s already what private enterprises
had to learn in the 1980s: one should not diversify too fast and too much but
rather proceed step by step.722
718  `Die Rendite ist sekundär...' Interview mit Bundesﬁnanzminister Hans Matthöfer,
Wirtschaftswoche, 23.7.1979, p. 39, copy in BArch B126/63957.
719 Wenn der Staat Geschäfte macht, Wirtschaftswoche, 23.7.1979, pp. 3647, copy in
BArch B126/63957.
720 Aufgaben der Bundesunternehmen bei der Modernisierung der Wirtschaft, ZögU vol.
2(4), 17.10.1979, pp. 433442, copy in BArch B126/63958. The article was based on a
talk of Matthöfer at an internal event of the SPD-associated Friedrich Ebert Foundation
in September 1979: BArch B126/63958, Bundesﬁnanzminister Hans Matthöfer vor dem
Arbeitskreis `Wirtschaft und Politik' der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung am 20. September
1979, Unkorrigiertes Manuskript, for the discussion which followed the talk see BArch
B126/63958, Internal note, VIIIA2 (Knauss), 24.9.1979.
721 Bundestagsdrucksache 08/3895, 9.4.1980.
722 Ohne ein klares Konzept dümpelte danach das industrielle Bundesvermögen vor sich
hin. (...) Bereits in den 70er Jahren wurde den Mitarbeitern der Beteiligungsverwaltung
an diesen Beispielen deutlich, was einige deutsche Privatkonzerne in den 80er Jahren
an Erfahrung nachholen durften: man soll nicht zu schnell und zu viel diversiﬁzieren,
sondern Schritt für Schritt vorangehen.Knauss (1993), p. 9.
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Retreat of the State:
De-Investments 19821989
In 1982, the social-liberal coalition ended when the FDP left the government
coalition to protest against the government's economic policy. This event be-
came known as Bonner Wende. Subsequently, CDU, CSU and FDP formed a
new government coalition and Helmut Kohl (CDU) was elected Federal Chan-
cellor. The change of government was the beginning of a revival of privati-
sation. By 1989, most participations in the industrial sector had been sold
to private investors. An exception was the struggling Saarbergwerke AG. Yet,
that the federal government would withdraw from state ownership in industries
almost entirely until 1989 was far from being obvious until the mid-1980s. Pri-
vatisation remained laborious and required negotiations due to strong forces
of resistance within the government coalition and in the German states.
The main goal of the new government was to cut public expenditures and
to reduce bureaucracy. The leading idea was a lean state. Privatisation did not
play an important role in the beginning. After the government coalition had
been renewed after the federal elections in 1983, Minister of Finance Gerhard
Stoltenberg (CDU) and his Secretary of State Hans Tietmeyer took on the task
to develop a privatisation programme. As a start, an equity increase of VEBA
was ﬁnanced by issuing shares in 1984. Other companies followed: VEBA
was fully sold between 1984 and 1987, VIAG and VW (the company had been
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renamed in 1985) between 1986 and 1988, IVG partially in 1986 and Salzgitter
AG completely in 1989. In the case of Lufthansa, the government reduced its
share passively to just above the voting majority.
6.1 Bonner Wende 1982
Otto Graﬀ Lambsdorﬀ (FDP), Minister of Economics in the social-liberal coali-
tion between 1977 and 1982, was one of the main proponents of the termination
of the social-liberal coalition. He was a representative of the FDP's economic
liberalism wing which had regained power in the late 1970s. In 1982, Lamb-
sdorﬀ's Ministry of Economics published a programmatic paper Konzept für
eine Politik zur Überwindung der Wachstumsschwäche und zur Bekämpfung
der Arbeitslosigkeit (Concept for a policy to improve economic growth and
ﬁght unemployment) which later became known as Lambsdorﬀ Paper or Di-
vorce Paper. The newspaper Die Zeit called it a Manifest of Secession and
remarked that it was rather an attempt of the FDP to distance itself from
the SPD than an economic programme.723 The paper had been prepared by
Lambsdorﬀ, his Secretary of State Otto Schlecht and Hans Tietmeyer, head of
the economic policy division. Otto Schlecht was a long-standing independent
oﬃcial of the Ministry of Economics and an advocate of ordoliberalism. After
studying economics, he had started his career in public administration in 1953
as a civil servant under Ludwig Erhard. In 1973, he had become secretary of
state under Minister of Economics Friderichs (FDP) and remained in this posi-
tion until 1991. Tietmeyer, an economist who had written his diploma thesis in
1957 about the element of economic order in the catholic social doctrine,724 had
started working for the Ministry of Economics under Ludwig Erhard (CDU)
in 1962, and had been head of division since 1973.
The Lambsdorﬀ paper addressed the phenomenon of stagﬂation and high-
lighted that the economic conditions in the year 1982 were deteriorating: do-
mestic and foreign demand had plummeted, the Ifo Index indicated a decline
723 Ein Manifest der Sezession. Graf Lambsdorﬀs Papier für den Kanzler- Grundstimmung:
Dieses Unternehmen muß beendet werden, Die Zeit, 10.9.1982, p. 2.
724 Der ORDO-Begriﬀ in der katholischen Soziallehre
Chapter 6. Retreat of the State: De-Investments 19821989 250
of business activity and the number of insolvencies and unemployment had
increased. The investment ratio had decreased from an average of 24.1 in the
1960s to 20.08 in the second half of the 1970s due to sinking returns on equity.
At the same time, the public spending ratio had increased from 39 to 49.5 in
the ﬁrst half of the 1970s, while public investments had declined. The tax and
contribution ratio had gone up from 36 to 41%, social expenditures had risen
signiﬁcantly and public net borrowing had increased by approximately 6% since
the late 1960s. These problems had reinforced the low degree of adaptability
of the economy, uncertainty and unwillingness to invest. All these problems
were regarded as being of a structural nature. The paper highlighted that in
order to improve the situation, it was necessary to ﬁght pessimism and resig-
nation among the population, to awaken corporate initiative and to foster the
willingness to invest and promote economic growth. The most urgent problem
which had to be tackled was the high unemployment rate; all other problems
would have to be subordinated. No special interest groups should be favoured
and a commitment to a supply-side oriented policy and a step away from Key-
nesian demand-side policy was required. To cure these problems, the paper
demanded a new economic concept which should focus on a market-oriented
policy, decrease bureaucracy, consolidate the public budget, shift public ex-
penditures from consumption to investments and adapt social systems to the
changed economic circumstances.725 The paper was highly contentious in the
FDP. Mischnick (FDP) and Genscher (FDP)  who had arranged the social-
liberal coalition in 1969  had attempted to keep Lambsdorﬀ from presenting
the document to Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (SPD). However, the economic-
liberal circles of the FDP had become too strong and the FDP ended the
government coalition, formed a new coalition with the CDU/CSU and elected
Helmut Kohl (CDU) as Chancellor.726
Otto Graf Lambsdorﬀ (FDP) remained Minister of Economics in the new
conservative-liberal government. Gerhard Stoltenberg (CDU) became Minister
of Finance and was as such in charge of federal enterprises. Prior to that, he
725 Konzept für eine Politik zur Überwindung der Wachstumsschwäche und Bekämpfung der
Arbeitslosigkeit, Dr. Otto Graﬀ Lamsbdorﬀ, Bundesminister für Wirtschaft, 9.9.1982,
in: FDP Dokumentation 9/82, pp. 311.
726 For the role of the FDP in the Bonner Wende see Scholtyseck (2013).
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had been Federal Minister of Education and Research between 1965 and 1969
under Ludwig Erhard (CDU) and Kurt Georg Kiesinger (CDU). Tietmeyer,
the former head of the economic policy division in the Ministry of Economics
under Lambsdorﬀ (FDP), now became secretary of state in the Ministry of
Finance.727 With these personnel decisions, key positions had been ﬁlled with
representatives of a more market-based economic approach. The focus on
a market-oriented economic policy was also reﬂected by a division of tasks
between the party-wings of CDU/CSU: while the Ministry of Economics and
the Ministry of Finance were both in the hands of liberal and business-oriented
circles, Norbert Blüm as representative of the CDU left wing became Minister
for Labour and Social Aﬀairs.
The coalition agreement from 1982 included the intention to reduce pub-
lic expenditure by approximately 5.5 billion DM per year. 500 million DM
would be saved by reducing direct subsidies.728 The ﬁrst cabinet Kohl served
from 4 October 1982 until 29 March 1983. The government coalition was re-
newed after the federal elections on 6 March 1983, where the FDP experienced
a signiﬁcant loss of votes. The coalition agreement from March 1983 pro-
vided a federal budget consolidation for the next legislation period in which
expenses would be cut by at least 6.5 billion DM per year for the years 1984
to 1986. That way, net borrowing would be reduced to below 40 billion DM in
1984. Like in the coalition agreement of 1983, privatisation was not directly
mentioned.
In his government declaration of 1983, Kohl announced that the economic
policy of the coming years would be guided by a retreat of the state to the
core of its tasks.729 This programmatic reorganisation has been interpreted as
a shift towards neoliberal ideas. Historians are still discussing to what extent
this was really the beginning of profound policy changes.730 Yet, the federal
727 As secretary of state in the Ministry of Finance from 1982 to 1989, Tietmeyer served
Chancellor Helmut Kohl (CDU) as an advisor for the German reuniﬁcation. In 1990,
he became a board member of the Deutsche Bundesbank and its president in 1993. He
remained in this position until 1999.
728 Ergebnisse der Koalitionsgespräche, in Archiv des Liberalismus, Neue Bonner Depesche
no. 10/1982, pdf document IN5-304, p. 3.
729 Wir führen den Staat auf den Kern seiner Aufgaben zurück, damit er sie wirklich zu-
verlässig erfüllen kann., Bundestag Plenarprotokoll 10/4, 4.5.1983, pp. 56747.
730 See for example Schulz (2010).
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government struggled to deﬁne the core tasks of the state in public enterprises.
6.2 Preparatory Works
Privatisation became one of the main economic policies in the 1980s. Sources
suggest that the privatisation of industrial shareholdings between 1984 and
1989 had not been prepared before the new government took oﬃce. State
enterprises and privatisation neither appeared in the Lambsdorﬀ paper nor in
the coalition agreements. Apparently, public enterprises were not seen as one
of the most urgent problems. This suggests that privatisation in the 1980s
was not primarily a reaction to pressures from highly ineﬃcient, unproﬁtable
enterprises and an excessive burden for the federal budget. Indeed, there was
a self-perception that since there were no nationalisations after the Second
World, there was less to privatise than in other countries. This becomes evident
in a report of Deutsche Bank from 1987 which says that a multitude of medium-
sized enterprises had been the backbone of the West German economic system
ever since. The state only owned a few industrial participations for political
reasons.731
After taking oﬃce, Stoltenberg and Tietmeyer started with an inventory
and a review of whether there were suﬃcient reasons for state ownership in
every single case. They were supported by ministerial oﬃcial Knauss who
had already been part of the administration in charge of shareholdings in the
1970s. Two factors accelerated privatisation eﬀorts at the start of the term of
oﬃce of the new government: a highly critical report of the Federal Court of
Audit from 1983 and a planned equity increase of VEBA. Since each larger
privatisation required the approval of the Bundestag and Bundesrat, a broad
political consensus among the coalition parties was required.
731DBA ZA43/x8091, Volksaktien in der UdSSR  Deutsche Erfahrungen als Anstoß für
erste Überlegungen in Richtung auf eine Beteiligung der sowjetischen Arbeitnehmer am
Produktivvermögen der Wirtschaft (Expert report for Ambassador Kwizinski), p. 4,
19.11.1987.
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6.2.1 The First Case: VEBA
The case of VEBA served as a precedent case for the de-investment from public
enterprises in the 1980s. Why Stoltenberg wanted to go ahead with VEBA
can only be assumed. It seems likely that in a situation where the government
focused on reducing public debt, a participation in the equity increase without
partial privatisation would have been diﬃcult to explain. Also, Stoltenberg
might have found the opportunity to set a favourable precedent. Just a few
days after the federal election in March 1983, an internal discussion paper
from division VIII in the Ministry of Economics discussed the possibilities of
a further privatisation of VEBA and questions whether the original energy-
political reasons to keep a participation were still relevant. According to the
paper, the fact that the state was a major shareholder has had both negative
and positive eﬀects on VEBA's development in the past. After all, VEBA was
still West Germany's largest energy company with signiﬁcant shareholdings
in the coal, electricity and oil sectors. The VEBA-Gelsenberg merger would
not have happened without federal intervention, but the idea of a national oil
company had not proven to be successful in the end. The oil supply contracts
with Saudi Arabia as well as the participation of the Venezuelan PdVSA in
the newly founded reﬁnery Ruhröl GmbH in the Ruhr District from 1982/1983
would not have been possible without the quasi-public status. At the same
time, a participation of the Iranian oil company NIOC in VEBA Oel was
not realised due to concerns of the federal government. The author points
out, however, that the described impact was not embedded in formal rights
but rather a consequence of the informal position of the government as a
main shareholder. The note concludes that a public interest could be justiﬁed
to secure electricity supply since VEBA was West Germany's second largest
electricity producer due to its subsidiary Preussenelektra. An interest could
also potentially be justiﬁed for the oil business (VEBA Oel had experienced
an operational loss of more than 1.5 billion DM in the previous seven years),
although it was not of international importance, and for the coal sector since
VEBA was the largest shareholder of RAG with a share of 27%. A public
interest was negated for VEBA's subsidiaries in the chemical and trade sector
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(Chemische Werke Hüls and Stinnes).
The discussion paper suggested an active partial privatisation as a con-
sequence of the declined federal interest in VEBA. The current value of the
federal participation in VEBA was estimated to be 2 billion DM. This was
considered as too much for a full privatisation because smallholders had to be
protected from price decreases in the case of a possible oversupply of shares
in line with the Schutzpatrontheorie (`patron saint theory'). An equity in-
crease was currently not intended for the near future and would also be to
small for a real privatisation eﬀect so that a passive privatisation was not
considered to be an option. As an alternative to or in addition to a reg-
ular share issue, the paper suggested adopting the Mercedes-Model. The
Mercedes model described the ownership construction in the case of Daimler-
Benz: the Mercedes-Automobil-Holding AG held 25.23% in Daimler-Benz. Of
the Mercedes-Automobil-Holding AG shares, 50% were in free ﬂoat and the
other 50% were owned by two holding companies which were each owned by
four corporations, including holding companies. Shares in the holding compa-
nies belonged mainly to banks and insurance companies, among these German
state banks. In the case of VEBA this would mean that a block of shares would
be sold to a holding which would consist of ten investors, each with 10%. This
idea was brought up again several times over the next few years. The perceived
advantage was that there would be a certain degree of a dispersion of owner-
ship but a better control compared to the case of free ﬂoat. In any case, the
paper recommended to keep a federal share in order to protect small investors
from price declines.732 The developments of partially privatised companies up
until then looked promising: an evaluation of people's shares conducted by
Deutsche Bank later in 1983 found that since their partial privatisations, the
three companies had actuarial returns of 12.42% (Preussag), 9.24% (VW) and
8.75% (VEBA).733
A comment on an earlier version of the discussion paper conﬁrms that a
public interest in most subsidies of VEBA could not be justiﬁed. The govern-
732 BArch B126, Memorandum, Head of Div. VIII (Wagner), 16.3.1983.
733 Summary of dividend payments in DBA ZA43 x8089x8091, Preussag, VEBA und VW,
Anlegerenditen seit der jew. Privatisierung, 22.12.1983.
Chapter 6. Retreat of the State: De-Investments 19821989 255
ment and also VEBA itself had by now distanced themselves from the idea of
bundling the German interests in the oil industry in VEBA which had justiﬁed
the federal participation in the 1970s. An exception was the participation in
RAG which could be disintegrated in the case of a privatisation of VEBA.
A handwritten comment however doubted that this would be feasible because
Minister of Economics Martin Bangemann (FDP) would not agree to this. The
paper further states that all companies except for VEBA and VIAG had to be
ruled out from privatisation at the moment due to unfavourable circumstances:
In the case of VW, proﬁts and hence dividends were risky at the moment, plus
the main share of the revenues from a sale would have to be passed on to the
Volkswagenwerk Foundation. Salzgitter, Saarberg and VIAG should not be
considered for economic and regional-political reasons. In the case of Prakla
and Treuarbeit, strong federal interests stood in the way of a privatisation,
and the companies were also too small for dispersed ownership. In terms of
the privatisation model, the discussion paper found that investment compa-
nies were the better option because they would harmonise better with the idea
of `ownership for everyone'. A handwritten comment however preferred the
holding model because it allowed for a better protection of smallholders.734
In November 1983, Secretary of State Tietmeyer informed the members
of the Bundestag economics committee about the government's intention to
reduce its share in VEBA by 13.75% from 43.75% to 30% from January 1984
onwards. The background for this was a planned equity increase which had
been decided at the general meeting in 1983 unlike the discussion paper from
March 1983 had expected. The government intended to participate in the eq-
uity increase of nominal 250 million DM because it wanted to secure a veto
minority of at least 25%. To reduce its share to the desired volume, the in-
tention was to sell shares on the stock market after participating in the equity
increase. Tietmeyer explained further that the choice of VEBA had to do with
the fact that the federal share was already below a 50% majority. Because
of that, the federal government could only exercise a limited inﬂuence on the
company. This led to ongoing tensions between the Federal Court of Audit,
734 BArch B126/ 93026, Internal note about an earlier version of the paper from 14 March
1983, VIIIA (Kropﬀ), 15.3.1983.
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the Federal Budget Act and the stock company law. Yet, this explanation
lacked sense because the federal government still owned the voting majority in
the general meeting  this had been kept on purpose in the 1970s because it
was declared to be suﬃcient by the social-liberal government. The reduction
of the federal VEBA share was not yet a preliminary decision for a full privati-
sation of shareholdings in the industrial sector. Tietmeyer stressed that the
government considered a veto minority in VEBA as important in order to be
able to block a possible impact of foreign investors. After all, VEBA was still
West Germany's largest oil company and second largest electricity producer.
Therefore, the government intended to keep a share of 30% in VEBA  this
would be suﬃciently above the threshold of 25%. According to Tietmeyer, a
second reason for keeping a veto minority was that the government assumed
that it would be easier to ﬁnd trade partners in the international oil market if
the company remained partially publicly owned. A state share would be seen
as a guarantee and would increase the trust of partner countries and compa-
nies. The veto minority was therefore seen as a long-term solution and not as
a temporary necessity. Special share features were not considered to be nec-
essary and also no social concessions and purchase restrictions should apply.
Only a special allocation to VEBA employees was intended.735
The ministerial administration was aware of the fact that the political
goal of a distribution of shares through people's shares had only been par-
tially realised. Approximately three quarters of the initial 2.6 million VEBA
shareholders had sold their shares by now. Information about how the share-
holder composition had changed since the partial privatisation in 1965 was
derived from information about shareholder presence at the recent general
meeting: Shareholders representing 78.49% of the nominal share capital were
present. This included the federal government (representing 43.75% of the
nominal share capital), smallholders through proxy voting of banks (28.70%),
investment funds (5.50%), shareholder associations (0.18%) and smallhold-
ers (0.11%). The number of portfolios had decreased steadily from initially
735 PA, Minutes of the 8th meeting of the Bundestag economics committee (9th committee)
on 9 November 1983, pp. 2227.
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2,600,000 in 1965 to 700,000 in 1981.736 This was a clear downward trend.
The initial dispersion of shares had not been maintained. The fact that small-
holders represented only 0.11% of the nominal share capital was far removed
from a shareholder culture. Instead, proxy voting was prevalent.
Although these trends did not look promising, Stoltenberg decided to
combine the sale of VEBA shares with property formation policy. The tim-
ing of the VEBA privatisation was chosen such that the subscription period
started just when the new Property Formation Act (also: 936-DM-Law) be-
came eﬀective on 1 January 1984. This act increased the savings for which
subsidies could be granted from 624 DM to 936 DM. Employee shares and
shares subscribed in the framework of the Property Formation Act were allo-
cated preferentially. The sharply criticised disadvantage was that subsidised
shares had to be held for a minimum of six years according to the law, otherwise
subsidies would have to be returned. Nevertheless, the deputy of the working
group on economic questions of the CDU/CSU Bundestag faction Matthias
Wissmann declared that the government had the full support of the faction
for the planned VEBA privatisation.737
In October 1983, right before a meeting of the federal cabinet, Stoltenberg
presented his plans at a press conference. He announced that the reduction
of the participation in VEBA would just be a ﬁrst step and that sharehold-
ings should be reduced in all cases where this was possible without impairing
public interests. Privatisation should aim at a broad distribution of ownership
of the means of production. Federal enterprises which were currently generat-
ing losses should ﬁrst be reorganised and consolidated.738 The federal cabinet
approved Stoltenberg's request to reduce the federal share in VEBA in Octo-
ber 1983 and highlighted the context of the Property Formation Act.739 The
736 BArch B126/ 93026, Attachment 2 of Memorandum, Head of Div. VIII (Wagner),
16.3.1983.
737 BArch B126/93027, press announcement of the CDU/CSU Bundestag faction,
26.10.1983.
738 BArch B126/136047, Erklärung des Bundesministers der Finanzen zur Reduzierung des
Bundesanteils an der VEBA AG vor der Bundes-Pressekonferenz am 26. Oktober 1983
in Bonn, BMF press announcement 94/83, 26.10.1983.
739 Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung online, Federal Cabinet, minutes of the
17th meeting on 26 October 1983, agenda item 8.b: Reduzierung des Bundesanteils an
der VEBA AG.
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expected revenues of 760 to 770 million DM were intended to be used to re-
duce net borrowing. It was expected that the resulting interest savings, oﬀset
against lost dividend payments, would lead to an annual relief of the federal
budget of about 32 million DM.740
The VEBA subscription result was that 4,393,648 shares were sold by the
bank consortium. Of these, 46,352 shares were sold in the framework of the
Property Formation Act and approximately 200,000 shares as employee shares.
This led to total revenues of 769,6193,491.69 million DM.741 Stoltenberg de-
clared the placement as successful. Shares to a nominal value of 232 million
had been placed only two days after the subscription period had started. Yet,
the subscription result of employee shares was not perceived as satisfying. Of
the 73,297 eligible persons (only domestic VEBA employees), 21,072 (28.7%)
had subscribed for 121,665 shares. Those who had subscribed for shares pur-
chased on average 5.8 of the maximum 6 shares, this entailed costs of 6 million
DM for VEBA. Only one quarter of these shares were purchased with the ﬁnan-
cial support of the Property Formation Act. Approximately two thirds of the
employee purchasers were ﬁrst purchasers and opened new securities accounts.
For comparison, employee shares were signed by 3% of eligible Daimler-Benz
employees, 24% of Siemens employees and 45% of Mannesmann employees in
the latest share issues of these companies. It was assumed that the minimum
holding period of six years probably had a negative eﬀect on the subscription
result. Also, it was noted that there was a clear increase of the number of
subscriptions with income.742 Hence, ﬁnancial resources or prior knowledge
about shares might have played a role.
6.2.2 Deﬁning the Public Interest
The annual Bundestag budget debates became focal points for privatisation
debates in the 1980s. One reason for the intense discussions in the Bundestag
budget committee were the latest remarks of the Federal Court of Audit. The
740 BArch B126/93027, BMF press announcement 7/84, 29.1.1984
741 BArch B126/93027, VIIIA3 (Blättner) to Stoltenberg, 24.5.1984
742 BArch B126/143220, Belegschaftsakten, VIII A2,3 (Knauss, Blättner) to Tietmeyer,
4.6.1984.
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court had in the past repeatedly complained that the government did not make
proper use of its rights as a shareholder. The remarks of the Federal Court of
Audit referred to all federal shareholdings without exceptions. Possibly, after
the change of government, critics of state ownership within the court sensed
an opportunity for change.
In May 1983, the Court of Audit sent a draft proposition for a Bundestag
motion to the audit subcommittee of the Bundestag budget committee. It con-
tained suggestions to improve the federal activities in corporations, amongst
others: The public tasks which can justify an important interest in a federal
enterprise have to be determined and speciﬁed in such a way that they can
serve as objectives for the execution of public tasks by public enterprises.743
The Bundestag committee decided to use this as a basis for a discussion of
the tasks which the federal state had to fulﬁl in public enterprises. A general
debate was postponed to after the summer break. By then, the committee
expected to have received an answer from the federal government.744 The cat-
alogue on which the committee and the court agreed comprised the questions
as to how the public interest was deﬁned and how it was certiﬁed that there
was no other equally good or better way to reach the same political goal.745
Stoltenberg took the question catalogue very seriously, asking all other
state departments for feedback and organising a government meeting.746 At
ﬁrst, oﬃcials in the Ministry of Finance reacted defensively. Knauss, who had
been in charge of federal enterprises since the 1970s, noted that every political
goal of the government could constitute a public interest and would hence be
eligible in the framework of the budget law. Moreover, public interests could
change over time. The convention so far had been that the public interest
had to be exist mainly in cases where direct participations were acquired. The
743 Die öﬀentlichen Aufgaben, die ein wichtiges Interesse an einem Bundesunternehmen
begründen, sollten durch politische Entscheidung bestimmt und so eindeutig festgelegt
werden, dass sie als Zielvorgabe für die Wahrnehmung öﬀentlicher Aufgaben mit Hilfe
von privatrechtlichen Unternehmen dienen können., BArch B126/136047, Bundesrech-
nungshof, Anlage zum Fragenkatalog, 31.5.1983, pp. 711.
744 BArch B126/136047, Minutes of the 4th meeting of the auditing subcommittee of the
Bundestag budget committee on 9 June 1983; see also Bundestagsdrucksache 10/393,
16.9.1983, p. 15.
745 BArch B126/136047, Fragenkatalog.
746 BArch B126/136047, Express letter, BMF to all other State Departments, 10.6.1983
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only shareholding which had actually ever been directly acquired was GBAG.
In that case, the public interest was of energy-political nature.747 Knauss'
colleague Koch added that the federal interest had to be tested regularly and
that it was a long and politically diﬃcult road give up participations. He added
that often, a sale was not achievable or companies had to remain in public
ownership in order to prevent them from being liquidated, or a liquidation
would be too costly.748
Additionally, the Ministry of Transportation defended `its' companies. It
argued that most participations and enterprises in the transport sector were
proﬁtable, with some exceptions. In 1981, the transport sector had gener-
ated net revenues of 82.6 million DM for the federal budget (excluding the
loss-making German Federal Railway). Lufthansa and Gesellschaft für Neben-
betriebe der Bundesautobahnen mbH regularly paid dividends or distributed
proﬁts. The only Berliner Flughafengesellschaft and Osthannoversche Eisen-
bahnen AG would regularly need subsidies, all other enterprises would break
even. Also, the ministry argued that under the current legal conditions, al-
most all participations in the transport sector could be kept since a public
interest was given in most cases. Only exceptions were the three waterway
construction ﬁnancing companies Elbe-Mittelland Kanal GmbH, Rheinisch-
Westfälische Kanal GmbH and Nordwestkanal GmbH.749 Upon Stoltenberg's
request, the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications went through the par-
ticipations of the German Federal Post Oﬃce and ﬁnally presented its results
to the Ministry of Finance in March 1984. According to this, a public interest
could not be stated in ﬁve cases: DLH, Depfa, the rather small and hardly prof-
itable Wohnungsbaugesellschaft and Deutsche Fernkabel-Gesellschaft mbH.750
In September 1983, a debate about the report for the budget year 1981
took place but a response from the Ministry of Finance was still pending.
Chairman of the audit committee Bernhard Friedmann (CDU/CSU) argued
that the state should not keep and ﬁnance the problematic enterprises because
747 BArch B126/136047, VIIIA1, 9.6.1983, Knauss to Parliamentary Secretary of State Voss.
748 BArch B126/136047, Internal note, IIA3 (Koch), 9.6.1983.
749 BArch B126/136047, Central Division Z22, May 1983, Beteiligungsverwaltung des
BMV.
750 BArch B126/143220, Secretary of State Winfried Florian (BMPost) to Tietmeyer,
3.2.1984.
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this would mean that medium-sized enterprises would have to ﬁnance their
state-owned competitors through taxes.751 This became a recurring argument
in the privatisation discussion and diﬀered clearly from the earlier argument
that only well-performing companies should be privatised.
The Ministry of Finance sent a response to the Bundestag budget com-
mittee in November 1983. It referred to an economic report of the government
from 1983 and conﬁrmed the general political goal of reducing the public sector.
However, the deﬁnition of the public interest which justiﬁed public ownership
would have to be the result of a political opinion-forming and decision-making
process which had only just started. To name such eligible interests was there-
fore not possible yet. Potentially important interests could include security
of supply, foreign and domestic policy, environmental, infrastructure and de-
velopment policy. If a federal interest was conﬁrmed, it could be imposed in
diﬀerent ways on public enterprises, for example through the company objec-
tives.752
The next impetus for the discussion of public ownership was provided
by the annual report of the Federal Court of Audit for the year 1981.753 The
report accused the Minister of Finance of failing to implement a suﬃcient level
of control, inﬂuence and access to information in the case of VEBA. Referring
to the budget law, the court demanded from the Minister of Finance that he
fulﬁl his obligations and exert the government's rights as a shareholder. More
speciﬁcally, the Federal Court of Audit was critical of the fact that VEBA had
been able to refuse demands of the ministry for more federal representation on
the supervisory boards of the subsidiary companies. Second, VEBA had not
submitted audit reports which was an infringement against 171 AktG. And
third, there existed no rules of order for the VEBA management board which
would regulate which business decisions needed an approval of the supervisory
board. In addition to the lack of supervision, the report advocated that the
share in VEBA should either be upgraded to a majority of votes (in the refer-
751 daß der Mittelständler über seine Steuern via Staat seine staatliche Konkurrenz ﬁ-
nanziert. BArch B126/136047, Bundestag Plenarprotokoll 10/26, 30.9.1983, p. 1764.
752 BArch B126/136047, Parliamentary Secretary of State Voss to Chairman of the Bun-
destag auditing committee Friedmann, 2.11.1983.
753 Report of the Federal Court of Audit for the Budget Year 1981, Bundestagsdrucksache
10/574, 8.11.1983.
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ence year 1981 the federal share was 43.75%) which would improve the federal
rights, or reduced to a participation of just above 25% which would secure the
tax privilege and a veto right.
One might wonder whether the Federal Court of Audit followed a political
agenda or whether it simply ensured that the government followed the legal
rules and regulations. What is interesting to note is that in the report for the
year 1981, the court demanded that the participation in VEBA should either
be reduced to 25% or increased to 50%. However, after the partial privatisation
of VEBA in 1984, the court argued that a 25% share was not enough in order
to secure a suﬃcient inﬂuence. Therefore, there was no reason to keep the
participation and it should be sold entirely as soon as the market situation
would allow for this.754
The reactions in the Ministry of Finance were two-sided: on the one hand,
with the privatisation agenda being prepared, Stoltenberg and his oﬃcials did
not seem keen to address the speciﬁc points which were mentioned in the
report. Also, the report obviously referred to the year 1981 and therewith to
the previous Minister of Finance Matthöfer and his ministerial administration.
Part of the accusations had become insubstantial because in the meantime, the
share had been reduced to 30% due to the equity increase and it was already
planned to reduce it further to 26% at a later point in time. Hence, Stoltenberg
simply declared that the problems addressed in the audit report were not his to
solve but fell under the responsibility of each individual government oﬃcial who
served on a supervisory board.755 On the other hand, due to concerns about the
Bundestag reaction it seemed advisable to address the criticism in some way.
The critical point was the refusal of VEBA to submit audit reports since this
was a clear violation of law, while all other addressed points could be justiﬁed.
Internally, it was acknowledged that holding back audit reports was a widely
customary practice to avoid business secrets falling into the wrong hands. In
the case of public enterprises, this risk was considered to be even larger because
there was a danger that information could be passed on through the Bundestag
and administrative bodies. VEBA reacted by commissioning a legal opinion
754 BArch B126/93019, Federal Court of Audit to BMF, 11.7.1985.
755 BArch B126/93019, VIII A 3 (Blättner) to Head of Div. VIII, 24.10.1984.
Chapter 6. Retreat of the State: De-Investments 19821989 263
which conﬁrmed this point of view.756 However, it was obvious that neither
the Federal Court of Audit nor the Bundestag would let the ministry get away
with this.
The auditor's report was discussed in the Bundestag audit subcommittee
in January 1984. Besides the points mentioned by the auditors, the committee
criticised the obvious lack of documentation of informal arrangements between
VEBA (and other companies) and the Minister of Finance. The subcommittee
decided to oﬃcially demand that the Stoltenberg should consider all legal
possibilities to coerce VEBA to submit their reports and approvingly took
cognizance of the auditor's report.757 This incident showed that a fresh wind
was blowing through the Bundestag rows and that parliamentarians of the
coalition parties would continue to question the role of the state in public
enterprises.
After some negotiations and legal arguments in which VEBA chief Bennigsen-
Foerder tried all manner of tricks,758 a deal with VEBA was achieved between
Tietmeyer and Bennigsen-Foerder: the requested VEBA report would be given
to Tietmeyer for a limited time and the reports of the subsidiary companies
would be handed out to the ministerial oﬃcials in charge of inspection in the
VEBA oﬃces.759 Internal notes from the Ministry of Finance conﬁrm that
there was indeed a lack of both the political will and the government's abil-
ity to increase its impact as a shareholder. Rules of order had in the past
not been considered as necessary and appropriate because the daily business
operations of public enterprises were so manifold that it was not possible to
create a list of business activities which would require approval from the super-
visory boards.760 Internally, it was agreed that impact and information rights
of the federal government should remain limited: The government should not
impose its will onto the enterprises as a minority shareholder and become
756 BArch B126/93019, Internal note VIIIA3 (Blättner) to VIIIA1, 17.1.1984.
757 Bundestagsdrucksache 10/1500, 24.5.1984; see also two internal notes about the meeting
of the Bundestag audit committee on 26 January 1984: BArch B126/93019, VIIIB6
(Klepp), 30.1.1984, and VIII A3, 1.2.1984.
758 In a letter to Tietmeyer, Bennigsen-Foerder declared that everything was just a misun-
derstanding and due to an oﬃce failure, BArch B126/93019, Note Reuber for Head of
Div. VIII, 7.9.1984.
759 BArch B126/93019, VIII A 3 (Blättner) to Tietmeyer, 23.1.1985 and 30.1.1985.
760 BArch B126/93019, VIII A 1, Bubinger to Tietmeyer/Stoltenberg, 28.8.1984.
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some sort of quasi-management. Responsibility should be entirely with the
managements. This was even more important because adverse eﬀects of busi-
ness decisions which were imposed by the federal government would oblige the
government to shoulder compensation payments. Also, it was considered to
be natural that the management restricted the information which was passed
on to supervisory boards and the federal government in order to avoid criti-
cal business information becoming public. The ministry conﬁrmed that there
were unoﬃcial contacts between the government and management boards, but
these would have to remain secret in order to not jeopardise the information
sources.761
Despite the upcoming sale of VEBA shares, the Bundestag budget com-
mittee found that things were moving too slowly and demanded a timely pre-
sentation of a privatisation conception from the government in January 1984.762
According to their budget report for the year 1984, the committee had not re-
ceived the report yet. In their budget report for the year 1985, there was no
word about it anymore. Possibly, the parliamentarians had decided to not
complicate things further since Stoltenberg's privatisation plans turned out to
be subject of controversies in the government coalition.
From autumn 1983, Stoltenberg and his administration were working on a
larger scale privatisation programme. Secretary of State Tietmeyer presented
the main features of the new policy at a joint event of the CDU-associated
Konrad Adenauer- Foundation and the Society for Public Economy in autumn
1983. He pointed out that the public interest was foremost a political question,
not a legal one. However, the burden of proof was with those who wanted to
maintain public ownership, not with those who wanted to privatise. In that
sense, the intention to privatise had nothing to do with ideological biases,
it was an obligation based on the budget law. Experiences had shown that
an adaptation of enterprises to changing market conditions was best achieved
through private competition. Despite that, in the case of VEBA, a public
energy-political interest justiﬁed a federal participation of 25%. But in gen-
761 ibid.
762 BArch B126/93027, Minutes of the 25. meeting of the Bundestag budget committee on
14.3.1984, committee document no. 405.
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eral, international developments did not encourage public ownership, although
the West German public enterprises were doing rather well compared to public
enterprises in other countries.763 A few days later, Tietmeyer presented this
approach at a meeting of the Bundestag economics committee and added that
a public interest which would justify public ownership could be of energy-,
transportation-, regional-, or research-political nature. Tietmeyer asked the
committee members to abstain from addressing the topic of privatisation pub-
licly while consultations were ongoing.764 Tietmeyer's argumentation indicated
a certain degree of `juridiﬁcation' of the privatisation debate: the political de-
bate was led as if it was primarily of legal nature. This way, Stoltenberg was
later able to approach criticism with the argument that the Federal Budget
Act would force him to consider all enterprises for privatisation. Whether this
was his intention to some extent is not clear.
An unﬁnished and undated memorandum of Stoltenberg on motives, mo-
tivations and limitations of privatisation provides an insight into his view on
public enterprises. He found that transferring municipal tasks from in-house
provision onto legally independent enterprises was a positive example for pri-
vatisation since enterprises were more adaptable to change. On the federal
level, the discretionary powers of the budget law had been deﬁned rather
widely in the past. Now, it was about time to rethink this in a more crit-
ical way. Recent international developments posed challenges beyond mere
structural change. Large companies and in particular public enterprise bu-
reaucracies were not adaptable enough to respond well to these changes, even
more so since they would assume that losses would be ﬁnanced by the federal
government. Therefore, privatisation should be implemented moderately and
in communication with all the parties involved. However, privatisation volume
and revenues should not be overestimated.765 Unfortunately, this version of the
763 Printed version of his speech in BArch B126/136047, Tietmeyer: Neukonzeption der
Beteiligungspolitik des Bundes, Bulletin der Bundesregierung no. 118, 4.11.1983, pp.
10791084.
764 PA, Minutes of the 8th meeting of the Bundestag economics committee (9th committee)
on 9 November 1983, pp. 2526.
765Gerhard Stoltenberg: Motive, Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Privatisierung von Bun-
desvermögen  Banken im Bundesbesitz ausgenommen? Undated, probably from late
1983/early 1984.
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paper does not deal with the question of banks as the title suggests. Possibly, a
later version of the memorandum exists which reveals more about Stoltenberg's
attitude to privatising banks. Yet, it is notable that he addressed this topic
this early. Later, Stoltenberg repeated that the same privatisation guidelines
should be applied for industrial and banking participations.766 Similarly, at
a congress of the European Centre of Enterprises with Public Participation
and of Enterprises of General Economic Interest (CEEP), Secretary of State
Voss (Ministry of Finance) said that Europe had to liberate itself from its
industrial inﬂexibility. Public enterprises should be allowed access to new eq-
uity in private markets and the risk appetite of entrepreneurs and enterprises
had to be strengthened in order to solve the European economic crisis. 767
Hence, the German move to privatisation was seen as part of larger European
developments.
Stoltenberg presented his privatisation plans to the Bundestag budget
committee in January 1984. According to his speaking notes for this meeting,
he did not yet commit to a privatisation programme beyond the upcoming sale
of VEBA shares. He further asked the Bundestag subcommittee members for
their understanding, arguing that the new government had just been elected
about half a year ago and that preparatory works had not been completed yet.
But in general, the two problem cases, Salzgitter AG and Saarbergwerke, were
proving that diversiﬁcation strategies had so far not improved the situation
of public enterprises but had rather led to additional problems. Therefore,
indirect participations had to be the ﬁrst targets of a future privatisation
policy. Stoltenberg reported that he had already rejected a few requests of
federal enterprises to acquire participations and that he had announced that
such requests would be examined very critically in the future. Also, he had
asked other ministries to do the same within their areas of responsibility. A
more detailed privatisation concept would follow later that year.768
766 BArch B126/ 143219, VIIIA2 (Knauss) to Tietmeyer, 27.9.1984.
767 BArch B126/143220, Rede des Parlamentarischen Staatssekretärs beim Bundesminister
der Finanzen, Dr. Friedrich Voss, vor dem X. Kongreß des Europäischen Zentralverban-
des der öﬀentlichen Wirtschaft am 27. Juni 1984 in Lissabon.
768 Blick über die Grenzen ermutigt nicht, den staatlichen Unternehmenssekor
auszudehnen, BArch B126/136047, VIII A2 und A1, Speaking note for the meeting
of the Bundestag audit committee on 26 January 1984, 23.1.1984.
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A Bundestag debate on the topic of privatisation took place in a gov-
ernment question time (Aktuelle Stunde) on 27 March 1985 upon request
of the FDP. Only one day earlier, the government coalition had approved
Stoltenberg's privatisation concept  probably because Stoltenberg had con-
vinced his colleagues in the federal cabinet that he needed to be able to deliver
something the next day. In the Bundestag debate, fundamental diﬀerences
in the argumentations of the political left and right emerged. The SPD, and
to some extent also the Green Party which had been elected into Bundestag
for the ﬁrst time in 1983, accused the government of selling the `family sil-
ver' for short-term ﬁscal reasons and thereby to constraining the future federal
budget. They argued that well performing public enterprises should be kept
to outbalance the losses from the companies with bad performances. The
conservative-liberal government argued against this that privatisation had a
positive long-term eﬀect on the federal budget because it would reduce public
debt.769 This ﬁscal argument became indeed the most fundamental diﬀerence
between the CDU/CSU and the SPD until the 1990s. At least for parts of the
CDU/CSU, proﬁts generated by public enterprises did not constitute a public
interest. However, a few months earlier, a representative of the Ministry of
Economics had still declared that it was the ministry's opinion that federal
enterprises should not be separated into a proﬁtable group which would be
privatised and a non-proﬁtable group which would be kept in public owner-
ship.770 Like the SPD, the Federation of German Trade Unions was against
privatisations. It demanded to maintain federal ownership in order to use
public enterprises as policy instruments. Subsidies should be transformed into
participations, and public enterprises in the natural resources and energy sec-
tors should be used for the purpose of market regulation.771
The ﬁrst target of Stoltenberg's privatisation programme were indirectly
held participations, including participations of the special assets German Fed-
eral Railway and German Federal Post Oﬃce. The ﬁrst goal was to streamline
769 Bundestag Plenarprotokoll 10/128, pp. 94239455. See also BArch B126/93027, Betr:
VEBA, undated, probably from autumn 1983.
770 PA, 10. legislation period, Bundestag economics committee, minutes of the 3. meeting,
16.6.1983, Speech of Ministerialdirigent Molitur, pp. 3739.
771 DGB Informationsdienst, 4.12.1984.
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cross-participations in the public sector. In the case of Depfa for example,
several public authorities and entities held participations: the federal govern-
ment owned 67.88% of the shares and the German Federal Post Oﬃce 8.2%.
Other shareholders included the Sondervermögen Ausgleichfunds (special as-
sets compensation fund), Deutsche Bahn, the Federal Labour Oﬃce, the Ger-
man Civil Service Insurance Fund and some of the German states. Similarly,
public shareholders of Lufthansa included the federal government with 74.31%
of the nominal share capital (and 84.77% of voting capital), Deutsche Post,
Deutsche Bahn, KfW and North Rhine-Westphalia. Stoltenberg's idea was
that all indirect participations of other federal entities, including the shares in
VIAG which KfW had taken over on behalf of the government once, should
be transferred to the federal government. He declared that of the portfolio of
indirect participations, 24 were in the process of being sold and four were be-
ing reduced. Six participations were being liquidated and four requests for an
acquisition of participations had been rejected recently.772 Division VIIIA1 in
the Ministry of Finance calculated that between 1970 and 1982, 130 approvals
to acquisitions had been given, that is 11.8 approvals per year on average. In
1973 and 1974 alone, 76 to 80 approvals had been given, most of them by the
Minister of Finance. In contrast to that, in 1983 only two acquisitions had
been approved, and three in 1984.773
The Ministry of Economics demanded a clear separation between privati-
sation and participation policy. Like Stoltenberg, the ministry considered the
portfolio of indirectly held participations to be the main problem. In order
to streamline the portfolio, a clear conceptualisation of a federal participa-
tion strategy was needed. The Ministry demanded answers to the following
questions as to whether loss-making participations should be balanced through
the acquisition of lucrative participations and as to how conﬂicts of interests
between diﬀerent political targets should be solved.774
772 BArch B102/143218, Privatisierung, Aufzeichnung Abstimmung mit anderen Ministe-
rien, Aufzeichnung Kabinettvorlage, pp. 1314.
773 BArch B102/143218, Internal note Beteiligungserwerbe von Bundesbeteiligungen, VI-
IIA2 (Knauss), 12.9.1984.
774 BArch B102/143218, Internal note about a meeting of the Ministries of Finance and Eco-
nomics about the privatisation and participation politics on 19 September 1984, VIIIA2
(Hartmann), 25.9.1984.
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Federally-owned banks deserve some special attention. The federal gov-
ernment did not have a house bank like the German states. On the state level,
German state banks were involved in building the state's portfolios of partici-
pations. This active role of the state banks has been associated with the term
state capitalism.775 The federal portfolio comprised KfW, Deutsche Pfand-
briefanstalt (Depfa), Deutsche Siedlungs- und Landesrentenbank (DSL Bank)
and DVKB. Closest to the idea of a house bank was the KfW which had in
the past acquired participations in VIAG and VEBA on behalf of the federal
government. The other federally-owned banks all fulﬁlled special tasks: the
main purpose of the DVKB bank was to serve as a house bank for the German
Federal Railway. Depfa was a major issuer of municipal loans, and DSL Bank
had been established with the task of supporting the integration of German
refugees from the East and, related to this, ﬁnancing agriculture in structurally
weak regions.
6.2.3 The Privatisation List
Although Stoltenberg tried to minimise public attention, rumours about an im-
minent privatisation were circulating in autumn 1983. Subsequently, Stoltenberg
invited the management boards of federal enterprises and attempted to appease
them. He assured them that there would be no sudden action and expressed
his gratitude that the number of requests from federal corporations to acquire
participations had decreased signiﬁcantly recently. He further stated that the
portfolio of indirect shareholdings required a constant examination in order
to identify the participations that were not urgently necessary for the core
business anymore. However, the German portfolio of state-owned enterprises
was much smaller than for example in the UK and the main reason for the
sale of participations was to equalise market competition. Fiscal eﬀects would
be small and just a side eﬀect. He promised that nothing would be decided
without consulting all aﬀected parties ﬁrst.776
775 See Trampusch, Linden, and Schwan (2014) for state banks in North-Rhine Westphalia
and Bavaria.
776 BArch B126/136047, Ausführungen von Minister Stoltenberg zur Beteiligungspolitik
anlässlich des Vorstandstreﬀens der Bundesbeteiligungen am 29. August 1983 in Berlin,
VIIIA2 (Knauss) to Divisions VII and I, 1.9.1983.
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By August 1984, a ﬁrst privatisation list had been compiled. According
to that list, eight enterprises should be privatised: Lufthansa, Volkswagen-
werk, VIAG, IVG, Prakla-Seismos and DIAG, and the banks Depfa and DSL
Bank. Since this list was relatively short compared to the initial intentions,
Stoltenberg emphasised that the government could be accused of being too
hesitant, therefore, no small transaction such as Depfa should be left out.777
The Federal Ministry of Finance was from the start aware of possible diﬃ-
culties with Bavaria in the case of VIAG. VIAG and Bavaria were connected
through joint participations in VAW, Bayernwerk, Innwerk, SKW Trostberg.
As part of an active state interventionist policy, Bavaria had made extensive
use of public enterprises. However, it was expected that a VIAG privatisation
would not have an impact on the Bavarian energy policy which relied mainly
on Bayernwerk.778 Not on the list was Salzgitter AG because it would not
provide a secure investment opportunity. Also, its location close to the inner
German border in South East Lower Saxony made the company a special case.
However, in light of the company's low proﬁtability, Salzgitter AG at the same
time served as an example for some parliamentarians that public ownership in
general was not beneﬁcial for business development.779
The privatisation list was discussed in an unoﬃcial cabinet meeting in
September 1984. Least controversial were the cases of VIAG, VEBA and Volk-
swagenwerk. For none of these companies was a reason to maintain public
ownership stated. In the case of Volkswagenwerk, only the timing was consid-
ered to be unfavourable due to the low stock price so that a sale would have
to wait until the price had recovered. Lower Saxony agreed on the condition
that the joint public share should stay above 25% of the nominal share capital.
Both the VIAG management and supervisory board considered their company
ready to be privatised. Since the company was not known well in public, it
was agreed that the privatisation would be implemented step by step.
More controversial were the cases of DSL Bank, Prakla-Seismos, IVG,
777 BArch B126/143219, VIIIA2 (Knauss) to Tietmeyer, 15.8.1984.
778 BArch B126/143220, Bundesbeteiligungen in Bayern, VIIIA2 (Knauss) to Tiet-
meyer/Stoltenberg, November 1984.
779 PA, Minutes of the 7th meeting of the Bundestag economics committee (9th committee)
on 26 October 1983, pp. 4044.
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DIAG, Depfa and Lufthansa. Lufthansa AG was an intensely and long debated
case and will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.780 The machine
manufacturer DIAG was located in West Berlin and the government's interest
in the company's future was high for political reasons. The Ministry of Eco-
nomics intended a privatisation and potential buyers had already been found:
a consortium of Gildemeister, MBB and Imhoﬀ was interested. However, it
was expected that the transaction would be diﬃcult since the federal govern-
ment requested a guarantee that the location in Berlin would be maintained
for political reasons. In the case of Prakla-Seismos, the company management
were concerned about a change of ownership. Due to the sensitive nature of
the company's business  energy resource development and engineering  the
management regarded it as important to maintain the independence and neu-
trality of the company. Hence, the head of subdivision VIII A, who served
as a chairman for the company's supervisory board, suggested decreasing the
federal share to 51% and awaiting the customers' reactions. Possibly, a full pri-
vatisation could be considered in the long-run. Stoltenberg found it suﬃcient
to keep just a 26% government share.781 A privatisation of IVG was further
consulted with the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Economics. First
it was considered that IVG be sold to Preussag.782 Preussag was interested
primarily because IVG would complement its shareholding in VTG. Since at
that time the North Rhine-Westphalian state bank West LB held a consider-
able share in Preussag, there were some concerns that the transaction would
not count as a privatisation, but Stoltenberg emphasised that it was more im-
portant to come to an agreement with the other ministries. A public interest
was stated for IVG excluding the wagon and repair business, so that this part
could be sold separately to Preussag.783 This was approved by Minister of De-
fence Wörner (CDU), but Minister of Economics Bangemann (FDP) preferred
a partial privatisation of the entire IVG.784
780 See chapter 6.2.4.
781 BArch B126/143219, VIII A2, Internal note about a cabinet meeting on 13 September
1984, 17.9.1984.
782 BArch B126/143219, VIIIA2 (Knauss) to Tietmeyer, 15.8.1984
783 BArch B126/143219, VIIIA2, Internal note about a cabinet meeting on 13 September
1984, 17.9.1984.
784 BArch B126/143220, Preparatory note for the coalition talks from VIIIA2 for Tiet-
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As for the banking sector, Stoltenberg aﬃrmed a federal interest in the
DLS Bank:785 the bank was set up as a public institute and was by law assigned
with the public task of ﬁnancing public and private investments in rural areas
and conducting commissioned transactions for the federal government. One
main purpose of the bank after 1945 was the integration of German exiles
and refugees from the East. According to Stoltenberg, the public tasks did
not require full ownership, a capital and voting majority of just over 50%
would be suﬃcient. The legal form should be kept, but the company should
be opened up for private participation. This would require an amendment of
the DSL Act.786 The originally intended addendum that the partial sale of
DSL Bank should take place until 1987 was removed due to concerns from the
Ministry of Finance's ﬁnance and credit division.787 Unlike DSL, Stoltenberg
negated an important federal interest in Depfa and its subsidiary Deutsche
Bau- und Bodenbank.788 Other ministers disagreed. The Minister of Posts and
Telecommunications Christian Schwarz-Schilling (CDU) had raised concerns
about a Depfa privatisation early on since Depfa was the largest ﬁnancial
institute for real estate credit.789 Minister for Construction Oscar Schneider
(CSU) was worried about Depfa's role as lender of local authority loans. If the
bank would be transformed into private law form, the volume of credit would
have to be reduced by 25% on the basis of the current equity base. Hence,
like in the case of DSL, Stoltenberg agreed to a participation of 51%. In the
long-run, a further reduction could be considered if the other ministers could
be convinced.790
The privatisation list which the Minister of Finance intended to oﬃcially
present to the federal cabinet in November 1984 was a modiﬁed version of the
original list. Despite controversies with Bavaria, the privatisation of Lufthansa
had highest priority. Upon the request of the FDP, the list of further partic-
meyer/Stoltenberg, 7.1.1985.
785 BArch B126/143219, VIIIA2 (Knauss) to Tietmeyer, 27.9.1984.
786 BArch B126/143219, Draft: Vorlage für die Sitzung des Bundeskabinetts, added loose
leaf: DLS-Beiblatt, VIII A2, 28.12.1984.
787 BArch B126/143220, Preparatory note for the coalition talks from VIIIA2 for Tiet-
meyer/Stoltenberg, 7.1.1985.
788 BArch B126/ 143219, VIIIA2 (Knauss) to Tietmeyer, 27.9.1984.
789 BArch B126/143220, Florian to Tietmeyer, 3.2.1984
790 BArch B126/143219, Internal note, VIIIA2, 17.9.1984.
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ipations which should be reviewed was extended by the two travel agencies
Deutsches Reisebüro (DR) and Amtliches bayerisches Reisebüro (abr) which
belonged to the German Federal Railway. Also, Deutsche Verkehrs-Kredit-
Bank AG and Schenker & Co. GmbH, both also owned by the German Federal
Railway, and the direct federal participation in Gesellschaft für Nebenbetriebe
der Bundesautobahnen mbH were on the list. For all potential privatisation
transactions, a wide dispersion of shares should be envisaged. Most impor-
tantly for Stoltenberg, however, was that he would be given the mandate by
the federal cabinet to investigate the federal interest of the entire portfolio of
shareholdings without exemptions.791
6.2.4 The Special Case: Lufthansa
Lufthansa was a diﬃcult privatisation case due to resistance from Bavaria
and the CSU. In August 1983, Werner Dollinger (CSU), at the time Federal
Minister of Transportation, had declared that there were no plans to reduce
the federal share in Lufthansa. Airline traﬃc was considered a public task
as part of Daseinsvorsorge and hence a participation of at least 75% was
necessary.792 Yet, the airline was later considered to be the most important
candidate for privatisation by Stoltenberg. He expected that the privatisation
list would be harshly criticised by the public if Lufthansa was missing, which
would damage the government's reputation and cast doubt on how serious the
privatisation intentions actually were.793
The Bavarian government under Franz Josef Strauß (CSU) mobilised po-
litical forces against a privatisation. After Klaus Reichelt, head of Lufthansa's
employee organisation, had turned to the Bavarian minister-president for sup-
port against a privatisation after rumours about a planned Lufthansa privati-
sation had become public, Strauß called on Chancellor Kohl. Kohl, according
791 BArch B126/143220, VIIIA2, Cabinet paper (4th version), 16.10.1984; and notes about
coalition talks about privatisation on 23 January 1985. See also Tofaute (1994), p. 5761.
792 BArch B126/136047, Bayer (Secretary of State in the Ministry of Transportation) to
MP Klaus Daubertshauser 16.8.1983. See also Bundestagsdrucksache 05/1911, 21.6.1967,
Poolabkommen, KfW-Lösung, and Bundestagsdrucksache 05/323, 16.2.1966, Teilpri-
vatisierung  nicht abgesprochen.
793 BArch B126/ 143219, VIIIA2 (Knauss) to Tietmeyer, 15.8.1984
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to Strauß, declared that he was against a sale of Lufthansa shares.794 The con-
cerns of the Lufthansa workforce had two dimensions: in general, they were
concerned about the image of Lufthansa as a national carrier which might
get lost in case of a privatisation. And second, they were worried about what
would happen to their membership in the Versorgungsanstalt des Bundes und
der Länder (VBL), a retirement fund which provided a supplementary pension
plan for employees and workers in the public sector.795
Stoltenberg argued that he was legally obliged to review the public inter-
est for all federal shareholdings. The membership in the public retirement fund
was not threatened as long as a majority of shares remained publicly-owned,
which was the long-term intention due to Lufthansa's importance as a `national
carrier': The importance of Deutsche Lufthansa AG as a national carrier is
fully recognised by all involved state departments; therefore, keeping a federal
majority of shares long-term is consensually regarded as necessary.796 Based
on experiences abroad, he assumed that the reputation of Lufthansa would not
be damaged due to a partial privatisation. This was proven by the cases of
British Airways and Japan Airlines. The Lufthansa shares in free ﬂoat repre-
sented the most traded shares at that time, hence, there should be no concerns
about whether a wide dispersion of shares could be reached as a result of a
public oﬀering.797
The Lufthansa executive board prudently decided to abstain from giving
an oﬃcial statement.798 The managing director of Lufthansa was the SPD
member and former secretary of state in the Ministry of Transportation Heinz
Ruhnau. His appointment to the Lufthansa management board in 1982 was
one of the last personnel decisions of the social-liberal government. It is un-
likely that Ruhnau supported privatisation, but he knew well that he had to
abide to the political circumstances. Deutsche Bank chief Abs, chairman of
794 BArch B126/143239, Strauß to Reichelt, undated.
795 BArch B126/143239, Reichelt to Stoltenberg, 13.8.1984.
796 Die Bedeutung der Deutschen Lufthansa AG als der nationalen Luftverkehrsgesellschaft
wird von den beteiligten Bundesressorts voll anerkannt; daher wird auch eine dauer-
hafte Mehrheitsbeteiligung des Bundes einvernehmlich für erforderlich gehalten., BArch
B126/143239, Stoltenberg to Reichelt, 15.11.1984.
797 BArch B126/143239, Internal note, VIIIA2 (Knauss), 30.1.1985.
798 BArch B126/143239, Notiz zu DLH for Tietmeyer, 23.10.1984.
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Lufthansa's supervisory board since many years, also explicitly abstained from
commenting on the federal privatisation plan. He only recommended issuing
non-voting shares in order to secure the impact of the federal government.
Later, he changed his mind and demanded that there should only be a passive
privatisation in the course of the next equity increase.799
Bavaria's interest in a public share in Lufthansa was a consequence of
its involvement in the industrial complex MBB  Lufthansa  Airbus. MBB,
privately owned but central to the Bavarian economy, received many orders
from Lufthansa. Also, MBB and Lufthansa worked closely together on the
Airbus development. For these reasons, Strauß was a member of the super-
visory board of Lufthansa. In an interview with an airline magazine, Strauß
argued that he was not against privatisations in general. Yet, Lufthansa was
a special case, not only due to its standing as a national carrier and the pen-
sion concerns of the workforce: Lufthansa should remain state-owned to make
sure that the company's procurement policy favoured Airbus over Boeing 
since the two products were of the same quality, the national product should
be favoured. Second, Strauß argued that state-ownership was favourable in
negotiations with GDR about landing opportunities. Third, it was important
to maintain still unproﬁtable but politically important ﬂight routes, especially
to African destinations. And ﬁnally, it would not be possible to secure a broad
dispersion of shares in case of a share issue so unwanted concentrations of
ownership would be possible.800 The argument of the procurement policy was
apparently taken up by Edmund Stoiber (CSU), at that time state minister
in Bavaria. According to Secretary of State Otto Schlecht (Ministry of Eco-
nomics), Stoiber had argued that it was pointless for the government to spend
several billion DM on Airbus development and remove its own possibility of
having an impact on the procurement policy of Lufthansa due to a few hun-
dred million DM at the same time. Schlecht rejected this argumentation. Good
sales ﬁgures of Airbus were of course desirable. But under all circumstances
799 BArch B126/143239, Hermann J. Abs to Stoltenberg, 17.10.1984, and Memorandum zu
einer weiteren Teilprivatisierung des Aktienkapitals der Deutsche Lufthansa AG, Köln,
Hermann J. Abs, 1.3.1985
800 BArch B126/143239, Privatisierung? Interview mit dem Bayerischen Ministerpräsiden-
ten und Mitglied des Aufsichtsrates der Lufthans Franz Josef Strauß, in Flugbegleiter
no. 12/84.
Chapter 6. Retreat of the State: De-Investments 19821989 276
the impression should be avoided that investment decisions of Lufthansa were
made under political pressure and not purely on the basis of business consid-
erations.801 The Ministry of Finance expressed serious concerns about such
interventionist ideas. An active industrial policy did not conform with the
general goal of a retreat of the state.802 With respect to Strauß' interview, the
Ministry of Finance noted that it was indeed in the interest of Lufthansa itself,
state-owned or not, to maintain ﬂight routes of future importance. Also, the
size of the federal participation had no impact on negotiations with the GDR
about transportation rights. 803
Evidently, federal and Bavarian ideas of economic policy diﬀered signiﬁ-
cantly. Whereas the Bavarians relied on a more active approach of industrial
policy which utilised public enterprises, the federal government distanced itself
from such a policy. The interventionist view however was not shared by the
entire CSU. Michael Glos (CSU), speaker for federal participations of the Bun-
destag budget committee, approved the idea of a privatisation of Lufthansa.804
Other parliamentarians supported a reduction of the federal share to 52% or
even 26%: what was possible in the Netherlands with KLM, it was argued,
should also be possible in Germany.805
The Ministry of Finance tried to come up with a solution which Bavaria
would approve. An internal note from October 1984 came to the result that the
only possible solution which would prevent block-building leading to unwanted
majorities was to establish an intermediate holding company. This was similar
to the Mercedes model which had been suggested for the VEBA privatisation
about a year before. The note found that all other solutions to restrict voting
rights had their ﬂaws: maximum voting rights were not feasible because this
would also have to apply to the federal government. An exemption would
violate the principle of equal treatment and could therefore be appealed by
other shareholders. Also, creating two classes of shares and imposing voting
right restrictions only for one type of shares as had been done in the case
801 BArch B126/143239, Schlecht to State Minister Stoiber, 18.12.1984.
802 BArch B126/143239, VIIIA (Kropﬀ), 31.1.1985.
803 BArch B126/143239, Internal note, VIIIA2 (Knauss), 30.1.1985.
804 Renommee einer Fluggesellschaft unabhängig von Staatsbeteiligungen, Handelsblatt,
11.5.1984.
805 For example BArch B126/136047, Schröder to Stoltenberg, 1.8.1983
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of VEBA in 1965 was legally controversial and politically hardly enforceable
at the moment. And last, non-voting preferential shares, which had been
used at several times in the past, would be legally problematic due to already
existing preferential shares: the creation of a new class of shares would require
a special resolution with approval of all existing shareholders, voting and with
non-voting shareholders, if the preferential dividend had priority over or was
equal to existing preferential dividends, but non-voting shareholders would
not want to share their preferential dividend. If the preferential dividend was
subordinate to already existing preferential dividends, only the approval of
shareholders with voting shares was required. But then, the resulting stock
price for those shares would remain under the price for normal shares, so there
was a double disadvantage for shareholders. Also, a low issue price was not
politically desirable since it would lead to a lower capital inﬂow for Lufthansa.
Plus, having three classes of shares might lead to complications for future
stock transactions and equity increases.806 A holding solution would avoid
`annoying' blocking minorities. 10% should be placed with a consortium of
private insurance companies. It was assumed that the public would understand
such a deal in the politically delicate case of a national carrier. The holding
arrangement would enable a reduction of the federal share to 54% so that 21.5%
of the voting shares would be in free ﬂoat, representing 24.52% of the voting
rights.807 Later, updated numbers intended a federal share of 55%, a 10%-
share for the intermediate holding, and 20.5% of the shares with voting rights
of 23.5% would remain in free ﬂoat. Up to ten companies could participate in
the holding, primarily insurances and banks should be asked.808 The Ministry
of Finance turned to Deutsche Bank for further advice. The goal was to ﬁnd a
way to reduce the federal share to 55% without risking substantially reducing
federal control over Lufthansa. Wilhelm Christians (Deutsche Bank) found
the same fundamental problems associated with non-voting preferential shares
as the ministry. The better solution would be to issue voting shares and try
806 BArch B126/143239, Notwendigkeit und Möglichkeit einer Stimmrechtsbegrenzung, VI-
IIA (Kropﬀ), Conﬁdential, 8.10.1984.
807 BArch B126/143239, VIIIA2 (Knauss) to Tietmeyer, 15.10.1984
808 BArch B126/143220, Bundesbeteiligungen in Bayern, VIIIA2 (Knauss) to Tiet-
meyer/Stoltenberg, November 1984.
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to ensure a wide dispersion of shares.809
Stoltenberg presented the intermediate holding conception to Strauß in
May 1985 and announced that he was not willing to give up yet.810 Strauß was
not content however: a holding which would hold 10% of the Lufthansa shares
would already mean a decreased inﬂuence for the federal government. The only
measure to which he would approve was Abs' (Deutsche Bank) recent sugges-
tion of a passive privatisation. In order to bundle political interests on the fed-
eral side, he suggested appointing a state oﬃcial who should just be in charge of
Lufthansa and Airbus.811 Despite Strauß' rejection, works on the holding plans
in the Ministry of Finance continued. The Abs-model was regarded as infeasi-
ble because the federal share would not decrease suﬃciently.812 Instead, a ﬁrst
list of possible partners for a holding was compiled. It comprised six banks, one
insurance company and four industrial enterprises: Deutsche Bank, Dresdner
Bank, Bayerische Vereinsbank, Bayerische Hypotheken- und Landesbank, Bay-
erische Landesbank, Norddeutsche Landesbank/Schleswig-Holsteinische Lan-
desbank, MBB, Siemens, Daimler-Benz, Bosch and Allianz.813 Dresdner Bank
was interested in taking over the lead management, but the Ministry of Finance
considered Deutsche Bank to be more neutral since Dresdner Bank was too
closely connected to the aerospace industry. For a second round of eligible com-
panies for the holding, Bank für Gemeinwirtschaft, Westdeutsche Landesbank,
DG-Bank, Thyssen, Mannesmann and Krupp corporation were suggested.814
Bavarian banks and industries were strongly represented on the two lists, very
likely in order to please the Bavarian government. Also, the list comprised
companies which were highly interwoven themselves: MBB was connected to
Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, Bayerische Vereinsbank, Siemens, Bosch and
Allianz through ownership structures. But despite all eﬀorts, Strauß was not
willing to give in. The minister-president of Schleswig-Holstein Uwe Barschel
809 BArch B126/143239, Dr. F. Wilhelm Christians (Deutsche Bank) to Tietmeyer, conﬁ-
dential, 23.10.1984
810 BArch B126/143239, Stoltenberg to Strauß, 9.5.1985
811 BArch B126/143239, Strauß to Stoltenberg, 22.5.1985.
812 BArch B126/143239, Stellungnahme zum Memorandum Abs, VIIIA to Tietmeyer,
4.6.1985.
813 BArch B126/143239, Zwischenholding Deutsche Lufthansa AG.
814 BArch B126/143239, Internal note about the Lufthansa, VIIIA2 (Knauss) , 14.6.1985.
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supported his North German colleague Stoltenberg and demanded a decision:
either at least 49% of the Lufthansa shares should be privatised or nothing,
but a solution somewhere in the middle, such as Abs had suggested, was not
acceptable. A partial privatisation was the right thing from a regulatory point
of view, in case foreign inﬁltration could be excluded. At the same time,
the market competition side should not be forgotten. A state monopoly like
Lufthansa's current position in inner German air transport was not accept-
able. Hence, either a proper partial privatisation would have to take place or
a second ﬂight licence for an existing or a newly formed German airline should
be granted in order to create competition in the inner German market.815 In
March 1985, the federal cabinet decided to reduce the federal share to 51% by
releasing 28% of the nominal capital into free ﬂoat. However, due to resistance
within the government, this decision was later taken back. Instead, the federal
government reduced its stake passively in 1987.
6.3 Step-by-Step De-Investment
The ﬁnal list of companies which were fully or partially privatised between 1984
and 1989 included VEBA, VW, VIAG, IVG, DSL Bank, DVKB, Treuarbeit
and Salzgitter AG. Except for DIAG, IVG, Prakla-Seismos and Saarbergwerke,
the sale of public enterprises in the industrial and energy sector was almost
completed by the end of 1989. In the case of IVG, it was decided to not di-
vest the transport business, instead the government reduced its share in the
company to 55% in 1986. Salzgitter AG was sold to Preussag in 1989 because
it was still not considered to be ready for dispersed ownership. Lufthansa
was not among the actively privatised companies. Instead, the government
did not participate in the equity increase in 1987 when the equity capital was
raised by 300 million DM to 1.2 billion DM against resistance from Bavaria.
The federal share decreased to 69.58% and shares in free ﬂoat increased to
23.1% of the share capital. But Bavaria managed to secure its stake through
the Bavarian state-owned banks Bayerische Landesbank Girozentrale and Bay-
815 BArch B126/143239, Uwe Barschel, position paper.
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erische Landesbank für Aufbauﬁnanzierung which each purchased a 5% share
in Lufthansa. In 1988, equity capital was increased substantially from 1.206
billion to 1.52 billion DM and the federal government again decided to not
participate, hence its share decreased to 51.42%  the same percentage which
Stoltenberg had intended initially. The volume of shares in free ﬂoat increased
to above the 25% veto minority threshold in 1989 for the ﬁrst time. In the
banking sector, privatisation remained slow: only the federal share in DLS
Bank was reduced to 51.05% in 1989. Possibly, this delay had to do with legal
complications. Compared to the initial plans of Stoltenberg, privatisation re-
mained rather slow. The political debates in the mid-1980s had revealed that
there was no broad consensus for privatisation yet.
Privatisation revenues did not play a key role in the debates and nego-
tiations. Rather, it was stated that the federal government did not need the
revenues from a ﬁscal point of view. Stoltenberg warned several times that
revenues should not be overestimated. Minister of the Interior Zimmermann
(CSU) argued in January 1985 that there was no need for privatisation from
a budget perspective, in light of expected Bundesbank proﬁts in double-digit
billions. He demanded that for that reason, the government should wait with
privatisations so that it would not be left with the weak enterprises.816 Sim-
ilarly, Strauß argued that from a ﬁscal point of view, a privatisation was not
necessary because the general budget consolidation made good progress, a tax
reform was in sight and net borrowing in 1983 had been reduced to 25 billion
and was hence only half as high as the social-liberal coalition had intended.
Also, privatisation revenues would be `peanuts' compared to the Bundesbank
proﬁts.817
According to Stoltenberg, there was a ﬂow of capital of 4.6 billion DM
to federal enterprises between 1969 and 1979, while only 1.6 billion DM ﬂowed
back into the federal budget, leading to a net eﬀect of minus 3 billion DM.818
816 BArch B126/143239, Zimmermann to Stoltenberg, 21.1.1985.
817 Privatisierung? Interview mit dem Bayerischen Ministerpräsidenten und Mitglied des
Aufsichtsrates der Lufthans Franz Josef Strauß in Flugbegleiter no. 12/84, copy in
BArch B126/143239.
818 BArch B126/136047, Ausführungen von Minister Stoltenberg zur Beteiligungspolitik
anlässlich des Vorstandstreﬀens der Bundesbeteiligungen am 29. August 1983 in Berlin,
VIIIA2 (Knauss) to Divisions VII and I, 1.9.1983.
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Ernst Pieper (SPD), an oﬃcial in the Ministry of Finance who in 1979 became
chief of Salzgitter AG, calculated a positive net result of plus 0.545 billion DM
for the entire period from 1949 until 1975.819 The loss of Salzgitter AG of
630 million DM in the year 1983 was highlighted as a bad example of public
entrepreneurship in Bundestag debates.820 However, the real problem case
of the 1980s was the German Federal Railway. While the German Federal
Post Oﬃce made proﬁts, the Federal Railway accumulated losses which were
disclosed in the annual reports of the Federal Court of Audit. Between 1979
and 1981, the annual deﬁcit increased from 3.576 billion DM to 4.044 billion
DM  many times over the losses of Salzgitter AG  and remained high in the
following years.821
As shown in Table 1.1, privatisation revenues which were generated be-
tween 1984 and 1989 were indeed rather small in relation to the total federal
budget. Hence, it can be concluded that the ﬁscal eﬀect was not very large
and certainly did not motivate privatisation in the ﬁrst place. The revenues
from the sale of the remaining federal VEBA shares in 1987 were the largest
transaction, accounting for 0.4% of the federal budget. Second largest was
Salzgitter AG, followed by VIAG and VW. The revenues from the Salzgitter
AG and VW transactions however were not credited to the federal budget:
according to the Volkswagen law, either the main share of the revenues from
the sale of VW shares had to be passed on to the Volkswagenwerk Founda-
tion, or the Volkswagenwerk Foundation had to be compensated by an annual
dividend payment from the federal government. (The government chose the
the second option.) The net revenues from selling Salzgitter AG to Preussag
were used to set up the DBU Foundation (Deutsche Bundesstiftung Umwelt),
a foundation which supports environmental projects and is nowadays one of
the largest foundations in Europe.
819 Pieper (1975).
820 Bundestag Plenarprotokoll 10/128, 27.3.1985, p. 9446.
821 Bundestagsdrucksache 10/574, 8.11.1983, Bemerkungen des Bundesrechnungshofes zur
Haushalts- und Wirtschaftsführung.
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6.3.1 The Ownership Side
Privatisation was to some extent counteracted by the fact that the German
states used the opportunity to increase their own participations in companies
with regional importance. The federal administration was aware of the fact
that privatisation on the federal and state level were two separate things. An
undated list of questions and suggested answers about the VEBA privatisa-
tion, probably prepared by lower oﬃcials for an interview or press conference
of the secretary of state or minister, contains some information about how
this was viewed. On the question of whether it was expected that the states
and municipalities would follow the example of the federal government and
withdraw from public ownership, the suggested answer was that the political
reasons for denationalisations did not only exist on the federal level but were
of a general nature. However, the federal government wanted to abstain from
giving unasked advice to the other political levels. Interests which could justify
public ownership were diﬀerent on all levels; regional arguments for example
had more weight on the level of the states.822
The states had in the past widened their portfolios with the consent of
the federal government and taken over federal shares. In 1969 for example,
the newly established North Rhine-Westphalian state bank West LB began to
build up its industrial portfolio by buying a 22.39% block of Preussag shares
from VEBA, increased its share later and kept it until 2004. But when the SPD
government of North Rhine-Westphalia expressed an interest to buy further
RAG shares in 1983, the federal government refused. The oﬃcial reason given
was that a clear distinction between the owner of a company and the provider
of subsidies should be kept. According to oﬃcial Braubach from the Ministry of
Economics, this had also been the reason for why the North Rhine-Westphalian
government had not been involved as a partial owner of RAG in the ﬁrst
place.823 However, it can be assumed that the federal government was not
particularly keen to let an SPD-led government as co-owner into RAG.
According to a calculation of the Bundesbank in 1988, the value of par-
822 BArch B126/93027, Internal note on VEBA, undated, probably from autumn 1983.
823 PA, Minutes of the 7th meeting of the Bundestag economics committee (9th committee)
on 26 October 1983, pp. 4044.
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ticipations of the German states in enterprises was 12.3 billion DM, compared
to 6.5 billion DM of the federal level. A major part of this were the four largest
state banks, Westdeutsche, Bayerische, Norddeutsche and Hessische Landes-
bank who also held participations on behalf of the state governments.824 When
VIAG was gradually privatised in the 1980s, Bayernwerke bought a 25% share
in the company on the stock market. This created a cross-ownership situation
as VIAG held 38.8% of Bayernwerke. The largest share in Bayernwerke was
held by Bavaria which attempted to secure its energy political interests with
the deal.825
Dispersed ownership increased considerably due to privatisation. Table
6.1 sorts the ﬁfteen German public companies826 with more than 100,000 share-
holders according to their number of shareholders in 1989. VW, VEBA and
VIAG are mong those companies. The fact that VW and VEBA are at the top
of the list can be ascribed to the combination of the widespread share issues
in 1961 and 1965, their full privatisation at the stock market in the 1980s and
their company size.
824 Cited after Esser (1994), p. 107.
825 In 1994, Bavaria sold its share in Bayernwerke to VIAG and received a 25.1% share in
VIAG in return. Bavaria sold its share in E.ON gradually between 2001 and 2010.
826 As described on p. 192, the term public company relates to companies which are listed
at the stock exchange according to common notion here.
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Table 6.1: Largest public companies 1989
Rank Company No. of Shareholders
1989 1988 1989
1 VW 400,000 728,000
2 VEBA 600,000 600,000
3 Siemens 538,000 538,000
4 Bayer 375,000 320,000
5 BASF 374,000 400,000
6 Hoechst 330,000 325,000
7 Deutsche Bank 310,000 245,000
8 Daimler-Benz 300,000 260,000
9 Mannesmann 250,000 180,000
10 RWE 200,000 200,000
11 Thyssen 200,000 160,000
12 Dresdner Bank 160,000 160,000
13 Commerzbank 160,000 160,000
14 VIAG 100,000 200,000
15 AEG 100,000 15,000
Source: Arbeitskreis Aktie e.V. 1988, 1989, cited after Knauss (1993), p. 162.
Table 6.2 shows the participation of private investors in selected share
issues and the average initial portfolio sizes of private investors. Private in-
vestors participated considerably in share issues. Also, the average number
of purchased shares of private investors was signiﬁcantly larger in the 1980s
than in the people's shares privatisation, when the purchase was limited to ﬁve
shares or less.
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Table 6.2: Participation of private investors in selected privatisations
Year Company Number of Shares bought Number of Shares/
privatised shares by private investors private investors Portfolio
(million) (in % of shares) (no.) (no.)
1986 VIAG 4.64 85.1 396,424 10
IVG 0.99 75.1 74,875 10
1987 VEBA 10.10 46.2 93,975 50
1988 VW 4.80 54.1 148,344 17
VIAG 6.69 15.8 28,929 38
1989 DSL Bank 2.10 64.6 76,896 18
Source: Knauss (1993), p. 161.
The relative share of private investors in IPOs was high: their relative
participation in the IPOs of VIAG, IVG and DSL Bank was considerably higher
than in the public oﬀerings of VEBA and VW. This is most notable in the
case of VIAG where private investors subscribed for 85% of the shares. That
the IPO of VIAG attracted a very large number of new shareholders could
have been a result of the fact that the company was well-known and that
this was just the beginning of the privatisation wave where private investors
were keen to make use of new investment opportunities. In contrast to this,
in the second round of the VIAG privatisation, the participation of private
investors was much lower and the number of shares per portfolio much larger.
The VEBA share issue in 1987 was the largest one and the participation of
private investors below 50%. This could be because many people already held
shares due to the earlier share issues and did not participate for diversiﬁcation
reasons. But also, the number of shares per portfolio increased signiﬁcantly in
the cases of step by step privatisations, as the examples of VIAG and VEBA
show: in the case of VEBA, private investors held on average 50 shares after
the full privatisation in 1987. After the ﬁrst round of the VIAG privatisation,
the average portfolio size was ten shares, after the second round in 1988 this
had increased to 38 shares.
Like during the people's shares privatisations, the big-three banks Deutsche
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Bank, Dresdner Bank and Commerzbank secured large shares of proxy voting
rights by participating in the issuing consortia and placing a large volume of
the shares. This means that monitoring of the respective companies was to
some extent transferred from the federal government onto the banks.
Chapter 7
Epilogue & Conclusion
This thesis set out to explore the causes and driving forces of privatisations
on the federal level in West Germany between 1949 and 1989. The discussion
of state ownership in the economy started around 1953, stimulated by private
industry associations and liberal politicians. As has been shown, there was
no initial blueprint, no privatisation programme which was implemented in a
strategic fashion. On the contrary, the federal government conducted an ad
hoc privatisation policy based on the respective circumstances.
In the ﬁrst part of this conclusion, I will review some of the factors
which have been presented as possible factors explaining privatisation in the
introduction of this thesis and factors which have been proven to play a role
in the case of Germany throughout the thesis. After that, it will be explored
how the privatised companies developed from the 1990s onwards and how
privatisation in Germany continued. This includes the sale of people's property
in East Germany after the German reuniﬁcation as well as privatisation in
infrastructure sectors. In the last section, the case of German privatisation
will be discussed in a wider context.
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7.1 Driving Forces of Privatisation
Re-examined
The ﬁrst two factors which will be reviewed in this chapter are ﬁscal argu-
ments and the crisis response hypothesis. Both are factors which have been
identiﬁed as being strongly correlated with privatisation volume and timing by
comparative studies, and as this thesis has shown, both have also played a role
in the case of German privatisation. The role of liberal ideas and paradigms
is a third factor which will be analysed. This includes ordoliberalism, the spe-
ciﬁc form of German liberalism, as well as the neo-liberal paradigm which won
inﬂuence around 1980. The fourth factor under consideration is the German
property formation policy in the 1950s and 1960s which has been associated
with privatisation.
7.1.1 Fiscal Arguments
Quantitative research has shown that public debt is strongly correlated with
privatisation. Fiscal elements can initiate privatisation for two reasons: ﬁrst,
because the state wants to generate funds and hence aims at generating pri-
vatisation revenues; and second, because public enterprises have often required
large amounts of funds from the government. These factors can aggravate when
public enterprises are not proﬁtable. In the case of Germany, the result from
the above analysis is puzzling: ﬁscal reasons appear to be less important in the
1980s than in the 1950s and 1960s although the federal debt was signiﬁcantly
higher in the 1980s. This suggests that the mechanism by which ﬁscal fac-
tors aﬀect economic policy might be more complex. I argue that three factors
account for this puzzling ﬁnding: First, not the actual level of public debt
was decisive but its perception. Second, the portfolio of German federal enter-
prises was and was perceived to be relatively small compared to the portfolios
of other Western European countries, hence, expected revenues were relatively
small. Third, German public enterprises were performing comparatively well,
excluding the German Federal Railway and Post Oﬃce.
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Fiscal factors were particularly important for the people's shares privati-
sations. It was not the government's primary objective to generate revenues.
Rather, privatisation served as a tool to generate funds for the enterprises
and to enable them to restructure and expand. This explains why the par-
tial privatisations of Preussag and VEBA were both connected with equity
increases; both companies were chosen for privatisation for their large equity
needs in light of necessary restructuring processes. At ﬁrst glance, this ﬁnding
seems surprising, because government funds were abundant during the eco-
nomic boom, but it can be explained by a strong political preference for aus-
terity. At that time, the government was used to high growth rates and small
public debt and Minster of Finance Fritz Schäﬀer (CSU) generated a federal
budget surplus. Crucial was the speciﬁc political setting with the combination
of federalism and a high degree of heterogeneity within the government parties
CDU and CSU. The provision of federal funds to ﬁnance equity increases of
public enterprises required the approval of both political chambers, Bundestag
and Bundesrat. Hence, the number of veto players which could block such an
approval was high and in each case, a broad political consensus was needed.
Eﬀectively, each equity increase was a political act and an aﬃrmation of the
status quo of public ownership. As a short-term solution, the government ac-
cepted low dividends in order to allow a larger degree of internal ﬁnancing.
While this has not been oﬃcially stated, the sources viewed for this thesis do
not indicate attempts to force public enterprises to increase dividend payments.
In addition to this, some public enterprises beneﬁted from the Investment Aid
Act from 1952 which re-channelled funds to primary industries. However, these
ﬁnancing solutions remained limited and did not work in the case of the newly
established Lufthansa which required several equity increases in the years af-
ter its foundation. Pragmatically, the government decided to allow private
minority participations early on. Due to a number of equity increases in which
the federal government did not participate, the federal share decreased to just
above 50% by the end of the 1980s. In the case of Preussag, Volkswagenwerk
and VEBA, equity increases and privatisation was connected with social el-
ements. However, the market-oriented wing of the CDU/CSU ensured that
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ﬁnancial concessions for small shareholders did not signiﬁcantly disadvantage
the companies by reducing the amount of generated funds. In the 1980s, ﬁscal
factors played a smaller or at least less obvious role. Yet, the early privatisa-
tions in the 1980s were also connected with equity increases and in the ﬁrst
case, VEBA in 1984, the equity increase was eﬀectively used as an argument
for privatisation. However, ﬁscal concerns were not the primary reason for pri-
vatisations although the government aimed at cutting public spending. More
important was a re-evaluation of state-ownership after the experiences in the
1970s. Stoltenberg and other government oﬃcials repeatedly pointed out that
ﬁscal arguments were not the main motivation.
Generating privatisation revenues was neither important in the 1950s and
1960s nor later. The partial privatisations of VEBA and Preussag in the 1950s
and 1960s were originally intended to be primarily passive privatisations which
would have implied only small federal revenues from the sale of subscription
rights. The revenues from the sales of VW and Salzgitter AG shares were not
even accredited to the federal budget but to the respective foundations. In the
case of VW, this was due to the contractual agreement with Lower Saxony. In
the case of Salzgitter AG in 1989, using the revenues to set up the Salzgitter
Foundation was an entirely voluntary decision. Nevertheless, the SPD pointed
to the presumed ﬁscal reasons and warned against a `sale of the family silver'
to generate short-term proﬁts.
One reason why generating revenues was of minor importance in the
1980s was that the federal portfolio was comparably small. In the debates
about Lufthansa, several politicians pointed to the fact that privatisation rev-
enues would be `peanuts' compared to the large expected Bundesbank rev-
enues. As has been shown in the introduction to this thesis, the entire Ger-
man portfolio of state-owned enterprises had about the same relative size as
the portfolios of other West European countries. However, this included the
signiﬁcant participations of municipalities and the German states. The federal
share in the portfolio was rather small. This fact also explains the relatively
low total privatisation revenues in West Germany.
One ﬁscal argument for privatisation is that states intend to unburden
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themselves from loss-making state industries. However, the sources which have
been reviewed for this thesis do not hint to that direction. On the contrary,
the federal strategy was to sell the proﬁtable companies ﬁrst and to keep the
unproﬁtable ones in order to consolidate them prior to privatisation. Unfortu-
nately, no reliable data about the net eﬀect of federal enterprises on the federal
budget for the years 1949 to 1983 exist. These ﬁgures cannot be extracted di-
rectly from the annual federal budget because the budget does not disclose all
payments to and from public enterprises and participations separately. Yet,
contemporary calculations show that the ﬁscal burden from federal enterprises
was not high enough to play a signiﬁcant role. (This was diﬀerent in the case
of the German Federal Railway, however, this chapter of privatisation only
started in the 1990s.)
One possible explanation for the fact that federal enterprises were per-
forming comparably well is that the federally-owned companies in the indus-
trial sector were organised as private law companies and competed with private
companies. The subsequent separation of management and ownership in fed-
eral enterprises allowed for a managerial independence which has been viewed
critically at times, as the price debates in the 1950s reveal. The sources which
have been reviewed for this thesis do not suggest that there were strong infor-
mal inﬂuence structures between the federal government and enterprises prior
to privatisation. This is particularly true for the 1950s and 1960s, when man-
agers such as Nordhoﬀ identiﬁed strongly with their companies and distanced
themselves from the federal government, and might have changed slightly in
the late 1960s and 1970s when a number of federal oﬃcials transferred to the
management boards of federal enterprises. One might think that the fact that
companies had a high degree of managerial independence could have stimu-
lated privatisation because the federal government had only limited control
over companies. However, this was not the case. Rather, the companies'
independence increased the legitimacy of public enterprises in the market set-
ting since the perception prevailed that there was no fundamental diﬀerence
between public and private companies in a market setting.
Chapter 7. Epilogue & Conclusion 292
7.1.2 Crisis Response
Rodrik (1996) describes the idea that economic crisis can stimulate major
economic policy changes. At ﬁrst glance, it seems as if the crisis hypothesis
does not match the case of West Germany: during the ﬁrst two people's shares
privatisations, the general economic situation was very good. The growth
had slowed down by the time of the partial privatisation of VEBA, and West
Germany experienced its ﬁrst post-war recession. After a period of severe
market crisis in the 1970s where the phenomenon of stagﬂation (simultaneous
occurrence of high inﬂation and high unemployment) was observed for the ﬁrst
time, the economic situation improved signiﬁcantly in the early 1980s. That
was around the time when Helmut Kohl (CDU) was elected federal chancellor
in 1983. Thus, it is unlikely that the economic conditions stimulated a drastic
policy change in the 1980s. However, I argue that the crisis hypothesis matters
indeed, because privatisation policy in the 1980s can be perceived as a lagged
crisis response, or as a response to the initial crisis response of the social-liberal
government. During the diﬃcult 1970s, even the market-liberal FDP agreed
to an expansion of the public sector as an immediate response to market crisis
and oil price shocks. Also, initially there was hardly any opposition from
the CDU/CSU; the party had even initiated the consolidation-oriented policy
itself when it was part of the grand coalition with the SPD from 1966 to 1969.
However, by the end of the 1970s, the political trust in Keynesian policies
and the expansion of the public sector diminished since it did not lead to the
intended results. Instead, the CDU/CSU and the FDP turned back to 1950s
ideas of austerity and a limited role of the state in the economy. Cutting public
expenditures became the central objective of the new government coalition.
Two further details deserve attention. First, it is remarkable that, based
on the sources which are available to this date, the FDP hardly advocated
privatisations during the 1980s and that Minister of Economics Otto Graf
Lambsdorﬀ (FDP) did not get involved more. Second, it has been shown that
politicians perceived their realisation that an expansion of public ownership
was counterproductive as part of a wider European phenomenon. However,
there is no empirical evidence that concrete transmission mechanisms played
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a decisive role. The British case did not serve as an example for re-shaping
the economy which means that privatisation cannot be ascribed to a spill-over
eﬀect.
From the perspective of the crisis view, the internationalisation of mar-
kets since the mid-20th century and the subsequent increase of competition
have fostered privatisation indirectly. In the 1970s, economic integration and
the global oil price shocks enhanced the perceived need for an active role of
the state which should create large national enterprises that would be able to
survive in light of international competition and turbulences.
7.1.3 Liberal Ideas & Paradigms
The sources reviewed for this thesis do not support the hypothesis that privati-
sation policy was primarily driven by ideological reasons during either of the
privatisation periods although underlying paradigms matter in some way of
course. In the 1950s, liberal politicians around Minister of Economics Ludwig
Erhard (CDU) and his government oﬃcial Alfred Müller-Armack focused on
other ordoliberal core projects, such as the adoption of the Antitrust Act in
1957 and the independence of the Bundesbank. Yet, when it came to setting
up new industries, Erhard was more careful, as the example of the armament
industry in the 1950s shows which was intentionally left to the private indus-
try. Ordoliberal theory actually oﬀered no direct guidance for the question of
public and private since it focused on market forms.
Neo-liberalism in Germany was basically a rediscovery of ordoliberal ideas
from the 1950s.827 Administrative oﬃcials who shaped economic policy in the
1980s such as Hans Tietmeyer (Ministry of Finance) had been inﬂuenced by
ordoliberal thinking during their early government careers. Yet, sources re-
viewed for this thesis show that liberal paradigms co-developed with privati-
sation policy rather than causing it. As argued before, the main objective of
the new conservative-liberal government was cutting public debt and reducing
the public sector, yet, privatisation was not part of the early programme. Al-
though Kohl announced a retreat of the state in his government speech from
827 Ritschl (2016).
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1982, the implementation of corresponding policies remained a long and dif-
ﬁcult process. Liberal ideas were far of being fully accepted by all members
of the conservative-liberal government and even Minister of Finance Gerhard
Stoltenberg (CDU), the driving force behind privatisation, intended to keep
government shares in strategically important enterprises. Also, regional and
sector speciﬁc interests such as in the cases of Lufthansa and DIAG remained
strong. Hence, it was far from being obvious that the review of public en-
terprises which Stoltenberg (CDU) conducted in 1984 would result in a full
privatisation of industrial participations (aside from Saarbergwerke). How
this happened cannot be further explored because the government sources for
the late 1980s are not yet accessible. Possibly, like in the cases of people's
share issues, a high demand for shares stimulated an extension of privatisa-
tion. While liberal ideas did not primarily drive privatisations, they inﬂuenced
some politicians strongly. One of them was Birgit Breuel (CDU) who later took
on a leading role for the privatisations in East Germany after reuniﬁcation.828
7.1.4 Property Formation Policy
Property formation of the low- and middle-income classes was a core concern
of the conservative employees' association. However, although property forma-
tion was a decisive factor in shaping privatisation, it did not cause it. Rather,
the speciﬁc people's share design that was a consequence of property forma-
tion made privatisation acceptable even for those conservative circles which
preferred a stronger role of the state. Core idea was a dispersed distribution
of ownership, generated through share issues with purchase restrictions.
Some political circles within the CDU/CSU shared a strong dislike of a
concentration of economic power in private hands. To some extent, concen-
tration was accepted as a necessary condition for the German reconstruction
which is why measures such as the Investment Aid Act from 1952 beneﬁted
existing shareholders. But the resulting property inequality was at the same
time viewed critically. In the case of public enterprises, an additional factor
came into play: one major motivation was to prevent foreign shareholders from
828 See p. 313.
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taking over veto minorities or controlling shares in privatised enterprises. All
the existing public enterprises were regarded as enterprises with national im-
portance due to their dominating positions in markets and their key role in the
economy. While for some circles in the CDU/CSU it was most important to
prevent a concentration of (foreign) economic power, others found it more im-
portant that dispersed ownership was created  the other side of the coin. An
additional element was that the CDU/CSU liberal party wing regarded peo-
ple's shares as an acceptable oﬀer to the employees' wing to prevent investment
wages.
Paternalistic ideas also mattered for privatisation in the 1950s and 1960s.
The view that the federal government had to protect smallholders from unex-
pected price drops was predominant. This, combined with the overall accepted
argument that a foreign concentration of power should be prevented, led to
the agreement that the government should keep voting majorities in partially
privatised companies. Hence, in the case of the people's shares privatisations,
special measures were included to ensure that the private inﬂuence would not
become too strong. In the case of VEBA, these restrictions were removed in
the 1970s. In the case of VW, one of these special conditions has survived until
today, namely the provision of a veto minority requiring only 20% of the votes,
in contrast to the 25%-threshold provided by the stock market law. Further,
the government thought about speciﬁc measures in order to maintain the ini-
tially created ownership structure. The only measure which was implemented
eventually was that according to the Property Formation Act and according
to the Volkswagenwerk Privatisation Act, subsidies had to be paid back if the
shares were sold within a speciﬁc period of time between three and six years.
Property formation policy remained half-hearted as the government did
not foster a shareholder culture in addition to the new ownership structures.
As the Allensbach surveys brought to light around 1960, knowledge about stock
markets was rather limited in the population, in particular among people in
the lower income spectrum. Nevertheless, the privatisation design in the 1980s
was still based on the idea of a broad distribution of ownership: companies
were sold step-by-step in form of share issues, the paternalistic idea that the
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state should protect smallholders from stock market losses as a `patron saint'
was still predominant. In contrast to the 1950s and 1960s, no purchase restric-
tions applied. But property formation policy, the core idea of the CDU/CSU
left wing in the 1950s and early 1960s, still mattered in the early 1980s  which
is why the sale of VEBA shares was conducted after the new Property Forma-
tion Act had become eﬀective. However, since fewer shares than expected were
bought in the context of the law, property formation policy mattered much
less for later privatisations. Also, in light of the experiences with stagﬂation
in the 1970s, the focus of social policy had shifted to ﬁghting unemployment
as the main reason for poverty. However, employee shares remained part of
the political programme. A major change was that the government did not
implement purchase restrictions in the 1980s since it perceived foreign owner-
ship as less threatening. This might have had to do with the fact that by then,
foreign governments had also started to sell their enterprises so that the risk
of an industry being dominated by a foreign government was reduced. Con-
siderations to cement the initial ownership structure by implementing strict
restrictions for reselling shares were less important in the 1980s. Yet, shares
which were purchased with subsidies provided on the basis of the Property
Formation Act remained subject to a minimum holding period of six years,
otherwise subsidies had to be paid back. Yet, whereas such a policy had been
consensus earlier, politicians criticised it in the 1980s and made it responsible
for the fact that subscriptions for subsidised shares remained low. The idea to
create a shareholder culture did not play a role anymore in the 1980s.
7.2 Epilogue
7.2.1 Post-privatisation Developments
Privatised companies were involved in a number of acquisitions and mergers
after they had become privately owned. VEBA and VIAG merged in 2000
and became E.ON. As part of this, Preussenelektra merged with Bayernwerke,
which VIAG had fully taken over from Bavaria in exchange for VIAG shares in
1994, and became E.ON Energie. E.ON has since then been the largest elec-
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tricity provider in Germany. Despite sharp protests of competitors, E.ON took
over Ruhrgas (which had been divested when VEBA took over GBAB back
in 1974) in 2002 after a ministerial approval by Minister of Economics Werner
Müller (who had been chief representative of VEBA in the 1980s) and against
the ruling of the German Cartel Oﬃce. It has subsequently also become Ger-
many's largest gas provider. It appears that the privatisations allowed for the
restructuring and reorganisation in the German energy market which had been
considered by politics and the ministerial administration for decades. However,
this has led to considerable market power of the previously federal enterprises
VEBA and VIAG. Preussag has undergone a deep restructuring process since
its full privatisation. In 2002, it was renamed TUI AG after it had transformed
from a mining and steel company into a travel and tourism company. As part
of this process, it sold Salzgitter AG in 1997. Salzgitter AG subsequently went
public in 1998 and has since then become one of the largest steel producers in
Europe. VW is still one of the largest car producers worldwide. Lower Saxony
has kept a 20% share in the company to this day which constitutes a veto
minority due to the special provisions of the Volkswagen Privatisation Act.
Overall, the companies which had been privatised by the end of the 1980s are
doing comparably well from a broader perspective, have kept dominant po-
sitions in speciﬁc market segments and have continued to shape the German
corporate landscape. Chari (2015), who studies winners and losers of priva-
tised companies, names VW, EO.N and Lufthansa as examples for companies
which have become highly successful global players since their privatisations.
Privatised companies have been subject to normal stock market pro-
cesses. Dispersed ownership has persisted to some degree. In some cases,
free ﬂoat is comparably high until today. For example, 80% of the shares
of E.ON are currently held in free ﬂoat. In the case of Volkswagenwerk, the
once feared foreign inﬁltration and block-building of shares has actually taken
place: Porsche has become the largest shareholder in autumn 2005 and has
since then strengthened its position, partially through a joint holding with
Qatar and Lower Saxony. At the end of 2013, only 12.27% of VW shares were
in free ﬂoat. Given that it was the declared goal of the government even in
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the 1950s and 1960s to create fully tradeable shares and promote secondary
markets, ownership concentration eﬀects were reluctantly accepted from the
start and it would be misleading to judge early privatisation politics based
on concentration eﬀects. To the contrary, it can be argued that the shares
held in private ownership have proven to be attractive. Part of these normal
stock market processes was that, as the data presented in this thesis show, the
share of low income households in the cases of Preussag and Volkswagenwerk
dropped signiﬁcantly within the ﬁrst years after the people's share issues.829
The overall evaluation of privatisation in terms of creating share-ownership
is ambivalent. On the one hand, people's shares undoubtedly reached many
people who had not owned shares before due to the large volume of sold shares
and the restriction of purchase rights. Also, the share issue privatisations in
the 1980s reached a large number of people, so that VW and VEBA were the
companies with the highest number of shareholders in 1989. This result reﬂects
the evidence of larger-scale research on ﬁnancial market development through
privatisation. An OECD study from 2003 ﬁnds that privatised companies
typically account for a high share of market capitalisation. In total, priva-
tised companies accounted for approximately 80% of market capitalisation in
OECD countries during the 1990s.830 Yet, this result is not surprising given the
large privatisation volume. On the other hand, there were no spill-over eﬀects
and a shareholder culture did hardly develop in Germany. Share-ownership
in Germany is still comparably low. In 2015, nine million people, 14% of the
population, owned shares; half of the investors owned stocks. Share ownership
peaked in 2001 with almost 13 million shareholders.831 Hence, it can be con-
cluded that subsidies are not necessarily suﬃcient in order to stimulate private
savings in form of stock beyond the privatised companies. Developing a new
shareholder culture and initiating a shift in people's saving behaviour requires
a diﬀerent concept.
829 See chapter 4.7.
830OECD (2003), p. 37.
831Deutsches Aktieninstitut (2016), p. 3.
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7.2.2 Privatisation in the 1990s: Network Industries
& German Reuniﬁcation
The privatisation of industrial shareholdings and banks continued in the 1990s.
In 1994, the federal government reduced its share in Lufthansa to 36% and thus
lost its voting majority.832 DIAG was sold after the German reuniﬁcation,
when the company's location in Berlin had become less important. Privatisa-
tion in the 1990s also had two new dimensions: the German reuniﬁcation and
the subsequent sale of East German plants by the Treuhandanstalt, and the pri-
vatisations of the German Federal Post Oﬃce and Railway. The liberalisation
in the European telecommunications market ﬁrst led to the formal privatisa-
tion of the German Federal Post Oﬃce, later the company was divided into
the two private law companies Deutsche Post AG and Deutsche Telekom AG.
Both companies went public in the 1990s. The German Federal Railway was
also formally privatised and transferred into the private law company Deutsche
Bahn AG. However, the company has not been listed at the stock exchange
until today although several attempts have been made in the last decades.
The earlier privatisation policy between 1949 and 1989 has largely shaped the
privatisations of Deutsche Telekom and the Deutsche Post. Both sales adopted
the pattern of a gradual issue of shares and the mobilisation of employees and
the middle class as share owners. In the case of Telekom, shares were marketed
as T-Aktien (T-shares), a term which reminded of people's shares.
For the sale of East German plants and companies after the German re-
uniﬁcation, a completely new strategy was adopted. Here, privatisation trans-
actions were not decided directly by the federal government but were out-
sourced to the government agency Treuhandanstalt which was subordinated
to the Federal Ministry of Finance and supported by business consultancies.
Sales transactions and liquidations did not require the approval of Bundestag
and Bundesrat so that the privatisation process was much less politically de-
832 The pension scheme indeed became a costly and complicated problem in this process:
the membership of Lufthansa in the VBL was terminated on December 1994. The VBL
pension scheme was transferred into an internal Lufthansa pension scheme with equal
beneﬁts, which existed until the diﬀerent internal pension schemes were integrated into
one system on 1 January 2002.
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bated and controlled. The Treuhandanstalt conducted privatisations speedily
and the main share of East German enterprises were sold or liquidated within
only four years. Most enterprises were sold to West German investors while
there was only little interest to let the East German population participate
in the former people's property, as had been attempted in post-war Germany
with people's shares. This strategy has been sharply criticised by Hans-Werner
Sinn, director of the Ifo Institute for Economic Research. Why privatisation
in East Germany was so fundamentally diﬀerent from West German privati-
sation remains to be examined. Until today, the strategies of the Ministry of
Finance and the Treuhandanstalt have not thoroughly been studied because
access to historical documents has not been granted yet. It is possible that
the experiences of the slow and diﬃcult privatisation processes in West Ger-
many against forces of resistance until 1989 had led to the conclusion that the
West German model was inapplicable in the case of East Germany where the
number of privatisation transactions was much larger.
Public participations in enterprises are still a common policy instrument
in Germany, in particular in the transportation sector. According to the latest
participation report of the federal government, the largest number of partic-
ipations are in the area of responsibility of the Ministry of Transportation.
A well-known example has recently become Flughafen Berlin Brandenburg
GmbH, builder-owner and future operator of the new Airport Berlin Branden-
burg (FBB), where severe management mistakes have occurred. Berlin and
Brandenburg each hold 37% of the company and the federal government has
a participation of 26%.
7.3 The Rise and Fall of Public Enterprises in
(West) Germany
Privatisation in West Germany looks like a typical case of privatisation in the
Western World: companies were gradually privatised through stock market
share issues, which was also intended to foster capital markets as a whole.
Fiscal reasons were the primary motivation for privatisation in the 1950s and
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1960s, whereas the later privatisations in the 1980s can be explained as a
lagged response to the market crisis in the 1970s. Compared to other Western
European countries, privatisation started two decades earlier, but the volume
of privatisation has remained fairly modest.833 Unique and worth pointing
out is that all German federal enterprises and participations that were sold
until the end of the 1980s had been in private law form prior to privatisation,
were operating in competitive markets governed by antitrust law with a few
exceptions, and did not constitute state monopolies. Hence, privatisation in
Germany until 1989 did not imply fundamental changes for the society and the
economy. The impact of the transfer of ownership on management practices
and market competition was comparably small. (The transformative eﬀect of
privatisation was larger in later cases such as the German Federal Post Oﬃce
and the German Federal Railway, which implied adopting proﬁt-oriented man-
agement practices and which were succeeded by market liberalisations.) This
setting of federal companies prior to privatisation distinguished West Germany
from countries where state monopolies in public industries were predominant.
With this observation in mind, the West German case will in the following be
connected to the history of the rise and fall of state-owned enterprises in the
Western World.
The majority of studies on privatisation presented in the introduction of
this thesis focus on the transfer of ownership since the late 1970s and oﬀer a
continuum of motivations and reasons, but neglect the historical circumstances
and objectives of the establishment of state-owned enterprises. Complemen-
tary to this, historical research has identiﬁed longer-term developments and
has described the rise and fall of state-owned enterprises in the Western World
in the 19th and 20th centuries.834 However, country-speciﬁc narratives have
often remained unconnected and have failed to address general explanations.
Among economic historians, Millward's work on establishing a universal nar-
rative for the development of state-owned enterprises stands out. Therefore,
his analysis serves as a background to embed the case of German privatisa-
tions in a larger framework. Millward focuses on the government objectives
833 For an overview of privatisation strategies in the OECD see OECD (2003).
834 See for example a collection of country studies in Toninelli (2000).
Chapter 7. Epilogue & Conclusion 302
that have once led to the set-up of state enterprises. He explains the rise of
state-owned enterprises in the Western World until the 1930s as primarily be-
ing driven by strategic concerns of defence and political and social uniﬁcation,
while ideological factors only played a minor role. Strategic concerns arose
predominantly from the geo-political situations and resource endowments of
nations. According to Millward, until the early 20th century defence consider-
ations are the reason for the diﬀerent degree of state interventions and public
enterprises between the UK and the US on the one hand and continental Eu-
rope on the other hand: In continental Europe, nation states were directly
surrounded by neighbouring countries, a situation which demanded a stronger
role for the state in industries which were of speciﬁc signiﬁcance for defence.
According to Millward, natural monopoly considerations have only played a
marginal role compared to geo-political concerns and have been largely over-
stated in previous research, particularly in the areas of telecommunications
and transportation. The second main factor, the objective of political and
social uniﬁcation, was driven by the desire of governments to bundle political
interests on the national level and strengthen the role of the central state.
Such considerations were of particular importance in countries with a federal
political structure such as the US and Germany.835
At the end of the Second World War Germany's portfolio comprised, like
those of Italy and Spain, more participations in manufacturing than in most
other countries.836 According to Millward, two factors have predominantly
shaped the rise of state-owned enterprises in Germany: the federal political
structure and the autarky and war interests in the early 20th century. Munic-
ipalities had a strong standing in the political system of the German Empire
and Weimar Republic and were providing the main share of local public ser-
vices. This changed temporarily in the Third Reich when the government
centralised the economy, but the Allied military governments and the German
constitution restored the federal structure and the strong role of municipalities
after 1945. According to the municipal codes of the German states, municipal-
ities remained in charge of public services such as water and energy supply. Of
835Millward (2011), p. 375.
836Millward (2011), p. 382.
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the typical network industries, the central state had taken over only railways
and postal services and communications  strategic key sectors for defence.
The energy market was organised with local monopolies for suppliers of gas
and electricity and a small number of energy producers who owned the supra-
regional networks since the 19th century. This structure was conﬁrmed by
the energy law from 1935 which remained, with small changes, valid until
the adoption of a new energy law in 1998. The holding companies VEBA
and VIAG were the result of military interests and substitution policies in
the First World War and Weimar Republic; they bundled Reich and Prussian
shareholdings in energy and manufacturing. Both companies were charac-
terised by vertically integrated concern structures: VIAG combined electricity
production with participations in the Bavarian energy intense aluminium in-
dustry, VEBA combined coal mining with electricity production and distribu-
tion. In the Third Reich, military interests were pursued more aggressively in
the economy; Volkswagenwerk and Reichswerke were established as part of the
war industry. In all cases, the question of private and public ownership was
not predominant. Rather, the government became active in those cases where
private entrepreneurs were reluctant to set up the politically desired industrial
undertakings. In particular, Germany's participations and public enterprises
in the manufacturing sector were established in order to ﬁll gaps for products
that were politically desired but which the private economy was not able to
produce (fast enough).837
In the 1940s, the German development starts to deviate more clearly
from the trend of the classic examples of early privatisers Britain and France
trend: Foreman-Peck and Millward (1994) and Millward (2011) argue that
in the interwar period, other factors besides strategic concerns and the social
and political uniﬁcation became important in many Western countries. As a
consequence of changing socio-political circumstances, nation states became
increasingly concerned with living standards and the question of economic
growth. This is why Millward's profound analysis of the period from the 19th
century until the end of the 1930s closes with the words that later developments
837Millward (2013), p. 240.
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were another story.838 In Britain, a collapse of exports and a low productiv-
ity in infrastructures in the interwar period had undermined the credibility of
capitalism based on private ownership. As a result, half of the capital forma-
tion in the British economy was ﬁnanced by the state in the 1950s.839 British
nationalisations from the 1940s onwards served as instruments to reorganise
and improve economic structures.840 In the 1960s and 1970s, the French and
British governments bailed out private companies which as a consequence be-
came state-owned.841
While the Great Depression certainly left its marks in Germany, the re-
sponse was diﬀerent. The solution was seen in less rather than in more state
and based on this notion, Freiburg economists developed the ordoliberal theory
in the aftermath of the economic crisis. In terms of state-owned enterprises,
the West German government did not nationalise entire industries after the
Second World War. The question of a nationalisation of industries has not been
directly addressed in this thesis, mainly because the reviewed sources do not
indicate that the question was particularly important. The coal sector, a Ger-
man key industry since industrialisation, is the case in which West Germany
was probably closest to nationalisations. The CDU in the British occupa-
tion zone and the CDU party faction in the North Rhine Westphalian state
parliament demanded a socialisation of the coal industry in their early party
programme from February 1947, the Ahlener Programm. The SPD-led North
Rhine-Westphalian and Hesse state governments unsuccessfully attempted to
bring coal mines under state control. However, there were strong political
concerns about nationalisations of industries both within West Germany and
the US military government and there was no word of a socialisation of coal
anymore in the CDU party programme from 1949, the Düsseldorfer Leitsätze.
In hindsight, nationalisations have been described as politically not achievable.
As shown in the introduction of this thesis, several authors have ascribed the
fact that the question of nationalisations remained of a minor political rele-
838Millward (2013), p. 245.
839Millward (1999), pp. 5960.
840 Foreman-Peck and Millward (1994), pp. 274299. For an overview of British nationali-
sations between 1920 and 1950 see Millward and Singleton (1995).
841Millward (2011), p. 385.
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vance to resistance particularly from the US military government but also to
the weak role of the SPD in post-war Germany.842 Millward (2011) argues that
the state was suspect and monitored by the US.843 However, as this thesis
has shown, dominant private investors were also suspect. Hence, one might
conclude that there was a German preference for a mixed system of private and
public ownership where both sides controlled and balanced each other. This
argument is in line with Prowe (1992) who describes the deep mistrust of the
Germans after the Second World War towards all kinds of economic power.
Beyond these historical and political explanations as to why there were
no nationalisations in West Germany, the federal government never considered
a nationalisation of industries and found it at no point economically necessary
or preferable according to the sources viewed for this thesis. Looking at speciﬁc
markets and the pattern of German public enterprises at the end of the Second
World War indicates reasons. In the German aviation industry for example,
Lufthansa which was established as a mixed ownership enterprise with a voting
majority of the federal government in the early 1950s had a de facto domestic
monopoly. Since no private competitor existed, no further nationalisation
could have occurred. (Private aviation companies had been taken over by the
Reich and merged to the original Luft Hansa AG in the 1920s and 1930s.)
In the coal sector, where suﬃcient supply was a problem in the ﬁrst post-
war years, the government did not consider the question of private and public
to be the main issue. The federal market share in domestic black coal produc-
tion was about one quarter during the 1950s, primarily due to mining activities
of Preussag and Hibernia. Yet, not the private ownership of coal mines but
the under-capitalisation of basic industries as a whole was perceived as a bot-
tleneck. Hence, the government re-channelled funds from other industries into
basic industries in the framework of the Investment Aid Act. As this thesis
has shown, the problem of under-capitalisation was not necessarily smaller
for state-owned enterprises. On the contrary, Preussag and later VEBA were
partially privatised exactly for the reason that the federal government did not
want to provide the required equity capital. Hence, a nationalisation of indus-
842 See p. 39.
843Millward (2011), p. 388.
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tries was at no point perceived to be the right instrument to solve eventual
problems of the mining industry. Furthermore, when the coal industry strug-
gled in the mid 1950s, Erhard and his Ministry of Economics argued that not
the organisation of the coal industry was causing a problem but that a trans-
formation of the industry was unavoidable due to the increasing availability of
oil; the solution was seen in more competition and adaptation.844 After the
European Coal and Steel Community had released coal prices in 1956, com-
petition between coal and oil increased and the Ruhr coal companies ﬁnally
merged and formed the consolidation company RAG in 1968.845 While subsi-
dies were granted for the entire sector, nationalisations or a speciﬁc protection
for public enterprises were not considered. The case of RAG indicates that
instead of formal nationalisations, mergers and acquisitions were the govern-
ment's primary tool to achieve a desired market structure  which supports
the view that the federal government perceived itself as a normal shareholder.
Another example of such a policy was the takeover of GBAG as a result of the
concentration eﬀorts in the oil sector in the 1970s.846
A factor that might have played a role in the government's decision not
to nationalise other industries was the structure of the German industry with
large corporations in heavy industries such as iron and steel. This was a
result of the relatively late industrialisation in Germany; in the cases of the
early industrialisers Britain and France, smaller ﬁrms were prevalent.847 One
could argue that the private enterprises which had emerged during German
industrialisation, such as August-Thyssen-Hütte AG (Thyssen) and Vereinigte
Stahlwerke AG, were economically and politically so strong that the federal
government had no reason to consider nationalisation and that the companies
would have resisted any nationalisation attempts.
The energy sector poses a particularly interesting case. Based on the
energy law from 1935, local supply was organised decentralised with local mo-
nopolies which were later exempted from the antitrust law from 1957. The
majority of local suppliers were small to medium municipal in-house under-
844 See p. 115.
845 See p. 215
846 See chapter 5.2.3.1.
847Millward (2013), p. 88.
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takings. Von Künsberg (2012) describes that municipalities fought strongly to
keep their competencies during the ﬁve decades of debates which ﬁnally led to
the adoption of a new energy law in 1998. Above the local level, three com-
panies dominated the electricity market: VEBA with Preussenelektra, VIAG
with Bayernwerke and RWE which was majority-owned by municipalities since
1920 (today, municipalities still own 25% of the shares). Oligopolistic struc-
tures also prevailed in the gas sector, where RWE was competing with the
privately owned Ruhrgas and Thyssengas. (Ruhrgas had been founded as a
joint venture of coal mines in the Ruhr district in 1926 and was taken over by
E.ON in 2003; Thyssengas was initially privately owned until VIAG took over
50% of the shares in 1984, since 1997, Thyssengas was gradually taken over
by RWE.) Hence, RWE was VEBA's and VIAG's main competitor in electric-
ity production and supply. Yet, RWE was majority-owned by municipalities.
While the federal government made sure that RWE did not become too domi-
nant in the 1970s, it would not have had the political power to threaten RWE's
existence. To summarise, looking at speciﬁc markets reveals that neither the
potential scope nor the political desire for nationalisations were suﬃciently
large in post-war Germany. Firstly, the share of public enterprises was already
quite substantial by the end of the Third Reich, including both network sectors
and manufacturing, and an extension of public enterprises was not considered
to be a solution for economic problems. Secondly, the strong role of local au-
thorities in the supply of public services left no scope for the national level
taking over the electricity and gas sector.
While Millward has focused on explaining the rise of state-owned enter-
prises, the link between privatisation, the fall of state-owned enterprises, and
his main hypothesis remains less clear. He suggests that three factors con-
tributed to government's decisions to privatise: improving market structures
and fostering economic growth  the same reasons which according to him
had led to nationalisations from the 1940s onwards , ﬁscal arguments and
the transformation of strategic defence considerations after the end of the Sec-
ond World War.848 An OECD analysis from 2003 ﬁnds that ﬁscal objectives
848Millward (2011), p. 375.
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and attracting investment are among the main drivers for privatisation and
also considers the introduction of competition and improving eﬃciency and
performance of state-owned enterprises as government objectives of privati-
sation.849 Millward however argues that public enterprises in infrastructures
were not performing worse than their private counterparts.850 This ambiva-
lence highlights that in order to explain privatisation, an evaluation of gov-
ernment objectives at the time of privatisation is required since political and
public perceptions have possibly shifted after privatisation had started. Hence,
driving forces in hindsight might diﬀer from original government objectives.
Government sources indicate that ﬁscal reasons, access to capital and
the 1970s economic crisis were the predominant motives for privatisations in
West Germany while performance has not been a main concern and the de-
velopment of capital markets and share ownership remained a side story. Yet,
the identiﬁed factors may reﬂect deeper underlying beliefs: providing capi-
tal to state-owned enterprises does not depend on the government's ability
to provide funds but on whether it believes that it is right to provide funds.
A recent publication examines the transformation of the view of the state on
the example of public ﬁnance since the global challenge of the oil crisis 1973
in several countries. The editors point out that the concept of a guarantor
state, which had characterised the post-war era of economic growth in the
Western World, was lost as a response. While they do not present a universal
explanation of shifts in the perception of the state and its role in the economy,
they suggest that downward spirals and contagion eﬀects might have led to
new evaluations of ﬁscal policies851  which would strengthen the hypothesis
that privatisations in Europe were rather a response to economic challenges
and need to be historically and not universally explained.
One central question arising from Millward's analysis is whether the dis-
solution of the reasons that had once led to the rise of state-owned enterprises
provides an explanation for the fall of state-owned enterprises. Of the reasons
which had initially led to the establishment of public enterprises, war and im-
849OECD (2003), pp. 2023.
850Millward (2011), pp. 390392.
851 Buggeln, Daunton, and Nützenadel (1965), pp. 3031.
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port substitution interests had dissolved with the end of the Second World
War, but national interests continued to matter indirectly. On the one hand,
Erhard's political decision that the reconstruction of the armament industry
in the 1950s should remain in private hands was a crucial turning point and
was made very clear in the Ministry of Economics.852 The fact that Reich-
swerke respectively Salzgitter AG, the successor of one of the most important
armament corporation in the Third Reich, remained federally owned cannot
be ascribed to defence interests. First of all, the company was struggling for
decades and its market share was too small in order to be of signiﬁcant impor-
tance  the federal share in the steel industry was just about 5% in 1958. Later,
the company's location close to the inner German border and the perceived
risky nature of its business served as reasons not to privatise it earlier that
1989. IVG's main task was the provision of real estate for military purpose,
hence, it does not classify as armament industry.
Yet, national interests mattered indirectly for privatisation. As has been
shown in this thesis, one of the main obstacles to privatisation was the concern
that foreigners, in particular foreign governments, could dominate companies
that were considered to be of national importance, such as in the shipbuilding,
aviation and energy industries. Although these national interests were never
speciﬁed, fears of a foreign inﬁltration of companies were the reason why, in
the ﬁrst partial privatisations, measures to prevent veto minorities of private
investors were implemented. While national interests were still stated for some
companies in the early 1980s, they evidently dissolved over time. The govern-
ment considered a voting majority for the federal government as suﬃcient but
necessary in the early 1980s in order to satisfy national interests, but that
requirement was given up later on. While the argument that defence interests
changed over time does not appear explicitly in the reviewed sources, it can be
assumed that it mattered indirectly: the establishment of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), the European integration and the establishment
of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) as well as technical and technological
changes have certainly altered defence strategies. In addition to this, the fact
852 See p. 94.
Chapter 7. Epilogue & Conclusion 310
that other national governments privatised state-owned enterprises mattered
because that way, it became less likely that foreign governments could come
into control of German enterprises.
As has been described above, public and private enterprises were com-
peting in the same markets after the Second World War, primarily in manu-
facturing and energy. This was exacerbated by the fact that due to the federal
setting, diﬀerent political levels had shares in companies that were sometimes
competing with each other, such as the federal state and municipalities in the
case of RWE and VEBA. Hence, privatisation until 1989 did not serve to create
competitive markets. Yet, while public enterprises were generally embedded
in a competitive setting, some of them had strong market positions. As can
be seen in Table 2.1, in 1958, the federal share in the aluminium industry was
particularly high with 70% due to VIAG, followed by the car industry with
40% due to Volkswagenwerk and coal with 24% due to Hibernia and Preussag.
The fact that public enterprises were competing in a market setting could have
had an impact on privatisation in two diﬀerent directions. On the one hand,
it could have made privatisation more likely: ﬁrst, because private companies
might have argued strongly for a privatisation of their competitors if they felt
disadvantaged and discriminated against by the government; second, because
federal enterprises needed access to funds in order to be able to compete with
private enterprises and this might have led to further ﬁscal pressures on the
government budget. On the other hand, competition could have made privati-
sation less likely, because functioning markets existed and privatisation was
not needed to create markets, and because federal enterprises were already
run with business objectives and did not need managerial improvements.
The ﬁndings from this thesis suggest a mixed result regarding the role
of competition. On the one hand, government sources do not indicate persis-
tent interventions for privatisation from the private industry. While industrial
associations campaigned openly against state-owned enterprises in the 1950s,
the associations became quieter in the 1960s and evidently accepted the status
quo of state-owned enterprises. Why that was the case deserves more thor-
ough research since it is puzzling that competitors of public enterprises have
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not fought stronger for a privatisation of their competitors.
As in the case of nationalisations, probably the best approach to solve
this puzzle is to look at speciﬁc markets. Key question is whether competitors
perceived public enterprises as a threat and actually felt disadvantaged. In
cases where subsidies were sector-speciﬁc and not ownership-related, such as
the wharf and the coal industry, it is possible that the ownership question
was not seen as a decisive diﬀerence. In the energy market, it is possible that
RWE as a partially municipally-owned company received a diﬀerent form of
public support. The case where it remains most surprising that competitors
did not intervene for a privatisation is Volkswagenwerk  and this question
remains valid until today, with Lower Saxony still owning 20% of the company.
While competitors did not have a strong impact on the timing and scope of
privatisation, the ﬁnancial argument that companies needed access to funds in
order to be able to survive competition and that this speeded up privatisation is
more convincing based on the ﬁndings from this thesis. On the other hand, the
view that privatisation was not necessary or at least not urgent because public
enterprises were embedded in a market setting and managed in a proﬁt-oriented
way was also predominant in Germany. Hence, the pressure to privatise was
reduced, as the argument prevailed that there was no fundamental diﬀerence
between public and private enterprises. Which of the eﬀects was stronger and
whether the market setting accelerated or slowed down privatisation remains
a question of counterfactuals. Yet, public enterprises in manufacturing which
were subject to competition were privatised before state monopolies and the
sale was signiﬁcantly easier to implement since no markets had to be created
beforehand.
Although German federal enterprises were performing comparably well,
the German case suggests that state ownership can hinder large-scale trans-
formations of companies. Although several federal government coalitions had
considered a reorganisation of public enterprises, they had failed to implement
their ideas and went for smaller solutions instead. Fundamental transforma-
tions of business ﬁelds such as in the case of Preussag and the long-intended
merger of VEBA and VIAG were conducted after privatisation. This indi-
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cates that some business decisions became possible as soon as they were not
political decisions anymore. (Whether the merger of VEBA and VIAG and
the ministerial approval were right from a regulatory angle shall be left aside
here.) Yet, one should be careful to jump to the conclusion that state owner-
ship leads to worse company management since this also remains a question
of counterfactuals. Nevertheless, the observation leads to the question as to
whether managers of state-owned enterprises had the capacities and abilities
to suggest and implement extensive transformations. This observation is in
line with Carlin, Fries, Schaﬀer, and Seabright (2001) and Bayliss (2005) who
ﬁnd that deep restructuring of companies is more likely after privatisation.
The ﬁndings from this thesis complement Millward's work on the rise
of state-owned enterprises and suggest some scope for future research. First,
we need a better knowledge about the relationship between public enterprises,
competitors and the government in cases where public enterprises operate in
competitive markets. In the case of Germany, a large number of company his-
tories exist, but much less historical research on speciﬁc markets such as the
automobile industry, steel and shipbuilding has been conducted. This makes
comparisons between public and private enterprises quite diﬃcult. Subsidies
and non-ﬁnancial support for private and public enterprises in the federal set-
ting are important elements which need to be explored.
While research has focused on network industries in recent decades, less
work has been done on state enterprises in manufacturing. Hence, future
comparative research could look at public entrepreneurship and privatisation
in manufacturing. Like Germany, Italy and Spain had large holding companies
with participations in energy and manufacturing. However, in contrast to
Germany, these holding companies expanded strongly in the 1950s and 1960s.
In Italy for example, holding companies were established as a consequence of
ﬁnancial and entrepreneurial diﬃculties in the private sector in the 1930s.853
More general, privatisation patterns could potentially even be connected with
patterns of industrialisation since there seem to be parallel developments in
Italy and Germany and in Britain and France.
853Millward (2011), pp. 377387.
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Consistent with the OECD report from 2003, this thesis ﬁnds that pri-
vatisation made it easier for federal enterprises to generate equity capital
through access to stock markets. This suggests that the rise and fall of public
enterprises is closely connected with the development of ﬁnancial markets: In
times of limited availability of private capital, banks and the government can
take on the role to provide funds and release companies when private capital
is available and government funds scarce. Such a pattern could be observed
during the latest ﬁnancial crisis, which highlights the ongoing importance to
think about how state owned enterprises can (temporarily) be run in an eﬃ-
cient way and about the question as to which industrial structures are worth
protecting through state takeovers.
Yet, not only government resources but also government's willingness
and ability in the political framework to provide funds can be decisive, which
in turn is related to the perception of the role of the state. This highlights
a fundamental problem of the existing literature on privatisation that focuses
on observable outcomes. In order to establish a narrative of privatisation
similar to Millward's hypothesis of the rise of state-owned enterprises, more
in depth analysis of speciﬁc countries and qualitative research on government
perceptions and objectives is required. As part of this, the hypothesis of a
shift of defence interests and how this changed and shaped political objectives
needs some further research.
Furthermore, this thesis suggests that the causal role which ideologies
played in the process of Western privatisations should not be overstated and
that ideas and policies rather co-developed as responses to economic chal-
lenges. Ideological factors were more decisive when privatisation policies were
implemented based on external pressures and forces of resistance were smaller.
An example for this is the sale of East German enterprises from 1990 to
1994. Birgit Breuel (CDU), who became the second president of the privatisa-
tion agency Treuhandanstalt after Karsten Detlev Rohwedder (SPD), the ﬁrst
president, had been killed by the Red Army Faction (RAF) in April 1991, was
an advocate of strict liberal politics and strongly believed in market forces 
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which gave her the reputation of a German Margaret Thatcher.854 Yet, it is
remarkable that even Breuel did not manage to sell Lower Saxony's share in
Volkswagenwerk when she was State Minister of Economics and Transportation
from 1979 to 1986 and State Minister of Finance from 1986 to 1990 in Lower
Saxony. This indicated that ideological convictions were of less importance
for West German privatisations than for East German privatisations (and that
national interests were over time partially replaced by interests of the German
states which used participations as tools for regional policy). Hence, the case
of East Germany has become what the privatisations in West Germany were
not: a policy experiment.
854 See Breuel's publications since the 1970s, for example Breuel (1976).
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Archival Sources
A. Unpublished Collections
Deutsche Bank Archiv (DBA):
V01/2143
V01/00A17
AV13
ZA15x/2052
ZA40 37
ZA40 38
ZA43/x8091
Bundesarchiv (BArch):
B102 German Federal Ministry of Economics
B115 German Federal Ministry of the Treasury
B126 German Federal Ministry of Finance
B136 Oﬃce of the Federal Chancellor
N1256 Literary Estate of Ludwig Kattenstroth
Parlamentsarchiv des Deutschen Bundestages (PA):
Minutes of Bundestag Committees and Subcommittees
B. Online Collections
Minutes of the German Federal Cabinet (Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung
online), edited and published by the Bundesarchiv, http://www.bundesarchiv.de/
cocoon/barch/00/k/index.html#Start (last access: March 2016):
Minutes of the Federal Cabinet (19491967)
Minutes of the Economic Committee of the Federal Cabinet (19501961)
Bundestag Documentation, http://pdok.bundestag.de/ (last access: March 2016):
Bundestagsdrucksachen (Bundestag printed documents)
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